JUDGMENT Virender Singh, J. - The sole question for consideration raised before this Court in this revision petition filed by the Special Police Establishment, Bhopal is as to whether the prosecution sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 can be granted by the authority superior to the authority competent to remove the public servant from the service ? 2. The question is no more res integra. The issue has been set at rest by a Division Bench headed by one of us (Justice Sheel Nagu) vide order dated 10.03.2022 rendered in CRR No.2283 of 2021 (Ankit Pathak vs State of M.P. through SPE). Having regard to identicality of the issue, suffice it to reproduce relevant paras of this order authored by Justice Nagu, which are as follows: '3. The question before this Court is as to whether an order of grant of sanction for prosecution stands vitiated in law if the same is passed by an authority superior in rank to the authority competent to remove the government servant from service. 3.1 The aforesaid issue/question is no more res integra as it stands concluded by the decisions of Apex Court in Mahesh Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 70 , State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 and , the relevant extract of which is reproduced below for ready reference and convenience:- Mahesh Prasad (supra) 'In view of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India and Rule 1705(c) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Vol. I (1951 Edition) a sanction under Section 6(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (as it existed prior to August 12, 1952) may be given either by the very authority who appointed the public servant or by an authority who is directly superior to such appointing authority in the same department. But such sanction is also legal if it is given by an authority who is equal in rank or grade with the appointing authority. But such sanction is also legal if it is given by an authority who is equal in rank or grade with the appointing authority. Sanction is invalid if it is given by one who is subordinate to or lower than the appointing authority.' Babu Ram Upadhya (supra) The position with regard to the tenure of public servants and to the taking of disciplinary action against them under the present Constitution was as follows: '(i) Every person who was a member of a public service described in Article 310 of the Constitution held office during the pleasure of the President or the Governor. (ii) The power to dismiss a public servant at pleasure was outside the scope of Article 154 and, therefore, could not be delegated by the Governor to a subordinate officer, and could be exercised by him only in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. (iii) This tenure was subject to the limitations or qualifications mentioned in Article 311. (iv) Parliament or the legislature of States could not make a law abrogating or modifying this tenure so as to impinge upon the overriding power conferred upon the President or the Governor under Article 310, as qualified by Article 311. (v) Parliament or the legislatures of States could make a law regulating the conditions of service of such a member which included proceedings by way of disciplinary action, without affecting the powers of the President or the Governor under Article 310 read with Article 311. (vi) Parliament and the legislatures also could make a law laying down and regulating the scope and content of the doctrine of 'reasonable opportunity' embodied in Article 311 but the said law was subject to judicial review. (vii) If a statute could be made by legislatures within the foregoing permissible limits, the rules made by an authority in exercise of the power conferred thereunder would likewise be efficacious within the said limits.' Sampuran Singh (supra) 26. The pleasure of the President under Article 310 of the Constitution cannot be fettered except by the provisions of Article 311. Accordingly the pleasure of the President or the Governor cannot be fettered by ordinary legislation. The pleasure of the President under Article 310 of the Constitution cannot be fettered except by the provisions of Article 311. Accordingly the pleasure of the President or the Governor cannot be fettered by ordinary legislation. Again in Union of India v.K.S. Subramanian, (1976) 3 SCC 677 , dealing with the pleasure of the President under Article 310 this Court observed that the Rules [Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, framed under Article 309], deal principally with the procedure for disciplinary proceedings and penalties and appeals and reviews against orders passed under the Rules. They are applicable if disciplinary proceedings had been taken against the respondent, but they do not make disciplinary proceedings incumbent or obligatory whenever the services of a person are terminated.' 4. From the aforesaid, it is evident that the Apex Court drawing analogy from the scheme of Article 311(1) of Constitution held that so long as the authority granting sanction for prosecution is not subordinate to the authority competent to dismiss government servant concerned, no fault can be found in the order of grant of sanction solely on the ground of incompetence of sanctioning authority. 5. In view of above exposition of law on the point, this court need not enter into prolixity of dwelling upon the contentions of petitioner in detail. 