ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Anil Kumar, learned Additional Solicitor General of India and Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned Spl.P.P. for the NIA. 2. In Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 514 of 2022 challenge has been made to the order dated 06.05.2022 passed by Shri Madhuresh Kumar Verma, learned AJC-XVI-cum-Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi in Special (NIA/RNC-04/2021) corresponding to NIA Case RC-04/2021/NIA/RNC (ATS P.S. Case No. 01/ 2021), whereby and whereunder, the period of investigation has been extended from 90 days to 120 days. 3. In Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 533 of 2022, the appellant has prayed for setting aside the order dated 10.05.2022 passed by Shri Madhuresh Kumar Verma, learned AJC-XVI-cum-Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi in Misc. Criminal Application No. 824/2022 arising out of Special (NIA/RNC-04/2021) by virtue of which the prayer for default bail u/s 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been rejected. 4. Since the fate of Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 533 of 2022 is dependent on the outcome of Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 514 of 2022, we feel it expedient that Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 514 of 2022 be considered and disposed of at first. 5. It has been alleged that during investigation of Tandwa P.S. Case No. 132 of 2021, the informant had received an information that one Avinash Kumar in conspiracy with others was engaged in supplying arms and ammunitions to naxalites and other antisocial elements for which Sanha No. 08/2021 was registered. In order to verify such information a team was constituted and Avinash Kumar was apprehended. On his disclosure one Rishi Kumar was also apprehended and they had disclosed about demanding levy in the form of ammunition of 200 pieces for Insas Rifle. On 14.11.2021 recovery of ammunitions buried on the ground were made. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations ATS P.S. Case No. 01/ 2021 was instituted. The investigation was taken over by the National Investigation Agency pursuant to the order of the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 03.12.2001 and the F.I.R. was reregistered as RC-04/2021/NIA/RNC. 6. The appellant had earlier moved for anticipatory bail in A.B.P. No. 2282 of 2021 before the Court of learned AJC-XVI, Ranchi, but the same was subsequently withdrawn on 03.01.2022 as the investigation was taken over by the NIA. 6. The appellant had earlier moved for anticipatory bail in A.B.P. No. 2282 of 2021 before the Court of learned AJC-XVI, Ranchi, but the same was subsequently withdrawn on 03.01.2022 as the investigation was taken over by the NIA. The appellant had again prayed for anticipatory bail in A.B.P. No. 13 of 2022 before the Special Court, NIA which became infructuous on account of the arrest of the appellant on 07.02.2022 and his subsequent remand to judicial custody on 08.02.2022. 7. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the impugned order dated 06.05.2022 is bad in law as the extension granted in investigation from 90 days to 120 days was behind the back of the appellant and in fact the appellant was caught unawares when he had filed the application for default bail u/s 167(2) Cr.P.C. as such extension was already in place making such application redundant. He has submitted that the principles of natural justice signifies fundamental rules of judicial procedure and the appellant being the accused should have been noticed before any order detrimental to his interest was passed. Mr. Sinha has referred to Section 43(D)(2) of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (U.A.P. Act), 1967 which relates to applicability of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, subject to the modification as at (a) and (b) of the said provision. He has submitted that Section 20(4)(bb) of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act is in pari materia with Section 43(D)(2)(b) of U.A.P. Act and in such context he has referred to the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharastra reported in (1994) 4 SCC 602 . Continuing further submission has been advanced that it is a settled principle of law that there should be fair play in criminal law and no order should be passed without giving a fair hearing to the party who will have an impact of the order passed by the Court. There is no doubt about the fact that the Court has the power to grant extension of time for completion of investigation, but exercise of such power must confirm to the principles of fair play and natural justice. It has been submitted that mechanically extending the time for filing charge sheet without even notifying the accused and without hearing the accused has led to his indefeasible right being frustrated. Mr. It has been submitted that mechanically extending the time for filing charge sheet without even notifying the accused and without hearing the accused has led to his indefeasible right being frustrated. Mr. Sinha has also submitted that the NIA in its counter affidavit has admitted that no notice was given to the appellant regarding the prayer for extension of time for conclusion of investigation. It has been submitted that once the order extending time for completion of investigation from 90 days to 120 days is held to be bad, the appellant automatically becomes entitled for bail in view of the provisions of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. 