ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The Steel Authority of India Limited (in short, 'SAIL') has challenged the order dated 6th September 2016 passed in WP(S) No. 4795 of 2009. 2. In a disciplinary proceeding, the respondent No.1 suffered the order of removal from service passed by the disciplinary authority which was modified by the appellate authority vide order dated 4th September 2009, to the punishment of reduction to a lower grade of E-6 in the lowest pay scale of the said grade. 3. The appellate order was challenged by the respondent No.1 in WP(S) No. 4795 of 2009. 4. The writ Court interfered with the appellate order dated 4th September 2009 and quashed the punishment order dated 23rd June 2009 of removal from service. 5. The writ Court held as under: “5. After hearing learned counsel for the respective parties at length and on perusal of the evidences on records, I am of the considered view that the petitioner has been able to make out a case for interference due to the following facts and reasons stated hereinbelow:- (i) On perusal of the statement of article of charges fell against the petitioner, who assumed his charge as DGM(RMP). At the relevant point of time, the lime production have gone down, which has adversely effected steel and hot metal production. The situation has occurred due to poor planning and management on the part of the petitioner and the onus was made to keep the shop in working order but the lime production has been adversely affected. The action on the part of the petitioner amounts to lack of maintaining devotion to duty and negligence in the performance of his duties. It has been alleged that the charges have been framed against him for contravention of relevant Rule of SAIL, Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules. On perusal of the statement of defence, Annexure-4 to the writ application, the petitioner owned the responsibility for forcing shut down of one blast furnace on 8 moral grounds. But, from the perusal of the order dated 04.09.2009 of the appellate authority it is manifestly clear that the appellate authority was of the opinion that there were 3 more DGMs in the department, who were also responsible for the mishap on 03.04.2009 and, therefore, the mishap was not the sole responsibility of the petitioner. But, from the perusal of the order dated 04.09.2009 of the appellate authority it is manifestly clear that the appellate authority was of the opinion that there were 3 more DGMs in the department, who were also responsible for the mishap on 03.04.2009 and, therefore, the mishap was not the sole responsibility of the petitioner. However, to the best of knowledge of the petitioner, no departmental proceeding has been initiated or any responsibility has been fixed on the other 3 DGMs, who were also responsible for the alleged misconduct, for which the petitioner has been charged though the petitioner could not have abdicated his responsibility, but, at the same time all the blame could not have been fastened on the petitioner alone. (ii) Although, the appellate authority has modified the penalty of removal from the services of the company to the penalty of reduction to a lower grade in E-6 grade, in the scale of pay but certainly the reduction of pay is a major punishment. Moreover, as stated in the appellate order, there are three more DGMs in the department therefore, the mishap which occurred on 03.04.2009 was not the sole failure on the part of the petitioner. But, since the petitioner has been subjected to rigors of the disciplinary proceeding and he has been found guilty by the inquiry committee, the petitioner cannot be absolved of his guilt. In the meantime, as stated by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner superannuated in the month of March, 2010 and the reduction of pay E-6 grade has adversely affected the pay of the petitioner, which got adverse affect to the post retiral benefits of the petitioner. Since the mishap dated 03.04.2009 was due to the collective in-action on the part of the petitioner as well as other three DGM's, when other three have been let off given a clean chit, the petitioner can not be discriminated on the impugned order of punishment of reduction of pay scale. On the facts and circumstances of the case the impugned order of punishment dated 04.09.2009 passed by the appellate authority i.e. relating to penalty of reduction to E-6 grade and pay appears to be unjustified being hit by vice of hostile discrimination. 6. The impugned order of punishment dated 23.06.2009 (Annexure7) being modified by the appellate authority are not legally sustainable. 6. The impugned order of punishment dated 23.06.2009 (Annexure7) being modified by the appellate authority are not legally sustainable. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order of punishment dated 23.06.2009 passed by the disciplinary authority and the order dated 04.09.2009 (Annexure10) passed by the Appellate Authority are hereby, quashed and set aside and the respondents are directed to restore the petitioner with his original cadre and pay scale i.e. E-7 with all consequential benefits. With the aforesaid direction, the writ petition stands allowed.” 6. The writ Court's order has been challenged by SAIL on the ground that (i) in a properly constituted departmental inquiry the order of punishment passed by the departmental authority is almost immune from interference except on the well known grounds of illegality, procedural impropriety and mala fide, and (ii) a plea of prejudice must be pleaded specifically and proved by the delinquent government employee. 7. In support of the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Jayant Franklin Toppo, the learned counsel for SAIL, refers to the judgments in “Sarva Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank v. Manoj Kumar Sinha” (2010)3 SCC 556 and “Union of India v. Alok Kumar” (2010)5 SCC 349 . 8. At the outset, we may indicate that within six months of the order passed by the appellate authority the respondent No.1 superannuated from service and, therefore, the only benefit which accrued to him by virtue of the writ Court's order is pension at an enhanced rate on the basis of difference of salary between E-7 and E-6 grades for six months. 