Judgment 1. With the consent of learned counsel for both parties, the second appeal itself has been heard on merits. 2. This second appeal has been filed by appellant-defendant-tenant (hereafter referred 'tenant') against the judgment and decree dated 15.02.2005 passed by District Judge, Karouli whereby the appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed and upheld the judgment dated 29.03.2001 in suit No.35/1998 passed by Judicial Magistrate, Karauli whereby the suit of eviction was decree against the tenant. 3. The rented premise is a shop measuring 5 X 7 sq. feet situated at Phoota Kot, Mohalla Dholikhar, Karauli which is in tenancy of the appellant since 1964 at the rate of Rs.10/- per month. The dispute of eviction is pending since 1969. In the first eviction suit No.68/1969, the appellant-tenant was declared defaulter in payment of rent, however, he was granted benefit of first default. Thereafter, it appears that tenant committed second default for the period 1.02.1995 to 31.03.1998 and on such default, the second civil suit for eviction No.35/1998 was filed, which has been decreed by the trial court on the ground of second default vide judgment dated 29.03.2001. The judgment of trial court has been affirmed in first appeal vide judgment dated 15.02.2005. 4. While admitting the second appeal, this Court observed in the order dated 25.04.2005 that the appellant shall continue to pay the rent month by month and in case of default for three consecutive months, the stay order shall automatically stand vacated.5. Respondents have filed an application dated 04.07.2011 alleging inter alia that the tenant has committed default in payment of rent during the pendency of this appeal for more than twelve months from January 2010 to January 2011, as the rent for this period was deposited on 07.03.2021 in the bank account of respondent-landlord. 6. No reply to this application has been filed by the appellant-tenant till date. 7. The present eviction suit was led on 02.03.1998 under the provisions of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premise (Control of rent and eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter "the Act of 1950"). The eviction suit filed on the ground of default and bonafide necessity. It was averred that defendant-tenant committed first default for the period from November 1968 to June 1969 and the first civil suit for eviction was decreed vide judgment dated 24.08.1974 on the ground of default. The eviction suit filed on the ground of default and bonafide necessity. It was averred that defendant-tenant committed first default for the period from November 1968 to June 1969 and the first civil suit for eviction was decreed vide judgment dated 24.08.1974 on the ground of default. However, in appeal, the benefit of the Section 13-A of the Act of 1950 was accorded to the defendant-tenant, declaring him the first defaulter. It was averred that after 09.11.1976, the defendant has again committed default in payment of rent which is the second default. The arrears of rent for period from 01.02.1995 to 31.01.1998 were also claimed. 8. Appellant-defendant submitted written statement on 16.07.1999 and contended that in 1976 he sent money order for payment of rent to the plaintiff but plaintiff refused to accept the money order. Thereafter, the defendant has deposited the rent through tender in the court under Section 19-A of the Act of 1950. 9. The trial court, after settlement of issues, recording of evidence of both parties, considered the issue of second default. It was found that in the previous Civil Suit No.165/1969, at the stage of first appeal, the defendant has been given benefit of first default and the copy of previous judgments are available on record. 10. As far as, issue No.2 pertaining to second default is concerned, it was found that rent deposited by the tenant under Section 19-A is not followed the ratio as propounded by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in case of Kuldeep Singh Vs. Ganpat Lal [ (1996) 1 SCC 243 ] was relied upon. On overall appreciation of evidence of parties including documents of tender through which rent was deposited in the court, it was observed that the tenant has committed second default in payment of rent before filing the present eviction suit on 02.03.1998. The trial court also decided the bonafide necessity in favour of the landlord. Finally, decree for eviction was passed on the ground of default and bonafide necessity vide judgment dated 19.03.2001. 11. The appellant-tenant preferred first appeal. During course of first appeal, the landlord's son Rajesh, for whom the necessity of rented shop was alleged, passed away, therefore the issue of bonafide necessity was not pressed. Finally, decree for eviction was passed on the ground of default and bonafide necessity vide judgment dated 19.03.2001. 11. The appellant-tenant preferred first appeal. During course of first appeal, the landlord's son Rajesh, for whom the necessity of rented shop was alleged, passed away, therefore the issue of bonafide necessity was not pressed. The appellate court heard the appeal on the issue of second default, the appellate court reconsidered the validity of deposition of rent under Section 19-A of the Act of 1950, and found that the procedure as prescribed under the statue was not followed, as such the deposition is not valid. Findings of the trial court, declaring the tenant as second defaulter in payment of rent for the period in between 1976 to 1995, were affirmed. Accordingly, the first appeal was dismissed vide judgment dated 15.02.2005. Since on the issue of second default, there is concurrent findings of fact by two courts below duly passed on appreciation of evidence and consideration of the deposition of rent under Section 19-A of the Act of 1950. Both courts have found that the procedure was not followed by the defendant-tenant and the rent deposited before the court is invalid, accordingly, the defendant has committed second default. Substantial questions of law as formulated by this Court require re-appreciation of findings for adjudication. It is a settled proposition of law that while exercising the powers by the High Court under Section 100 of CPC, re-appreciation of findings is not required unless and until the findings of fact recorded by two courts below suffer from any perversity. Counsel for appellant could not point out any infirmity, illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the fact findings of two courts below in relation to the issue of second default. 12. Further, it has also come on record that during course of penedency of this second appeal, appellant-tenant has again committed a default in payment of rent for the period January 2010 to January 2011. Considering the conduct of the appellant-tenant and the old pendency, coupled with the concurrent findings of fact, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the findings of the impugned judgment and eviction decree. 13. Hon'ble The Supreme Court, in case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam Vs. Considering the conduct of the appellant-tenant and the old pendency, coupled with the concurrent findings of fact, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the findings of the impugned judgment and eviction decree. 13. Hon'ble The Supreme Court, in case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam Vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar [(1999) 3SCC 722] has categorically held that the concurrent findings of fact recorded two courts below need not to be disturbed under Section 100 CPC. Further, Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in case of Umerkhan Vs. Bismillabi [ (2011)9 SCC 684 ] has propounded that if a second appeal is admitted on substantial question of law, while hearing second appeal finally, can re-frame substantial question of law or can frame substantial question of law afresh or even can hold that no substantial question of law involved, but the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction of Section 100 CPC without formulating substantial question of law. 14. In view of the aforesaid impugned judgments for eviction passed on the ground of second default and the fact of further default, during the pendency of this second appeal, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the judgment and decree for eviction against the appellant and the same are affirmed. However, since the appellant is in possession since long, the appellant is allowed to retain the possession of rented shop for a period of three months, subject to payment of arrears of rent and the future rent as mesne profits. 15. Accordingly, this second appeal stands disposed of. 16. Since the appeal itself is disposed of, the application (No.01/2022) also stands disposed of.