JUDGMENT : SHARAD KUMAR SHARMA, J. 1. These are the two Appeals from Orders, which arises out of an accident, which had chanced on 20th November 2007 resulting into death of Zakir, who was said to have been sitting on the right side mudguard of the tractor bearing registration number UA-06A-7593, who on account of being hit by the running Bus, belonging to the appellant of Appeal from Order No. 492 of 2010, bearing Registration No. HR 46B-4919, Zakir had fell down and was later on crushed by the Bus and had consequently met with the sad demise. 2. It is contended that on the date of the accident, when the Tractor aforesaid, was passing through Bajpur, Kashipur Road, the accident did chanced at the turn of the village Parmanandpur at about 6.15 a.m. when the accident has occurred, it was alleged by the claimants/respondents herein, in the Appeal from Order No. 492/2010, that the accident has chanced on account of rash and negligent driving of the driver of the bus and hence they filed a claim petition under Section 166 to be read with Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, by preferring the same before the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal on 30th April 2008. 3. The foundation of the case, even before the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was that on the date of the accident the deceased Zakir, who was travelling on the right side mudguard of the tractor in question, was of 28 years of age and was a skilled person since he was a carpenter and he used to earn approximately Rs. 200/- per day, amounting to a total income of Rs. 6000/- per month and thus it was contended by the learned counsel for the claimants, that the claimants, who are the wife and the four children of the deceased, they would be entitled for an appropriate compensation, based upon their quantum of dependency, on the basis of the annual income, which was accruing to the deceased. 4. The claim petition thus preferred by the claimants, they had further contended, that as a consequence of the incident, which has chanced on 20th November 2007, the uncle of the deceased i.e. Mr. Khalif Ahmed, who was also travelling on the same Tractor also fell down and he too had suffered with some minor injuries in the same accident. 4. The claim petition thus preferred by the claimants, they had further contended, that as a consequence of the incident, which has chanced on 20th November 2007, the uncle of the deceased i.e. Mr. Khalif Ahmed, who was also travelling on the same Tractor also fell down and he too had suffered with some minor injuries in the same accident. It is submitted by the claimants that the post-mortem was conducted on the corpus of the deceased Zakir on 20th November 2007, and simultaneously an FIR was also registered being Case Crime No. 6017 of 2007 for the offences under Sections 279 and 304A of IPC. 5. The claim petition thus filed by the claimants, they had submitted that on the basis of the income which was accruing to the deceased and considering the aspects of their dependency and the liability, which has befallen on the claimant No. 1 and on the four surviving minor children, the claimant has claimed for compensation to be remitted to them to the tune of Rs. 11.00 lakh. 6. The claim petition was contested by the appellant of Appeal from Order No. 492 of 2010, i.e. Haryana State Road Transport Corporation, by filing its written statement by way of paper number 14 (kha), wherein it was submitted by the respondent No. 1, in the written statement, that the liability of payment of compensation couldn’t be fastened upon the owner of the offending vehicle i.e. the Bus in question, because there was no cause of action against them, because of the fact that the Bus in question, at the relevant point of time was being driven by its driver, who was having the valid document, i.e. the valid driving licence and it was being driven by him with utmost perfection without there being any factor of negligence, at all which could have required to be determined under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 7. 7. It was further submitted by the appellant of AO No. 492 of 2010, that on the date of the accident, the offending vehicle i.e. the Bus was duly insured with the Insurance Company called as ‘ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited, and the same was covered by the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy, bearing No. PCVE-4897480, and in that eventuality, what the owner of the offending vehicle intended to argue, was that since the vehicle at the relevant point of time was insured, it was incumbent on the claimants that they ought to have impleaded the insurer of the alleged offending vehicle as one of the parties to the claim petition. But, since having not done so, the claim suffered from the vices of non-joinder of the necessary parties. This plea was bad because in the proceedings before the MACT, the Insurance Company, was impleaded as Opposite Party No. 3, by way of an order dated 12.09.2008, passed by the Tribunal. 