ORDER : 1. Instant civil revision petition filed under S.24 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter ‘Act’) lays challenge to judgment dated 27.4.2018 passed by Appellate Authority-(IV), Shimla, Himachal Pradesh in Rent Appeal No. 31-S/14 of 2017 titled M/s Eagle Tours and Travels vs. Sh. J.B.S. Bawa, affirming the order of eviction dated 29.8.2017 passed by learned Rent Controller-(1), Shimla, whereby Rent Petition No. 10-2 of 2014/10 under S. 14 of the Act, titled J.B.S. Bawa vs. M/s Eagle Tour and Travel, having been filed by the respondent came to be allowed on the ground of arrears of rent. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case as emerge from the record are that the respondent filed a petition under S.14 of the Act against the petitioner-tenant (hereinafter ‘tenant’) for eviction from the demised premises known as Eagle Tour and Travels, Bawa Market, AG Chowk, Kali Bari (hereinafter ‘demised premises’) claiming therein that the tenant was inducted as a tenant in March, 1992 by way of oral agreement on monthly rent o Rs. 1,000/- and since then he has not paid any rent of the shop in question. Respondent claimed that the tenant has not paid amount of rent with effect from 1992 and as such, he may be evicted from the premises on the ground of arrears of rent. 3. Tenant refuted the aforesaid claim of the respondent by filing a detailed reply, claiming therein that there exists no relationship of landlord-tenant inter se parties and the petition deserves to be dismissed for mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties. On merit, tenant claimed that the ownership of the demised premises, which is a shop in ground floor of building situate on Khasra No. 18 and 21, Up Mohal Kali Bari, Tehsil and District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, stands recorded in the name of Central Government, and the respondent has nothing to do with the demised premises. Tenant further claimed that the demised premises were let out in March, 2002 by one H.L. Sethi, who was earlier in possession of the demised premises. Besides above, tenant also claimed that the petition is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties because, neither M/s Eagle Tours and Travels is tenant in the demised premises nor he has any concern with the same, rather, one Varinder Kumar is tenant in the demised premises. Besides above, tenant also claimed that the petition is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties because, neither M/s Eagle Tours and Travels is tenant in the demised premises nor he has any concern with the same, rather, one Varinder Kumar is tenant in the demised premises. Tenant claimed that he has been inducted as tenant by one H.L. Sethi on monthly rent of Rs. 500/- and payment of rent has been acknowledged by said H.L. Sethi. Lastly, the tenant claimed that since for more than 19 years, respondent never claimed any rent, it can be well presumed that there is no relationship of landlord-tenant between the parties and petition has been filed with a view to oust him and extract rent, which otherwise is not payable to him. 4. Respondent filed rejoinder/replication to the reply, refuting the contentions made therein, and claimed that he was administrator appointed by learned District and Sessions Judge, Shimla vide order dated 30.6.1989, qua the building built upon Khasra Nos. 808/580(81-1), 581/1(330-18) and 794/581/A min 218-0 at Mohal Upper Kaithu. It is claimed by the respondent that said H.L. Sethi himself is tenant under him (respondent) as such, he cannot be said to be the landlord of the tenant. 5. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, learned Rent Controller, after having framed as many as six issues on 14.2.2011, ordered eviction of the tenant on the ground of arrears of rent. Learned Rent Controller held the respondent entitled to arrears of rent since April, 1992 amounting to Rs. 4,34,443/- alongwith enhancement and interest. While passing the order of eviction, learned Rent Controller specifically ordered that in case, arrears of rent cauclated by it are paid within the stipulated period of 30 days from the date of passing of the order, tenant would not be evicted from the demised premises. 6. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid order of eviction passed by learned Rent Controller, tenant filed rent appeal under S.24 of the act before the appellate authority, which also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 27.6.2018. In the aforesaid background, tenant has approached this court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set aside the aforesaid judgment passed by learned appellate authority upholding the order of eviction passed by learned Rent Controller, further affirmed by the appellate authority. 