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2022 DIGILAW 1137 (AP)

Pangi Naganna v. Union of India

2022-10-28

M.GANGA RAO, T.MALLIKARJUNA RAO

body2022
JUDGMENT : T. Mallikarjuna Rao, J. 1. This criminal appeal is filed under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (for short 'the Act) against the order dated 11.02.2022 in Crl. MP No.897 of 2021 in SC No.174 of 2021 (Rc. No.1/2021/NIA/Hyd) passed by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge for the trial of NIA Act cases, Vijayawada, whereby the prayer of the A.1/appellant to allow him to go on bail stands dismissed. 2. The case of the prosecution, as set forth in the charge sheet, states as under : (a) On 23.11.2020, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Munchingaput police station, along with mediators/witnesses, intercepted one Pangi Naganna around 15 hours during the vehicle check at Rudakota-Kumada road of Munchingaput Mandal and recovered the revolutionary Maoist books and other material from his bag. He was arrested on 23.11.2020. (b) The instant case basically relates to the activities of the accused persons as members of the terrorist organization (CPI). Maoists are sympathizers or members of various frontal organizations in order to support and further the activities of the proscribed terrorist organization, and an extensive investigation was conducted in the instant case. (c) The appellant/A.1 was brought to the police station. A case in crime No.37 of 2020, Cr. No.48 of 2020 of Pedabayalu PS were registered for the offences punishable under Sections 120(b), 121(a), 143, 144, 124(A) r/w. 149 IPC, Sections 10, 13, 18 of UA (P) Act, Section 8(1)(ii) of APPS Act and Section 25 of IA of Arms Act. The Sub-Inspector of Police registered the case against A.2 to A.64 based on the said confessional statement of the appellant herein/A.1. During the investigation, Pangi Naganna, A.1/appellant herein, was taken to police custody for two days from 05.12.2020 to 06.12.2020, he disclosed the names of 19 more accused persons, who were involved in furthering and supporting the CPI Maoists. During the custodial interrogation by the State Police, Pangi Naganna revealed certain facts about the dump in the reserve forest area wherein various items meant for the Maoists were concealed in the white plastic bag and were recovered by the State Police under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act on 06.12.2020 from the place pointed out by Pangi Naganna. Apart from the Maoists literature, explosive material, i.e., 50 Nos. of electrical detonators, 13 Nos. of wire bundles and 25 Nos. of 7.62 MM live-rounds, were recovered. Apart from the Maoists literature, explosive material, i.e., 50 Nos. of electrical detonators, 13 Nos. of wire bundles and 25 Nos. of 7.62 MM live-rounds, were recovered. (d) Based on the direction by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, vide Order No.11/01/18/2021/NIA, Dt. 05.03.2021 National Investigation Agency took up the investigation of Munchingaput Police Station, FIR No.47/2020, by registering the case as Rc. No.01/2021/NIA/Hyd at NIA Hyderabad on 07.03.2021 under different Sections 120B, 121, 121A, 143, 144, 124A r/w.149 IPC and Sections 10, 13 & 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, Sections 8(1) and 8(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Public Security Act and Section 25 of the Indian Arms Act and subsequently, the case records and properties were taken over by NIA on 16.03.2021. (e) On 31.03.2021, based on a search warrant issued by the NIA Special Court, the NIA conducted searches at different locations of accused persons. However, the police custody of A.1/appellant herein was rejected by the NIA Special Court on the ground that A.1/appellant herein was already taken to police custody. Out of 84 accused persons involved in this case, 34 accused persons belonged to 12 frontal organizations. The statements of witnesses recorded during the course of the investigation disclose that Pangi Naganna, who is the appellant herein, was in contact with the underground Maoists and purchased items from the shops and provided them to Maoists and he was a courier for the Maoists leaders in the forest, used to bring medicines, footwear and other essential items and A.1 used to take people to the forest to meet A.2 who is an advisor and in charge of AOB area and controls the mass organization and A.1 had accompanied A.46, A.60, A.64, A.80 and A.84 to the forest to meet A.2 and discussed the strategy for conducting activities of mass organizations for further in the ideology of CPI Maoists and it also revealed that he has also instigated the people against the police by stopping them during the regular combing operations. He is a staunch supporter of CPI Maoists. He is a habitual offender and had 8 criminal cases registered against him for his association with the Maoists for further activities in the CPI Maoists. 3. He is a staunch supporter of CPI Maoists. He is a habitual offender and had 8 criminal cases registered against him for his association with the Maoists for further activities in the CPI Maoists. 3. a. In the counter filed by the prosecution, while reiterating the contents of the charge sheet, it is mentioned that 90 days of judicial custody of the accused was completed on 22.02.2021. b. As the case was transferred to NIA Special Court Vijayawada, an application was filed in NIA Hyderabad before the Special Court on 31.03.2021 seeking to extend the judicial custody of A.1/appellant herein from 90 to 180 days. The matter was considered by the NIA Special Court, Vijayawada and the judicial custody of A.1/appellant herein was extended by an order dated 01.04.2021. Since the judicial custody of A.1/appellant herein was extended by the competent Court of jurisdiction, he is not entitled to default bail. 4. It is the stand of the accused in the bail application as well in the grounds of appeal that the appellant was falsely implicated in this case, and the FIR was concocted for the purpose of this case. It is false to claim that some material objects were seized from the possession and recovered at the instance of the appellant. The literature said to have been seized from the possession of the appellant was not shown as proscribed by filing any official notification. There is no evidence to show that the appellant entered into a conspiracy with any person or persons, including the other accused, in this case. The other accused, Nos.46, 60, 64 and 84, in this case, were released on bail by the Sessions Court at Vijayawada. 