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2022 DIGILAW 1166 (JHR)

Abdul Wahid v. Md. Iliyas son of Late Ismail

2022-09-14

ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY

body2022
JUDGMENT : Heard the parties. 2. Both these appeals have been preferred against the common judgment and award passed by the Civil Judge, Sr. Division-II- cum- L.A. Judge, Dhanbad in L.A. Reference Case No.10 of 1999 dated 27.09.2012 by which the learned Civil Judge, Sr. Division-II-cum-L.A. Judge, Dhanbad dismissed the reference petition filed by the applicants and opposite party nos.2 to 7 who are interveners without costs and further went on to observe that the applicants and interveners have no right, title and possession over the khata no.407, plot nos. 2093, 2129, 2130, 1878 and 1880. 3. The applicants of L.A. Reference Case No.10 of 1999 have filed F.A. No.29 of 2013 while the interveners-opposite party nos.2 to 7 of L.A. Reference Case No.10 of 1999 have filed F.A. No.217 of 2012. Since both these appeals have arisen out of the common judgment. Hence, both the appeals are disposed of by this common judgment. 4. The brief facts of the case is that the State Government through the District Land Acquisition Officer, Dhanbad acquired the land situated over khata no.407, plot no. 2093 area 5 decimals, plot no.2129 area 78 decimals, plot no.2130, area 31 decimals, plot no.1878 area 12 decimals and plot no.1880 area 70 decimals being in total area of 1 acre and 96 decimals at Mouza Katras, Mouza No.239, Dist. Dhanbad. L.A. Proceeding bearing case no.19/94-95, vide project case no.3/96-97 culminated in award no.1 and being made for the compensation award of Rs.1,88,650/- in favour of respondent no.1 in both these appeals who was the opposite party no.1 before the learned court below. Being aggrieved by the order of the District Land Acquisition Officer, Dhanbad, the original applicant filed reference petition before the District Land Acquisition Officer Dhanbad under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act on 10.10.1998 stating therein that the acquired land was originally in the name of Samsher Mouth son of Pir Box in the last cadastral survey and after death of Samsher Mouth, the acquired land came in possession of all the four sons of Samsher Mouth. After the death of the four sons of Samsher Mouth, the land came in possession of the applicants along with opposite party no.1- Md. Illiylas but the award was prepared only in the name of opposite party no.1- Md. Illiyas for a compensation of Rs.1,88,650/- and paid to him. After the death of the four sons of Samsher Mouth, the land came in possession of the applicants along with opposite party no.1- Md. Illiylas but the award was prepared only in the name of opposite party no.1- Md. Illiyas for a compensation of Rs.1,88,650/- and paid to him. The applicants further stated in the reference petition that the applicant no.1 had 1/3rd share, applicant nos.2 to 9 had 1/3rd share and the opposite party no.1 along with his brothers had also 1/3rd share. The applicants objected before the Land Acquisition Officer during the land acquisition proceeding. The applicants stated that Banatannama was never acted upon and no partition has ever taken place between the descendants of Samsher Mouth. The District Land Acquisition Officer, Dhanbad referred the reference petition to the court of Civil Judge, Senior Division-II-cum- L.A. Judge. After receiving of the reference petition, notice was issued to the opposite parties. The opposite party no.1- Md. Illiyas filed show cause before the learned court below challenging the maintainability on the reference petition on various technical grounds. The opposite party no.1 also pleaded that reference petition is barred by limitation and the applicants have no locus standi to file the petition. The opposite party no.1 denied the relationship with the applicants. The opposite party no.1 denied that the applicants were ever in possession of the acquired land. The opposite party nos.2 to 7 also appeared and filed their show cause claiming that they had right, title and possession over the acquired land and supported the contention of the applicants. They further pleaded that the Banatannama was never acted upon at any point of time and no partition has ever taken place between the sons of recorded raiyats. 5. In support of their case, the applicants examined altogether five witnesses. 