JUDGMENT : GAUTAM KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J. 1. Appellant is the plaintiff who has preferred the appeal against the judgment of reversal passed by the first court of appeal in Title Appeal No. 21 of 1994. 2. Parties shall be referred to by their placement in the suit and will include their legal representatives substituted from time to time. 3. The plaintiff Jiro Mahto filed the suit for declaration that the deed of adoption No. 48 of 1964 was illegal, invalid and not binding on the plaintiff. 4. Case of the plaintiff in brief is that her husband Ganpat Mahto died in or about 1955 leaving behind the plaintiff as his widow and Rukmini Devi as daughter. His entire interest devolved on them. The plaintiff was residing in husband’s house and is in possession of the suit property. In July 1987, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 came to the village and Defendant No. 1 made a declaration that he had been adopted by the original plaintiff Jiro Mahto. On this, when she made enquiry she found that a forged and fabricated deed of adoption was created. There was actual giving and taking and the formalities and ceremonies of adoption were also not performed. Plaintiff was in need of money for the marriage of his daughter Rukmini Devi and for which the defendants had agreed to advance money on creation of a Bhugutbandha deed and on this pretext the deed of adoption was created. Choudhary Mahto was aged about 45 years so at the time of creation of the said deed he was aged about 22 years. He was married prior to 1964 and he had never lived with the plaintiff nor he was treated as adopted son. 5. Defendants Nos.1 and 2 namely, Choudhary Mahto and Harihar Mahto, have filed the joint written statement. Case of the defendants is that Ganpat Mahto had married several times and one of his wife was Meghiya Mahtwain. Rukmini Devi was daughter of Meghiya Mahtwain from her first husband Koka Mahto and she was not daughter of Ganpat Mahto. Ganpat Mahto died in the year 1949 issue less. In Para 5, it is contended that defendant No. 1 was taken in adoption by the plaintiff in 1964 in the ceremony on the eve of Basant Panchami and later a deed of registration was effected on 12.2.1964. Ganpat Mahto died in the year 1949 issue less. In Para 5, it is contended that defendant No. 1 was taken in adoption by the plaintiff in 1964 in the ceremony on the eve of Basant Panchami and later a deed of registration was effected on 12.2.1964. After the deed of adoption plaintiff has been living with defendant No. 1 as mother and son. After the death of the plaintiff Jiro Mahto, Rukmini Devi has been substituted in place as plaintiff who has been living in that house. The defendant No. 1 got a new house constructed and for last 15 of 16 years had been living in the old house with his wife and children. Defendant No. 1 was in possession of other properties of Ganpat Mahto. On 12.2.1964, Jiro Mahtawain adopted Choudhary Mahto by a registered deed of adoption. Chaudhary Mahto was aged about 12 years on the date of adoption and 38 years at the time of filing of the written statement. After his adoption he became Ramlakhan Mahto. After the adoption defendant no. 1 had ceased to have any relation with the defendant no. 2. It is averred that Chaudhary Mahto was not married prior to 1964 but was married in April 1964 that is after adoption he was given in marriage by the plaintiff as per the custom of the prevalent child marriage at the time. 6. The other defendants who are Defendant no. 3 to 6 been impleaded by order dated 31.3.93. They have filed their joint written statement and contested the suit. It is pleaded that Rukmini Devi who has been substituted as plaintiff was the daughter of Maghiya Mahtawain from her first marriage with Koka Mahto and as such was not the descendant of Ganpat Mahto. Ganpat Mahto died in the year 1971 leaving behind these defendants and Jiro Mahatawain the sixth wife of Ganpat Mahto. Jiro Mahatawain was not the heir and descendant as he was married to him in the year 1962 during the lifetime of Guri Mahtawain and these defendants were the heirs of Ganpat Mahto. These defendants were the heirs from the line Guri Mahtawain. Guri Mahtawain died in the year 1958 and Ganpat Mahto died in the year 1971. These defendants have denied the claim of adoption by defendant Nos.1 and 2. 7. These defendants were the heirs from the line Guri Mahtawain. Guri Mahtawain died in the year 1958 and Ganpat Mahto died in the year 1971. These defendants have denied the claim of adoption by defendant Nos.1 and 2. 7. From the pleadings of the parties it is manifest that the suit of the plaintiff is contested by the defendant no. 1 and 2 on the ground that the plaintiffs were not the heir and descendants of the Ganpat Mahto and on the basis of adoption whereas defendant no. 3 to 6 have contested have claimed themselves to be the heirs and descendants from the first wife of Ganpat and have contested the case of both the plaintiffs and that of the defendant no. 1 and 2 on the ground of their adoption. 8. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties following issues have been framed: (I) Is the Suit as framed mala-fide? (II) Is the alleged adoption deed being no. 48 of 1964 genuine, valid and effective? (III) Is Rukmini Devi daughter of Ganpat Mahto? (IV) Is defendant no. 1 Choudhary Mahto adopted son of Jiro Mahto was given name as Ramlakhan Mahto after adoption? (V) Was defendant no. 1 Choudhary Mahto aged about 22 years on the date of adoption? (VI) Was the said defendant Choudhary Mahto already married prior to 1964? (VII) Whether the ceremony of actual giving and taking or any other religious ceremony was performed or not? (VIII) Is plaintiff entitled to any relief or other reliefs, if so to what extent? 