JUDGMENT : BIREN VAISHNAV, J. 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Mr. Kurven Desai, learned Assistant Government Pleader waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the State-respondents. 2. The prayers made in this petition are to direct the respondents to pay death-cum-retirement benefits such as family pension, gratuity, leave encashment etc. as per the Government Resolution dated 17.10.1988 by counting total length of service of the deceased from initial date of appointment i.e. 09.01.1987 till the last date of service of the deceased employee to the petitioner with all consequential benefits including arrears. 2.1 As far as this prayer is concerned, it is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner’s husband was working as a daily wager from 09.01.1987 and passed away on 19.05.2001. Having earned the benefits of the Resolution dated 17.10.1988 after completion of five and ten years respectively on 09.01.1992 and 09.01.1997, he was entitled to the benefits of pension from counting his service from the initial date of appointment and consequential benefits accordingly to the petitioner. 3. In light of the decision rendered in Special Civil Application No. 14304 of 2019, wherein, the decision rendered in Special Civil Application No. 14300 of 2019 in the case of Executive Engineer (R&B) Department vs. Samudabhai Jyotibhai Bhedi, 2017 (4) GLR 2952 , is considered. As far as the prayer in terms of paragraph16(A) is concerned, the petition is allowed in light of the order dated 09.02.2022 rendered in Special Civil Application No. 14304 of 2019. The respondents are directed to consider the date of initial date of appointment of 09.01.1987 as the initial date of appointment in case of the deceased husband and re-compute the pension counting that date for the purposes of pension. In other words, while computing pensionary benefits, the initial date of appointment shall be taken for the purposes of qualifying services. Pensionary benefits be recomputed accordingly. Pension be revised accordingly and the arrears accruing be paid to the petitioner including the entitlement of revision of family pension based on this within a period of ten weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 4. As far as prayer 16(B) is concerned, in light of the decision rendered in Special Civil Application No. 5257 of 2021 in the case of Solanki Kapilaben Ramsang vs. State of Gujarat, wherein, this Court has held as under: “6. 4. As far as prayer 16(B) is concerned, in light of the decision rendered in Special Civil Application No. 5257 of 2021 in the case of Solanki Kapilaben Ramsang vs. State of Gujarat, wherein, this Court has held as under: “6. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing for the respective parties, the Court, therefore, will have to consider whether the decision of this Court in the case of Nathabhai Ghemarbhai Parmar vs. State of Gujarat and Another, rendered in Special Civil Application No. 1795 of 2013 dated 07.10.2016, should apply to the facts of the case or that of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court rendred in Special Civil Application No. 12270 of 2013 dated 30.08.2016. 6.1 It will be in the fitness of things to appreciate the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench dated 30.08.2016 in the case of Javeed A. Surangi vs. State of Gujarat and Another, relevant paras of which reads as under: “5. Thus the entire premise on which the dispute is rested, is as to whether the father of the petitioner whose status was as per admitted position, was that of a Rojamdar employee, could be treated as a permanent employee for the purpose of applying the scheme for compassionate appointment in Resolution dated 10th March, 2000, on the footing that he was liable to be treated as one entitled to get the benefits of a regular employee under the State Government Resolution dated 17th October, 1988. The respondents have produced Resolution dated 18th July, 1994 of the Road and Building Department, which deals with the aspect of implementation of Dolatbhai Parmar Committee recommendations of which the Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 is a product. In the Resolution dated 17th October, 1988, which is in Gujarati, the word used is “to be treated as regular” or “regular service.” It is clarified in the Resolution dated 18th July, 1994 that those words were used to denote the continuous long service and the security of service conferred on that basis by giving various service benefits, but however, the said words or the said aspect does not confer the beneficiary Rojamdars the actual status of regular employees in the establishment. 5.1 The State Government's Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 operates to grant the benefits of payscale and other benefits of permanancy to the daily-rated workmen working under the different departments, on the basis of length of service they may have put in. It is a policy prescription conferring beneficial service benefits recognising the continuous long period of service of the daily-rated employees who otherwise have no security of service. True that the benefits which are granted in their kind and nature are akin and similar to the regular employees, still however it can be said to be for the long services rendered and not for any other purpose. It cannot be perceived or conceived for any other import. A daily wager receiving benefits under the Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 does not stand on same pedestal with a permanent employee who is permanent because he was appointed in regular way upon regular selection process. Therefore, though the daily wagers would receive benefits of permanency in form of pay-scales and perks, they do not form a same class as “permanent employees” or “regular employees.” A daily wager though getting benefits under the Resolution of 17th October, 1988, he is not regular or permanent employee per se. His original or inherent character and status remain unchanged, but benefits of pay, perks, etc. are secured. They stand as valid classification operating for respective different purposes. 