JUDGMENT : 1. I have heard Mr. M. Pertin, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. K. Dabi, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of accused-appellant, and Mr. G. Tado, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Arunachal Pradesh, for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. M. Tunar, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 (victim). 2. This appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is directed against the judgment and order, dated 30-06-2022, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, West Sessions Division, Basar, District Leparada, Arunachal Pradesh. It is to be noted here that vide the impugned judgment and order, dated 30-06-2022, the learned Court below has convicted the appellant in Sessions Case No. 03/2018, under Section 307 of the IPC and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years with a fine of Rs.10,000/-, with default stipulation. 3. The factual background leading to the filing of the present appeal is adumbrated herein below: “On 01-11-2016, one Smt. Yapa Kopdak, wife of Tama Kodak of Repin Colony, Taliha, lodged an FIR with the Officer-in-Charge of Taliha Police Station to the effect that on that day, at about 08.50 p.m., one Shri Tapor @ Niapor Maying, son of Shri Tabu @ Niaby Maying, Gandhi Colony, Taliha, attempted to commit murder her son-Shri Taro @ Maro Kodak by causing cut injury over his head by means of a dao, near the residence of Shri Sokum Paying without any reason. Upon receipt of the said FIR, the Officer-in-Charge of Taliha Police Station, registered the Taliha Police Station Case No. 04 of 2016, under Section 326 IPC and investigated into the same. During investigation, the Investigating Police Officer visited the place of occurrence, examined the witnesses and got the victim examined by Doctors, collected injury report, arrested the accused, forwarded him to the Court and, finally, submitted charge-sheet against the accused/appellant to stand trial in the Court under Sections 326/307 of the IPC. Thereafter, upon hearing the learned Advocates for both sides, the learned court below has framed charge against the accused-appellant under Sections 307/326 of the IPC and on being read and explained over the accused appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, upon hearing the learned Advocates for both sides, the learned court below has framed charge against the accused-appellant under Sections 307/326 of the IPC and on being read and explained over the accused appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the learned court below had examined the prosecution witnesses and after closing the evidence examined the accused appellant under section 313 Cr.P.C. and thereafter, hearing arguments of the learned advocates for both sides, the learned Court below had convicted the appellant under Section 307 of the IPC and sentenced him as aforesaid.” 4. Being highly aggrieved, the appellant approached this Court by filing the present appeal, contending to set aside the impugned judgment and order on the following grounds:- (i) That, the learned Court below has erred in law as well as in facts and the impugned judgment is contrary to the law and the materials placed on record; (ii) That, there is discrepancy in the version of the prosecution witnesses about the time of occurrence and the learned Court below has failed to appreciate the same; (iii) That, there is also discrepancy in the version of the witnesses as regards the weapon of offence and the person from whom it was seized. As per the version of the Investigating Police Officer, the same was seized from the father of the accused and as per prosecution; the same was seized from the possession of the accused. (iv) That, the weapon of offence was not sent for FSL examination to ascertain as to whether the same was used for committing the offence; (v) That, there was sudden provocation on the part of the prosecution witness Nos. 2, 3, 4 and that all of them were interested witnesses and cannot be relied upon; and (vi) That, the ingredients of offence under section 307 of the IPC is not established by the prosecution side; (vii) That, the learned Court below also failed to appreciate the fact that a sum of Rs.2,50,000/-has been paid to the victim by the appellant, being the medical expenses incurred by him and one Mithun was also sacrificed and a community feast was also arranged and a brass plate was also given to the appellant as a mark of customary settlement. 5. 