5. It is also further submitted that, in this case, the investigation was completed. A charge sheet was filed and numbered SC No.174 of 2021 on the file of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge for the trial of NIA Act cases, Vijayawada. The appellant was granted bail in different crimes, and the appellant has been on remand for nearly one year and six months, and the organizations mentioned in the FIR are not banned or prohibited by the Government. The appellant was granted bail in different crimes, and the appellant has been on remand for nearly one year and six months, and the organizations mentioned in the FIR are not banned or prohibited by the Government. It is false to claim that some material objects were seized from the possession and recovered at the instance of A.1/appellant herein and that some of those things must have been planted to make the allegations appear as if true, which otherwise are false. He further submits that 52 witnesses were cited in the charge sheet and that they are to be examined during the course of the trial. There is no possibility of completion of the trial in the near future; hence the appellant is enlarged on bail. 6. Sri. Y. Koteswara Rao, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submits that the liberty guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial is imperative, and the undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the Courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge him on bail. 7. He further submits that the object of bail is neither punitive nor preventive. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon". The rule of the criminal justice system is bail, not jail, is being followed as of today. 8. Contradicting the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, Sri K. Krishna Bushan Chowdary, learned Central Government Counsel, submits that there is sufficient incriminating material against A.1/appellant and vehemently opposed this application. He further submits that serious allegations are levelled against the appellant. There are all chances that the appellant may not be available at the time of trial, and the Court may not exercise its discretion in his favour and pray to dismiss the application. 9. The material on record shows A.1/appellant herein has been in judicial custody from 24.11.2020 onwards. He further submits that serious allegations are levelled against the appellant. There are all chances that the appellant may not be available at the time of trial, and the Court may not exercise its discretion in his favour and pray to dismiss the application. 9. The material on record shows A.1/appellant herein has been in judicial custody from 24.11.2020 onwards. The Chief Investigation Officer/National Investigation Agency, Hyderabad, filed the charge sheet against A.1 and others for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 121, 121A, 143, 144, 124A IPC READ WITH 149 IPC and Sections 10, 13 and 18 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, Sections 8(1) and 8(2) of A.P. Security Act, Section 25 of the Indian Arms Act. As seen the grounds of appeal, the learned counsel appeared for the appellant regarding the non-granting of bail. As seen from the order passed by the Special Judge, it is observed that previously petitioner/A1 has filed a bail petition seeking default bail under secion43(D) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, on the ground that the charge sheet has not been filed within 90 days and the extension of remand beyond 90 days by the learned Judge is illegal. It seems that the petitioner/appellant has not preferred appeal against the said orders passed by the Special Judge. The reading of the counter filed by the prosecution shows that as the case was transferred to NIA Special Court, Vijayawada, on an application filed by NIA Hyderabad, the judicial custody of A1 was extended from 90 days to 180 days. As such, this Court is of the opinion that the contentions raised by the learned appellant's counsel regarding the non-granting of default bail cannot be considered. 10. In National Investigation Agency vs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali 2019 (5) SCC 1 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in bail application under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the approach should be different. 11. 10. In National Investigation Agency vs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali 2019 (5) SCC 1 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in bail application under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the approach should be different. 11. In a Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Masroor vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 14 SCC 286 , it is held that the valuable right of liberty of an individual and the interest of society, in general, has to be balanced and that liberty of a person accused of an offence would depend upon the exigencies of the case and that the collective interest of the community may outweigh right of personal liberty of the individual concerned. 12. Considering the fact that it is the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA (P) Act, which puts severe restrictions on the Special Court's power to grant bail, it is imperative to take note of what the proviso to Section 43D(5) conveys. For the sake of clarity, Sub-Section (5) of Section 43D, which is of utmost importance, is reproduced below : (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release : Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. 13. 13. A bare reading of Sub-Section (5) of Section 43D shows that apart from the fact Sub-Section (5) bars a Special Court from releasing an accused on bail without affording the Public Prosecutor an opportunity of being heard on the application seeking the release of an accused on bail, the proviso to Sub-Section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail by laying down that if the Court, on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of The Code of Criminal Procedure, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or chapter VI of the A(P) Act, is prima facie true, such an accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond. 14. From the meaning attributed to the words "Prima facie true" by various dictionaries, this Court views that the expression 'prima facie true’ would mean that the Court shall undertake an exercise to determine whether the accusations made against the accused or inherently improbable and/or wholly unreliable. When the word 'prima facie' is coupled with the word 'true', it implies that the Court has to undertake an exercise of checking