7. In the aforesaid background, tenant has approached this court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set aside the aforesaid judgment passed by learned appellate authority upholding the order of eviction passed by learned Rent Controller, further affirmed by the appellate authority. 7. I have heard the Learned Counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record of the case. 8. Mr. Sumit Sood, learned Counsel appearing for the tenant, vehemently argued that the impugned judgment passed by the appellate authority below affirming the order of eviction passed by learned Rent Controller is not sustainable in the eyes of law as the same is not based upon proper appreciation of facts as well as law as such, deserves to be set aside. He argued that since it stands established on record that the respondent is not the landlord of the demised premises and actual owner of the demised premises is the Central Government, courts below ought to have dismissed the eviction petition having been filed by the respondent on this ground alone. He further argued that while passing the eviction order, learned Rent Controller below totally brushed aside the ocular and documentary evidence, especially Ext.RW-1/D, RW-2/A to RW-2/D and RW-3/A to RW-3/C, whereby it stood proved that the demised premises is owned by Custodian Department and the respondent is not the landlord or the administrator of the same. He further argued that the learned Courts below have failed to take note of the fact that as per Ext.AW-3/M, it stands proved on record that the respondent is not an administrator of the property as such, he has no right to hold the demised premises as landlord thereof. Mr. Sood further argued that learned Courts below gravelly erred by holding that the tenant is in arrears of rent with effect from 1992 because, the tenant had been occupying the rented premises at the rent of Rs. 500/- per month since 2002. 9. Mr. Mr. Sood further argued that learned Courts below gravelly erred by holding that the tenant is in arrears of rent with effect from 1992 because, the tenant had been occupying the rented premises at the rent of Rs. 500/- per month since 2002. 9. Mr. Y.P. Sood, Advocate, while supporting the impugned judgment passed by learned appellate authority below, upholding the order of eviction passed by learned Rent Controller, argued that there is overwhelming evidence available on record suggestive of the fact that the respondent is owner of the property in question and, otherwise also, entry, if any, in the name of Custodian Department in the revenue record showing the Custodian Department to be owner of the property in question is of no relevance, especially in the proceedings under the Act ibid. He submitted that since it stands duly proved on record that learned District and Sessions Judge, Shimla, vide order dated 30.6.1989, had appointed the respondent as an Administrator of the property in question and he was collecting rent from the tenants in the premises, pleas raised by the tenant deserve outright rejection being devoid of merit. While referring to the definition of ‘landlord’ as provided under S.2(d) of the Act, Mr. Y.P. Sood, Advocate submitted that the definition not only includes the original owner, but also his agents, who are entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land, whether on his own account or on behalf of the benefit, if any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner authorised, a specified landlord, and every person from time to time driving title under a landlord, as such, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the learned Courts below, while allowing the eviction petition having been filed by the respondent. Lastly, Mr. Sood, learned counsel for the respondent, argued that this court, while exercising revisionary power under S.24(5) of the Act, has very limited scope to re-appreciate the evidence, especially when there is no perversity in the order impugned in the proceedings at hand. 10. Lastly, Mr. Sood, learned counsel for the respondent, argued that this court, while exercising revisionary power under S.24(5) of the Act, has very limited scope to re-appreciate the evidence, especially when there is no perversity in the order impugned in the proceedings at hand. 10. Having heard Learned Counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned judgment passed by authority below, this court finds no illegality in the same and as such, no interference is called for. In the case at hand, claim of the tenant is that since the demised premises stands recorded in the name of the Central Government, as such, respondent has no authority to claim the eviction of the premises claiming himself to be the owner thereof. 