5. It is to be mentioned here that the respondent No.2, the victim also had filed an affidavit during the course of hearing, stating that a Kebang was held to settle the dispute and a compromise was effected between them and as per the terms of such compromise he received a sum of Rs.2,50,000/-from the appellant, being the medical expenses, incurred by him and a Mithunwas also sacrificed and a community feast was also arranged and a brass plate was also given to him as a mark of customary settlement. He annexed the said Kebang decision with the affidavit as Annexure-1 and, therefore, it is stated that he has no objection in the event of setting aside the impugned judgment and order. 6. Mr. M. Pertin, learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellant, submits that this appeal is preferred mainly two grounds:- (i) there was provocation on the part of the victim and two of his friends and (ii) none of the ingredients of the offence under Section 307 of the IPC is established by the prosecution side here in this case and that the parties have already effected a compromise and the respondent No. 2 has filed an affidavit to that effect and the compromise deed is also filed in the Court along with the affidavit as Annexure-1. Mr. Pertin further submits that since the pronouncement of the judgment, the appellant is behind the bar and since the matter has been settled effectively between the parties, the impugned judgment may be set aside and appellant may be release from jail. Mr. Pertin, also referred to three case laws, namely, Murali vs State represented by Inspector of Police, reported in (2021) 1 SCC 726 , Ishwar Singh vs State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2008) 15 SCC 667 and the case of the State of Madhya Pradeshvs Laxmi Narayan and others, reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688 in support of his submission. 7. On the other hand, Mr. G. Tado, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State respondent submits that the offence is serious in nature and the prosecution side had succeeded in bringing home the charge against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt and rightly convicted him under Section 307 of the IPC and the same cannot be compounded lawfully, therefore, it is contended to dismiss the appeal. 8. Per contra, Mr. 8. Per contra, Mr. M. Tunar, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 submits that the victim has already effected compromise with the appellant and he has filed an affidavit to that effect and that the respondent No.2 had already received a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/-being the compensation from the appellant and he has no objection in the event of allowing this appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for both the sides, I have carefully gone through the appeal petition and the materials placed on record and the record of learned court below and also perused the impugned judgment and order. 10. It appears from the record of the learned Court below that the case was registered under Section 326 of the IPC, on the basis of the FIR lodged by Smt. Yapa Kodak, mother of the victim on 01-11-2016. The occurrence took place on the same day at about 8.50 p.m. On receipt of the said FIR, the Officer-in-Charge, Taliha Police Station registered the Taliha Police Station Case No. 04/2016, under Section 326 of the IPC and investigated the same and after completion of investigation, he laid charge-sheet against the appellant under Sections 326/307 of the IPC. 11. Now, let it be seen whether the victim had sustained any injury on his person and if so, whether the same was grievous in nature and who caused the same. First let the evidence of the victim be examined. The prosecution has examined the victim, Maro @ Taro Kodak as PW3. His evidence reveals that on 01-11-2016, he along with Sri Suresh Nipu (PW4) and Sri Sodak Paying (PW2) were walking on the road and noticed that the accused was driving one Tata Mobile in full speed. After seeing PW2, the accused caught hold of his color and exchanged altercation with him and also tried to run the Tata Mobile, he was driving, over them and, thereafter, he tried to assault Sri Sodak Paying (PW2) by means of a stone and then one Sri Giadak Nimpu (PW5) stopped the accused. After seeing PW2, the accused caught hold of his color and exchanged altercation with him and also tried to run the Tata Mobile, he was driving, over them and, thereafter, he tried to assault Sri Sodak Paying (PW2) by means of a stone and then one Sri Giadak Nimpu (PW5) stopped the accused. Thereafter, PW-2 ran away towards his house and the accused followed him and after some time, the accused brought one dao and again went to the house of Sri Sodak Paying (PW2) and after returning from his house, the accused came towards him (PW-3) and in presence of one Suresh Nipu (PW4) and one Sri Giadak Nimpu (PW5), he caught hold of his color and without any provocation, administered dao blow over his head, and there was bleeding profusely and he ran towards his colony and become unconscious. After he gained sense at CHC, Taliha, and seen his mother there and he told his mother that the accused caused cut injury over his head and asked her to inform the police. Thereafter, he was referred to Daporijo Civil Hospital and from there, he was shifted to Itanagar and from Itanagar he was referred to Shillong, and there he stayed for more than one month. Though the defence side cross-examined him at length, yet nothing tangible could be elicited to discredit his version except that he had no enmity with the accused and he was assaulted near the house of PW-2. The medical evidence also lends support to the version of the victim. 