8. During the course of the argument before the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, in order to shift the burden of liability, and payment of compensation on the Insurance Company with which the offending vehicle said to have been insured, they submitted that the insurance of the offending vehicle since it was covered by the Special Contingency Insurance Policy Agreement and the said policy was validly insured and was effective w.e.f. 12th January 2007 to 11th January 2008 and since the aspect of negligence on part of the driver Krishna Kumar, was not a fact, which was ever attempted to be established by evidences, the claim petition under Section 166 to be read with Section 140 of the motor vehicle act deserved to be dismissed. 9. 9. It was further specifically pleaded in the written statement being paper number 14 (kha), that if at all the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal came to a conclusion that there was a negligence on part of the driver of the offending vehicle, in commission of an accident, which had chanced on 20th November, 2007, and in that eventuality, under the terms of the Special Contingency Insurance Policy Agreement, the liability of payment of compensation, has to be harnessed upon the Insurer of the offending vehicle and hence, since the insurer of the offending vehicle has not been made as a party to the claim petition, the claim petition suffered from the vices of non-joinder of the necessary parties. 10. The driver of the offending vehicle, who was impleaded as opposite party No. 2, has filed his independent written statement i.e. bwinf paper No. 26 (kha) and in the written statement thus filed by him since he being the employ of opposite party No. 1, to the claim proceeding, has almost taken an akin stand in the written statement filed by him in order to deny his liability contending thereof that no liability could have been fastened upon the driver of the offending vehicle, because the same would not fall for consideration under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, because the aspect of negligence was never attributed nor it was established to be attributable on the driver by the evidences which were produced before the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. 11. Apart from it, the opposite party No. 2, i.e. the driver of the offending vehicle, in support of his contention, has also placed before the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal the driving licence, the insurance policy and had contended, that the vehicle, at the relevant point of time was being plied with under all valid documents including the registration, the route permit, the tax clearance certificate, the fitness certificate, insurance documents etc. The opposite party No. 3, i.e. the Insurer of the offending vehicle, who was impleaded as opposite party No. 3 of MACP Case No. 161 of 2008, by an order dated 12.09.2008, in fact, it was contended that since there was a non compliance of the provisions contained under Section 158 (6) of the Motor Vehicles Act to be read with Section 64VB of the Insurance Act, 1938, the liability couldn’t have been harnessed upon the appellant i.e. the owner of the offending vehicle. 12. Based on the pleadings exchanged between the parties, to the proceedings before the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, the learned Tribunal framed the following issues vide its order dated 29th October 2009, which is extracted here under: ^^¼1½ D;k fnukad 20-11-2007 dks le; djhc 6-15 cts lqcg LFkku xzke ijekuUniqj frjkgk ds ikl cktiqj dk'khiqj ekxZ ij vUrxZr Fkkuk dk'khiqj ftyk jkeiqj esa jksMost cl la[;k ,pŒvkjŒ46ch&4919 ds pkyd }kjk cl dks rsth o ykijokgh ls pykrs gq, VªSDVj&VªkSyh esa ihNs ls VDdj ekj nhA ftlls VªSDVj ds eMdkM ij cSBs tkfdj dh e`R;q gks xbZ\ ¼2½ D;k nq?kZVuk ds fnu o le; jksMost cl la[;k ,pŒvkjŒ46ch&4919 ds pkyd ds ikl oS/k ,oa ÁHkkoh MªkbZfoax ykbZlsUl ugha Fkk\ ¼3½ D;k ;kphx.k fdlh Áfrdj dks ÁkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh gSa\ ;fn gka rks fdl foi{kh ls vkSj fdruh Áfrdj /kujkf'k\** 13. In fact, at this stage itself, in order to record further findings based upon the arguments which had been extended by the learned counsel for the appellant herein, it becomes relevant to extract the part of the order dated 29th October 2010, wherein the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, had specifically observed, that apart from the issues, which were formulated on 29th October 2010, no other issues were pressed in by any of the parties to the proceedings and the relevant part of the order is extracted hereunder: ^^mijksDr okn fcUnqvksa ds vfrfjDr vU; dksbZ okn fcUnq l`ftr ugha gksrk vkSj u gh i{kdkjksa }kjk vU; fdlh okn fcUnq ds l`ftr fd;s tkus esa cy fn;k x;k gSA i=koyh ij nkf[ky vfHkys[kksa ds vfrfjDr i{kdkj ;fn vU; dksbZ nLrkost nkf[ky djuk pkgrs gSa rks vfxze fu;r frfFk rd nkf[ky djsaA mHk; i{kksa dks funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd og vius xokgku dh lwph nkf[ky djsaA i=koyh okLrs lk{; fnukad 9-12-2009 dks is'k gksA** 14. The learned counsel for the appellant of AO No. 492 of 2010, had confined his argument only from two