the truthfulness of the allegations made in the complaint on the basis of the materials on record. If the Court finds, on such analysis, that the accusations made or inherently improbable or wholly unbelievable, it may be difficult to say that a case, which is 'prima facie true, has been made out. 15. Thus while considering the appeal, it needs to be borne in mind that, in the case on hand, it is required to be determined by this Court, as an appellate court, whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations made against the appellant for prima facie true or not. 16. In the case at hand, there is nothing placed before the Court to show that the accusations made against the accused are inherently improbable, nor can accusations be said to be wholly unbelievable. In such circumstances, the materials on record, so long as they remain what they are, speak that the accusations are prima facie true. 16. In the case at hand, there is nothing placed before the Court to show that the accusations made against the accused are inherently improbable, nor can accusations be said to be wholly unbelievable. In such circumstances, the materials on record, so long as they remain what they are, speak that the accusations are prima facie true. In the case at hand, there are serious incriminating materials to show that the accused was a part of the criminal conspiracy. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the long period of incarceration that the appellant had already undergone may be taken as a ground to grant bail to the appellant herein. 18. This Court is of the view that it is not the case that the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the sentence. The learned counsel for the appellant has prayed to consider the aspect that the investigation into the crime has already been completed, and the charge sheet has already been filed. 19. In this regard, we would like to refer to the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Virupakshappa Goud vs. State of Karnataka, (2017) 5 SCC 406 holds that “the filing of the charge sheet does not in any manner lessen allegations, but rather establishes that after due investigation, the charge sheet is filed against the accused; therefore, the fact that the charge sheet has been submitted against the appellant cannot be used in favour of the appellant, rather it would go against him”. 20. It is well settled by the combined High Court of Andhra Pradesh in National Investigation Agency, Hyderabad vs. Saddam Hussain, 2017 (2) ALD 197 A.P., wherein it was held that Section 43(D) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, takes away the discretion of the Court to grant bail wherever is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the accused are prima facie true. 21. In Afzal Khan @ Babu Murtuzakhan Pathan vs. State of Gujarat, [Appeal (Crl.) 757 of 2007], the Hon’ble Apex Court held that a bail application, in a case of this nature, which involves the security of the State should be rejected. 22. 21. In Afzal Khan @ Babu Murtuzakhan Pathan vs. State of Gujarat, [Appeal (Crl.) 757 of 2007], the Hon’ble Apex Court held that a bail application, in a case of this nature, which involves the security of the State should be rejected. 22. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the allegations levelled against the appellant that the appellant had committed the offences under Chapter IV/VI of the NIA Act are prima facie established. From the material on record, this Court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the applicant is 'prima facie true. Serious allegations are levelled against the appellant. 23. It is the submission of the appellant's counsel that there is no material to suggest that the appellant is the sympathizer of the banned organization of CPI (Moist). The material available on record ‘prima facie’ shows that at the time of the arrest of the accused, there is adequate evidence to show that he is actively associated with the CPI (Moist) against the security and the interest of the Nation and the Investigating Officer had taken the appellant on police custody and on his pointing out recovered some more incriminating explosive material included 315 number of electrical detonators, 7.60MM live rounds and shoes, soap boxes, blades which are required for day to day requirement of Maoists and also at the time of arrest of accused he is in possession of the Moist literature. Therefore, it is not a case of possession of some literature. The material placed on record prima facie reveals that his association with the Moist as a courier and in the garb of being a journalist used to support CPI (Moist) ideology and used to go to forests to meet Moist leaders and during the search at his residence ‘press notes’ to handover to the associates of Maoists in the garb of being a journalist and the activities of accused were connected with the propaganda of agenda relating to the insurgency operation against the State. 24. The Special Court was well within its jurisdiction in the present case in not granting bail to the present appellant. The Special Court did not commit any illegality in dismissing the appellant’s application for bail, and it does not warrant any inference by this Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. 25. 24. The Special Court was well within its jurisdiction in the present case in not granting bail to the present appellant. The Special Court did not commit any illegality in dismissing the appellant’s application for bail, and it does not warrant any inference by this Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. 25. We have carefully considered the material available on record which was collected during the investigation; it would reveal that there is a prima facie material showing that the allegations made against the appellant are prima facie true. In view of the law referred supra and the rider provided under Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act, since this Court has already held that the allegations made against the appellant are prima facie true, this Court concludes that the appellant has failed to make out a case for grant of bail. Further, if the appellant is enlarged on bail, there are all chances that he will tamper with the evidence and would, flee away from the clutches of law and would not be available at the time of trial. 26. Resultantly, we find no merits in the appeal. For the above-stated reasons, the instant appeal being devoid of any merit, the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the criminal appeal is dismissed. 27. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.