12. The prosecution side examined Dr. D. Dupit as PW12. He deposed that on 01-11-2016, at about 6.30 p.m., the victim was brought by his mother, Smt. Yapa Kodak (PW1), and on police requisition he had examined him and he found lacerated wound on the left side of the skull, which was bleeding and there was also fracture/depression at the cut site of the skull. The size of the injured portion was around 4cm x 4cm x 2cm diameter. According to him, the injury sustained by the victim was grievous in nature and caused by a sharp weapon, i.e., with the blunt side of the dao. As there is lack of medical facility in the CHC, Taliha, after administering first aid, he had referred the victim District Hospital, Daporijo, for management. According to him, the injury sustained by the victim was grievous in nature and caused by a sharp weapon, i.e., with the blunt side of the dao. As there is lack of medical facility in the CHC, Taliha, after administering first aid, he had referred the victim District Hospital, Daporijo, for management. He had exhibited the injury report of the victim as P. Ext.9 (A), and on perusal, the same is found to be consistent with his version. Nothing tangible could be elicited in cross-objection to discredit his version. 13. PW13, Dr. Wangju Sumnyan, another Doctor, who testified that having done the CT Scan of the brain and skull of the victim (PW3) by his Radiographer and examining its image in DICOM (Digital Communication in Medicine) format, he found fracture in the right side of the skull, bleeding between the brain and the skull and small blunt injury in the brain. He exhibited the CT Scan report as P.Ext.2 and the same is also found to be consistent with his version and nothing could be elicited in his cross-examination to describe his evidence. 14. P.W.1-the mother of the victim and PW2-Sri Tadak @ Sodak Paying and PW4, Sri Suresh Nipu also lends support to the version of the victim. And the FIR Ext.P.1 is also consistent with their version. It is to be mentioned here that P.W.4 is the eye witnesses to the occurrence. The evidence of PW2 reveals that the accused caused cut injury over the head of the victim and he saw the entire incident and on the relevant date, he along with Sri Suresh Nipu (PW4) and victim (PW2) were on the main road and then the accused came driving one Tata Mobile and tried to hit them and thereafter, the accused caught hold of him and threatened to kill him. He, then, ran away and the accused followed him and kicked the door of his house, and thereafter, the accused came again with a dao and started hitting his door. He, then, switched off the light and concealed himself and he had seen the accused meeting the victim on the road and also seen causing injury over his head by means of a dao. Later on, he has seen the victim at CHC, Taliha. Nothing could be elicited in the cross-examination of this witness also to discredit his examination-in-chief. He, then, switched off the light and concealed himself and he had seen the accused meeting the victim on the road and also seen causing injury over his head by means of a dao. Later on, he has seen the victim at CHC, Taliha. Nothing could be elicited in the cross-examination of this witness also to discredit his examination-in-chief. He has seen the accused assaulting the victim within 20 metres. 15. PW4, Sri Suresh Nipu has corroborated the version of the PW2 and the victim. His evidence reveals that he along with the victim (PW3) and Sri Sodak Paying (PW2) were walking on the road, the accused came there driving one Tata Mobile in full speed. The accused then caught the color of the victim and was arguing with him. Then P.W.2 ran away. After sometime the accused brought one dao and proceeded to the house of P.W.2. After returning from there he caused injury over the head of the victim by means of a dao. His evidence remained un-impeached in the cross-examination. 16. The evidence of PW5, Sri Gyadak Nyumpu reveals that he has seen the accused trying to assault PW2 by means of a stone and then he intervened in the matter. 