5.2 In any view, even if for such purposes, the daily-rated employees are deemed to be viewed as ‘regular’ or given ‘regularisation’ the said concept is limited for applying and operating the Resolution in question. It cannot extend to seek benefits under the other benefit-oriented schemes when the scheme of compassionate appointment provides that the same applies to permanent employees only and not to ad-hoc or daily-waged employees. 6. The scheme and concepts of State Government Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 cannot be exported there. Not only both the schemes have different purport and import, the daily-rated employees do not acquire status of permanent employees per se. the contemplations of ‘regular’ or ‘permanency benefits’ in the 17th October, 1988 Resolution do not have pervasive effect even for other schemes such as the scheme for giving compassionate appointment or benefits to the kiths and kin of permanent employees. No benefit would ensue unless the scheme specifically provides or mentions. the contemplations of ‘regular’ or ‘permanency benefits’ in the 17th October, 1988 Resolution do not have pervasive effect even for other schemes such as the scheme for giving compassionate appointment or benefits to the kiths and kin of permanent employees. No benefit would ensue unless the scheme specifically provides or mentions. Accepting the contention of the petitioner would mean modifying the scheme for compassionate appointment. As the deceased employee could be classified and treated only as daily wager, the impugned decision of the second respondent dated 07th March, 2013 sustains. The case of the petitioner for giving him compassionate appointment could not be accepted. 7. Petition is dismissed. Notice is discharged with no order as to costs.” 6.2 Considering the Scheme of the Resolution dated 17.10.1988, the Court specifically held that the policy prescription confirming benefits recognising continuous long service of daily rated employees will not ipso facto render them permanent employees. Similar argument was extended by the learned counsel as was extended today for the respondent in the case of Nathabhai (supra), where this Court (Coram: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Abhilasha Kumari) considering this argument and relying on the decision in the case of Mahendrakumar Bhagwandas (supra), observed as under: “6. A perusal of the impugned order dated 26.06.2012 passed by respondent No. 2 makes it amply clear that the only ground for the rejection of the application made by the petitioner for the grant of lump-sum compensation is that his father was a daily waged employee. 7. It may be true that initially, the father of the petitioner was engaged on a daily-wage basis when he entered service under the respondent Board from 01.01.1981. However, it is equally true that on 28.03.2008, respondent No. 2 passed an order making the services of the father of the petitioner permanent with effect from 01.01.1986, that is, after the completion of five years of continuous service as a daily wager. This is evident from the order dated 28.03.2008 passed by respondent No. 2 which has not been disputed by the respondents. The list of daily-waged workers who were made permanent is annexed at running pages 10 to 12 of the petition. The name of the petitioner's father figures at Serial No. 32 of the said list. The services of the petitioner's father were made permanent with effect from 01.01.1986 and remained as such upto his death on 11.07.2011. The list of daily-waged workers who were made permanent is annexed at running pages 10 to 12 of the petition. The name of the petitioner's father figures at Serial No. 32 of the said list. The services of the petitioner's father were made permanent with effect from 01.01.1986 and remained as such upto his death on 11.07.2011. On the date when the petitioner's father died, he was very much a permanent employee of the respondent Department. 8. A strange ground is taken in Paragraph-7 of the affidavit-in-reply filed by respondent No. 2, wherein it is stated that the “service of the petitioner was regularised and his service was converted as permanent daily-wager.” There is no concept of a “permanent daily-wager” in service jurisprudence. What the term “permanent daily-wager” means can only be explained by the second respondent. Mr. Niraj Ashar, learned Assistant Government Pleader, has remained unsuccessful in satisfying this query of the Court. In the order dated 28.03.2008, whereby the services of the petitioner's father were made permanent, respondent No. 2 has used the word “permanent” and not “permanent daily-wager.” The term “permanent daily wager” therefore, appears to have been coined by respondent No. 2, presumably with a view to taking the case of the petitioner out of the scope and ambit of the Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011. 9. The nomenclature of “permanent daily-wage employee” came up for discussion before the Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat and Another vs. Mahendrakumar Bhagvandas and Another, 2011 (2) GLR 1290 . This is what the Division Bench held: “5.......Once the employees concerned were, in fact, treated for all purposes as permanent employees in terms of G.R. dated 17.10.1988, any discrimination or denial of benefits for a segment of such employees, who were subsequently re-branded as “daily wager” (rojamdar) by G.R. dated 18.7.1994, could not be rationally explained and could not be countenanced in the face of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Nor can the State Government legally take away the rights conferred and benefits, already accorded to the employees concerned by or under a subsequent government resolution, which expressly supersedes earlier instructions and not earlier G.R. dated 17.10.1988 by which the benefits were accorded to the employees. Nor can the State Government legally take away the rights conferred and benefits, already accorded to the employees concerned by or under a subsequent government resolution, which expressly supersedes earlier instructions and not earlier G.R. dated 17.10.1988 by which the benefits were accorded to the employees. It also sounds absurd and baseless that employee employed on daily wage basis for 15 years would be made permanent under G.R. dated 17.10.1988 but subsequently re-branded and treated as a daily wager. The submission of learned AGP that such employees had to continue as daily wage employee, with limited benefits in terms of subsequent G.R. dated 18.7.1994 and that they were at best “permanent daily wage employees” is contradictory and has no backing of any legal provision or precedent. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned common judgment except for the clarification made hereunder.” 10. The contention in the affidavit-in-reply that the father of the petitioner was a “permanent daily-wager” and, therefore, could not be given the benefit of the Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011 is, therefore, contrary to the principles of law laid down by the Division Bench in the above judgment and also to their own order dated 28.03.2008 by which the petitioner's father was made permanent. 11. A submission has been advanced by Mr. Niraj Ashar, learned Assistant Government Pleader, that the services of the petitioner's father were regularised under the Industrial Disputes Act and not under the Gujarat Civil Services Rules, therefore, he cannot be said to be a permanent employee. Another submission advanced is that as the petitioner's father was not appointed under the Gujarat Civil Services Rules, he cannot get benefit of the Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011. Both these submissions deserve outright rejection. It is a matter of record that the petitioner’s father was initially appointed as a daily-wager with effect from 01.01.1981 and his services came to be made permanent with effect from 01.01.1986, by the order dated 28.03.2008. It is the permanent nature of the appointment of the petitioner's father at the time of his death that is to be considered for the benefit under the Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011 and not whether he was initially appointed as a daily-wager. The submission that the petitioner's father was appointed under the Industrial Disputes Act, is factually and legally incorrect. It is the permanent nature of the appointment of the petitioner's father at the time of his death that is to be considered for the benefit under the Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011 and not whether he was initially appointed as a daily-wager. The submission that the petitioner's father was appointed under the Industrial Disputes Act, is factually and legally incorrect. Having been engaged as a daily-wager in the year 1981 and thereafter, being accorded permanent status with effect from 01.01.1986, there is no question of appointment under the Gujarat Civil Services Rules. The contention raised by learned Assistant Government Pleader is totally irrelevant and out of context. 12. The material on record is sufficient to show that the petitioner's father has enjoyed the status of the permanent employee for a period of thirty years, therefore, the rejection of the application of the petitioner on the ground that his father was a daily-wager when he died is against the factual position and is, therefore, unjustified and untenable. 13. The impugned order dated 26.06.2012 reveals that the sole reason for the rejection of the application of the petitioner is that his father was a daily-wager and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of the Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011 as the said benefits are not extended to daily-waged employees. No other reason has been indicated in the said order. However, in the affidavit-in-reply filed by respondent No. 2, a new and additional ground has been taken, wherein it is stated that the petitioner received an amount of Rs.3,68,498/ as gratuity and an amount of Rs.1,36,450/ as leave encashment pursuant to the death of his father, therefore, he cannot be said to be in a penurious condition. This ground has not been taken in the impugned order and is not a ground on which the application of the petitioner has been rejected. The respondents cannot be permitted to take a new ground in the affidavit-in-reply so as to supplement the order passed earlier. Such a new ground, which is not taken in the impugned order, cannot be looked into by this Court. This position of law has been clearly enunciated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Sigh Gill Commissioner and Another vs. The Chief Election, AIR 1978 SC 851 , in the following terms: “8. Such a new ground, which is not taken in the impugned order, cannot be looked into by this Court. This position of law has been clearly enunciated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Sigh Gill Commissioner and Another vs. The Chief Election, AIR 1978 SC 851 , in the following terms: “8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought, out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. in Gordhandas Bhanji (1) “Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to, do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to effect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.” Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older. 14. As stated by the Supreme Court in the above judgment, the validity of an order is to be judged by the reasons mentioned therein and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of an affidavit, or otherwise. The additional reason reflected in the affidavit-in-reply filed by respondent No. 2, therefore, cannot be taken into account and cannot be accepted. 15. It is stipulated in the Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011, at Clause 6, that the benefits of the Government Resolution would not be available to a person whose application has been rejected under the earlier Scheme. However, if it is found that the rejection itself is untenable and unjustified and, therfore, illegal, and if such rejection is set aside by the Court, this clause cannot come in the way of the petitioner. It may be true that the application of the petitioner for the grant of lump-sum compensation has been rejected by the impugned order. However, if it is found that the rejection itself is untenable and unjustified and, therfore, illegal, and if such rejection is set aside by the Court, this clause cannot come in the way of the petitioner. It may be true that the application of the petitioner for the grant of lump-sum compensation has been rejected by the impugned order. As stated earlier, the impugned order has been passed on a legally and factually incorrect premise, as the father of the petitioner was not a daily-waged employee when he died on 11.07.2011, but held the status of permanent employee ever since 01.01.1986. The basis on which the impugned order has been passed is, therefore, incorrect and unjustified. An order that is not in accordance with law can be termed to be an illegal order. The impugned order, therefore, being illegal, deserves to be quashed and set aside. As such, clause 6 of the Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011 cannot be an obstruction in the case of the petitioner. 16. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated hereinabove, the following order is passed: The impugned order dated 26.06.2012, passed by respondent No. 2, is hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioner for the grant of lump-sum compensation under the Government Resolution dated 05.07.2011, in accordance with law, within a period of two months from the date of the receipt of a copy of this judgment. 17. The petition is allowed, in the above terms. Rule is made absolute accordingly. There shall be no orders as to costs.” 6.3 What emphatically needs to be reproduced of the learned Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Nathabhai (supra) is paragraph 9, wherein extensive reference is made to extracted portion in the case of Mahendrakumar Bhagwandas (supra). The said Para 9 of the decision read as under: “9. The nomenclature of “permanent daily-wage employee” came up for discussion before the Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat and Another vs. Mahendrakumar Bhagvandas and Another, 2011 (2) GLR 1290 . The said Para 9 of the decision read as under: “9. The nomenclature of “permanent daily-wage employee” came up for discussion before the Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat and Another vs. Mahendrakumar Bhagvandas and Another, 2011 (2) GLR 1290 . This is what the Division Bench held: “5......Once the employees concerned were, in fact, treated for all purposes as permanent employees in terms of G.R. dated 17.10.1988, any discrimination or denial of benefits for a segment of such employees, who were subsequently re-branded as “daily wager” (rojamdar) by G.R. dated 18.7.1994, could not be rationally explained and could not be countenanced in the face of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Nor can the State Government legally take away the rights conferred and benefits, already accorded to the employees concerned by or under a subsequent government resolution, which expressly supersedes earlier instructions and not earlier G.R. dated 17.10.1988 by which the benefits were accorded to the employees. It also sounds absurd and baseless that employee employed on daily wage basis for 15 years would be made permanent under G.R. dated 17.10.1988 but subsequently re-branded and treated as a daily wager. The submission of learned AGP that such employees had to continue as daily wage employee, with limited benefits in terms of subsequent G.R. dated 18.7.1994 and that they were at best “permanent daily wage employees” is contradictory and has no backing of any legal provision or precedent. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned common judgment except for the clarification made hereunder.” (Emphasis supplied) 6.4 What is also evident is that the Division Bench in the case of Mahendrakumar Bhagvandas (supra), in its decision dated 18.03.2011 had considered this analogy and while referring to a decision of the learned Single Judge in Para 7 of the decision, held as under: “7. Apparently the aforesaid resolution dated 18.7.1994 was not pressed into service when the impugned judgment dated 6.4.2000 was delivered. It is observed by learned Single Judge as under: “......It appears that the Government Resolution is very clear that these petitioners who have completed more than 10 years as daily workers will be treated as permanent employees and they will get regular scale of pay. It is observed by learned Single Judge as under: “......It appears that the Government Resolution is very clear that these petitioners who have completed more than 10 years as daily workers will be treated as permanent employees and they will get regular scale of pay. When these employees are treated as permanent employees with regular scale of pay, I do not find any reasons that they will be deprived of the benefits given to other government employees of same category. There cannot be any confusion about the Government Resolution and it is obligatory on the part of the government to extend all the benefits to these petitioners, who have been regularzed on regular posts with regular scale of pay....” 7. Considering the question of law as aforesaid, when the decisions of this Court rendered in Special Civil Application No. 12270 of 2013 and Letters Patent Appeal No. 1532 of 2007 are silent about the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Mahendrakumar Bhagwandas (supra), wherein specifically the Court have opined that there can be no concept of permanent daily wager, I see no reason why the benefit of the resolution granting financial lump-sum compensation to the petitioner cannot be extended. 8. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 11.02.2021, only to the limited extent that it rejects the case of the petitioner on the ground of the deceased being a daily wager is rejected. The benefits of the Resolution dated 07.04.2016 shall be accorded to the petitioner, in accordance with law, preferably within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. On the second ground with regard to the outstanding amount and the procurement of the No Objection Certificate with the bank is not considered. The aforesaid order dated 11.02.2021, therefore, is quashed and set aside only to the limited extent. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no orders as to costs.” 5. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioner for the benefits of the resolution dated 05.07.2011 and 07.04.2016 within the time limit stipulated in the above direction. The petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule is made absolute to the above extent.