Sanjeev Ireddy v. Hazrat Shah Sayad Khusro Hussaini Sajade Nasheen Darga
2022-09-01
M.G.S.KAMAL
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. Present appeal is filed by the appellant-plaintiff aggrieved by the judgment and order dtd. 8/3/2018 passed in R.A.No.92/2017 on the file of the I Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Kalaburagi (herein after referred to as "First Appellate Court") by which the First Appellate Court while dismissing the regular appeal filed by the appellant-plaintiff confirmed the order dtd. 22/11/2017 passed in O.S.No.394/2017 on the file of the I Addl. Civil Judge & JMFC, Kalaburagi (herein after referred to as "trial Court"),by which the trial Court while allowing the application in IA.No.2 under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC rejected the plaint of the appellant-plaintiff. 2. The brief facts of the case are that; The appellant-plaintiff is a lessee in respect of three shop premises belonging to respondent No.1/defendant No.1 bearing (i) Municipal No.9' A1 Block, (ii) Municipal No.10' A1 Block, (iii) Municipal No.11' A1 Block having been inducted therein as a tenant in terms of a lease agreement dtd. 5/10/2001 on a initial monthly rent of Rs.3,500.00 each of the aforesaid shop. That he had deposited a sum of Rs.1,00,000.00 each in respect of three shops aggregating in a sum of Rs.3,00,000.00. That he had borrowed loan from Krishna Grameen Bank, Super Market Branch, Kalaburagi to an extent of Rs.6,00,000.00 by providing collateral security of his property bearing H.No.61, Uma Cottage, Shanti Nagar, Kalaburagi standing in the name of his mother. That he was running the business of restaurant in the aforesaid premises by obtaining VAT registration, Trade license and Labour registration. It is his further contention that in the month of April, 2017, the second respondent/defendant No.2 had issued a notice calling upon the appellant-plaintiff to remove the material stocked and dumped in the corridor of the suit premises. In response to the same, the appellant-plaintiff had removed the said material. He further contends that in the first week of September, 2017 i.e., on 8/9/2017, the respondents-defendants sought to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit premises by the appellantplaintiff, constraining him to file a suit seeking the judgment and decree of permanent injunction restraining the respondents-defendants and their agents, servants and representatives from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the suit premises. 3.
3. The defendants on service of summons appeared and filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on the premise that the suit premises is the Wakf property and in view of the bar contained under Sec. 85 of the Wakf Act, no Civil Court shall entertain a suit in which the Wakf property is involved, as such, sought for rejection of the plaint. 4. Trial Court by its order dtd. 22/11/2017 allowed the said application rejecting the plaint. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant filed a regular appeal in R.A.No.92/2017. Considering the grounds urged in the appeal memorandum, the first appellate Court framed the following points for its consideration: 1. Whether the trial court committed error by rejecting plaint holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit? 2. Whether thereby the impugned order is illegal, perverse, capricious warranting interference by this court? 3. What order? 5. The first appellate Court by the impugned judgment and order had dismissed the said appeal confirming the judgment and order passed by the Trial Court. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant has filed the present appeal. 6. It is contended by the appellant that an interim order had been passed by this Court on 17/5/2018, which reads as under: "Heard the learned counsel for the appellant both on the office objection and interim application for injunction (I.A.1/2018). The learned counsel for the appellant submits that as regards the office objection, though only a photo copy of the valuation is filed in compliance with the office objection, the certified copy of the valuation slip will be filed with the next two weeks. Insofar as the interim order of injunction against dispossession, the learned counsel emphasizes that the appellant, who is in possession of the subject property as a tenant, had the benefit of the interim protection granted by the appellate Court as against the aforesaid dispossession and that in view of the impugned order, there is imminent threat of dispossession. In these circumstances, there shall be an ad interim injunction as against dispossession of the appellant from the subject property/I.A. schedule property. Issue emergent notice to the respondents". 7. It is the further case of the appellant that in disobedience to the said interim order, he was dispossessed from the suit premises on 3/6/2018.
In these circumstances, there shall be an ad interim injunction as against dispossession of the appellant from the subject property/I.A. schedule property. Issue emergent notice to the respondents". 7. It is the further case of the appellant that in disobedience to the said interim order, he was dispossessed from the suit premises on 3/6/2018. An application under Order 39 Rule 2A of CPC came to be filed by the appellant. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents-defendants vehemently submits that the appellant himself has vacated the suit premises on 14/3/2015 by inducting one Mohammed Nooruddin, as a sub- tenant, therefore, the question of dispossessing the appellant from the suit premises does not arise. 9. Be that as it may. The fact remains that even according to the appellant-plaintiff, he has been allegedly dispossessed from the premises on and from 3/6/2018. Till date no steps have been taken by the appellant with regard to his alleged dispossession. 10. It is also necessary to note at this juncture that the learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff on 14/10/2019 has made a submission which is recorded by this Court as under: "The learned counsel for the appellant submits that if respondent Nos.1 and 2 return the amount of Rs.6,35,040.00 to the appellant, appellant will not press this appeal." The learned counsel for the appellantplaintiff further submits that at the time of commencement of tenancy, he had paid Rs.1,00,000.00 each in respect of the shops premises towards refundable security deposit aggregating in a sum of Rs.3,00,000.00. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents-defendants submits that the pl appellant-plaintiff himself is in arrears in excess of Rs.24,00,000.00. He submits that if the said amount is taken into consideration, the appellant-plaintiff is still due and liable to pay arrears of rent. The said issue is not the subject matter of the appeal. The parties are at liberty to pursue their remedy in accordance with law with regard to their respective dues against each other. 11. The suit is one for bare injunction, the plaint of which has been rejected by the Trial Court and confirmed by the first appellate Court, in view of bar contained under Sec. 85 of the Wakf Act, in the light of the admitted position of the appellant-plaintiff not being in possession of the suit premises on and from 3/6/2018, nothing survives for consideration.
No substantial question of law arises for consideration. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed as having become infructuous.