6. A.W.1- Md. Samsuddin has supported the averments made in the reference application filed by the applicants and further stated that the acquired land was in the joint possession of the four sons of Samsher Mouth. In paragraph no.10 of his cross-examination, A.W.1 has stated that he does not know how many plots of lands have been acquired and he had never gone to the acquired land. He is having his own land at khata no.9 of Mouza no.239, Chatudih Mouza Khata no.1 and 7. In paragraph no.10 of his cross-examination, A.W.1 has stated that he does not know how many plots of lands have been acquired and he had never gone to the acquired land. He is having his own land at khata no.9 of Mouza no.239, Chatudih Mouza Khata no.1 and 7. In paragraph no.17, he admitted that the sons of Samsher Mouth and their descendants have sold the land separately and they have purchased separate land also. In paragraph no.18, A.W.1 has stated that he cannot say whether the acquired land is of the share of opposite party no.1 nor he can say to whose share the acquired land was allotted. 7. A.W.2- Md. Ayub has deposed about the averments made in the reference application. In paragraph no.4 of his crossexamination, he admitted that he had gone to the disputed land 17-18 years prior to deposing in court and in paragraph no.5, he admitted that he never cultivated the acquired land and in paragraph no.3 he deposed that he resided at Baliapur since long. At the time of acquisition of land he did not take any steps. He does not know that land revenue has to be paid in respect of the land. 8. A.W.3- Abdul Sattar has also supported the contents of the reference application. In paragraph no.5 of his crossexamination, A.W.3 has stated that he had no knowledge that Samsher Mouth had also land at Narayanpur Mouza and further stated that he had no knowledge that survey operation has been completed in Narayanpur mouza or not. A.W.3 in paragraph no.7 denied that the land of mouza Narayanpur is entered in the name of Ishaque son of late Saheb Jan. 9. A.W.4- Md. Nashir also supported the averments made in the reference petition. In paragraph no.12 of his crossexamination, A.W.4 deposed that he cannot say the plot numbers of the acquired land and in paragraph no.12, A.W.4 has stated that he has no idea as to where the land of Samsher Mouth were situated. 10. Besides the oral testimony, the applicants also filed documents which have been marked as Ext. 1 to 4. 11. From the side of the opposite parties, O.P.W.1- Yudhisthir Prasad Sharma proved the rent receipt of the acquired land which was marked Ext. A. 12. O.P.W.2- Seikh Md. 10. Besides the oral testimony, the applicants also filed documents which have been marked as Ext. 1 to 4. 11. From the side of the opposite parties, O.P.W.1- Yudhisthir Prasad Sharma proved the rent receipt of the acquired land which was marked Ext. A. 12. O.P.W.2- Seikh Md. Illiyas deposed that Samsher Mouth distributed the entire land through unregistered Banatannama dated 24.09.1926 amongst his sons and as per the Banatannama, the entire land was allotted to the three sons of Samsher Mouth. As per Banatannama, the land of Katras Mouza were distributed amongst the three sons namely Gulab Jan, Nabab Jan and Mugal Jan. From the land at Chharidar Kanali, Gulab Jan, Nabab Jan and Mugal Jan were allotted 1/4, 1/4 and ½ share respectively and the land at Mochigarah, Gulb Jan and Nabab Jan were allotted ½ share each. The entire land of Mouza Narayanpur were allotted to Saheb Jan, the descendants of Samsher Mouth came in possession of their allotted share as mentioned in the Banatannama. Late Md. Yusuf- the father of the late Md. Yunush during his life time sold the land of Chharidar Kanlai in favour of the wife of Mohan Lal Agarwal. The opposite party no.1 is the only person to get the compensation in respect of the land of B.C.C.L. The District Land Acquisition Officer before making the award got the land verified by the halka karamchari and only thereafter, the award was made in the name of opposite party no.1. The opposite party no.1 stated that he is the only son of Md. Ismail. The applicants filed objection before the District Land Acquisition Officer, Dhanbad at the time of preparing of the award and it was rejected by the District Land Acquisition, Dhanbad. In Paragraph no.38 he has stated that the entire land has been mutated in his name. 13. O.P.W.3- Seikh Md. Sarif is the one applicant of the case and he has supported the case of Md. Seikh Ilias during his entire evidence. He has stated that Banatannama is genuine and Late Samsher Mouth had distributed his land during his life time through Banatannama dated 24.09.1926 amongst his four sons. 14. Md. Wahid who is the lone witness examined by the intervener has also supported the averments made in the reference petition. 15. Seikh Ilias during his entire evidence. He has stated that Banatannama is genuine and Late Samsher Mouth had distributed his land during his life time through Banatannama dated 24.09.1926 amongst his four sons. 14. Md. Wahid who is the lone witness examined by the intervener has also supported the averments made in the reference petition. 