perspectives: (i) That the claim proceedings before the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, suffered from the vices of the non-joinder of the necessary parties and hence, no liability of payment of compensation could have been harnessed upon the appellant i.e. the owner of the offending vehicle, since the insurer of the offending vehicle was not made as a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal. (ii) The argument, which has been extended by the learned counsel for the appellant of AO No. 492 of 2010, is that in fact it is a case of contributory negligence and hence no liability could have been exclusively fastened upon the appellant for meeting out the compensation, which has been determined by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal by the impugned award. 15. If the findings, which has been recorded by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal by virtue of the impugned award dated 29th October 2010 is that itself is taken into consideration, in fact, if the oral evidences which were otherwise required to be adduced by the opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 i.e. the appellant of AO No. 492 of 2010 is considered, a specific finding in that regard has been recorded in Para 10, where it has been recorded that opposite party Nos. 1 and 2, have not led any oral evidences in support of their contention, which were raised by them in their respective written statement. But, the documentary evidences, which were filed by them by way of list number 27(ga) to 28(ga), which included the documents pertaining to the validity of the vehicle, which were being carried as per law were in fact that they were placed on record before the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. 16. The Court feels that it would be necessary to deal with the first argument, as extended by the learned counsel for the appellant, as to what would be the impact of non-joinder of the necessary parties to the proceedings before the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. 17. 16. The Court feels that it would be necessary to deal with the first argument, as extended by the learned counsel for the appellant, as to what would be the impact of non-joinder of the necessary parties to the proceedings before the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. 17. This argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is not based on any valid logic, rather its contrary to the proceedings which were held before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, the reason for the aforesaid is that if the lower Court records are scrutinized particularly the order dated 12.09.2008, which finds place in the order sheet of the proceedings of claim petition No. 161 of 2008, which is extracted hereunder: ^^12-09-2008 okn iqdkjk x;kA mHk; i{kksa ds fo}ku vf/koDrkx.k U;k;kf/kdj.k ds le{k mifLFkr vk;sA i=koyh ij foi{kh la[;k&2 dh vksj ls tckonkok nkf[ky fd;s tkus gsrq LFkxu ÁkFkZuk i= 17x ÁLrqr fd;k x;k gSA ftldks vkifRrdrkZ }kjk voyksfdr fd;k x;k gSA LFkxu ÁkFkZuk i= okLrs tckonkok nkf[ky fd;s tkus gsrq Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gSA vfxze fu;r frfFk rd tckonkok nkf[ky gksA 2- i=koyh ij 16[k ÁkFkZuk i= ckor la'kks/ku gsrq ÁLrqr fd;k x;k gSA fuLrkj.k la'kks/ku ÁkFkZuk i= 16[k 2- ÁLrqr la'kks/ku ÁkFkZuk i= bl vk'k; ls ÁLrqr fd;k x;k gS fd ;kfpdk esa foi{kh la[;k&2 ds ckn foi{kh la[;k&3 vkbZŒlhŒvkbZŒlhŒvkbZŒ ykseokMZ tujy bU'kksjsUl dEiuh fyfeVsM 'kk[kk jksgrd gfj;k.kk dks i{kdkj cuk;k tkuk vko';d gS tks fd lEcfU/kr nq?kZVukxzLr okgu dh chek dEiuh gSA blfy, la'kks/ku ÁkFkZuk i= Lohdkj dj fy;k tk;sA 3- ÁLrqr la'kks/ku ÁkFkZuk i= ij foi{kh dh vksj ls vkifRr dh xbZ gS vkSj ÁkFkZuk i= ds fujLrhdj.k ij cy fn;k x;k gSA 4- lquk x;k rFkk i=koyh dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA i=koyh ds voyksdu ls Li"V gS fd ;kfpdkdrkZ }kjk la'kks/ku ÁkFkZuk i= esa foi{kh la[;k&3 okgu dh chek dEiuh dks i{kdkj cukuk pkgrk gSA la'kks/ku vkSipkfjd Ád`fr dk gSA okn ds U;k;ksfpr fuLrkj.k ds fy, ;g la'kks/ku vko';d gSA vr% la'kks/ku ÁkFkZuk i= Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS c'krsZ vkifRrdrkZ dks {kfr/ku dh iwfrZ dh tk;sA vkns'k 5- vr% la'kks/ku ÁkFkZuk i= gtkZ eqŒ 25@& :i;s ij Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gSA ;kfpdkdrkZ dks funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd og ;kfpdk esa la'kks/ku] ÁkFkZuk i= ds Ádk'k esa okn fyfid le{k fu;ekuqlkj la'kks/ku dk;Zokgh fd;k tkuk lqfuf'pr djsA rRi'pkr uohu i{k dks uksfVl tkjh gksA ;kph bl lEcU/k esa iSjoh iw.kZ djsaA vr% i=koyh okLrs tckonkok gsrq fnukad 14-10-2008 dks is'k gksA** ,eŒ,ŒlhŒVhŒ vij ftyk U;k;k/kh'k dk'khiqjA** 18. The argument extended on the first question, raised is not sustainable but rather contrary to the records because Insurance Company was impleaded as opposite No. 3, in the proceedings, and order dated 12.09.2008, which was passed on an application under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of C.P.C. being paper number 16kha, has attained finality as it was not challenged, and insurance company was made party. Rather the order was complied with and it was incorporated in the claim petition on 16.09.2008. 