8. Mr. Anil Kumar, learned Additional Solicitor General of India has refuted the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant by submitting that a prayer was made by the NIA for extending the period for conclusion of investigation by supplementing the same with materials submitted in sealed cover and the Court being satisfied that it was not possible to conclude the investigation within 90 days had extended the period by 30 days within which time charge sheet has been submitted by the NIA. He has further submitted that merely because the appellant was not heard by the learned court below, the impugned order dated 06.05.2022 would not become inoperative and redundant. The primacy for the learned court below was the extension of period for conclusion of investigation and the documents submitted by the investigating agency necessitated such extension and therefore the appellant is precluded from drawing an inference that the impugned order dated 06.05.2022 is bad in law. 9. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the respective parties and we have also perused the materials on record. 10. The sequence of events unfolded with the registration of an F.I.R. being ATS P.S. Case No. 01/ 2021. The investigation was taken over by the NIA and on 9.12.2021, the F.I.R. was reregistered as RC-04/2021/NIA/RNC. The appellant was remanded on 08.02.2022 to judicial custody. On 28.04.2022 an application was preferred by the NIA for extending the period for conclusion of investigation. The investigation was taken over by the NIA and on 9.12.2021, the F.I.R. was reregistered as RC-04/2021/NIA/RNC. The appellant was remanded on 08.02.2022 to judicial custody. On 28.04.2022 an application was preferred by the NIA for extending the period for conclusion of investigation. The reasons enumerated for such extension was that several suspects were still at large, the digital exhibits and the arms and ammunitions seized/ collected during the investigation have been sent to C-DAC Thiruanantpuram for forensic examination for which the report is still awaited and that it was necessary to unearth the larger conspiracy. By virtue of the impugned order dated 06.05.2022, the learned court below had extended the period of investigation as well as judicial custody of the appellant for 30 days till 06.06.2022. As per the appellant on 09.05.2022 he had completed 90 days in judicial custody though as per the prosecution it was 07.05.2022 and as such by invoking the provisions of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. the appellant had filed an application for default bail on 10.05.2022. On 10.05.2022 itself the prayer for default bail was rejected on the ground that the Court had already extended the period of investigation from 90 days to 120 days and therefore the application itself was held to be not maintainable. Immediately on such rejection on 11.05.2022 charge sheet was submitted by the NIA pursuant to which cognizance was taken on 13.05.2022. 11. The preeminent submission advanced by Mr. Sinha is of violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play as the appellant was never supplied with a copy of the application seeking extension of the period of investigation nor he was heard prior to passing of the impugned order dated 06.05.2022. 12. To evaluate the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respective sides some legal provisions guiding the subject under consideration have to be taken note of. Section 167 Cr.P.C. lays down the procedure when investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours and sub section (2) of the same deals with the maximum period during which a person accused of an offence may be kept in custody to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation and file charge sheet. Section 167 Cr.P.C. lays down the procedure when investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours and sub section (2) of the same deals with the maximum period during which a person accused of an offence may be kept in custody to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation and file charge sheet. Section 43(D) of UAP Act, 1967 provides for modified application of certain provisions of the Code and sub section (2) reads as follows:- Section 43(D) ……… (2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modification that in sub-section (2),— (a) the references to “fifteen days”, “ninety days” and “sixty days”, wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to “thirty days”, “ninety days” and “ninety days” respectively; and (b) after the proviso, the following provisos shall be inserted, namely:— “Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Court may if it is satisfied with the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days, extend the said period up to one hundred and eighty days: Provided also that if the police officer making the investigation under this Act, requests, for the purposes of investigation, for police custody from judicial custody of any person in judicial custody, he shall file an affidavit stating the reasons for doing so and shall also explain the delay, if any, for requesting such police custody.” The proviso to sub section (2)(b) of Section 43(D) of the UAP Act, 1967 envisages that the Court may extend the period for completion of investigation up to 180 days if it is satisfied with the report of Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation. The question whether there was a requirement of giving notice to an accused at the time of granting extension for conclusion of investigation came up for consideration in the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharastra reported in (1994) 4 SCC 602 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering amongst other issues, the effect of Section 20(4)(bb) of TADA Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering amongst other issues, the effect of Section 20(4)(bb) of TADA Act. Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act reads as follows:- Section 20(4)(bb) ……… (4) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder subject to the modifications that— (a) the reference in sub-section (1) thereof to “Judicial Magistrate” shall be construed as a reference to “Judicial Magistrate or Executive Magistrate or Special Executive Magistrate”; ((b) the references in sub-section (2) thereof to “fifteen days,” “ninety days” and “sixty days” wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to “sixty days,” [“one hundred and eighty days”] and 10 [“one hundred and eighty days”], respectively; and 11 [(bb) in sub-section (2), after the proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:— ‘Provided further that, if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of “one hundred and eighty days”, the Designated Court shall extend the said period up to one year, on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days; and’]. It is therefore absolutely clear that Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act and 43(D)(2) of the UAP Act is pari materia. In such context we may now have a glimpse of the relevant part of the judgment rendered in the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharastra (Supra):- 21. Thus, we find that once the period for filing the charge-sheet has expired and either no extension under clause (bb) has been granted by the Designated Court or the period of extension has also expired, the accused person would be entitled to move an application for being admitted to bail under sub-section (4) of Section 20 TADA read with Section 167 of the Code and the Designated Court shall release him on bail, if the accused seeks to be so released and furnishes the requisite bail. We are not impressed with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that on the expiry of the period during which investigation is required to be completed under Section 20(4) TADA read with Section 167 of the Code, the court must release the accused on bail on its own motion even without any application from an accused person on his offering to furnish bail. In our opinion an accused is required to make an application if he wishes to be released on bail on account of the ‘default’ of the investigating/prosecuting agency and once such an application is made, the court should issue a notice to the public prosecutor who may either show that the prosecution has obtained the order for extension for completion of investigation from the court under clause (bb) or that the challan has been filed in the Designated Court before the expiry of the prescribed period or even that the prescribed period has actually not expired and thus resist the grant of bail on the alleged ground of ‘default’. The issuance of notice would avoid the possibility of an accused obtaining an order of bail under the ‘default’ clause by either deliberately or inadvertently concealing certain facts and would avoid multiplicity of proceedings. It would, therefore, serve the ends of justice if both sides are heard on a petition for grant of bail on account of the prosecution’s ‘default’. Similarly, when a report is submitted by the public prosecutor to the Designated Court for grant of extension under clause (bb), its notice should be issued to the accused before granting such an extension so that an accused may have an opportunity to oppose the extension on all legitimate and legal grounds available to him. It is true that neither clause (b) nor clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 TADA specifically provide for the issuance of such a notice but in our opinion the issuance of such a notice must be read into these provisions both in the interest of the accused and the prosecution as well as for doing complete justice between the parties. This is a requirement of the principles of natural justice and the issuance of notice to the accused or the public prosecutor, as the case may be, would accord with fair play in action, which the courts have always encouraged and even insisted upon. This is a requirement of the principles of natural justice and the issuance of notice to the accused or the public prosecutor, as the case may be, would accord with fair play in action, which the courts have always encouraged and even insisted upon. It would also strike a just balance between the interest of the liberty of an accused on the one hand and the society at large through the prosecuting agency on the other hand. There is no prohibition to the issuance of such a notice to the accused or the public prosecutor in the scheme of the Act and no prejudice whatsoever can be caused by the issuance of such a notice to any party. We must as already noticed reiterate that the objection to the grant of bail to an accused on account of the ‘default’ of the prosecution to complete the investigation and file the challan within the maximum period prescribed under clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 TADA or within the extended period as envisaged by clause (bb) has to be limited to cases where either the factual basis for invoking the ‘default’ clause is not available or the period for completion of investigation has been extended under clause (bb) and the like. No other condition like the gravity of the case, seriousness of the offence or character of the offender etc. can weigh with the court at that stage to refuse the grant of bail to an accused under sub-section (4) of Section 20 TADA on account of the ‘default’ of the prosecution. 