17. PW1, Smt. Yapa Kodak, the mother of the victim deposed that on hearing about the occurrence, she proceeded to the CHC, Taliha and found his son in unconscious state and when her son regained sense, he told that the accused assaulted him by means of a dao and then, she lodged the FIR (P. Ext. 1) and, thereafter, he was taken to R.K. Mission Hospital, Itanagar and from there, to Shillong for better treatment. Though this witness had not seen the occurrence of assault yet, she heard it from her son. 18. PW6, Sri Tabu Maying and PW7, Smt. Yarap Maying are the parents of the accused and they have not supported the prosecution version. PW9, Ct. Ongbu Singpho is the witness of seizure and he confirmed the M. Ext.1, dao, before the Court, which was seized vide seizure list -P.Ext.8 by the Investigating Police Officer (PW10). PW10, S.I., Pusa Bayor laid charge-sheet against the accused appellant (P.Ext.12) and he prepared the sketch map (P.Ext.10) and formed seizure memo (P.Ext.8) and the seized the dao (M. Ext. 10). 19. PW11, Sri Sokum Paying is the brother of PW2. PW10, S.I., Pusa Bayor laid charge-sheet against the accused appellant (P.Ext.12) and he prepared the sketch map (P.Ext.10) and formed seizure memo (P.Ext.8) and the seized the dao (M. Ext. 10). 19. PW11, Sri Sokum Paying is the brother of PW2. His evidence reveals that a few years back, the accused called him from the road nearby his rented house, situated at Gandhi market, Taliha to enter into his house and he knew him from earlier as he was the co-driver of a commercial vehicle, he opened the door despite protest of his wife and thereafter, they had beverage. His brother Sri Tadak @ Sodak Paying (PW2) complained against their talking to each other with bit loud voice as the same caused disturbance in his study. On that complaint, the accused got annoyed and had altercation with his younger brother (PW2) and thereby the accused left his house. Thereafter, the PW11 left for Daporijo and he returned to Taliha after some days and came to know from PW2 that the accused had cut the wooden entry door of his rented house while attempting to assault PW2 who was hiding inside his house. His brother also informed him that the accused tried to hit him with his Tata mobile vehicle. 20. Thus, it appears from the evidence of the doctors, PW12 and PW13 that the injury sustained by the victim (PW3) was grievous in nature and caused by sharp object. The injury, so sustained by the victim, falls in the category of grievous hurt as provided in Section 320 of the IPC as it caused fracture the head of the victim measuring 4cm x 4cm x 2cm in diameter, the same has been caused by a dao, which the Investigating Police Officer has seized vide seizure memo, P.Ext.8 and the dao has been exhibited in the Court as M. Ext. 1. Thus, it appears that the victim sustained grievous injuries caused by a sharp object, i.e., dao and as such, the offence under Section 326 of the IPC is clearly made out here in this case. Further it is established that the injury sustained by the victim was caused by none then the accused appellant. 21. However, the learned Court below has convicted the accused-appellant under Section 307 of the IPC, holding that the offence committed is covered by Section 307 of the IPC. Further it is established that the injury sustained by the victim was caused by none then the accused appellant. 21. However, the learned Court below has convicted the accused-appellant under Section 307 of the IPC, holding that the offence committed is covered by Section 307 of the IPC. But, having examined the evidence adduced by the victim (PW3) and other witnesses, it cannot be ascertained that the accused caused injuries to the victim with the intention to kill him. None of the prosecution witnesses whispered any word in this regard and as such, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section 307 of the IPC is made out here in this case and as such the conviction of the accused-appellant under Section 307 of the IPC cannot sustained and accordingly the same stand set aside and quashed. However, the prosecution side has succeeded in establishing beyond all reasonable doubt, that the accused has committed the offence under Section 326 of the IPC. 22. Though Mr. M. Pertin the learned counsel for the accused appellant had submitted there was provocation on the part of the victim and the PW2, but no such evidence is lead to establish the same. Though the appellant has examined two witnesses -Sh. Tipak @ MUkesh Kodak and Sh. Maji Kodak as D.W.1 and D.W. 2 respectively yet they have never testified to that effect and, therefore, there is no force in the submission advanced by Mr. Pertin, learned senior counsel for the appellant that the injuries upon the victim was caused by provocation. 