11. Record reveals that the respondent placed on record Ext.AW-3/A to AW-3/F i.e. copy of order dated 30.6.1989 passed by learned District and Sessions Judge, Shimla on the petition of the respondent, for issuance of letter of probate. As per letter of administration, which came to be issued vide order dated 30.6.1989, Ext.AW-3/M, respondent was appointed as an administrator of the estate of deceased Bawa R. Singh and the immovable property i.e. Bawa Hotel with annexe land and shops, Bawa Niwas, Lower Kaithu, Shimla. Though, learned Counsel appearing for the tenant claimed that the demised shop is not the part of the property qua which the respondent claimed to be appointed as an administrator but the Ext.RW-1/A and RW-1/C placed on record by the tenant, reveals that the demised premises stands mentioned as Bawa Estate. 12. As has been taken note herein above, respondent vide order dated 30.6.1989 was appointed as an administrator qua Bawa Hotel, Annexe, land and building and shop, Bawa Niwas, Lower Kaithu, Shimla. Record further reveals that prior to passing of order dated 30.6.1989, Ext.AW-3/M, one compromise Ext RW2/D, dated 6.7.1987 was effected between JBS Bawa and Bawa Gurpartap Singh, Bawa Harparkash Singh and Manorama Bawa R. Singh, widow of Bawa Rattan Singh, perusal whereof clearly reveals that deceased Manorma Bawa, step mother of H.L. Sethi also agreed to appoint the respondent as an administrator of the entire estate of deceased Bawa Rattan Singh, which fact further proves that H.L. Sethi was never given any such right. Demised premises was on Bawa Estaet. Demised premises was on Bawa Estaet. Perusal of order dated 30.6.1989, Ext.AW-3/M speaks as under: “First party is hereby authorized and empowered to collect rent, arrears of rent monthly suits, pre-note etc. from the tenants in the property known as Bawa Estate, Bawa Hotel, Shimla-3, against proper receipt and any amount paid to the 1st party shall be a valid discharge on behalf of all the heirs of deceased Dr. Bawa R. Singh on production of receipt. In case any tenant refused or neglected to pay the rent/arrears of rent to the 1st party, the 1st party shall call upon such tenants to deposit the same in the court of rent controller, Shimla.” 13. Careful perusal of aforesaid para given in order dated 30.6.1989 reveals that the respondent was empowered to collect rent, arrears of rent monthly suits, pre-note etc. from the tenants in the property known as Bawa Estate, Bawa Hotel, Shimla-3. Hence, it cannot be said that Bawa Market is not part of the Bawa Estate, rather, it is amply clear on record that Bawa Estate and Bawa Bhawan are names of one property and qua all these properties, respondent was appointed as an administrator. 14. Tenant set up a plea that the Custodian Department is the owner of the property but as per copy of Jamabandi, Ext.RW-1/E, this submission is not sustainable in light of the fact that the landlord may not be owner of the subject matter in question, which is subject matter of the controversy inter se parties but, in case he is having right to collect/receive rent, he can always file proceeding for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. 15. Though, by way of placing on record certificate, Ext.RW-1/G, issued by the revenue authorities, tenant made an attempt to carve out a case that since the property in question stood mutated in the name of Custodian Department, respondent being total stranger to the property, ought not have filed eviction proceedings against the tenant. However, such plea is of no help to the tenant as far as proceedings initiated by respondent under the Act are concerned. It is well settled that disputed questions of title of property cannot be determined in the proceedings under the Act. Moreover, S.2(d) of the Act provides that an agent of the landlord is also entitled to receive rent from the tenant on behalf of the landlord. It is well settled that disputed questions of title of property cannot be determined in the proceedings under the Act. Moreover, S.2(d) of the Act provides that an agent of the landlord is also entitled to receive rent from the tenant on behalf of the landlord. In view of this, the respondent also falls under the definition of landlord. 16. This court in a catena of judgments has held that if a person collects rent and issues receipts thereof, for a very long period in respect of premises, can be called a landlord. 17. Even if for the sake of arguments, it is presumed that the respondent is not the owner of the demised premises, once it stands duly established on record that the respondent had been receiving rent from the tenant qua demised premises, tenant cannot raise objection with regard to title of the demised premises in the instant proceedings. 