15. The learned court below formulated the following three questions for consideration:- (1) Whether the Banatannama dated 24.09.1926 is genuine and was acted upon as per distribution of share mentioned in it? (2) Whether there is presumption of jointness during a long period among all the parties? (3) Whether the case of applicant and O.P. No.2 to 7 are barred by limitation? 16. The learned court below considered that Ext. E in respect of khata no.94, mouza Narayanpur area 2.74 acres reveals that the said land stood recorded in the name of Ishaque son of Saheb Jan. The learned trial court has also considered that Ext. B/1 which is the order of D.C.L.R., Dhanbad passed in Misc. Appeal No.1/88-89 reveals that in the year 1988 and before it Md. Yunush had accepted the Banatannama during the proceeding. So it cannot be said that Md. Yunush, the original applicant no.1 had no knowledge about the Banatannama. The learned trial court also took note of the fact that the witnesses examined by the applicants admitted that they were not cultivating the acquired land. The learned trial court also took note of the fact that by and large the witnesses examined by the appellant-applicants could not say about the identification of the land with their boundaries. From Ext. 1, 2 and E, it was found out by the learned trial court that Samsher Mouth had five plots of land but it cannot be explained by the applicants and the opposite party nos.2 to 7 as to where the rest lands apart from Khata no.407 of area 1 acre and 96 decimals were and the applicants and the opposite party nos.2 to 7 were unable to explain as to what happened to the rest of the plots of land of Samsher Mouth. The learned trial court also took note of the fact that the descendants of Samsher Mouth have sold the different land vide Ext. 3 and 4 which is in consonance with the averments made in the Banatannama marked Ext. The learned trial court also took note of the fact that the descendants of Samsher Mouth have sold the different land vide Ext. 3 and 4 which is in consonance with the averments made in the Banatannama marked Ext. F. Basing upon these evidence, the learned trial court believed the version of the opposite party no.1 that there was a partition between the parties. The learned trial court found the correctness of Ext. F basing upon Ext. E which is the khatiyan prepared in terms of Banatannama. The learned trial court also considered that since Ext. B/1 indicates that applicant- Md. Yunus was fully aware about the Banatannama in the year 1988-89. So, he had no right to question the relevancy and genuineness of Banatannama which was made on 24.09.1926 for the first time before it in the year 2012. The learned trial court also relied upon the Judgment of Patna High Court in the case of Md. Hasihan vs. Jallauddin reported in AIR 1982 Patna 226 wherein it was held that renunciation or relinquishment need not be expressly stated in the documents. It can be inferred from the conduct of the parties if a suit for partition in a Mohammedan family is brought after 12 years and the plaintiff-applicant fails to explain his or her inaction, renunciation can be inferred and ultimately went on to hold that the applicants have totally failed to prove the jointness of the family or possession of the land and dismissed the reference petition. 17. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants in both these appeals submits that the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned court below is contrary to the evidence in the record. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants that the learned trial court has wrongly and illegally not accepted the genealogy table of the parties. It is then submitted by learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants that the learned trial court failed to appreciate the evidence in the record in its proper perspective and further submits that on the basis of Ext. 1 which is the genealogy table issued by the circle officer, the learned court below ought to have held that the applicants and the opposite party nos. 2 to 7 are also entitled to their share from the compensation amount received by the opposite party no.1. 1 which is the genealogy table issued by the circle officer, the learned court below ought to have held that the applicants and the opposite party nos. 2 to 7 are also entitled to their share from the compensation amount received by the opposite party no.1. It is then submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants that the learned court below erred by relying upon the Banatannama which is a forged document. It is next submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants that the learned court below ought to have held that the appellants are entitled to 2/3rd share of the entire compensation amount. It is then submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants that the learned court below ought to have held that the applicants, opposite party no.1 and the opposite party nos.2 to 7 were jointly possessing the acquired land. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Syed Shah Gulam Ghouse Mohiuddin and Ors. vs. Syed Shah Ahmad Mohiuddin Kamisul Qadri (dead) by his legal representatives and Ors. reported in AIR 1971 SC 2184 , paragraph nos.12 and 21 of which reads as under:- “12. The High Court held that the appellant's suit was barred by limitation by reason of knowledge of the appellant that Abdul Hai was in adverse possession since the year 1927 or 1928. In regard to the properties which the appellant claimed in the suit as liable to partition, it is established that all parties proceeded on the basis that Exhibits B-1 to B-10 in the award were not Matrooka properties but Dargah and Khankah properties. If, in fact, they are not Dargah and Khankah properties but Matrooka properties, these should be available to co-owners for partition unless there are legal impediments. The estate of a deceased Mohammedan devolves on his heirs at the moment of his death. The heirs succeed to the estate as tenants in common in specific shares. If, in fact, they are not Dargah and Khankah properties but Matrooka properties, these should be available to co-owners for partition unless there are legal impediments. The estate of a deceased Mohammedan devolves on his heirs at the moment of his death. The heirs succeed to the estate as tenants in common in specific shares. Where the heirs continue to hold the estate as tenants in common without dividing it and one of them subsequently brings a suit for recovery of the share the period of limitation for the suit does not run against him from the date of the death of the deceased but from the date of express ouster or denial of title and Article 144 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act, 1908 would be the relevant article. 21. The cause of action for partition of properties is said to be a “perpetually recurring one” (See Monsharam Chakravarty v. Ganesh Chandra Chakravarty [17 CWN 521 : 16 IC 383] . In Mohammedan law the doctrine of partial partition is not applicable because the heirs are tenants-in-common and the heirs of the deceased Muslim succeed to the definite fraction of every part of his estate. The shares of heirs under Mohammedan law are definite and known before actual partition. Therefore on partition of properties belonging to a deceased Muslim there is division by metes and bounds in accordance with the specific share of each heir being already determined by the law.” (Emphasis supplied) And submits that in Mohammedan law, the doctrine of partial partition is not applicable because of heirs are tenants in common and the heirs of the deceased Muslim succeed to the definite fraction of every part of his estate. The share of heirs under Mohamedan Law are definite and known before actual partition. Therefore, on portion of properties belonging to a deceased Muslim there is division by metes and bounds in accordance with the specific share of each heir being already determined in law. It is next submitted that limitation for the suit does not run against him from the date of the death of the deceased but from the date of express ouster or denial of title. 18. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants next relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Hriday Narain Choudhary vs. Shyam Kishore Singh & Ors. 18. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants next relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Hriday Narain Choudhary vs. Shyam Kishore Singh & Ors. reported in AIR 2002 SC 2526 , paragraph no.9 of which reads as under:- “9. We have perused the judgment of the High Court and the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the lower courts to which our attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the parties. The position of law regarding admissibility of the deed of partition, Ext. 3, as held by the High Court, in our view, is unassailable. The document did require registration and having not been registered, was rightly held to be inadmissible. But that is not the end of the matter. The question whether the other evidence available on record on the point is to be considered, arises for consideration. As noted earlier, the High Court brushed aside such evidence holding that the transaction having been reduced to writing it is the only document which can be looked into and if for any legal impediment it cannot be looked into, other evidence for the said purpose also cannot be looked into. In that respect, the contents of the document have to be looked into to see whether by the document the transfer of shares of the parties is effected or the document is only a memorandum of previous partition which is now reduced to writing as evidence of the same. Therefore, though the document was not available to be looked into for want of registration, if the parties have