6. Consequently, since the order of grant of sanction herein is issued by an authority (State Government) superior to the competent sanctioning authority (Sub-Divisional Officer), the same cannot be held to be bad in the eyes of law.' 3. We also find support in A. Sudhakar vs Postmaster General (2006) 4 SCC 348 and in Secretary, Ministry of Defence vs Prabhash Chandra Mirdha (2012) 11 SCC 565 . Paras 12, 17 & 18 of A. Sudhakar's judgment (supra) reads thus: 12. The Tribunal, in arriving at a finding that the Superintendent of Post Offices being the designated authority the order of punishment could not be imposed upon the appellant by the Director of Postal Services, relied upon a decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal in K.P. Varghese v. Director of Postal Services (1992) 19 ATC 625 (Ernk). However, in that case, by reason of the action on the part of the said higher authority as a disciplinary authority, the delinquent officer was deprived of the forum of appeal. Such is not the position here. However, in that case, by reason of the action on the part of the said higher authority as a disciplinary authority, the delinquent officer was deprived of the forum of appeal. Such is not the position here. Clause (1) of Article 311 of the Constitution puts an embargo upon passing of an order of dismissal, removal or reduction of rank in services by an authority below the rank of the appointing authority. There does not appear to be an embargo in terms of the said provision that a higher authority would not act as a disciplinary authority. In the instant case, the appellant has not been deprived of an opportunity of preferring an appeal against the order of the Director of Postal Services. He admittedly preferred an appeal before the Postmaster General which was duly considered. In a matter of this nature, it would be obligatory on the part of the delinquent officer to show prejudice. (See Surjit Ghosh v. Chairman & MD, United Commercial Bank [ (1995) 2 SCC 474 and Balbir Chand v. Food Corpn. of India Ltd. (1997) 3 SCC 371 ). ....... 17. We, in this case, are not concerned, as regards the concept of the designated authority. If an authority has been designated by a statute enjoining him to perform statutory duties indisputably it is he who has to do the same but in a case of this nature where clause (1) of Article 311 of the Constitution envisages that a delinquent officer should not be imposed with major penalties save and except an order passed by the appointing authority, the latter becomes the designated authority. 18. It is now trite that an authority higher than the appointing authority would also be the designated authority for the purpose of Article 311 of the Constitution. Even the Appellate Authority can impose a punishment subject, of course, to the condition that by reason thereof the delinquent officer should not be deprived of a right of appeal in view of the fact that the right of appeal is a statutory right. However, if such right of appeal is not embellished, an authority higher than the appointing authority may also act as a disciplinary authority. (Underlined by us) 4. Paras 4 and 5 of Prabhash Chandra Mirdha's case (supra) are as under: 4. However, if such right of appeal is not embellished, an authority higher than the appointing authority may also act as a disciplinary authority. (Underlined by us) 4. Paras 4 and 5 of Prabhash Chandra Mirdha's case (supra) are as under: 4. The legal proposition has been laid down by this Court while interpreting the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India that the removal and dismissal of a delinquent on misconduct must be by the authority not below the appointing authority. However, it does not mean that disciplinary proceedings may not be initiated against the delinquent by the authority lower than the appointing authority. 5. It is permissible for an authority, higher than the appointing authority to initiate the proceedings and impose punishment, in case he is not the appellate authority so that the delinquent may not lose the right of appeal. In other case, the delinquent has to prove as to what prejudice has been caused to him. (Vide Sampuran Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1982) 3 SCC 200 , Surjit Ghosh v. United Commercial Bank (1995) 2 SCC 474 , Balbir Chand v. Food Corporation of India Ltd. (1997) 3 SCC 371 and A. Sudhakar v. Postmaster General (2006) 4 SCC 348 ). (Emphasis supplied) 5. Coming back to the facts of the present case which would show that on 11.07.2016, Co-operative Inspector, Sehore Manoj Kumar Khatri was trapped by the SPE; commonly known as Lokayukt Police, while accepting bribe of Rs.25,000/. Crime No.223/2016 under Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 was registered against him. After the investigation is over, the police proceeded to obtain sanction, which was accorded vide order dated 26.05.2017 by the State Government on recommendation of Commissioner, Co- operative-cum-Registrar Co-operative Societies. The police observed some defects/mistakes in the sanction granted and sent a communication for their rectification. After reconsidering the issues raised by the SPE, a fresh sanction was granted vide order dated 24.06.2017. The police filed the charge-sheet. A Special Case No.01/2018 was registered. After framing the charges, the trial Court proceeded with the trial and recorded statements of as many as 8 prosecution witnesses including Mangesh Pathak (PW8). At this stage, the respondent moved an application under Section 19 of the PC Act to quash the proceedings on account of incompetency of the Authority who granted prosecution sanction. After framing the charges, the trial Court proceeded with the trial and recorded statements of as many as 8 prosecution witnesses including Mangesh Pathak (PW8). At this stage, the respondent moved an application under Section 19 of the PC Act to quash the proceedings on account of incompetency of the Authority who granted prosecution sanction. It was asserted that Co-operative Inspector is a Grade III employee and his appointing as well as removing authority is the Registrar; Co-operative Societies but, ignoring this vital fact, the sanction has been granted first by the Deputy Secretary and then by the Under Secretary (Ex.P/42 & 43 before the Special Court), which is not a valid sanction in the eyes of law and, therefore, in absence of a valid sanction, his prosecution is illegal. Vide order dated 29.10.2021 in Special Case No.01/2018, the ld. Special Court acceded to the plea, allowed the application and dropped the proceedings. 