JUDGMENT : 1. This revision petition, under Sections 401/397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is directed against the judgment and order dated 23.03.2020, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Yupia, Papum Pare (A.P.) in Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 2019. It is to be noted here that vide impugned order, the learned Court below has upheld the judgment and order, dated 30.10.2019, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Yupia, Papum Pare, convicting the petitioner under section 138 N.I. Act and sentencing him to pay a sum of Rs. 11,00,000, being the compensation, within three months and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, in C.R. Case No. 71/2016. 2. The factual background, leading to filing of the present petition, is briefly stated as under: “The petitioner, Shri Kanya Doke, had approached the respondent- Shri Tongom Jamoh for a sum of Rs. 13,00,000/ (Rupees Thirteen Lacs) only as loan and the respondent has given the same from Tongam Jamoh Mutual Fund on the condition that the petitioner shall repay the loan amount with 10% interest, within three months. But the petitioner had failed to repay the loan amount within stipulated time. Thereafter, on repeated request the petitioner had issued two post dated cheques to the respondent and one of the cheque, bearing No. 055929, dated 11.08.2016 was for an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/, drawn on Bank of Maharastra. The respondent then presented the said cheque for encashment with his banker- Punjab National Bank, at Ganga Branch, Itanagar, on 12.08.2016, but the same returned unpaid with an endorsement “Insufficient Fund.” Then on 13.08.2016, the respondent issued demand notice to the petitioner asking him to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of receipt of the same. But, the petitioner had failed to make payment of the demanded amount. Then being left with no other option the respondent had filed one case, being complaint case No. 71/2016, under section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act case, before the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Yupia. The petitioner had contested the same. Then after hearing both side the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had found that the respondent had succeeded in establishing the case against the petitioner and accordingly convicted the petitioner under section 138 N.I. Act and sentenced him to pay a sum of Rs. The petitioner had contested the same. Then after hearing both side the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had found that the respondent had succeeded in establishing the case against the petitioner and accordingly convicted the petitioner under section 138 N.I. Act and sentenced him to pay a sum of Rs. 11,00,000/-, being the compensation within three months, and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, vide judgment and order dated 30.10.2019. Being highly aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 30.10.2019, of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Yupia, the petitioner had preferred an appeal, being Criminal Appeal No. 12/2019, before the court of learned Sessions Judge, Yupia. But the same also came to be dismissed on 30.10.2020.” 3. Being highly aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 30.10.2019, of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Yupia, the petitioner had preferred an appeal, being Criminal Appeal No. 12/2019, before the court of learned Sessions Judge, Yupia. But the same also came to be dismissed on 30.10.2020.” 3. Being highly aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred this revision petition and contended to set aside the conviction and sentence of the petitioner, on the following grounds:- (i) That, the learned court below had failed to appreciate the evidence on the record as well as the points of law while arriving at the finding of guilt of the petitioner under section 138 N.I. Act; (ii) That, the learned court below had failed to appreciate the fact that there was no legally enforceable debt on the part of the petitioner and the cheque in question was issued as security; (iii) That, the respondent had failed to establish his authority to represent the ‘Tongom Jamoh Mutual Fund’ in respect of whom the money receipt dated 13.02.2014 was executed by the petitioner; (iv) That, ‘Tongom Jamoh Mutual Fund’, being an unregistered organisation with that of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), and had no authority to advance loan and as such cannot charge interest on loan and the respondent has no authority to represent it; (v) That, there is no mention of the cheque No. 055929 being handed over by the petitioner as security to the alleged loan taken by the petitioner, and as such there is no legally enforceable debt; (vi) That, the cheque in question was issued by M/S Lendo Ice Cream which is a separate legal entity and as such M/S Lendo Ice Cream is a prime accused liable for issuing the cheque No. 055929, and the petitioner being an individual cannot be held liable for the aforesaid cheque; (vii) That, even assuming that the petitioner had availed loan, the same was repaid by the petitioner with interest as is evident from the evidence of D.W.1, 2 3, and 4, and Exhibit-D/1. D/2, and D/3, clearly established that the respondent had received the amount, and the learned court below had failed to appreciate the defence evidence in view of section 114 of the Evidence Act; (viii) That, there is total nor reading as well as total misreading of evidence by the learned court below; 4. Heard Mr. D/2, and D/3, clearly established that the respondent had received the amount, and the learned court below had failed to appreciate the defence evidence in view of section 114 of the Evidence Act; (viii) That, there is total nor reading as well as total misreading of evidence by the learned court below; 4. Heard Mr. C. Joshi, the learned counsel for the petitioner. Also, I heard Mr. V. Jamoh, the learned counsel for the respondent. 5. Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioner, had reiterated the points mentioned herein above during argument. He also submits that the learned Sessions Judge had not considered the entire contention of the petitioner and did not consider any grounds mentioned in the petition. Referring to defence evidence and its exhibits, Mr. Joshi submits that the petitioner had paid a sum of Rs. 35,00,000/ and money receipts were enclosed with the record of learned court below from page No.37 to 38 and said documents were exhibited during trial, but, the learned courts below had overlooked the material evidence and arrived at a perverse finding. Mr. Joshi, referring one case law Ramaiah @ Rama vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 365 , submits that documents produced by prosecution, but not exhibited/formally proved, can be relied upon by the defence even without formal proof thereto by prosecution, to falsify the prosecution version. Referring to another case law of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Janki Devi vs. Juggilal Kamlapat, reported in 1971 1 SCC 477 , Mr. Joshi submits that once the document is used in cross-examination, then the document gets proved and can be used in evidence. Mr. Joshi further pointed out that the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge is ad-verbatim reproduction of the judgment of the learned trial court and as such the impugned judgments and orders of the learned courts below suffers from manifest illegalities and therefore it is contended to allow this petition. Later on, Mr. Joshi also submitted written argument. 6. On the other hand, Mr. V. Jamoh, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the petitioner had taken a sum of Rs. 35 lacs and the same is admitted by the petitioner and out of the said amount he had paid a sum of Rs. Later on, Mr. Joshi also submitted written argument. 6. On the other hand, Mr. V. Jamoh, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the petitioner had taken a sum of Rs. 35 lacs and the same is admitted by the petitioner and out of the said amount he had paid a sum of Rs. 18 lacs through his wife, but the same has not been proved and there is contradiction in the versions of the defence witnesses. Mr. Jamoh further pointed out that the money receipts have not been proved by exhibiting the same during trial, even though the petitioner had tendered evidence of five defence witnesses, and except the wife of the petitioner rest does not know about the same. Mr. Jamoh further submits that the petitioner, being the holder of the cheque in question, presumption is available in his favour and that sitting in revision, this court cannot reappreciate the evidence. Mr. Jamoh also referred one case law of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Triyambak S. hedge vs. Sripad reported in (2022) 1 SCC 742 , in support of his submission. 7. Having heard the submissions of learned Advocates of both sides, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record. Also I have carefully gone through the impugned judgments and orders of the learned courts below, and the case laws referred by learned Advocates of both sides. 8. It appears that the petitioner had taken a sum of Rs. 13,00,000/ (Rupees Thirteen Lacs) only from the respondent- Shri Tongom Jamoh as loan and the respondent has given the same from ‘Tongam Jamoh Mutual Fund’ on the condition that the petitioner shall repay the loan amount with 10% interest, within three months. But, having been failed to repay the loan amount within stipulated time the petitioner had issued two post dated cheques to the respondent and one of the cheque, bearing No. 055929, dated 11.08.2016 was for an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/, drawn on the Bank of Maharastra. But, when the respondent presented the said cheque for encashment with his banker- Punjab National Bank, at Ganga Branch, Itanagar, on 12.08.2016, the same returned unpaid with an endorsement “Insufficient Fund.” Thereafter, on 13.08.2016, the respondent had issued demand notice to the petitioner to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of receipt of the same. But, when the respondent presented the said cheque for encashment with his banker- Punjab National Bank, at Ganga Branch, Itanagar, on 12.08.2016, the same returned unpaid with an endorsement “Insufficient Fund.” Thereafter, on 13.08.2016, the respondent had issued demand notice to the petitioner to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of receipt of the same. But, the petitioner had failed to make payment of the demanded amount. Then being left with no other option the respondent had filed one case, being complaint case No. 71/2016, under section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act case, before the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Yupia. Upon the said complaint the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had taken cognizance and issued process to the petitioner. 