adduced other evidence to prove the extent of their holding evidence on record was to be considered. In this regard, it is to be kept in mind that the suit is not based on the document, Ext. 3 or for enforcement of any right or claim arising under the document. On a plain reading of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it is clear that the courts below had not only placed reliance on Ext. 3 but had also taken into consideration the other materials on record in support of the plaintiff's case that his landholding was less than 5 acres. On a plain reading of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it is clear that the courts below had not only placed reliance on Ext. 3 but had also taken into consideration the other materials on record in support of the plaintiff's case that his landholding was less than 5 acres. The High Court was not entitled to disturb the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court on the basis discussed earlier without considering the other relevant evidence available on record. The resultant position is that the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that the exemption provided under the government notification does not extend to the plaintiff mortgagee is unsupportable and the judgment unsustainable.” (Emphasis supplied) And submits that though a document was not available to be looked into for want of registration, if the parties have adduced other evidence to prove the extent of their holding evidence on record was to be considered. 19. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants next relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Siromani & Anr. vs. Hemkumar and Ors. reported in AIR 1968 SC 1299 , paragraph no.4 of which reads as under:- “4. The first question to be considered in this appeal is whether the deed Ex. D-4 dated December 27, 1943 is admissible in evidence. On behalf of the appellants Mr Gupte put forward the argument that the document is inadmissible in evidence as it effected the partition of the properties of the value of more than Rs 100 and it was not registered. It was argued that there was allotment of specific properties to individual coparceners in this document and its registration was therefore compulsory under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. In our opinion, the argument put forward on behalf of the appellants is well founded and must be accepted as correct. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the document was not necessary to be registered because there was only severance of joint status of the members of the coparcenary and there was no partition of the properties by metes and bounds. It is not possible to accept this argument as correct. The relevant portion of Ex. D-4 is to the following effect: “For the partition of our joint land in Mauza Tilgi and Supa and house and utensils etc. It is not possible to accept this argument as correct. The relevant portion of Ex. D-4 is to the following effect: “For the partition of our joint land in Mauza Tilgi and Supa and house and utensils etc. and Dhan, movable and immovable property, amongst us three brothers, the Panchas have been appointed. The partition and distribution effected by the under mentioned Panchas will be acceptable to us and also the undermentioned conditions will also have to be accepted by us. 1. Out of lease land in Mauza Tilgi and Mauza Supa totalling 123 acres, Hem Kumar's share including Jethosi will be 51 acres that is 51 shares and Dinmani's 39 acres that is 39 shares and minor Shiromani's whose guardian is Smt Sobhagwati 33 acres that is 33 shares. The three of them will be in possession of the same. Out of 123 acres of land, the land near Munga Tikra Gara Para will be given to Dinmani and minor Shiromani through guardian Smt Sobhagwati for building a house instead of the old house. For building of the house in Munga Tikra the three brothers will give Rs 60. Out of the ‘Mitti Khatu’ and Gobar khatu, there is in the house, after deducting Hemkumar's tenth share will be divided into three equal shares amongst the three brothers and they will take it so. They will also divide the buried Khatu into their shares. *** 5. That out of the old house the house on the side of the village the length of which is 30 haath and the stone used in it and the house on the side of ‘Patav’ the length of which is 30 haath, is given to Hem Kumar in his share and as Jethosi and the Bamboo, wood etc. used in the other house is given to the two brothers Dinmani and Shiromani. Besides the house and Kotha there is old and new wood and 3 new doors. All this is given to Dinmani and Shiromani.” With regard to ryoti lands, para 1 definitely states that Hemkumar is allotted 51 acres, Dinmani 39 and Siromani 33 acres. With regard to the joint family house there is partition between the three brothers by metes and