18. Leaving everything aside, in the case at hand, respondent was appointed as an administrator of Bawa Estate, wherein demised premises is situate, vide order dated 30.6.1989 (Ext.AW-3/M) passed by District and Sessions Judge, Shimla, as such, he was very much entitled to receive rent from the tenant housed in the demised premises. 19. Though, Mr. Sumit Sood, learned Counsel appearing for the tenant, while placing reliance upon certificate Ext.RW-1/G, vehemently argued that since the Custodian Department stood recorded as owner of the property in question, case filed by respondent claiming himself to be the landlord, ought to have been dismissed outrightly by the court but, such plea is without any merit. Though, there is no material worth credence available on record, suggestive of the fact that the Custodian Department took steps, if any, for eviction of tenant and other tenants from the demised premises known as Bawa Estate after it having been recorded as landlord of the demised premises in the revenue record but even otherwise competence of the respondent/landlord to file eviction proceedings against the tenant housed in the demised premises could not be laid challenge by the Custodian Department or by the tenant herein, till the time, order dated 30.6.1989 Ext.RW-3/G appointing the respondent as an administrator is/was set aside by competent Court of law. 20. Mr. 20. Mr. Sumit Sood was not able to point out order if any passed by competent Court of law, recalling/setting aside order dated 30.6.1989, Ext.AW-3/M appointing the respondent as an administrator of the Bawa Estate. As has been taken note herein above, person appointed as an administrator by virtue of letter of administration of court, have the rights of the landlord and the tenant cannot challenge letter of administration in the eviction proceedings. Reliance is placed upon judgment passed by this Court in C.R. No. 37/2020, Surjit Verma vs. Bawa Jung Bahadur (decided on 2.9.2002), wherein it has been held as under: “16. It is evident on a bare reading of the above provisions that a letter of administration granted by a competent Court is conclusive of the “representative title” of the Administrator thereby appointed until it is revoked. In view of the conclusiveness so attached to the letter of administration, no evidence can be admitted to impeach it except in the proceedings seeking revocation of the letter of administration. Otherwise the decision of the Court granting letter of administration is a judgment in rem and thus binding on the whole world. 17. There is nothing on the record to show that the letter of administration appointing the Respondent to be the Administrator of the concerned estate had been revoked. 18. Section 220 of the Indian Succession Act clearly and unambiguously provides that letter of administration entitles the Administrator to have all rights of the intestate as effectually as if the administration had been granted to him at the moment after the death of the testator. 19. On a combined reading of the provisions of Sections 273 and 222 of the Indian Succession Act, the representative title of the Respondent who has been granted the letter of administration by a competent Court, cannot be denied in eviction proceedings by the Petitioner being a tenant. 20. Section 2(c) of the Act includes an “Administrator” in the definition of a landlord for the purposes of the Act. Thus, the inescapable result is that the Respondent is the landlord of the premises in dispute. 21. It appears that the Respondent brought on record a few documents to show that she is owner of the demised premises by virtue of gift made in her favour. Thus, the inescapable result is that the Respondent is the landlord of the premises in dispute. 21. It appears that the Respondent brought on record a few documents to show that she is owner of the demised premises by virtue of gift made in her favour. It is pertinent to mention that in her reply to the petition the case of the Petitioner is not that she has acquired ownership of the premises in dispute by way of gift but her case is that Smt. Manorama is the landlady thereof. A case set up by a party in the evidence when at variance with the pleadings is wholly unacceptable. There fore, the statement of the Petitioner that she had acquired the ownership of the demised premises by virtue of a gift allegedly made before the reply was filed by her, being at variance with the pleadings, is wholly unacceptable. Moreover, whatever documents she had brought on record, have not been proved in accordance with law and, therefore, have rightly been rejected as evidence by the learned Authorities below. In view of her admission in the reply that she is holding the premises in question as a tenant she has rightly been held a tenant.” 