30. In conclusion, we may (even at the cost of repetition) say that an accused person seeking bail under Section 20(4) has to make an application to the court for grant of bail on grounds of ‘default’ of the prosecution and the court shall release the accused on bail after notice to the public prosecutor uninfluenced by the gravity of the offence or the merits of the prosecution case since Section 20(8) does not control the grant of bail under Section 20(4) of TADA and both the provisions operate in separate and independent fields. It is, however, permissible for the public prosecutor to resist the grant of bail by seeking an extension under clause (bb) by filing a report for the purpose before the court. It is, however, permissible for the public prosecutor to resist the grant of bail by seeking an extension under clause (bb) by filing a report for the purpose before the court. However, no extension shall be granted by the court without notice to an accused to have his say regarding the prayer for grant of extension under clause (bb). In this view of the matter, it is immaterial whether the application for bail on ground of ‘default’ under Section 20(4) is filed first or the report as envisaged by clause (bb) is filed by the public prosecutor first so long as both are considered while granting or refusing bail. If the period prescribed by clause (b) of Section 20(4) has expired and the court does not grant an extension on the report of the public prosecutor made under clause (bb), the court shall release the accused on bail as it would be an indefeasible right of the accused to be so released. Even where the court grants an extension under clause (bb) but the charge-sheet is not filed within the extended period, the court shall have no option but to release the accused on bail if he seeks it and is prepared to furnish the bail as directed by the court. Moreover, no extension under clause (bb) can be granted by the Designated Court except on a report of the public prosecutor nor can extension be granted for reasons other than those specifically contained in clause (bb) which must be strictly construed. 13. It has been specifically held that no extension shall be granted by the Court without notice to an accused to have his say regarding the prayer for grant of extension under clause (bb) of Section 20(4) of TADA Act. In the case of Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI, Bombay reported in (1994) 5 SCC 410 it was held as follows:- 53 (2)(a) Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act only requires production of the accused before the court in accordance with Section 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and this is how the requirement of notice to the accused before granting extension beyond the prescribed period of 180 days in accordance with the further proviso to clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the TADA Act has to be understood in the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur. The requirement of such notice to the accused before granting the extension for completing the investigation is not a written notice to the accused giving reasons therein. Production of the accused at that time in the court informing him that the question of extension of the period for completing the investigation is being considered, is alone sufficient for the purpose. 14. A similar issue as of the present case fell for consideration before the Karnataka High Court in the case of Muzammil Pasa and others v. National Investigation Agency reported in 2021 SCC Online Kar 12688 and it was held as follows:- 29. In my considered opinion, the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hitendra Thakur and in the case of Sanjay Dutt would be applicable to the facts of the present case. Since the petitioners were not given an opportunity of being heard before passing an order on the application filed by the prosecution for extension of time for completion of the investigation and since the petitioners were not kept present before the court when the application filed by the prosecution for extension of time for completion of the investigation was being considered and since the petitioners were not notified that such an application filed by the prosecution was being considered by the court for the purpose of extending the time for completion of investigation, I am of the considered opinion that the order passed by the trial court on the application filed by the prosecution under the first proviso to Section 43-D(2)(b) of the Act of 1967 extending the time to complete the investigation is legally unsustainable and accordingly, the point No. 1 for consideration is answered in the negative. 15. On a conjoint reading of the judicial pronouncements as noted above what can be culled out is that the accused has to be made aware about the prosecuting agency seeking extension of time for conclusion of investigation either notifying the accused about its intention and/or by making the application in the presence of the accused. 16. Adverting back to the case in hand it is an indisputable fact and supported by the counter affidavit of the NIA as well that no notice was given to the appellant regarding the seeking of extension for conclusion of investigation by the prosecuting agency and no copy of the application dated 28.04.2022 was served upon him. 16. Adverting back to the case in hand it is an indisputable fact and supported by the counter affidavit of the NIA as well that no notice was given to the appellant regarding the seeking of extension for conclusion of investigation by the prosecuting agency and no copy of the application dated 28.04.2022 was served upon him. So far as the presence of the appellant at the time of passing of the impugned order dated 06.05.2022 is concerned it also is undisputed that the impugned order was not passed in the presence of the appellant. The learned court below did not at all consider these aspects of the matter and only by taking recourse to the proviso to Section 43(D)(2) of the UAP Act had allowed the application for completion of investigation filed by the NIA. 17. The rules of natural justice and fair play mandated in law having been not considered by the learned court below, we have no hesitation to come to a finding that the order dated 06.05.2022 is bad in law and liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the order dated 06.05.2022 passed by Shri Madhuresh Kumar Verma, learned AJC-XVI-cum-Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi in Special (NIA/RNC-04/2021) corresponding to NIA Case RC-04/2021/NIA/RNC is hereby set aside. Consequent to the setting aside of the order dated 06.05.2022 which is impugned to Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 514 of 2022, the prayer for default bail made by the appellant u/s 167(2) Cr.P.C. and its rejection vide order dated 10.05.2022 being the subject matter of Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 533 of 2022 gets revived. The application 167(2) Cr.P.C. was rejected as not maintainable since the period of investigation was extended from 90 days to 120 days by the learned court below. 