9. The aforesaid being the actual state of affairs, any Court would be reluctant to interfere with such an order even if the appellant has been able to make out an arguable case. The filing of the appeals of the kind of present one which the appellant has preferred must stop. This is really in the public interest that the government and its instrumentalists stop approaching the Court at the drop of the hat, for challenging every order passed by a Court of law. The appellate order is the order of an authority of SAIL which could not have been challenged and, as noticed above, implication of the writ Court's order is negligible. The appellate order is the order of an authority of SAIL which could not have been challenged and, as noticed above, implication of the writ Court's order is negligible. It is a well known practice in the Courts of law, and, in criminal matters it has statutory recognition under section 376 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the Courts do not take cognizance of the petty matters. 10. Mr. A.K.Das, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 refers to the judgment in “Union of India and others v. J. Ahmed” (1979) 2 SCC 286 and “Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others” (2007) 4 SCC 566 to submit that the misconduct alleged against the respondent No.1 under Rule 4.0 (1) and (ii), 4.0 (2) and 5.0 (9) of the Steel Authority of India Limited Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977 are not attracted in view of the specific imputations of misconduct in the articles of charge dated 7th April 2009. 11. On the basis of a memorandum of charge dated 7th April 2009, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the respondent No.1 on the allegation that on account of poor management production of steel and hot metal was adversely affected. Though the respondent No.1 denied the charges, and, in course of the inquiry he furnished certain documents along with the reply to the questionnaire to show that there was no negligence on his part, by an order dated 23rd June 2009, the disciplinary authority imposed a punishment of removal from service of the company which shall not be a disqualification for future employment. 12. As noticed above, this order of removal from service has been modified by the appellate authority by imposing a punishment of reduction in the lowest pay scale of E-6. 13. It is stated that till the stage of appellate order a copy of the inquiry report was not furnished to the respondent No.1 and this fact has been admitted by SAIL in the affidavit filed in the present proceeding. For this reason, a plea of prejudice has been raised by the appellant. 14. A plea of prejudice caused to the delinquent government employee on account of non supply of the inquiry report should be demonstrated by examples how prejudice has been caused to him. For this reason, a plea of prejudice has been raised by the appellant. 14. A plea of prejudice caused to the delinquent government employee on account of non supply of the inquiry report should be demonstrated by examples how prejudice has been caused to him. But in a case where the inquiry report which was not furnished to the respondent No.1 even at the appellate stage, the stand taken by SAIL that the respondent No.1 was required to demonstrate how prejudice has been caused to him must be rejected. The very purpose of issuing a second show cause notice on submission of the inquiry report is to make the delinquent government employee aware of the adverse findings recorded by the Enquiring Officer and to enable him to put forth his defence to persuade the disciplinary authority not to accept the adverse findings recorded by the Enquiring Officer. 15. On such premise, non supply of inquiry report must be held to have caused serious prejudice to the respondent No.1. 16. The appellate authority while interfering with the order of removal from service passed by the disciplinary authority has held as under: “3.0 I have gone through the appeal made by Shri Choudhuri in detail and my finding are as under: i) There was lack of ordination in RMP in respect of scheduling of work as well as supervision of repair which ultimately resulted in non supply of requisite Lime to SMS from 3rd April, 2009 to 5th April, 2009 Shri D.C. Choudhuri being the head of RMP did not properly coordinate between different agencies both within and outside Department for smooth functioning of the Department. ii) However, there were three more DGMs in the Department and therefore the mishap which occurred on 3/04/2009 was not the sole failure on the part of Shri Choudhuri. 4.0 Taking into consideration the facts of the case, the defense statement of Shri Chudhuri, enquiry resort, orders of the Disciplinary Authority, the appeal of Shri Choudhuri and another relevant documents concerned in the case, I am inclined to give some relief and reduce the penalty of removal from the services of the Company vide separation order No. BSL/Pers/OD/2009-2486 dated 23/06/2009 to the penalty of reduction to a lower grade on Shri Choudhuri. Accordingly, Shri Choudhuri is placed as Asstt. General Manager in E-6 grade in the scale of pay of Rs. Accordingly, Shri Choudhuri is placed as Asstt. General Manager in E-6 grade in the scale of pay of Rs. 190004% -24400 w.e.f 23/06/2009 and his pay will be fixed at the lowest of the grade. His date of increment shall remain unchanged.” 17. In our opinion, once it was accepted by the appellate authority that there were three other DGMs in the department who were also responsible for schedule of work and supervision of repairs, without attributing specific responsibility to the respondent No.1 which resulted in non supply of requisite quantity of lime, the respondent No.1 could not have been found guilty of misconduct under Rule 4.0 (1) and (ii), 4.0 (2) and 5.0 (9) of Steel Authority of India Limited Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules,1977. We are inclined to hold so also for the reason that the appellate authority himself has recorded a finding that the mishap which occurred on 3rd April 2009 was not on account of any failure solely on the part of the respondent No.1. Moreover, the other three DGMs were not charged at all for lack of supervision or negligence. 18. A disciplinary proceeding against a government employee is a serious exercise which does not admit any casual observation by the departmental authorities. Since the appellate authority which formed an opinion that the punishment of removal from service was not proper for the reason that it was not the sole responsibility of the respondent No.1 which caused the mishap on 3rd April 2009, the respondent No.1 should have been restored to his original position when the order of removal from service was passed. In a departmental enquiry, the delinquent government employee cannot be awarded punishment on mere guesswork. 19. Having held so, we find no reason to interfere with the writ Court's order dated 6th September 2016 and, accordingly, LPA No. 270 of 2017 is dismissed. 20. Needless to indicate that the consequences shall follow.