21. Moreover, entry if any, in the name of Custodian Department though raises presumption in its favour but it is well settled that the entry in the revenue record may at times, raise presumption but it does not conclusively confer title. Reliance is placed upon judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in E. Parashuraman (D) vs. V. Doraiswamy (D), (2006) 1 SCC 658 , wherein it has been held as under: “It was submitted before us that in the facts and circumstances of this case the tenants were justified in challenging the claim of the respondent to be the landlord. It was argued that the tenancy, if any, was created at an earlier stage and thereafter certain developments took place which justified the appellants' challenge to the right of the landlord to seek their eviction. In this context it was submitted that after the court sale, though the name of Doraiswamy was added in the record maintained by the Corporation, his name was subsequently deleted. Doraiswamy, thereafter, filed a suit for declaration and also a decree for cancellation of the order deleting his name. In this context it was submitted that after the court sale, though the name of Doraiswamy was added in the record maintained by the Corporation, his name was subsequently deleted. Doraiswamy, thereafter, filed a suit for declaration and also a decree for cancellation of the order deleting his name. The suit was dismissed on the ground of want of jurisdiction and the appeal preferred against the said judgment and order was also dismissed. Therefore, it was submitted, that the order of the Civil Court dismissing the suit filed by Doraiswamy attained finality. On the basis of these facts it was contended that Doraiswamy ceased to be the owner of the property and consequently could not exercise the rights conferred upon a landlord by the statute. The submission must be rejected firstly, for the reason that the landlord under the Karnataka Rent Control Act need not be the owner of the premises. Secondly, the mere dismissal of the suit did not, as a consequence, confer title on the Corporation in respect of the property in question. In fact we have noticed that a subsequent suit filed by the Corporation for a declaration that the sale deed executed in favour of Doraiswamy was null and void was also dismissed. In these circumstances whatever may be the dispute between the Corporation and the respondent, the appellants certainly cannot take advantage thereof, once having admitted that they were inducted as tenants by Doraiswamy, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent. It is also interesting to note that in the suit filed by the Corporation a prayer was made for a direction to the respondent as well as to the appellants herein to handover vacant possession of the premises to the Corporation. The appellants derive their right to continue in possession of the premises only through the respondent. The judgment relied upon by the appellants in D. Satyanarayana vs. P. Jagdish, (1987) 4 SCC 424 is clearly distinguishable on the facts of the case. In our view there was no extinguishment of title of the respondent, even though there may be some dispute about it with the Corporation. It is well settled that entries in the revenue record may, at times, raise a presumption, but do not conclusively confer title.” 22. In our view there was no extinguishment of title of the respondent, even though there may be some dispute about it with the Corporation. It is well settled that entries in the revenue record may, at times, raise a presumption, but do not conclusively confer title.” 22. It is not on record that after issuance of certificate Ext.RW-1/G, steps if any ever came to be taken at the behest of the Custodian Department to get the order dated 30.6.1989 passed by District and Sessions Judge, Shimla, appointing the respondent as an administrator of the property in question, annulled/vacated, as such, entry, if any in the revenue record to that extent in the column of possession qua the property in question has no relevance especially when the respondent led cogent and convincing evidence to prove that he in the capacity of an administrator appointed by the competent Court of law, had been collecting rent from the various tenants including the present tenant housed in the property in question. Tenant, claimed that the demised premises was rented to him by H.L. Sethi, in March, 2002 and since then, he had been paying rent to H.L. Sethi. With a view to substantiate his