17. To recapitulate the appellant was remanded to judicial custody on 08.02.2022 and on completion of 90 days he had invoked his right to default bail by filing an application u/s 167(2) Cr.P.C. on 10.05.2022. He had completed 90 days in custody on 09.05.2022 though as per the prosecution it was completed on 07.05.2022. The discrepancies in the date are hardly material since admittedly no charge sheet was submitted by the time the application u/s 167(2) Cr.P.C. was preferred by the appellant. In fact the charge sheet was submitted on 11.05.2022. However, the subsequent filing of charge sheet would not render the application u/s 167(2) Cr.P.C. vulnerable. The discrepancies in the date are hardly material since admittedly no charge sheet was submitted by the time the application u/s 167(2) Cr.P.C. was preferred by the appellant. In fact the charge sheet was submitted on 11.05.2022. However, the subsequent filing of charge sheet would not render the application u/s 167(2) Cr.P.C. vulnerable. We may in such context refer to the case of Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2020) 10 SCC 616 wherein it has been held as follows:- 36. A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions would show that so long as an application for grant of default bail is made on expiry of the period of 90 days (which application need not even be in writing) before a charge-sheet is filed, the right to default bail becomes complete. It is of no moment that the criminal court in question either does not dispose of such application before the charge-sheet is filed or disposes of such application wrongly before such charge-sheet is filed. So long as an application has been made for default bail on expiry of the stated period before time is further extended to the maximum period of 180 days, default bail, being an indefeasible right of the accused under the first proviso to Section 167(2), kicks in and must be granted. 18. The scope of the right to be exercised u/s 167(2) Cr.P.C. has recently been considered in the case of M. Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence reported in 2021)2 SCC 485 and it has been held as follows:- 25.1. Once the accused files an application for bail under the proviso to Section 167(2) he is deemed to have “availed of” or enforced his right to be released on default bail, accruing after expiry of the stipulated time-limit for investigation. Thus, if the accused applies for bail under Section 167(2) CrPC read with Section 36-A(4), NDPS Act upon expiry of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, the court must release him on bail forthwith without any unnecessary delay after getting necessary information from the Public Prosecutor, as mentioned supra. Such prompt action will restrict the prosecution from frustrating the legislative mandate to release the accused on bail in case of default by the investigating agency. 25.2. Such prompt action will restrict the prosecution from frustrating the legislative mandate to release the accused on bail in case of default by the investigating agency. 25.2. The right to be released on default bail continues to remain enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding pendency of the bail application; or subsequent filing of the charge-sheet or a report seeking extension of time by the prosecution before the court; or filing of the charge-sheet during the interregnum when challenge to the rejection of the bail application is pending before a higher court. 25.3. However, where the accused fails to apply for default bail when the right accrues to him, and subsequently a charge-sheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished. The Magistrate would be at liberty to take cognizance of the case or grant further time for completion of the investigation, as the case may be, though the accused may still be released on bail under other provisions of the CrPC. 25.4. Notwithstanding the order of default bail passed by the court, by virtue of Explanation I to Section 167(2), the actual release of the accused from custody is contingent on the directions passed by the competent court granting bail. If the accused fails to furnish bail and/or comply with the terms and conditions of the bail order within the time stipulated by the court, his continued detention in custody is valid. 19. The prayer for default bail therefore subsists so far as the appellant is concerned irrespective of the filing of the charge sheet at a later date. Consequently, the order dated 10.05.2022 passed by Shri Madhuresh Kumar Verma, learned AJC-XVI-cum-Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi in Misc. Criminal Application No. 824/2022 arising out of Special (NIA/RNC-04/2021) is set aside with a further direction that the appellant be directed to be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 20,000/-(Rs. Ten Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned trial court [learned AJC-XVI-cum-Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi] in connection with Special (NIA/RNC-04/2021) corresponding to NIA Case RC-04/2021/NIA/RNC (ATS P.S. Case No. 01/ 2021). 20. Both these appeals are allowed.