bounds and specific shares are given to each. In view of the recitals in Ex. With regard to the joint family house there is partition between the three brothers by metes and bounds and specific shares are given to each. In view of the recitals in Ex. D-4 we are of opinion that there is allotment of specific properties to individual coparceners and the document therefore falls within the mischief of Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. It follows that Ex. D-4 is not admissible in evidence to prove the title of any of the coparceners to any particular property or to prove that any particular property has ceased to be joint property. Of course, the document is admissible to prove an intention on the part of the coparceners to become divided in status; in other words, to prove that the parties ceased to be joint from the date of the instrument dated December 27, 1943 (See the decision of this Court in Nanni Bai v. Gita Bai [1950 SCR 479]= ( AIR 1958 SC 706 ) .” and submits that Ext. F is a document mandatorily registrable but the same having not been registered ought not to have been relied upon by the trial court. Hence, it is submitted that the impugned judgment and award be set aside and the appellants are directed to be paid 2/3rd of the amount of compensation and the opposite parties be awarded 1/3rd share of the compensation amount. 20. Mr. Dilip Kumar Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand defended the impugned judgment and award and submits that the appellants are blowing hot and cold in the same breath as on the one hand, they are saying that Ext. F is not a document of partition as in case of muslim, the partition can take place only after the death of the holder of the property and on the other hand though Ext. F is not a document of partition as in case of muslim, the partition can take place only after the death of the holder of the property and on the other hand though Ext. F is a document which was executed by the ancestor of the parties when he was very much alive, still they are making a contradictory statement that the same cannot be looked into by the learned trial court on the ground that the same was not registered but the appellants are not answering the question that if Exhibit-F is not a document of partition then why it is required to be registered and if it is not required to be registered then in what manner the trial court has committed any error into it. It is next submitted by Mr. Prasad that as none of the witnesses examined by the applicants or for that matter, the opposite party nos.2 to 7 could say the definite location of the land which were acquired and most of them have categorically admitted that they were not cultivating the said land. So it is crystal clear that they have contradicted their claim made in the reference application that they were in joint possession with the opposite party no.1 over land which has been acquired. It is further submitted by Mr. Prasad that the trial court has assigned cogent reasons for believing that the opposite party no.1 was in exclusive possession of the land which has been acquired consequent upon the partition between the ancestors and the said acquired land belong to the share of his father. Hence, there is absolutely no merit in this appeal and the same be dismissed. 21. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after going through the materials in the record, the only point for determination that crop up in this appeal is:- “Whether the learned trial court has committed an error by holding that the applicant nos. 1(A) to 1(E) and the opposite party no.2 to 7 had no right, title or possession over the acquired land?” 22. Now coming to the facts of the case, so far as the Ext. F is concerned, admittedly, the same was a wish of the ancestor of the parties to this appeal that in a particular manner, his property was to be distributed amongst his sons. Now coming to the facts of the case, so far as the Ext. F is concerned, admittedly, the same was a wish of the ancestor of the parties to this appeal that in a particular manner, his property was to be distributed amongst his sons. The document does not bear the signature of the descendants of Samsher Mouth at whose behest the said Ext. F was written in presence of witnesses. Thus, the said document cannot be said to be a deed of partition either requiring registration or inviting stamp duty. The case of the opposite party no.1 is that in terms of such wish which document of course, has been named as Banatannama, subsequently, the partition has taken place between the descendants of Samsher Mouth. It is a settled principle of law that the import and meaning of a document cannot be deduced from its title rather it has to be gathered from the recitals made in that documents. The fact remains that the applicants and the opposite party nos.2 to 7 