9. That, as regard the plea of issuing the cheque in question as security by the petitioner is concerned, it may also be mentioned here that now it is settled position of law that security cheque also comes under the purview of section 138 N.I. Act. Reference in this regard may be made to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ICD vs. Beena Shabir and Anrs., reported in 2002(6) SCC 426 , wherein, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the security cheques also would fall within the purview of the Section 138 of the NI Act and a person could not escape his liability. As such, when there is existence of debt on the date of presentation of the cheque and the security cheques issued are dishonoured, the accused would be liable under Section 138 of the NI Act. In the given facts and circumstances on the record it cannot be said that the petitioner escape liability under the purview of section 138 N.I. Act. 10. However, it appears from the record of the learned court below that the cheque in question, bearing No. 055929, dated 11.08.2016, which was for an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/, was exhibited by the respondent as Exhibit P/2. A careful perusal of the same reveals that it was issued in the name of a Firm i.e. ‘M/s Lendo Ice Cream,’ Papu Nallah, Naharlagun. But, the said Firm, in whose name the cheque in question was issued, and which stood dishonoured on account of insufficient fund, has never been arraigned as a party in the complaint under section 138 N.I. Act. But, the said Firm, in whose name the cheque in question was issued, and which stood dishonoured on account of insufficient fund, has never been arraigned as a party in the complaint under section 138 N.I. Act. And it also appears that no legal notice was also issued to the said Firm, in whose name the cheque in question was issued. The respondent, however, in the legal notice issued to the petitioner, had stated that the cheque was issued in the name of M/s Lendo Ice Cream, Papu Nallah, Naharlagun, by the petitioner, being the proprietor of the same. 11. The petitioner, in his petition clearly stated that the cheque in question was issued by M/S Lendo Ice Cream, which is a separate legal entity, and as such M/S Lendo Ice Cream is a prime accused liable for issuing the cheque No. 055929, and the petitioner being an individual cannot be held liable directly for the aforesaid cheque. But, he may be liable vicariously in view of the provision of section 141 of the N.I. Act. This point is raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner also during argument. But, the same eschewed consideration of both the learned courts below. Now, it is to be seen whether the petitioner can be prosecuted and convicted without arraigning the principal accused as party in the proceeding under N.I. Act. 12. This issue has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several of its decisions. In the case of Aneeta Hada vs. Godfather Travel and Tours Pvt. Ltd., reported in 2012 5 SCJ 661 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. 13. The aforesaid decision is being followed consistently in the case of Himanshu vs. B. Shivamurthy & another in Criminal Appeal No.1465/2009 and also in the case of Hindustan Unilever Ltd. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No.715/2020 (arising out of SLP Criminal No.578/2020), which is quoted here-in-below, for ready reference: “58. 13. The aforesaid decision is being followed consistently in the case of Himanshu vs. B. Shivamurthy & another in Criminal Appeal No.1465/2009 and also in the case of Hindustan Unilever Ltd. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No.715/2020 (arising out of SLP Criminal No.578/2020), which is quoted here-in-below, for ready reference: “58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words “as well as the company” appearing in the section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a director is indicted.” In similar terms, the Court further held:- “59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself…. “ The judgment of the three Judge Bench has since been followed by a two Judge Bench of this Court in Charanjit Pal Jindal vs. L.N. Metalics. There is merit in the second submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellant as well. The proviso to Section 138 contains the pre-conditions which must be fulfilled before an offence under the provision is made out. These conditions are; (i) presentation of the cheque to the bank within six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (ii) a demand being made in writing by the payee or holder in due course by the issuance of a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within thirty days of the receipt of information from the bank of the return of the cheques;….” 14. As per the averments made in the legal notice, by the respondent, M/s. Lendo Ice Cream, Papu Nallah, Naharlagun, is a Firm and the petitioner is the proprietor of the same. But, said Firm has not been arraigned as an accused in the complaint and apparently, no notice was also issued to it and as such there is substance in the submission of Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioners as because the cheque was issued by M/s. Lendo Ice Cream, Papu Nallah, Naharlagun, though it was signed by the petitioner and since M/s. Lendo Ice Cream, Papu Nallah, Naharlagun has not been arraigned as an accused, the petitioner cannot be prosecuted without invoking Section 141 of the N.I. Act in view of the settled legal position in the case of Aneeta Hada (Supra). 15. It is also the case of the petitioner that he had repaid the loan amount. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits vehemently that the evidence of the petitioner and his witnesses and the defence exhibits were overlooked by the learned courts below, and the finding was perverse. However, to ascertain this fact and to appreciate the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, this court has to go into the factual aspect of the case and has to appreciate the evidence. Here, the question arises as to whether this court in exercising its revisional jurisdiction, can go into the factual aspect. In the regard reference may be made to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharastra vs. Jagmohan Singh reported in AIR 2004 SC 4412 , has held that :- “The revisional court is empowered to exercise all the powers conferred on the appellate court by virtue of the provisions contained in section 401 Cr.P.C. Section 401 Cr.P.C is a provision enabling the High Court to exercise all powers of appellate court, if necessary, in aid of power of superintendence or supervision as a part of power of revision conferred on the High Court or the sessions court. Section 397 Cr.P.C confers power on the High Court or sessions court, as the case may be, “for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such inferior court.” It is for the above purpose, if necessary, the High Court or sessions court can exercise all appellate powers. Section 401 Cr.P.C conferring powers of appellate court on the revisional court is with the above limited purpose. The provisions contained in section 395 to section 401 Cr.P.C, read together, do not indicate that the revisional power of the High Court can be exercised as a second appellate power. 