JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Jonathan L. Sailo, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant and Mr. Zodinpuia Hnamte, learned counsel for the respondent/opposite party. 2. This is an appeal filed by the appellant/complainant and is directed against the Order dated 30.05.2018 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Serchhip in Criminal Complaint No. 2/2016 by which the complaint submitted by her under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.PC) read with Section 499/500 of the India Penal Code (IPC) was disposed of by giving the respondent/opposite party the benefit of doubt and thereby, acquitting him from the charge. Since the appeal is against the acquittal, the appellant filed Criminal Leave Petition No. 1/2018 under Section 378 (4) of the Cr.PC and the same was allowed vide Order dated 22.10.2018. 3. The case of the appellant is that she is a bona-fide member of the Mizo Hmeichhe Insuihkhawm Pawl (MHIP), which is a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) for women in the State of Mizoram. She was elected as the President of MHIP Sub-Headquarters, Serchhip. The respondent is a married man, married to Smt. Lalnunsangi. Since the year 2012, the respondent tried to have illicit relationship with the appellant but the appellant never wanted to have such a relationship, especially with a married man like the respondent. The respondent despite several attempts did not succeed to have illicit relationship with the appellant but despite this, the respondent claimed that he had a relationship with the appellant and he could do whatever he wanted with the appellant, which irritated and agonized Smt. Lalnunsangi, the wife of the respondent. Smt. Lalnunsangi started reacting against the appellant and as a result, they quarreled a few times on the street. Consequently, the respondent’s wife Smt. Lalnunsangi made a complaint before the MHIP General Headquarters, Aizawl. As a result of the complaint, the appellant was removed from the post of President, MHIP Sub-Headquarters, Serchhip and also from her membership to the said NGO. Thereafter, the appellant filed a criminal complaint against the respondent under Section 190 of the Cr.PC read with Section 499/500 IPC alleging that the respondent has defamed her and should be punished as per the relevant provisions of law. The criminal complaint was registered and numbered as Criminal Complaint No. 2/2016. 4. Against the criminal complaint, the respondent filed his written objection denying the charge. The criminal complaint was registered and numbered as Criminal Complaint No. 2/2016. 4. Against the criminal complaint, the respondent filed his written objection denying the charge. He denied that he tried to have illicit relationship with the appellant and counter alleged that the appellant tried to marry him despite knowing the fact that he was a married man. He further stated that he did not falsely implicate the appellant and his statement that he had sucked the complainant’s breast was a fact which happened between them a long time back and that he had made that statement since the appellant was adamant not to listen to his request that she should not disturb and assault his wife in future. 5. The Court after having found a prima facie case against the respondent framed charge against him under Section 500 IPC and to which, the respondent pleaded not guilty and claimed for trial. During the trial, the appellant examined 14 witnesses while the respondent examined 3 witnesses. In order to decide the case, the Court below formulated two (2) points for determination namely:- (i) Whether the respondent defamed the complainant by making a false and defamatory statement in respect of the complainant? (ii) If so, whether the accused is guilty? 6. Thereafter, the Trial Court while considering the criminal complaint discarded the evidence of the complainant’s witness Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14 since the Court was of the view that their evidence was not directed against the respondent and therefore did not have any relevance in the determination of criminal liability to the respondent. Consequently, vide the impugned order dated 30.05.2018, the Trial Court by giving the respondent the benefit of doubt acquitted him from the liability of the charge. Being aggrieved, the appellant has filed the present appeal. 7. Mr. Jonathan L. Sailo, learned counsel by referring to the Memorandum of Appeal submits that the learned Trial Court committed manifest error in discarding the deposition/evidence of the appellant’s witness Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14 without any valid and justifiable reason even though the evidence of the said witnesses have corroborated the statement of the appellant and were relevant in determining the criminal liability of the respondent. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14 without any valid and justifiable reason even though the evidence of the said witnesses have corroborated the statement of the appellant and were relevant in determining the criminal liability of the respondent. The learned counsel submits that the learned Trial Court ought to have considered the evidence given by the appellant’s witness No. 2 which was to the effect that she had read the text messages from the mobile phone of the appellant sent by the respondent to the appellant stating that he missed her and could not live without her and that he used his wife only to satisfy his sexual urge. To this, the appellant angrily replied by asking the respondent not to contact her anymore. In her cross-examination, the appellant’s witness No. 2 was not asked any question challenging the veracity of the said statement. In fact, this statement is relevant inasmuch as, it corroborates the accusation made by the appellant that the respondent tried to have illicit relationship with the appellant and not the other way round. However, the learned Trial Court without any reason discarded this evidence. 