JUDGMENT : BIRENDRA KUMAR, J. 1. The claimants are not satisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded by the learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal No. 1, Dholpur in M.A.C.T. Case No. 452/2004 vide award dated 20.07.2004, hence, S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2045/2005. 2. Respondent No. 1-Dilip Kumar Bansal who is/was owner of the offending vehicle is not satisfied with the above said award deciding his liability to pay compensation in absence of insurance of the vehicle, hence, S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1809/2004. 3. Brief facts of this case are that Sant Kumar, husband of claimant-Kusum Dixit and father of other claimants, was carrying his goods on Truck bearing Registration No. RJ/25/G/0427, on 12.01.1997, at about 09:30 p.m. near Keshar Bagh, due to rash and negligent driving of driver, the truck turned turtle and Sant Kumar died at the spot. The driver fled away. However, on getting information, the police came and took out the dead body with the help of others from the truck. FIR No. 09/1997 was registered with Police Station Sadar, Dholpur. During investigation, it surfaced that Mr. Gorelal S/o Sukalal was driving the truck at the time of accident. After completion of investigation, police submitted charge-sheet in the police case aforesaid. Driver was not a party to the claim case, however, one Bangali S/o Prabhu Dayal was impleaded as respondent No. 2, for the reason that it came to the notice of the claimant that Bangali was, in fact, managing entire affairs of the truck business and he was getting income of the truck. 4. The claimants examined altogether three witnesses. Witness No. 1-Kusum Dixit, one of the claimants deposed that her husband was about forty years at the time of his death. He was a Junior Engineer in the Department of Irrigation, Government of Rajasthan. His monthly emolument was Rs. 6,199/- vide salary certificate at Ex.6. She had got information of motor accident death of her husband. Witness No. 2-Ramratan Shrama deposed that on hearing alarm of truck accident, he reached at the place of accident. Dead body of Sant Kumar was found at the spot. In the cross-examination, the witness denied to have seen the actual accident. Witness No. 3-Bhupendra Kumar Rajoria is brother-in-law of the deceased and he had got information under Right to Information Act, 2005 from the Motor Vehicle Registration Department vide Ex.7. Dead body of Sant Kumar was found at the spot. In the cross-examination, the witness denied to have seen the actual accident. Witness No. 3-Bhupendra Kumar Rajoria is brother-in-law of the deceased and he had got information under Right to Information Act, 2005 from the Motor Vehicle Registration Department vide Ex.7. The information was that the offending truck was registered in the name of respondent No. 1/appellant Dilip Kumar Bansal S/o Shri Bishamber Dayal Bansal, R/o Choudhary Para, Karauli since 12.08.1993. The said information was supplied on 28.09.2001. As per records, on the date of accident, the appellant was owner of the offending truck. 5. Respondent No. 1 contested the claim case by filing written statement stating therein that he is not the owner of said truck nor had ever been its owner. Therefore, no liability lies against him. No evidence was laid on behalf of respondent-owner. S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1809/2004: 6. The owner has challenged correctness of the impugned award on the ground that Gorelal S/o Sukalal, who was driver of the truck at the time of accident, was not a party to the claim petition. Proforma Respondent No. 2-Bangali S/o Prabhu Dayal never appeared before the Tribunal, hence, the proceeding was taken ex-parte against him. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that since driver was not a party to the claim case, whole proceeding and award was vitiated in law. Reliance has been placed on judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Machindranath Kernath Kasar vs. D.S. Mylarappa and Others, AIR 2008 SC 2545 . 8. To contra, learned counsel for the claimants submits that under Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the liability to pay compensation is of the owner, who is vicariously liable for act of his servant. The case on hand would clearly depict that the truck turned turtle without any obstruction from any other body/object including any other vehicle. There is no evidence that the accident was result of mechanical failure of the truck, therefore, negligence of truck driver is implied. 9. The case on hand would clearly depict that the truck turned turtle without any obstruction from any other body/object including any other vehicle. There is no evidence that the accident was result of mechanical failure of the truck, therefore, negligence of truck driver is implied. 9. Section 164 (1) of the Act of 1988 is being reproduced below: “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorized insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or grievous injury due to any accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle, a compensation of a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- in the case of death or of Rs. 2 and a half lakh in case of grievous hurt to the legal representative or the victim, as the case may be.” 10. Since the husband of claimant No. 1 died during use of motor vehicle accident owned by appellant-Dilip Kumar Bansal, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be argued that in absence of the driver as a party, the claim proceeding was vitiated in law. Now there is no need to prove negligence or rashness on the part of the driver leading to accident. It would be considered only in the matter where there is allegation of contributory negligence. 11. In the case on hand, the deceased was owner of the goods being carried on the truck which turned turtle due to negligence of the driver, who fled away leaving the truck aforesaid. Therefore, in my view, driver is not a necessary party. Machindranath’s case (supra) was decided on a different factual situation of the case as a bus and a truck had collided and the question was whether the driver of truck was a necessary party when the driver of the bus was claimant in the case. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant next contends that the learned Tribunal did not allow him sufficient opportunity to lead evidence. The record would reveal that on 20.03.2002, evidence of claimant was closed. Thereafter, the case was running on difference dates for evidence of the respondents. On 16.07.2003, last opportunity for evidence was given to the appellant. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant next contends that the learned Tribunal did not allow him sufficient opportunity to lead evidence. The record would reveal that on 20.03.2002, evidence of claimant was closed. Thereafter, the case was running on difference dates for evidence of the respondents. On 16.07.2003, last opportunity for evidence was given to the appellant. On 15.09.2003, one more chance was allowed and ultimately, on 30.10.2003, opportunity of evidence was closed as no witness was present in the Court. Evidently, the Tribunal allowed one and half years to the appellant to bring evidence but he did not bring any evidence. Moreover, the appellant did not raise the issue before the Tribunal at any time before the judgment. The appellant has admitted in the memo of appeal that the award was made after hearing arguments of the parties. Therefore, the appellant was aware throughout about the progress of the proceeding, hence, this ground is not available to the appellant at this stage. 13. Next contention is that counsel engaged by the appellant never apprised him about progress of the claim case and for lapses on the part of counsel, the appellant should not be allowed to suffer. The record does not reveal that there was any lapse on the part of counsel as the appellant has admitted that he was heard before making of the award. 14. Learned counsel further contends that Ex.7 which is information regarding registration of the truck in the name of appellant, is not a legally acceptable document in absence of examination of any of the competent person from the District Transport Authority and production of the original records. 15. Section 169 of the Act of 1988 provides that the proceedings before the Tribunal would be summary proceedings. Once a document was marked as exhibit and no objection was raised against the genuineness of the said document, it cannot be argued that in a summary proceeding, the burden of proof of genuineness of the said document was on the claimants. Mere denial of ownership of the truck by the appellant would not suffice unless the appellant could have also brought some evidence contrary to the claim of respondent/s that the appellant was owner of the vehicle. 16. Therefore, I do not find any merit in this appeal and accordingly, it stands dismissed. S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2045/2005: 17. Mere denial of ownership of the truck by the appellant would not suffice unless the appellant could have also brought some evidence contrary to the claim of respondent/s that the appellant was owner of the vehicle. 16. Therefore, I do not find any merit in this appeal and accordingly, it stands dismissed. S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2045/2005: 17. The motor vehicle accident and the death of Sant Kumar in a motor vehicle accident, is established by oral and documentary evidences on record and it has not been disputed before this Court. Salary Certificate issued by the Assistant Engineer, Irrigation Department, Masuda, Ajmer vide Ex.6 reveals that in the in the month ending 21.12.1996, the deceased was getting Rs. 6,199/-. Deductions shown were against GPF contribution, Group Insurance contribution, LIC contribution and PMP contribution. These are savings of the employee and not compulsory deduction like tax etc. Therefore, the Tribunal has wrongly left this deduction from the income of the deceased. Monthly income of the deceased is taken as Rs. 6,200/- in round figure. Considering the number of dependents on the deceased, 1/4 deduction for personal expenses is permissible. After deduction aforesaid, the amount comes to Rs. 4,650 per month. 18. In the case of National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 680 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court said that where the deceased had a permanent job and was in between forty to fifty years, 30% be made towards future prospects of the deceased. 30% of Rs. 4,650/- comes to Rs. 1,395/-. Thus, the calculation would be Rs. 6,045/-. This amount is multiplied with 12 to get yearly income. After multiplication, the amount comes Rs. 72,540/-. The Tribunal has rightly applied the multiplier of 15 as the age of deceased was between 36 to 40 years, as per Sarla Verma and Others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Others, (2009) 6 SCC 121 . After multiplication, the amount comes to Rs. 10,88,100/-. One of the claimants is wife and other claimants are daughters and sons of the deceased. All six claimants are individually entitled for Rs. 40,000/- as loss of spousal consortium and parental consortium as held in Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Nanu Ram and Others, (2018) 18 SCC 130 and New India Assurance Co. vs. Somwati, (2020) 9 SCC 644 . 19. Besides the aforesaid, Rs. All six claimants are individually entitled for Rs. 40,000/- as loss of spousal consortium and parental consortium as held in Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Nanu Ram and Others, (2018) 18 SCC 130 and New India Assurance Co. vs. Somwati, (2020) 9 SCC 644 . 19. Besides the aforesaid, Rs. 30,000/- is payable for funeral expenses and loss to the estate. Thus, total payable compensation is calculated as Rs. 13,58,100/-. 20. Tribunal has awarded Rs. 10,25,000/- along with 9% interest. This Court has enhanced the said amount to the tune of Rs. 3,33,100/-. 6% interest would be payable on this enhanced amount till payment of the amount from the date of enhancement, failing which 12% interest would be payable till the date of realization. Other findings of the Tribunal are hereby affirmed. 21. Respondent No. 1 is directed to make payment of the aforesaid amount, minus already paid amount within two months. 22. The appeal stands allowed to the aforesaid extent.