23. On this aspect, it is sufficient to refer to and rely on the decision of this Court in Dulichand v. Delhi Administration [ AIR 1975 SC 1960 ] in which it is observed thus:- “The High Court in revision was exercising supervisory jurisdiction of a restricted nature and, therefore, it would have been justified in refusing to re-appreciate the evidence for the purposes of determining whether the concurrent finding of fact reached by the learned magistrate and the learned additional sessions judge was correct. But even so the High Court reviewed the evidence presumably for the purpose of satisfying itself that there was evidence in support of the finding of fact reached by the two subordinate courts and that the finding of fact was not unreasonable or perverse.” 16. In view of above, this court is inclined to go into the factual aspect of the case only to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the finding so recorded by the learned court below. 17. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner and also as is apparent from the record of the learned court below, the petitioner (D.W.1), while taking the loan, had given two cheques without date, and when he asked the respondent about the two cheques he stated that same was misplaced. Then, as asked, his wife had withdrawn and paid the cheque amount to the respondent. According to D.W.1, he had paid through his wife to the respondent a sum of Rs. 18,00,000/ to the respondent as against a sum of Rs.13,00,000/. Thereafter also the respondent used to harass him demanding interest @ Rs. Then, as asked, his wife had withdrawn and paid the cheque amount to the respondent. According to D.W.1, he had paid through his wife to the respondent a sum of Rs. 18,00,000/ to the respondent as against a sum of Rs.13,00,000/. Thereafter also the respondent used to harass him demanding interest @ Rs. 60,000/ in a month and threatened to put lock in his business premises and that one Tadug Tayem had came to him representing the respondent and asked to pay another sum of Rs.7,00,000/ and on being compelled he paid the said amount to respondent through Tadung Tayem (D.W.5), which stood confirmed from his version. On the other hand payment of a sum of Rs.35,00,000/ to the respondent is confirmed by Smti. Bipi Doke (D.W.2), the wife of the petitioner. Initially she had paid a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/, and thereafter, a sum of Rs. 17,50,000/ and thereafter, another sum of Rs. 7,00,000/ to the respondent through one Tadung Tayem. The money receipts have been tendered in evidence, and exhibited as D/Exhibit-1, 2 and D/Exhibit-3, without there being any objection and cross-examination on the same. Shri Ngulo Doke (D.W.4) is the author of D/Exhibit-2, and witness to D/Exhibit-3, and he also supported the case of the petitioner. 18. The money receipts, D/Exhibits-1, 2 and 3 were not seriously disputed by the respondent. Thus, there appears to be substance in the submission of Mr. Joshi, the learned counsel for the petitioner, and the case law referred by him also bolstered his submission. The D/Exhibits and the materials on record, reveals that the petitioner had paid more than the cheque amount to the respondent before presentation of the cheque- Exhibit-P/2, by the respondent with his banker. However, both the learned courts below had overlooked the D/Exhibits and also failed to appreciate the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Thus, misreading of evidence by the learned courts below and consequently, arriving at a perverse finding, is apparent on the face of record. 19. When a part or whole of the sum represented on the cheque is paid by the petitioner/drawer of the cheque, it must be endorsed on the cheque as prescribed in section 56 of the Act. The cheque endorsed with the payment made may be used to negotiate the balance, if any. 19. When a part or whole of the sum represented on the cheque is paid by the petitioner/drawer of the cheque, it must be endorsed on the cheque as prescribed in section 56 of the Act. The cheque endorsed with the payment made may be used to negotiate the balance, if any. Since here in this case the cheque amount has already been paid by the petitioner, the sum of Rs.10,00,000/ was not the enforceable debt, on the date of maturity. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have committed an offence under section 138 of the N.I. Act, when the cheque was dishonoured, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel Vs. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel & Anr., reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 830. In the said case it has been held that :- “30. In view of the discussion above, we summarise our findings below: (i) For the commission of an offence under Section 138, the cheque that is dishonoured must represent a legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity or presentation; (ii) If the drawer of the cheque pays a part or whole of the sum between the period when the cheque is drawn and when it is encashed upon maturity, then the legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity would not be the sum represented on the cheque; (iii) When a part or whole of the sum represented on the cheque is paid by the drawer of the cheque, it must be endorsed on the cheque as prescribed in Section 56 of the Act. The cheque endorsed with the payment made may be used to negotiate the balance, if any. If the cheque that is endorsed is dishonoured when it is sought to be encashed upon maturity, then the offence under Section 138 will stand attracted; (iv) The first respondent has made part-payments after the debt was incurred and before the cheque was encashed upon maturity. The sum of rupees twenty lakhs represented on the cheque was not the ‘legally enforceable debt’ on the date of maturity. Thus, the first respondent cannot be deemed to have committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act when the cheque was dishonoured for insufficient funds; and (v) The notice demanding the payment of the ‘said amount of money’ has been interpreted by judgments of this Court to mean the cheque amount. Thus, the first respondent cannot be deemed to have committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act when the cheque was dishonoured for insufficient funds; and (v) The notice demanding the payment of the ‘said amount of money’ has been interpreted by judgments of this Court to mean the cheque amount. The conditions stipulated in the provisos to Section 138 need to be fulfilled in addition to the ingredients in the substantive part of Section 138. Since in this case, the first respondent has not committed an offence under Section 138, the validity of the form of the notice need not be decided.” 20. Thus, on these three counts, the impugned judgment and orders of the learned courts below had failed to withstand the legal scrutiny. Firstly, the learned courts below has failed to consider the fact that the cheque in question was issued by a firm in the name and style of M/s Lendo Ice-Cream, Papunallah, Naharlagun, and the said firm has neither been arraigned as an accused under section 141 of the N.I. Act, nor any demand notice was issued to it. The present petitioner is the proprietor of the said Firm and he is liable vicariously only. Without arraigning the Firm as an accused the petitioner cannot be prosecuted for the offence committed by the Firm. Secondly, the learned courts below have misread the defence evidence. Thirdly, when the cheque amount has already been paid by the petitioner, the sum of Rs.10,00,000/ was not the legally enforceable debt, on the date of maturity. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have committed an offence under section 138 of the N.I. Act, when the cheque was dishonoured. These illegalities, according to the considered opinion of this court, are serious in nature, and therefore, it requires interference of this court. 21. I have considered the submissions so advanced by Mr. C. Joshi and I find sufficient force in the same and the case law, referred by him also fortified his submission to some extent. On the other hand, I find the submission Mr. Jamoh, the learned counsel for the respondent, devoid of substance and the ratio laid down in the case law referred by him would not come into his aid, and for the sake of brevity detail discussion of the same is skipped herein this case. On the other hand, I find the submission Mr. Jamoh, the learned counsel for the respondent, devoid of substance and the ratio laid down in the case law referred by him would not come into his aid, and for the sake of brevity detail discussion of the same is skipped herein this case. That, with regard to his submission in respect of availability of presumption under section 139 of the N.I. Act, it may be noted here that the Act raises two presumptions: firstly, in regard to the passing of consideration as contained in Section 118(a) therein and, secondly, a presumption that the holder of cheque receiving the same of the nature referred to in Section 139 discharged in whole or in part any debt or other liability. These presumptions, both under Sections 118(a) and 139 are rebuttable in nature. And it is not necessary that the accused must step into the witness box to discharge the burden of proof in terms of the aforementioned provision, in view of the definition of terms ‘proved’ and ‘disproved’ as contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act as also the nature of the said burden upon the prosecution vis-à-vis an accused. It is also to be noted here that the standard of proof so far as the prosecution is concerned is proof of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt; the one on the accused is only mere preponderance of probability. Reference in this context can be made to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Prakashan v. P.K. Surenderan reported in (2008) 1 SCC 258 . But, in the given facts and circumstances on the record I find that the respondent has successfully dislodge the same by entering into the witness box. 22. In the result, I find sufficient merit in the present Criminal Revision Petition, and accordingly, the same stands allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Yupia, convicting the petitioner under section 138 N.I. Act and sentencing him to pay a compensation of Rs. 11,00,000, with three months and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six months in C.R. Case No. 71/2016, and the impugned judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge, Yupia, upholding the judgment of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Yupia, stands set aside and quashed. 11,00,000, with three months and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six months in C.R. Case No. 71/2016, and the impugned judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge, Yupia, upholding the judgment of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Yupia, stands set aside and quashed. Send down the record of the learned court below forthwith, with a copy of this Judgment and Order. The parties have to bear their own costs.