JUDGMENT Shekhar B. Saraf, J. - This is an application wherein the petitioners are seeking the following reliefs:- a) An order of injunction restraining the respondents from dealing with its bank accounts and particularly the one mentioned in paragraph 26 hereinabove and all other bank accounts of the respondents corresponding to Permanent Account Nos.(PAN) ALQPS 3878 R and AUMPS 3474 J without keeping apart a sum of Rs.29,56,904/-. b) An order restraining the respondents from selling, transferring or alienating or creating any third party interest of any part or portion of the said property in any manner whatsoever; c) Ad-interim orders in terms of the prayers above; d) Pass any such further and/or other order or orders, direction or directions as Your Lordships may deem fit and proper. 2. Mr. Chayan Gupta, Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff petitioners submits that an agreement had been reached between the parties wherein the petitioner was to purchase a property from the defendants at a cost of Rs.1,26,40,000/-. He further submits that a sum of Rs.25 lakhs was paid by way of earnest money to the defendants. He submits that in spite of several requests, the respondents did not make over the papers relating to the regularization of the said property to one commercial unit as had been agreed between the parties. He further submits that the respondents failed to execute a deed of conveyance in their favour. 3. It is to be noted that a legal notice had been issued by the plaintiff petitioners on February 8, 2021 and the same was replied to by Advocates representing the defendants on February 15, 2021. It is also to be noted that a suit was filed by the plaintiff petitioners before the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction in the month of April, 2021. Subsequently, the plaint was returned with liberty to the plaintiffs to file before the Commercial Division. CS/263/2021 is the new suit filed by the plaintiff petitioners wherein this interlocutory application has been filed seeking the above reliefs. 4. To buttress his arguments, Mr. Chayan Gupta has relied on three judgments of the Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 2021 Cal 212 (Prabha Surana -v- Jaideep Halwasiya), 2019(4) CHN (CAL) 412 (Harleen Jairath -v- Prabha Surana and Ors.) and 2017(1) CHN (CAL) 189 (Santosh Promoters Pvt. Ltd and Ors. -v- Intrasoft Technologies Ltd.). 5. Mr. 4. To buttress his arguments, Mr. Chayan Gupta has relied on three judgments of the Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 2021 Cal 212 (Prabha Surana -v- Jaideep Halwasiya), 2019(4) CHN (CAL) 412 (Harleen Jairath -v- Prabha Surana and Ors.) and 2017(1) CHN (CAL) 189 (Santosh Promoters Pvt. Ltd and Ors. -v- Intrasoft Technologies Ltd.). 5. Mr. Rudraman Bhattacharyya, Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants, submits that he disputes all the statements made by the petitioners except for the fact that Rs.25 lakh was given as earnest money to his client. He submits that there was never a written contract and the submissions in the petition are required to be proved by way of evidence. He further submits that earnest money is normally forfeited when the transaction does not go through. Mr. Bhattacharyya has taken me through the notices issued by both the parties and highlighted the fact that the petitioners are claiming in their notice that the stamp duty and registration fees for registration of the conveyance deed was required to be paid by the seller i.e. his client. He submits that the entire allegation is baseless and quite absurd as it is common knowledge that in case of purchase of property, the registration and stamp duty costs are paid by the buyer of the property. 6. I would first like to deal with the judgments cited by the petitioners. In the judgement passed in Prabha Surana -v- Jaideep Halwasiya, reported in AIR 2021 Cal 212, the plaintiff lent money to the defendant by way of cheques and fixed rate of interest was agreed on between the parties. Thereafter, default in repayment was committed by the defendant against which the plaintiff moved an injunction application before the learned single judge of this Hon'ble High Court. The court allowed the interim application on the ground that a prima facie case has been established by the plaintiff establishing the fact of money being lent and advanced to the respondent by acknowledging receipt of the same payment. The denial of loan by the defendant/respondent was considered by the Court as alarming which required remedy/protection to the petitioner. The court also felt that balance of convenience was in favor of the plaintiff. 7. In the case of Santosh Promoters Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. The denial of loan by the defendant/respondent was considered by the Court as alarming which required remedy/protection to the petitioner. The court also felt that balance of convenience was in favor of the plaintiff. 