19. Apart from the above factual reasons on record, the proceeding before the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal are the civil proceedings; the procedure of which are governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and once the appellant has submitted the written statement being paper number 14 (kha) and he took a conscious view, that the claim petition was bad because of the non-joinder of the necessary parties, it was incumbent upon the appellant of AO No. 492 of 2010, to request the Court for formulation of an appropriate issue about the impact of non-joinder of necessary parties, though the plea was contrary to records itself, as pleaded by him in the written statement. But, in view of the part of the order dated 29th October 2009, which has been extracted above, in fact, it shows that no efforts was ever made by the appellant of AO No. 492 of 2010, to get an appropriate issue framed. Rightly so too because of the order of the Tribunal dated 12.09.2008, impleading the Insurance Company as Opposite Number 3. 20. In response to it, the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Ghanshyam Joshi, Advocate, submits that in fact, it is exclusively the liability of the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, to ensure that an appropriate issue is framed, based upon the rival pleadings raised by the parties. 21. 20. In response to it, the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Ghanshyam Joshi, Advocate, submits that in fact, it is exclusively the liability of the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, to ensure that an appropriate issue is framed, based upon the rival pleadings raised by the parties. 21. This Court is not in agreement with the arguments as extended by the learned counsel for the appellant, from the said perspective and for the reasons behind it is that if the provisions of Order 14 Rule 1(6) of the CPC, is taken into consideration, which is extracted here under, it rather provides, that nothing requires under the rule for imposing a liability on the Court to frame an issue or to record an issue where the defendant to the proceedings, which is the appellant herein, on the first date of hearing does not make a defence to that effect: “(6) Nothing in this rule requires the Court to frame and record issues where the defendant at the first hearing of the suit makes no defence.” 22. In that eventuality, this argument of the learned counsel for the appellant for the alleged effect of non-joinder of the necessary party, which the appellant wanted to shift upon the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, is not available to him being contrary to the proceedings held before the Tribunal, because it was an exclusive prerogative of the defendant i.e. the appellant of AO No. 492 of 2010, to have requested the Court, on the first date of hearing itself, before the Court was venturing to decide the matter on merits, to have formulated an appropriate issue, as pleaded in the written statement with regard to the fact and effect of non-joinder of the necessary parties. But, no efforts were ever made as such and the aspects of no efforts having been made, is also reflected from the part of the order dated 29th October 2009, where the observations has been made by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, that the defendant has not pressed, any other issue based on the pleadings which were raised by him. Hence, this question raised by the appellant is answered in negative against him. 23. Hence, this question raised by the appellant is answered in negative against him. 23. The second question, which has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant of AO No. 492 of 2010, that this is the case of a contributory negligence and hence a proportionate liability was to be fastened upon the owner of the other vehicle too, which was engaged in the said accident. 24. This Court is apprehensive to accept the said pleading raised by the learned counsel for the appellant before this Court, in the appellate proceedings under Section 173, particularly, in the light of the fact, that if the written statement, which was filed by them before the Court below, that is paper number 14 (kha), is taken into consideration, no such plea was ever raised by the appellant to develop a case from the said prospective, in order to bring it within the ambit of a contributory negligence and hence, this plea too is answered against the appellant of AO No. 492 of 2010. 25. Apart from it, the learned counsel for the appellant has not pressed any other issue, which requires to be considered and answered by this Court under the light of implications of the provisions, contained under Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC. Thus, the Appeal from Order preferred by the owner of the offending vehicle, deserves to be dismissed. The same is accordingly dismissed. 26. Reverting back to the Cross Appeal being Cross Appeal No. 14 of 2018, Haryana State Transport Corporation and Others vs. Smt. Amana and Others, which has been filed by the claimants, praying for an enhancement of the compensation. 