JUDGMENT : 1. In the wake of instant surge in COVID – 19 cases and spread of its highly infectious Omicron variant, abundant caution is being maintained, while hearing the matters in the Court, for the safety of all concerned. 2. This criminal appeal under Section 374 Cr.P.C has been preferred claiming the following reliefs:- “It is, therefore, humbly and respectfully prayed that this appeal of the appellant may kindly be allowed and the judgment & conviction passed by the Special Judge N.D.P.S. Act Cases against the appellant in Special case no. 11/96 on 14.2.97, may kindly be set-aside.” 3. Brief facts of the case as placed before this Court by the learned counsel for the appellant are that on 11.07.1996, at 12:15 a.m., about 9 kg. of chura-post was allegedly recovered from the possession of the appellant at the bus stand of Sardarshahar by S.H.O. Police Station Sardarshahar, P.W.-10, and that the appellant was arrested on the spot by the said S.H.O., pursuant to which an F.I.R., bearing No. 180/96, was registered against the appellant. And that, subsequently, after investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the appellant, and after trial, the learned Special Judge, N.D.P.S. Act Cases, Churu, and on the basis of examination of 10 witnesses, convicted the appellant, vide the impugned judgment dated 14.02.1997, under Section 8/15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance, Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1985’), and sentenced him to undergo ten years R.I. with a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-, in default of payment of which, he was to further undergo 2 years R.I. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the sentence awarded to the appellant by the learned trial court was however, suspended by this Hon’ble Court vide order dated 02.04.1997 passed in S.B. Criminal Bail Application No. 80/97. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the alleged recovery from the appellant is said to have been made pursuant to a reliable information received by the mukhbir/informant. And that, despite the same, the S.H.O. did not comply with the mandatory requirement, couched in the language of Section 42 sub-section (2) of the Act of 1985. Section 42 of the Act of 1985 reads as follows:- 42. And that, despite the same, the S.H.O. did not comply with the mandatory requirement, couched in the language of Section 42 sub-section (2) of the Act of 1985. Section 42 of the Act of 1985 reads as follows:- 42. Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorisation.— (1) Any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the departments of central excise, narcotics, customs, revenue intelligence or any other department of the Central Government including para-military forces or armed forces as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government, or any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the revenue, drugs control, excise, police or any other department of a State Government as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the State Government, if he has reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken down in writing that any narcotic drug, or psychotropic substance, or controlled substance in respect of which an offence punishable under this Act has been committed or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of the commission of such offence or any illegally acquired property or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act is kept or concealed in any building, conveyance or enclosed place, may between sunrise and sunset,— (a) enter into and search any such building, conveyance or place; (b) in case of resistance, break open any door and remove any obstacle to such entry; (c) seize such drug or substance and all materials used in the manufacture thereof and any other article and any animal or conveyance which he has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under this Act and any document or other article which he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the commission of any offence punishable under this Act or furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act; and (d) detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under this Act: [Provided that in respect of holder of a license for manufacture of manufactured drugs or psychotropic substances or controlled substances granted under this Act or any rule or order made thereunder, such power shall be exercised by an officer not below the rank of sub-inspector: Provided further that if such officer has reason to believe that a search warrant or authorisation cannot be obtained without affording opportunity for the concealment of evidence or facility for the escape of an offender, he may enter and search such building, conveyance or enclosed place at any time between sunset and sunrise after recording the grounds of his belief. (2) Where an officer takes down any information in writing under sub-section (1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso thereto, he shall within seventy-two hours send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant also submits that in their statements so rendered, the hostile witnesses, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 clearly stated that on the day of the incident, no recovery of the contraband in question was made in their presence and they also did not know the present accused-appellant. And that, the same is evident from a bare reading of paragraph 11 of the impugned judgment. 7. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor opposes, and submits that the learned trial court has rightly passed the impugned judgment, after taking into due consideration the overall facts and circumstances of the present case and the evidence placed before it. 8. Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that the learned trial court has rightly held that the applicable provision of law, in the present case is Section 43 of the Act of 1985 which deals with seizure and arrest in a public place by the concerned officer and not Section 42, since the accused-appellant was apprehended on the Sardarshahar Bus Stand, i.e. a public place. Section 43 of the Act of 1985 reads as follows:- 43. Section 43 of the Act of 1985 reads as follows:- 43. Power of seizure and arrest in public place.— Any officer of any of the departments mentioned in section 42 may— (a) seize in any public place or in transit, any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance in respect of which he has reason to believe an offence punishable under this Act has been committed, and, along with such drug or substance, any animal or conveyance or article liable to confiscation under this Act, any document or other article which he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the commission of an offence punishable under this Act or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act; (b) detain and search any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed an offence punishable under this Act, and if such person has any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance in his possession and such possession appears to him to be unlawful, arrest him and any other person in his company. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the expression “public place” includes any public conveyance, hotel, shop, or other place intended for use by, or accessible to, the public. 9. Heard learned counsel for both parties as well as perused the record of the case. 10. This Court is conscious of the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mukesh Singh Vs. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) (2020) 10 SCC 120 , wherein the following was observed:- “If the officer Under Section 41(2) or Section 42 receives some secret information, he is statutorily required to inform the same Under Section 42 of the Act to his superior officer after 72 hours. The officer is not obliged and cannot be compelled to give the source of his information in view of the bar contained in Section 68 of the Act. Thus, there is no mechanism to verify, except the oral testimony of Section 42 officer himself or his subordinate officers who are part of his raiding party, that he has acted on some prior secret information or that the recovery etc. was a chance recovery or that the officer was acting maliciously for extraneously. Thus, there is no mechanism to verify, except the oral testimony of Section 42 officer himself or his subordinate officers who are part of his raiding party, that he has acted on some prior secret information or that the recovery etc. was a chance recovery or that the officer was acting maliciously for extraneously. Even after effecting arrests or seizures, while the officer Under Section 42 is required to forward the articles seized and persons arrested "without unnecessary delay" to the investigation officers, he is required to report to his immediate superior officer in 48 hours” 11. This Court, with respect to the first contention of the made on behalf of the appellant, observes that the language in Section 42 (2) of the Act of 1985 is clear, which has also been considered and affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mukesh Singh (supra). However, the learned trial court, in the impugned judgment, has in unequivocal terms recorded that the concerned officer, Shri Raghuveer Singh, has complied with the statutory requirement laid down in Sections 50 & 57 of the Act of 1985, the same was also stated by the said officer, P.W. 10, in his testimony rendered before the learned trial court. 12. This Court, however, after a perusal of the impugned judgment, finds the contention made by the learned counsel for the appellant, that the testimonies rendered by the independent witnesses, P.W. 3, and P.W. 4, who have turned hostile, regarding the recovery of the contraband in question from the appellant herein, recanted from their earlier testimony and stated that no recovery of contraband was made from the accused appellant in their presence. 13. This Court, is also conscious of the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajesh Dhiman and Ors. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 10 SCC 740, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:- “We may firstly clarify that the expression "reasonable doubt" is a well-defined connotation. It refers to the degree of certainty required of a court before it can make a legally valid determination of the guilt of an Accused. These words are inbuilt measures to ensure that innocence is to be presumed unless the court finds no reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged. Reasonable doubt does not mean that proof be so clear that no possibility of error exists. These words are inbuilt measures to ensure that innocence is to be presumed unless the court finds no reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged. Reasonable doubt does not mean that proof be so clear that no possibility of error exists. In other words, the evidence must only be so conclusive that all reasonable doubts are removed from the mind of an ordinary person. This Court in K. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, MANU/SC/0104/1978 : (1979) 1 SCC 355 , explained that "if two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account. To entitle an Accused person to the benefit of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views, the possible view in favour of the Accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him." The Appellants effectively have ended up admitting that they were present on the spot; some interaction with the police had indeed taken place; that there was sufficient cause to stop the vehicle, and that such search was based not on any prior information but was spontaneous and thus, it was a case of chance recovery. As correctly appreciated by the High Court in detail, non-examination of independent witnesses would not ipso facto entitle one to seek acquittal. Though a heighted standard of care is imposed on the court in such instances but there is nothing to suggest that the High Court was not cognizant of this duty. Rather, the consequence of upholding the trial Court's reasoning would amount to compulsory examination of each and every witness attached to the formation of a document. Not only is the imposition of such a standard of proof unsupported by statute but it is also unreasonably onerous in our opinion. The High Court has rightly relied upon the testimonies of the government officials having found them to be impeccable after detailed re-appreciation of the entire evidence. Not only is the imposition of such a standard of proof unsupported by statute but it is also unreasonably onerous in our opinion. The High Court has rightly relied upon the testimonies of the government officials having found them to be impeccable after detailed re-appreciation of the entire evidence. We see no reason to disagree with such finding(s).” 13.1 The observations made in Rajesh Dhiman (supra), as laid out above, speak of two factors; the first being whether there is reasonable doubt, which must not be a remote or fanciful possibility, but the evidence on record should be conclusive to the degree that all reasonable doubts, in the mind of an ordinary lay person, be removed. And that, the benefit of doubt to an accused person, may be extended in the case of a duality of views, only when both are equally probable. 14. This Court finds that the suspicion creeps in the prosecution case and there is also absence of the required standard of proof in the present case. 15. Thus, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against present appellant with cogent, impartial and reliable evidence and beyond all reasonable doubts. Therefore, the accused-appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt and consequential acquittal from the charge under section 8/15 of the Act of 1985. 16. Resultantly, the present appeal is allowed, while extending the benefit of doubt to the present accused-appellant. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant as recorded vide the impugned judgment dated 14.02.1997 passed by the learned Special Judge, NDPS Act Cases, Churu in Special Case No.11/96 is quashed and set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against him, while giving him the benefit of doubt. The appellant is on bail; he need not surrender. His bail bonds stand discharged accordingly. All pending applications also stand disposed of.