23. That, as regard the other limb of submission of Mr. Pertin that the parties have compounded the offence outside the Court, it appears that the victim (PW3) has filed an affidavit before this Court stating that he has received a sum of Rs.2,50,000/-from the accused and that the village elders in Kebangheld on 14-12-2019, has settled the dispute vide Annexure-1 in the affidavit. Now, the question is whether an offence under Section 326 of the IPC can be compounded as the same is not provided in Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. 24. Mr. Now, the question is whether an offence under Section 326 of the IPC can be compounded as the same is not provided in Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. 24. Mr. Pertin, the learned counsel for the appellant referring to three decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Murali (supra), Ishwar Singh (supra) and Laxmi Narayan (supra) has argued that though the offence is not compoundable, yet the Court has the power, under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., to quash the proceeding. It is mentioned here that in the case of Laxmi Narayan (supra), a three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 29 held as follows: “29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” 25. In the case of Murali (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “If the parties to the dispute have mutually buried their hatchet, then the separate affidavit of the victim inspires confidence that the apology has voluntarily been accepted given the efflux of time and owing to the maturity brought about by age. In the case of Murali (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “If the parties to the dispute have mutually buried their hatchet, then the separate affidavit of the victim inspires confidence that the apology has voluntarily been accepted given the efflux of time and owing to the maturity brought about by age. There is no question of the settlement being as a result of any coercion or inducement and the parties are on friendly terms and they inhabit the same society, it is a fit case to reduce sentence”. 26. In the case of Ishwar Singh (supra) also the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “In our considered opinion, it would not be appropriate to order compounding of an offence not compoundable under the Code ignoring and keeping aside statutory provisions. In our judgment, however, limited submission of the learned counsel for the appellant deserves consideration that while imposing substantive sentence; the factum of compromise between the parties is indeed a relevant circumstance which, the Court may keep in mind.” 27. In the said case Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that:- “Since the incident took place before more than fifteen years; the parties are residing in one and the same village and they are also relatives. The appellant was about 20 years of age at the time of commission of crime. It was his first offence. After conviction, the petitioner was taken into custody. During the pendency of appeal before the High Court, he was enlarged on bail but, after the decision of the High Court, he again surrendered and is in jail at present. Though he had applied for bail, the prayer was not granted and he is not released on bail. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, in our opinion, ends of justice would be met if the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant (Accused No.1) is reduced to the period already undergone.” 28. Here in this case, the appellant was in judicial custody during the period of investigation for 36 days, then, after pronouncement of the judgment on 30-06-2022, he was taken into custody and now serving the sentence. Here in this case, the appellant was in judicial custody during the period of investigation for 36 days, then, after pronouncement of the judgment on 30-06-2022, he was taken into custody and now serving the sentence. The appellant and the victim have mutually buried their hatchet and also the appellant had paid a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- to the victim, and the victim has filed an affidavit to that effect and the learned counsel for the victim also appeared and submits that the matter has already been resolved between the parties in Kebang. Thus, relying upon the ratio, laid down in the case laws discussed herein above, this Court is of the view that modifying the period of sentence which the appellant has already undergone, during the period of investigation and after the sentence, would meet the ends of justice. 29. In view of above, the sentence of the appellant stands modified to the period which he has already undergone. However, the fine amount has to be paid by him and in default he has to suffer the imprisonment as provided by the learned court below. The appeal stands partly allowed. On payment of the fine amount the appellant be released from jail hajoot, if not warranted in any other case. Send down the LCR to the Court below with a copy of this judgment and order immediately.