27. The same is accordingly dismissed. 26. Reverting back to the Cross Appeal being Cross Appeal No. 14 of 2018, Haryana State Transport Corporation and Others vs. Smt. Amana and Others, which has been filed by the claimants, praying for an enhancement of the compensation. 27. There are two fold arguments, which has been extended by the learned counsel for the claimant/appellant therein which could be determined to be as under, under Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC: (i) That the application of multiplier based upon the age of the deceased, which was 28 years on the date of the death by applying a multiplier of ‘16’ was not in consonance to the principles which had been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sarla Verma’s judgment where, according to it, the multiplier as made applicable to the age bracket of the deceased as provided therein that if a person is falling between the age bracket as provided in the judgment itself, the multiplier which has to be made applicable has had to be ‘17’ as it has been dealt by the aforesaid judgments in its Para 33 and 34, which is extracted hereunder: “33. In Susamma Thomas, this Court stated the principle relating to multiplier thus: “17. The multiplier represents the number of years' purchase on which the loss of dependency is capitalized. Take for instance a case where annual loss of dependency is Rs. 10,000. If a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 is invested at 10% annual interest, the interest will take care of the dependency, perpetually, the multiplier in this case work out to 10. If the rate of interest is 5% per annum and not 10% then the multiplier needed to capitalize the loss of the annual dependency at Rupees 10,000 would be 20. Then the multiplier, i.e. the number of years' purchase of 20 will yield the annual dependency perpetually. Then allowance to scale down the multiplier would have to be made taking into account the uncertainties of the future, the allowances for immediate lump-sum payment, the period over which the dependency is to last being shorter and the capital feed also to be spent away over the period of dependency is to last etc., Usually in English Courts the operative multiplier rarely exceeds 16 as maximum. This will come down accordingly as the age of the deceased person (or that of the dependents, whichever is higher) goes up. 34. The Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 was amended by Act 54 of 1994, inter-alia inserting Section 163A and the Second Schedule with effect from 14. 11.1994. Section 163A of the MV Act contains a special provision as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis, as indicated in the Second Schedule to the Act. The Second Schedule contains a Table prescribing the compensation to be awarded with reference to the age and income of the deceased. It specifies the amount of compensation to be awarded with reference to the annual income range of Rs. 3,000/- to Rs. 40,000/-. It does not specify the quantum of compensation in case the annual income of the deceased is more than Rs. 40,000/-. But it provides the multiplier to be applied with reference to the age of the deceased. The table starts with a multiplier of 15, goes upto 18, and then steadily comes down to 5. It also provides the standard deduction as one-third on account of personal living expenses of the deceased. Therefore, where the application is under Section 163A of the Act, it is possible to calculate the compensation on the structured formula basis, even where compensation is not specified with reference to the annual income of the deceased, or is more than Rs. 40,000/- by applying the formula: (2/3 x AI x M) that is two-thirds of the annual income multiplied by the multiplier applicable to the age of the deceased would be the compensation. Several principles of tortious liability are excluded when the claim is under Section 163A of MV Act.” 28. In that view of the matter, the multiplier, as imposed by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal if it was based upon the principles of Sarla Verma’s judgment as reported in Sarla Verma and Others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, 2009 (6) SCC 121 the multiplier is to be enhanced from ‘16’ to ‘17’ which has to be made applicable in the instant case. 29. 