9. The learned trial Court decreed the suit by extensively discussing the evidence on record by recording the finding of fact that defendant no. 1 was not adopted by the plaintiff. Harihar Mahto (D2) who was father of D1 deposed in Para 6 that could not state about the age of his eldest son or his own age at the time of the birth of his first son or the present age of his eldest son. He also failed to name his first and second wife and deposed that he cannot say the village in which Choudhary Mahto (D1) was married. In Para 16 he deposed that when the plaintiff demanded adoption, only he and his wife were present. Jiriya Mahto had already a son Paltan Mahto from her first husband therefore there was no reason why the plaintiff should adopt anyone. In Para 16 he deposed that when the plaintiff demanded adoption, only he and his wife were present. Jiriya Mahto had already a son Paltan Mahto from her first husband therefore there was no reason why the plaintiff should adopt anyone. The plaintiff was an illiterate village woman and she was not read over the contents of the deed. Ruplal who identified the plaintiff in the adoption deed has not been examined. Not a single family member or relative of the plaintiff had been examined in support of adoption. After the said adoption nowhere either in the voter list or in any other document, there was evidence that the name of defendant no. 1 was changed to Ramlakhan Mahto and his parentage was changed. As per Ext-5 which is the statement made before the judicial magistrate on 14.7.1990, the defendant no. 1 stated himself to be son of Harihar Mahto and not Ganpat Mahto. He was convicted in a murder case but he did not state his father’s name to be Ganpat Mahto. The rent receipts showed it to be in the name of Rukmini Devi. At the time of the said adoption defendant no. 1 was 21 years old and was not eligible for adoption and he was married prior to 1964 and no ceremony connected with adoption was held. He never lived in the house of Ganpat Mahto and as such his name was not recorded in the voter list for 30 years. On these and other evidence the learned trial court in the light of the provisions of sections 10 and 11 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act the trial Court refused to accept the claim of adoption by the said registered adoption deed. 10. The first appellate court reversed the findings and dismissed the suit mainly on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish fraud in execution of the adoption deed. Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 casts a duty on the courts to draw a mandatory presumption to the effect that whenever there is a registered document purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, then the adoption is made in compliance of the provision of the Act, unless and until it was disproved. This document was an old document and cannot be challenged after 14 years. The attesting witnesses could not be examined as they were dead but their signatures and the signature of deed has been proved. The learned appellate court refused to accept Exhibit 5 in evidence on the age of Choudhary Mahto since he was illiterate villager and had no idea about the actual age. Similarly, the voter list was also discarded as it was prepared on a large scale. 11. This appeal has been admitted to be heard on the following substantial questions of law: (I) Whether the Court of Appeal has committed error of law in reversing the finding recorded by the trial court on the issue of adoption and whether the reasons given by the appellate court is based on evidence? (II) Whether in the absence of any positive evidence led by the defendant/respondent showing that he was always treated as adopted son after the deed of adoption which took place in 1964 till the date of institution of the suit in the year 1987, the finding of the lower appellate court can be sustained in law? 12. The adoption of a child shall be controlled by the provisions of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956. Section 10 of it lays down the Persons who may be adopted — No person shall be capable of being taken in adoption unless the following conditions are fulfilled, namely: (i) he or she is a Hindu. (ii) he or she has not already been adopted. (iii) he or she has not been married, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who are married being taken in adoption. (iv) he or she has not completed the age of fifteen years, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who have completed the age of fifteen years being taken in adoption. Further, there is a presumption that a registered deed of adoption has been made in accordance with law. It has been held in Kamla Rani vs. Ram Lalit Rai, (2018) 9 SCC 663 that: 6. Further, there is a presumption that a registered deed of adoption has been made in accordance with law. It has been held in Kamla Rani vs. Ram Lalit Rai, (2018) 9 SCC 663 that: 6. We cannot lose sight of the principle that though the factum of adoption and its validity has to be duly proved and formal ceremony of giving and taking is an essential ingredient for a valid adoption, long duration of time during which a person is treated as adopted cannot be ignored and by itself may in the circumstances carry a presumption in favour of adoption. Laxmibai vs. Bhagwantbuva, (2013) 4 SCC 97 : 1. Undoubtedly, adoption disturbs the natural line of succession, owing to which, a very heavy burden is placed upon the propounder to prove the adoption. However, this onus shifts to the person who challenges the adoption, once a registered document recording the adoption is brought before the court. This aspect must be considered taking note of various other attending circumstances i.e. evidence regarding the religious ceremony (giving and taking of the child), as the same is a sine qua non for valid adoption. Further under Section 16 of the Act there is a legislative mandate that the Court shall presume whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved. Lal Man vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation, (1998) 8 SCC 693 at page 694: 2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant urged that once the conditions prescribed by Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 in respect of the execution and registration of a deed of adoption had been complied with it is to be presumed that the adoption had been made in accordance with the provisions of the said Act unless and