6. But, in view of the forgoing discussion, it is crystal clear that prosecution sanction can be granted by the authority superior to the authority competent to remove a public servant. Therefore, the impugned order dated 29.10.2021 is not sustainable, deserves to be and is set aside hereby. 7. The issue of 'non-application of mind' while granting sanction had also been raised by the respondent before the Special Judge, who has not recorded any clear finding on this but, on perusal of the sanction order, the contention of the respondent that the sanction order suffers from vice of non- application of mind cannot be accepted on the face of it. It is not the law that the sanction order has to be pen down in great detail mentioning all the evidences collected by the Investigating Agency. A sanction order need not to be a detailed one. It is sufficient if from a bare perusal of the sanction order it transpires that the Sanctioning Authority has applied his mind on the materials produced before him and has then granted the sanction. 8. In this regard, reference may be made to the decision in Parkash Singh Badal vs. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1 wherein it is observed : '47. The sanctioning authority is not required to separately specify each of the offences against the accused public servant. This is required to be done at the stage of framing charge. 8. In this regard, reference may be made to the decision in Parkash Singh Badal vs. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1 wherein it is observed : '47. The sanctioning authority is not required to separately specify each of the offences against the accused public servant. This is required to be done at the stage of framing charge. Law requires that before the sanctioning authority materials must be placed so that the sanctioning authority can apply his mind and take a decision. Whether there is an application of mind or not would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and there cannot be any generalized guidelines in that regard.' 9. The validity of a sanction order is to be judged by reading it as a whole, and not by picking up one or two sentences from here and there so as to conclude that the order of sanction is vitiated for non application of mind or that it does not sanction the prosecution of the accused with respect to certain offences. It is undisputed that power to grant sanction is vested in the appointing authority or an authority superior to it and grant of sanction is an administrative exercise undertaken by it. Grant of sanction is not an empty formality. Indispensable legal requirements for grant of sanction, which lifts the veil from prosecution of the delinquent employee, are that the act complained of must have done in the discharge of official duty within the ambit of legal power and must have been performed in the official capacity. The requirement of grant of sanction has been incorporated in the statute books to protect the Government servants from being maliciously prosecuted with the salutary object that they should not be under any fear while discharging their responsibilities in accordance with law within the purview of their powers. So long as a Government servant acts in accordance with the provisions of law in discharging his official duties within the ambit of his powers, he should not be prosecuted unless the sanction is granted. Thus the scheme of grant of pre-prosecution sanction has been enacted to repose confidence in the minds of Government servants that if they are discharging their responsibilities within the area of their office in consonance with law and power they will not be harassed through malicious prosecution. 10. Thus the scheme of grant of pre-prosecution sanction has been enacted to repose confidence in the minds of Government servants that if they are discharging their responsibilities within the area of their office in consonance with law and power they will not be harassed through malicious prosecution. 10. In the instant case, the sanction orders (Ex.P/42 and P/43) itself indicate that the Sanctioning Authority has taken into consideration all the aspects of the matter and after considering pros and cons of the prosecution version and the charges levelled against the respondent and evidences collected for the same, the sanction has been granted. The Sanctioning Authority recorded its satisfaction, upon application of mind to the material placed before it, and granted sanction for the prosecution of the respondent with respect to the crime described above. If the order of sanction is read as a whole it does go to show that the Sanctioning Authority, upon application of its mind to the material placed before it, sanctioned the prosecution of the respondent for the entire crime, which would comprise all the relevant sections. We thus do not see any force in the submission of the ld. counsel for the respondent. 11. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The case is remanded back to the Special Court to proceed further with the trial in accordance with law.