aforesaid plea, he also placed on record receipt Ext.RW-1/A, RW-1/B, dated 11.5.2003 and 24.11.2001, receipt Ext.RW-1/D dated 25.3.2011 and no objection certificate Ext.RW-1/C allegedly issued by H.L. Sethi. He further claimed that H.L. Sethi expired in 2011 and since then he was paying rent to Smt. Sukhwarsh Sethi. He also placed on record rent receipt paid to Smt. Sukhvarsha Sethi, Ext.RW-1/D but, interestingly, neither H.L. Sethi nor Smt. Sukhvarsha Sethi ever came to be examined by the tenant. None of the legal heirs of deceased H.L. Sethi were ever examined by the tenant to prove that he being tenant of H.L. Sethi was paying rent to them. 23. Most importantly, tenant in his cross-examination, feigned ignorance as to in what capacity, shop in question was rented by H.L. Sethi to him. He feigned ignorance qua the fact that whether respondent is also an administrator in respect of Bawa Market and Bawa Estaet, in which demised premises /shop is situate. 24. 23. Most importantly, tenant in his cross-examination, feigned ignorance as to in what capacity, shop in question was rented by H.L. Sethi to him. He feigned ignorance qua the fact that whether respondent is also an administrator in respect of Bawa Market and Bawa Estaet, in which demised premises /shop is situate. 24. AW-1, Smt. Champa Thakur, Clerk Tax Department, Municipal Corporation, Shimla produced record, according to which inspection list of Municipal Corporation, Shimla, (Ext.AW-1/A) was found to be correct and as per this list, H.L. Sethi is shown to be in possession of the premises at Ward No. 4 and 5 on payment of rent of Rs. 500/- and Rs. 1200/- per month. Since H.L. Sethi himself stood recorded as tenant, it is not understood how he could induct the tenant in the demised premises. 25. Plea of the tenant, that he was inducted as tenant in 2002 by H.L. Sethi on the monthly rent of Rs. 500/-, rightly came to be rejected by learned Courts below because such fact never came to be proved in accordance with law. Tenant admitted in his cross-examination that he has not paid any rent to respondent since 1992. In the case at hand, tenant claimed that he was inducted as a tenant in March, 2001 by way of Ext.RW-1/B, and has paid Rs. 6500/- to H.L. Sethi on 24.11.2001, which plea of him clearly belies the stand of the tenant that he took demised premises in March, 2001 from H.L. Sethi. 26. No doubt, rent receipts placed on record as Exts.RW-1/A, RW-1/B and RW-1/D. reveal that the rent was being paid by the tenant to H.L. Sethi and Smt. Sukhvarsha Sethi, but since none of the legal representatives of H.L. Sethi stepped into witness box to prove actual rent if any received by them, learned Courts below rightly did not place reliance upon the same. 27. Tenant examined none from the vicinity to prove that he had paid rent in their presence to any person other than the respondent. Since the tenant specifically denied relationship of landlord-tenant with the respondent, plea having been taken that he was inducted as tenant in March, 2001, rightly came to be rejected by learned Courts below. 28. Perusal of Ext.RW-1/A reveals that the tenant paid a sum of Rs. 6500/- on 24.1.2002. Since the tenant specifically denied relationship of landlord-tenant with the respondent, plea having been taken that he was inducted as tenant in March, 2001, rightly came to be rejected by learned Courts below. 28. Perusal of Ext.RW-1/A reveals that the tenant paid a sum of Rs. 6500/- on 24.1.2002. If the tenant was inducted in March, 2002, then why he paid rent on 24.11.2001 through Ext.RW-1/A, which renders entire case of the tenant false. 29. At this stage, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that while exercising revisionary powers, this court has very limited jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence adduced by respective parties. 30. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case State of Kerala vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 , wherein it has been held as under: “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 31. Since this court does not find any glaring error in the appreciation of evidence by both the learned Courts below, this court sees no occasion to exercise its revisionary powers in the case at hand. 32. Having scanned entire evidence available on record, this court sees no reason to interfere with the judgment passed by Appellate Authority-IV, Shimla, upholding the order of eviction passed by learned Rent Controller-II, Shimla, which otherwise appear to be based on proper appreciation of the facts as well as law. 33. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed so also the pending applications. Interim directions, if any, stand vacated.