29. The second limb of argument of the learned counsel for the claimant/appellant, of Cross Appeal No. 14 of 2018, is that the notional income, which was determined, as to be the foundation for determining the dependency of the claimants, it has been made on the basis of the notional income, as provided under the schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act, which was then incorporated way back in 1994, making the notional income applicable as to be Rs. 15000/- which ought to have been proportionately increased, with the passage of time, based on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, rendered in Pranay Sethi’s case. 30. He submitted that it was too lesser amount to be fixed, as notional income for the purposes of determination of notional income that too in the context of the fact that the accident did chanced in 2007, and the notional income, which was provided under the schedule formula given under the Act, it should have been proportionately enhanced to be made applicable for the purposes of determining the compensation which should be increased rationally with the efflux of time. 31. To this question, raised by the learned counsel for the appellant to the Cross Appeal, it could have been answered against him for the reason being that his claim petition before the Tribunal was not preferred under Section 163A, but it was rather preferred under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Both the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, which contemplates filing of the claim petition, have got the different parameters and dimensions of consideration, because if it is a claim petition has been filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is exclusively the aspect of negligence, which has to be considered by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. But for the purposes, for the grant of compensation on the basis of structured formula provided under the Motor Vehicles Act, as per the schedule provided therein, it could have been attracted only when the claim petition was filed under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act. But for the purposes, for the grant of compensation on the basis of structured formula provided under the Motor Vehicles Act, as per the schedule provided therein, it could have been attracted only when the claim petition was filed under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Since having not been filed under Section 163A, there could have been a denial to attract the principles of a proportionate enhancement of the notional income, as subscribed under the Act in 1994, inserting the notional income in the Schedule of the Act of 1988, which was required to be enhanced proportionately as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court, as reported in Dhaneshwari and Another vs. Tejeshwar Singh and Others, ILR 2012 (3) Delhi 585 which had rather laid down that if a compensation has to be determined under Section 163A, based on structured formula, while applying the principles of notional income, in fact, there has to be a rationale increase to be made in the notional income, then as what has been settled in the schedule appended to the Act by giving it an increase of 10% by every three years. The said principle, in fact, has yet again been asserted to be made applicable on the basis of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, pertaining to the proportionate increase, to be made in the application of the notional income for the purposes of determining the compensation on the basis of the proportionate increase in the inflation rate. 32. In that view of the matter, the notional income, which ought to have been taken as to be the basis, this Court is of the opinion that the notional income of Rs. 36,000/- per annum, ought to have been taken as to be the basis for the purposes of determining the compensation which would be payable to the claimants on account of the death of their breadwinner. 33. In view of the aforesaid reasons and coupled with the principles, which had been laid down by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court, based on the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Hon’ble Apex Court judgment, the notional income, which ought to have been made applicable, should have been to the widely adopted principles of applying the notional income, as to be Rs. 36,000/- per annum and accordingly, for the purposes of determination of compensation in the instant case, the notional income, which ought to have been considered and applied, it should have been Rs. 36,000/- per annum, instead of Rs. 15,000/- per annum. Accordingly, the notional income, which has been taken as to be the basis for determining the compensation, is being enhanced to Rs. 36,000/- per annum. 34. So was the principles which was laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, in a judgment as reported in National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi and Others, 2017 (16) SCC 680 in its Para 59.8, has held as under: “59.8. Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000/- and Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years.” 35. For the reasons aforesaid, the Cross Appeal, preferred by the claimants would partly stand allowed. The multiplier of ‘16’ is enhanced to ‘17’ and since the compensation has been determined on the basis of the notional income of Rs. 36,000/- per annum, which has been commonly made applicable as per the ratios of the aforesaid judgments since has already been granted to the appellant, no proportionate increase by enhancing the notional income is required to be paid to the claimants/appellants. 36. Accordingly, the Cross Appeal partly stands allowed only limited to the extent of application of multiplier.