7. In the case of Santosh Promoters Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. -v- Intrasoft Technologies Ltd. reported in 2017 (1) CHN (Cal) 189, a suit for recovery of the outstanding amount due to the plaintiff on account of a lease agreement in respect of the suit premises was filed. The defendant failed to pay the due amount. In such a suit, the plaintiff filed an application for temporary injunction for restraining the opposite party and/or any other person claiming through or under them from transferring the property. The trail judge rejected the plaintiff's prayer for ad interim order injunction on the ground of lack of urgency and also held that no prima facie case was made out by the plaintiff for passing an ad interim order of injunction. The Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court while granting relief under Order 39 Rule 1 (b) of the Civil Procedure Code held that if the court finds that the defendant intends to transfer his property to defraud the plaintiff the court should not hesitate to pass temporary injunction restraining the defendants from transferring his property during pendency of the suit. Relevant paragraphs of the judgement are delineated below: '32. Thus, we hold that the Court's power to grant temporary injunction cannot be treated at par with its power to pass an order of attachment before judgment under Order 38 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, while passing an order of temporary injunction, post decree consequences need not be considered by the Court, but while passing an order of attachment before judgment, the Court has to consider the post decree consequences. As such the standard of proof in case of attachment before judgment is higher then the standard of proof necessary to be discharged in case temporary injunction is sought for. 33. Keeping the aforesaid distinction between those two provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, in mind, we have considered the pleadings of the plaintiff made out in the plaint as well as in the injunction application. 33. Keeping the aforesaid distinction between those two provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, in mind, we have considered the pleadings of the plaintiff made out in the plaint as well as in the injunction application. On reading the said plaint we have found that the plaintiff has claimed a money decree on the allegation that the defendant is not only liable to pay arrear rent and/or infrastructure user charges and service tax on rent but it has also claimed damages for the delay in shifting from the 5th Floor to the 3rd Floor of the said premises at a rate as prescribed under the contract. The monetary claim of the plaintiff is mostly ascertainable with reference to the contract as the contract itself specifies the rate of rent payable by the defendant in respect of its 5th Floor tenancy per month and the rate of infrastructure user charges payable by the defendant in respect of its 5th Floor tenancy and its liability to pay interest on such unpaid dues when of the defendant commits default in payment of rent/infrastructure user charges. Again the liability to pay damages for the delay in shifting from the 5th Floor to the 3rd Floor is also capable of quantification with reference to the contract. 34. However, the extent of liability of the defendant to pay service charges on rent can be ascertained by the Court, only after some additional exercise is made by the Court in course of hearing of the suit. The exact liability which the defendant is required to bare on such account can be ascertained by the Court, only when the parties lead their evidence in support of their respective claims with suit. Before passing decree, the Court will have to find out the proportionate liability of the defendant on such head as per the said agreement. The amount of money payable by the defendant on this accounts is variable amount which varies from time to time depending upon the rate levied by the Municipal authority on account of service charge on rent from time to time. Thus, we find that the major part of the liability of the defendant is ascertainable with reference to the agreement itself. The amount which is claimed by the plaintiff from the defendant on account of rent, infrastructure user charges and damages for delay in shifting is a substantial amount. Thus, we find that the major part of the liability of the defendant is ascertainable with reference to the agreement itself. The amount which is claimed by the plaintiff from the defendant on account of rent, infrastructure user charges and damages for delay in shifting is a substantial amount. If the Court finds that the defendant intends to transfer his property being the 3rd Floor of the said premises and leaves the jurisdiction of the Court with the sale proceeds, to defraud the plaintiff, the Court should not hesitate to pass temporary injunction restraining the defendants from transferring his property during the pendency of the suit. In the instant case, we find that the plaintiff stated in the plaint that the defendant was trying to transfer the said property to a stranger with the sole intention of defrauding the plaintiff and the other creditors. If the pleading of the plaintiff as a whole is considered, we are of the view that a prima facie has been made out by the plaintiff for going to trial. If the defendant is allowed to transfer his property as mentioned in the schedule of the temporary injunction application during the pendency of the suit with an intent to defraud the plaintiff to whom the defendant is liable to pay such huge amount, it will not be wise for the Court to refuse to grant ad interim injunction as in case, ad interim injunction is refused and the plaintiff succeeds in transferring the suit property during the pendency of the suit, then the object of granting injunction under Order 39 Rule 1(b) will be defeated in the instant case.' 8. In the case of Harleen Jairath -v- Prabha Surana and Ors. reported in (2019) 4 CHN (Cal) 412, the plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of money on account of loan given to the defendant. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an application for relief under Order 38 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 before the learned single judge of this Hon'ble Court and the same got rejected on the ground that the powers under Order 38 Rule 5 should not be exercised mechanically or merely for asking in order to convert an unsecured debt into a secured debt. In appeal before the Division Bench, the court held that the main objective of an attachment before judgment is to enable the plaintiff to realise the decretal sum if one is eventually passed, from the defendant's property. It prevents an unholy attempt by the defendant to defeat fruits of the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff. The court allowed the appeal against the impugned order of the single judge. The court further observed that the plaintiff was required to be protected more so when the defendants prima facie appear to have admitted their liability and in spite of acknowledgement of liability did not even repay the interest which according to the admission of the defendants was to be regularly paid. The balance of convenience was also in favour of the plaintiff having regard to the fraudulent conduct of the respondents. Under such facts and circumstances an order of injunction restraining the defendant/respondent from dealing with possession of the suit property was granted. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment are extracted below: '18. The essential requirements which must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court for seeking a relief for attachment are:- (i) The defendant is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property; or (ii) The defendant is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court; (iii) that the defendant is intending to do so to cause obstruction or delay in the execution of any decree that may be passed against him. Vague and general allegations that the defendant is about to dispose of the property or remove it beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, unsupported by particulars, would not be sufficient compliance with the rule; (iv) It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to state the grounds on which he entertains the belief or apprehension that the defendant would dispose of or remove the property, or to give the source of his information and belief in the matter through an affidavit. 49. There cannot be an absolute proposition that in a money claim no order of injunction or attachment or receiver could be made. Order 38 to Order 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not restrict the power of the court to pass any order that a court is empowered to pass just because it is a money claim. 49. There cannot be an absolute proposition that in a money claim no order of injunction or attachment or receiver could be made. Order 38 to Order 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not restrict the power of the court to pass any order that a court is empowered to pass just because it is a money claim. We have already discussed the circumstances when the court can exercise any of such power. 50. If there were doubts about exercising power under any of the aforesaid provisions, it can be safely stated that the court has inherent power to pass an order of injunction or attachment upon an unimpeachable liquidated claim being demonstrated and upon it being established that the respondents are taking steps to improperly deny the realization of the claim. When a huge sum of money is claimed and the plaintiff prima facie establishes such amount he would be entitled to secure his interest keeping in view the amount involved in the suit. (See. Rajendran v. Shankar Sundaram reported at (2008) 2 SCC 724 (paragraphs 12 and 13) and Sourav Ganguly v. Mahuaa Media Pvt. Ltd. reported at 2015 (4) CHN (Cal) 509 (paragraph 43)) 54. On the basis of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the view that interest of the plaintiff is required to be protected more so when the defendants prima facie appear to have admitted their liability and in spite of acknowledgment of liability did not even repay the interest which according to the own admission of the defendants were to be regularly paid. In fact, it appears to have been paid for the year 1st April, 2017 to 31st March, 2018. Moreover, we find that the defendants are encumbering their assets soon after the notice of demand was issued by the plaintiffs. The balance of convenience is also in favour of the plaintiff having regard to the fraudulent conduct of the respondents. The assets are insufficient to secure the claim of the plaintiff. Under such circumstances there shall be an order of injunction restraining the respondents and each of them from dealing with disposing off, alienating and/or parting with possession of Flat nos. 5A and 6A, at Metro Plaza Apartment at 1, Ho Chi Minh Sarani, Kolkata and Flat nos. 8A and 9A, 6 Queens Park, Kolkata-19 till the disposal of the interlocutory application.' 