until it was disproved. In view of Section 16, a presumption has to be drawn by the Court. But such presumption can always be rebutted on the basis of evidence adduced before the court concerned. Jai Singh vs. Shakuntala, (2002) 3 SCC 634 : 3. In view of Section 16, a presumption has to be drawn by the Court. But such presumption can always be rebutted on the basis of evidence adduced before the court concerned. Jai Singh vs. Shakuntala, (2002) 3 SCC 634 : 3. The section thus envisages a statutory presumption that in the event of there being a registered document pertaining to adoption there would be a presumption that adoption has been made in accordance with law. Mandate of the statute is rather definite since the legislature has used “shall” instead of any other word of lesser significance. Incidentally, however, the inclusion of the words “unless and until it is disproved” appearing at the end of the statutory provision has made the situation not that rigid but flexible enough to depend upon the evidence available on record in support of adoption. It is a matter of grave significance by reason of the factum of adoption and displacement of the person adopted from the natural succession - thus onus of proof is rather heavy. Statute has allowed some amount of flexibility, lest it turns out to be solely dependent on a registered adoption deed. The reason for inclusion of the words “unless and until it is disproved” shall have to be ascertained in its proper perspective and as such the presumption cannot but be said to be a rebuttable presumption. Statutory intent thus stands out to be rather expressive depicting therein that the presumption cannot be an irrefutable presumption by reason of the inclusion of the words just noticed above. 13. From the above exposition of law, for valid adoption it is evident that the party claiming to be adopted has to prove that the necessary formalities for adoption has been completed as mandated under Section 10 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. Registration of adoption provides credence to it and the court shall draw presumption that adoption has been made in compliance to the provision of this Act, until and unless it is disproved. This presumption is however a rebuttable presumption and can be disproved by leading evidence. 14. Whenever an instrument is under challenge, the veracity of it is to be tested not only against the background of contemporary events, but also in the light of the subsequent events to show whether the said instrument was ever acted upon. This presumption is however a rebuttable presumption and can be disproved by leading evidence. 14. Whenever an instrument is under challenge, the veracity of it is to be tested not only against the background of contemporary events, but also in the light of the subsequent events to show whether the said instrument was ever acted upon. Here in the present case the deed of adoption has been challenged by none other than the original plaintiff Jiro Mahto, who is said to have taken defendant no. 1 in adoption by the registered deed executed in the year 1964. Section 10 mandates that adoptive child should be unmarried at the time of adoption unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who are married being taken in adoption. Admittedly defendant No. 1 was married at the time when he was given in adoption. The custom has been pleaded by defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 but no evidence has been led to show that adoption of married person was permitted. As per Ext-5 which is the statement made before the judicial magistrate on 14.7.1990, the defendant no. 1 stated himself to be son of Harihar Mahto and not Ganpat Mahto. Similar was his statement in a murder trial. At the time of the said adoption defendant No. 1 was 21 years old and was also not eligible for adoption and he was married prior to 1964. The father of defendant no. 1 has deposed that the time of adoption he and wife were only present. There is no evidence that ceremonies of adoptions were performed. After the said adoption there is no evidence that he lived in the house of Ganpat Mahto and as such his name was not recorded in the voter list for 30 years. The rent receipts showed it to be in the name of Rukmini Devi. The other defendants (D3 to D6) have also disputed that D1 was taken in adoption by the plaintiff. The witnesses to the deed of adoption have not been examined. There are evidences that after adoption the name of defendant no. 1 was not changed to Ram Lakhan Mahto as claimed in the pleadings. DW-2 has admitted in para-seven of the cross-examination that Rukmini called the plaintiff as her mother. The witnesses to the deed of adoption have not been examined. There are evidences that after adoption the name of defendant no. 1 was not changed to Ram Lakhan Mahto as claimed in the pleadings. DW-2 has admitted in para-seven of the cross-examination that Rukmini called the plaintiff as her mother. It has also been deposed by him in Para 10 that Palton son of Jiriya was present at the time of the said adoption. If the plaintiff had a son there was no occasion for taking defendant no. 1 in adoption. Although it has been claimed that he had been taken in adoption in the year 1964 but no petition for mutation was moved by the defendant to get the suit land mutated in his name. The cumulative effect of these evidences rebuts the presumption that any adoption of Defendant no. 1 was taken by the original plaintiff in consonance with the provisions of the Adoption Act 1956. The findings recorded by the first court of appeal in this regard is not tenable and is accordingly set aside. 15. Both the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the appellant plaintiff. The impugned Judgment and decree passed is set aside and the Judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court is restored and the plaintiff’s suit is decreed. 16. Appeal is allowed. 17. I.A. No. 2436 of 2008 is allowed. Let respondent No. 6-Harihar Mahto be deleted from the cause title of this appeal. Legal representatives of respondent No. 6-Harihar Mahto are already on record.