have admitted the said Banatannama in the year 1998-99 as is evident from Ext. B/1. The preparation of khatiyan in terms of the said Banatannama has also been made; one of which has been marked Ext. E. The fact that the descendants of Samsher Mouth have independently sold portions of the land to different persons, two of the sale deeds in evidence of such independent sale by the descendants of Samsher Mouth having been marked Exhibits also being Ext. 3 and 4; also supports the case of the opposite party no.1 that there was partition of the land. Though this fact of independent sale of the inherited lands by the descendants of Samsher Mouth is not disputed by the plaintiff but the plaintiff cannot come with any explanation that if there is no partition as claimed by the plaintiff, than under what circumstances such independent sale was made by the descendants of Samsher Mouth. Before the court below also the applicant-appellants did not challenge the veracity of the Exhibit-F but resorted to technicality of admissibility of the said document in evidence because of the same being a document which has not been registered but their such contention that Exhibit-F is mandatorily registrable did not find favour with the learned court below nor such contention was accepted by this court; for the reasons already mentioned above. 23. 23. After going through the evidence in the record, this Court finds that the appellant-applicants have miserably failed to prove the case of the appellant and the witnesses examined by plaintiff, as already indicated above, rather virtually admitted that no one except the opposite party no.1 was in possession of the acquired land at the time of its acquisition because as already indicated above, some of them contrary to the case of the appellant-applicants, have admitted that they were not cultivating the land and they have failed to even say the detail particulars of the land. On the other hand undisputedly the acquired land stands recorded in the name of the opposite party no.1 after the mutation made in respect of the land. The opposite party no.1 has led the cogent evidence to establish that he was in exclusive possession of the acquired land at the time of acquisition of the same. So far as the judgement in the case of Syed Shah Gulam Ghouse Mohiuddin and Ors. vs. Syed Shah Ahmad Mohiuddin Kamisul Qadri (dead) by his legal representatives and Ors. (Supra) is concerned without doubt the same is a settled principle of law, but here in this case as already indicated above the evidence in the record has established that the opposite party no.1 was in exclusive possession of the acquired land, hence under such established facts of this case, the ratio of Syed Shah Gulam Ghouse Mohiuddin and Ors. vs. Syed Shah Ahmad Mohiuddin Kamisul Qadri (dead) by his legal representatives and Ors. (Supra) is not of any help to the appellants of these 2 appeals. So far as the judgment in the case of Hriday Narain Choudhary vs. Shyam Kishore Singh & Ors. (Supra) and Siromani & Anr. vs. Hemkumar and Ors. (Supra) is concerned as it has already been held by this court that undisputedly Exhibit-F was executed by Samsher Mouth during his life time, by no stretch of imagination the same can be termed as a deed of partition more so when the same does not bear the signature of the sons of Samsher Mouth. Hence Exhibit-F is not a document mandatorily registrable thus the ratio of Hriday Narain Choudhary vs. Shyam Kishore Singh & Ors. (Supra) and Siromani & Anr. vs. Hemkumar and Ors. (Supra) has also no application in the facts of the case. Hence Exhibit-F is not a document mandatorily registrable thus the ratio of Hriday Narain Choudhary vs. Shyam Kishore Singh & Ors. (Supra) and Siromani & Anr. vs. Hemkumar and Ors. (Supra) has also no application in the facts of the case. Under such circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the learned trial court has not committed any error in coming to the conclusion that the applicants and the opposite party nos.2 to 7 have failed to establish their right, title and possession over the acquired land at the time of its execution. The sole point of determination is answered accordingly. 24. In view of the aforesaid discussion made in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment, this Court is of the considered view that there is no merit in these two appeals being F.A. No.217 of 2012 and F.A. No.29 of 2013 passed by the Civil Judge, Sr. Division-II- cum- L.A. Judge, Dhanbad in L.A. Reference Case No.10 of 1999 dated 27.09.2012. Accordingly, the same is dismissed on contest but in the circumstances without any costs. 25. The Lower Court Record be sent back to the court below along with a copy of this judgment forthwith. 26. In view of the dismissal of these two appeals, the interim order, if any, made during the pendency of these appeals is vacated.