9. 5A and 6A, at Metro Plaza Apartment at 1, Ho Chi Minh Sarani, Kolkata and Flat nos. 8A and 9A, 6 Queens Park, Kolkata-19 till the disposal of the interlocutory application.' 9. In my view, the judgments relied upon by Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners are distinguishable on facts. Furthermore, none of the judgments lay down the principle that in a money suit, at the ad interim stage, the plaintiff is mandatorily required to be secured. In fact, the converse is true wherein in a money suit normally parties are required to lead evidence and no interim order is required to be passed by the Court under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure unless there is a threat of alienation of the suit property or there exists actions by the defendant that indicate that the defendant intends to defraud the plaintiff. In the present case, there are no averments that the defendants have taken any steps with intent to defraud the petitioners. In fact, Mr. Gupta has categorically submitted that no case of fraud has been made out by his clients. 10. Furthermore, the entire case made out by the petitioners is based on an oral agreement and apart from the legal notices exchanged between the parties and the admission by the respondents in having received Rs. 25 Lakhs as earnest money, there is nothing on record to indicate the terms of the agreement for sale that had been contracted between the parties. In such an event, only the averments with regard to the right of the petitioners to receive the earnest money in full along with interest cannot make the same an ascertained amount due by the respondents to the petitioner. In fact, it is only in trial that the actual facts of the terms of the contract can come up. In light of the same, it is clear that there is no ascertained and accrued debt visible before this court, and therefore, the petitioners have failed to show a prima facie case. Furthermore, as the petitioners have not indicated or averred in the petition with regard to the intentions of the respondents/ defendants to remove or dispose of their property with a view to defraud the petitioners, the balance of convenience and inconvenience lies in favour of the respondents and not the plaintiff/ petitioners. 11. Mr. Furthermore, as the petitioners have not indicated or averred in the petition with regard to the intentions of the respondents/ defendants to remove or dispose of their property with a view to defraud the petitioners, the balance of convenience and inconvenience lies in favour of the respondents and not the plaintiff/ petitioners. 11. Mr. Chayan Gupta's arguments that in cases where the amount is fixed and determinable the court is required to pass an order securing the claim of the petitioners is to be out rightly rejected as in the present case the only fact that is undisputed is the fact of payment of Rs. 25 Lakhs by the plaintiff to the respondents as earnest money. However, several questions are left unanswered as the agreement is an oral agreement. Questions such as : a) Was there any further money required to be advanced by the buyers? b) What were the conditions of sale and were the sellers required to do certain acts before the sale could be completed? c) In case of default by either of the parties what would happen to the earnest money and would the same be forfeited? Several such questions could arise and the same can only be answered at the time of trial. Hence, it is clear in the present case that there is no specific debt that has accrued and is payable. In absence of any accrued determinable debt, it is clear that no prima facie case is made out at this stage. Furthermore, as pointed out earlier, for an injunction to be granted it is required to be proved by the petitioners by affidavit or otherwise that the defendants threatens or intends to remove or dispose of their property with a view to defraud their creditors. No such averment has been made as clearly indicated above. 12. It is to be noted that this matter is now being heard at the ad interim stage and affidavits have not been exchanged between the parties. Accordingly, in my view, parties should be allowed to file affidavits before any injunctive relief may be granted to the plaintiff petitioners. 13. Accordingly, let affidavit-in-opposition be filed within four weeks from date; reply thereto, if any, within two weeks thereafter. Liberty is granted to the parties to mention for listing. 14. On the request made by Counsel on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. 13. Accordingly, let affidavit-in-opposition be filed within four weeks from date; reply thereto, if any, within two weeks thereafter. Liberty is granted to the parties to mention for listing. 14. On the request made by Counsel on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. Rudraman Bhattacharyya, upon instructions, has consented to have the plaint served upon the Advocate-on-Record appearing on behalf of the respondents. Accordingly, the service of writ of summons may be dispensed with. 15. Plaintiff petitioners are directed to serve a copy of the plaint upon the Advocate-on-Record of the defendant respondents within one week from date. 16. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, should be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.