8. The learned counsel further submits that the elder brother of the appellant was examined as complainant’s witness No. 8. In his deposition, he stated that in the morning of 26th September, 2015, the respondent came to his residence and said that he could have sexual intercourse with his sister whenever he wanted. This statement was bound to make the said witness believe that his sister was having a consensual sexual relationship with the respondent. The statement of the respondent deeply angered the said witness and made him doubt the moral character of his younger sister. The said witness enquired about the matter to the appellant who vehemently denied the same and even offered to be examined by a doctor to test her virginity. The credibility of the complainant’s witness or his statement was not at all shaken in his cross-examination and therefore, the same must be held to be a fact. The respondent in paragraph No. 2 of his cross-examination admitted that he went to the house of the brother of the appellant in September, 2015 and in paragraph No. 5, he stated that he did not know whether the appellant was a still a virgin or not. The respondent in paragraph No. 2 of his cross-examination admitted that he went to the house of the brother of the appellant in September, 2015 and in paragraph No. 5, he stated that he did not know whether the appellant was a still a virgin or not. In paragraph No. 7, he also stated that he did not want to have sexual intercourse with the appellant and likewise, the appellant too did not want it. This statement of the respondent is clearly contradictory to his earlier statement that he could have sexual intercourse with the appellant whenever he wanted to. Therefore, the learned Trial Court ought to have considered the evidence given by the respondent and the appellant’s witness No. 8 to come to a conclusion that the respondent had made a totally false and defamatory imputation concerning the moral behavior and character of the appellant, intending to harm or knowing that such imputation would harm the reputation of the appellant and lower her in the eyes of her family and the society. 9. The learned counsel further submits that the Trial Court wrongly came to the conclusion that the respondent was protected by the Eight Exception to Section 499 IPC. The learned counsel submits that according to the Eight Exception, it is not defamatory to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject matter of the accusation. He submits that the false imputation made by the respondent to the appellant’s witness No. 8 i.e., the brother of the appellant, does not fall within the Eight Exception inasmuch as, the accusation is false and made with malice without any evidence to show that the defamatory statement was made in good faith. Further, the appellant being a woman and 49 years of age and her brother (appellant’s witness No. 8) living in a separate house with his own family, cannot be held to be the lawful authority over the subject matter of accusation. Therefore, since there are evidences proving that the respondent has clearly made false and defamatory imputations against the appellant, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 10. Therefore, since there are evidences proving that the respondent has clearly made false and defamatory imputations against the appellant, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 10. The learned counsel also submits that the learned Trial Court has committed manifest error in holding that the imputation made by the respondent against the appellant in the presence of the family members of the appellant on the morning of 26th September, 2015 falls within the First Exception as provided under Section 499 IPC. In fact, the words uttered by the respondent that he could have sexual intercourse with the appellant however and whenever he wanted to and that he even sucked her breast are false, malicious, defamatory in nature and nowhere connected with the public good or required for the protection of the interest and safety of one’s wife under the First Exception to Section 499 IPC. Therefore, the learned counsel submits that the learned Trial Court having failed to appreciate the evidence led by the appellant in its true perspective, the impugned order cannot be sustained and should be set aside. The learned counsel also submits that the case of Bilal Ahmed Kaloo Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997) 7 SCC 431 relied upon by the learned Trial Court is in respect of Sections 153-A (1)(a)(b) and 505(2) IPC and therefore, it is not relevant to the present case. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has relied upon the following authorities:- (i) Chaman Lal Vs. The State of Punjab (1970) 1 SCC 590 (ii) Balraj Khanna & Ors. Vs. Moti Ram (1971) 3 SCC 399 (iii) John Thomas Vs. Dr. K. Jagadeesan (2001) 6 SCC 30 (iv) Jeffrey J. Diermeier & Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal & Anr. (2010) 6 SCC 243 (v) Om Prakash Chautala Vs. Kanwar Bhan & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 417 11. Mr. Zodinpuia Hnamte, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submits that the appellant was terminated from the post she was holding under the MHIP, including her membership vide order dated 24.10.2015. Aggrieved with the same, she challenged her termination order by filing Declaratory Suit No. 26/2015. The Suit was however dismissed vide Judgment & Order dated 20.06.2016. Thereafter, the appellant filed the present criminal complaint alleging that she has been defamed. Aggrieved with the same, she challenged her termination order by filing Declaratory Suit No. 26/2015. The Suit was however dismissed vide Judgment & Order dated 20.06.2016. Thereafter, the appellant filed the present criminal complaint alleging that she has been defamed. He submits that the dismissal of the declaratory suit clearly demonstrates that there is no substance in the complaint submitted by the appellant. He submits that the DW-3 who is the colleague and co-worker of the respondent clearly deposed before the Trial Court that he and the respondent visited the appellant’s house on 26.09.2015 and that it was the appellant who misbehaved with the respondent. He submits that this has not been denied by the appellant and the same can be seen from the fact that the appellant declined to cross-examine DW-3. The learned counsel further submits that DW-2 worked as a daily laborer in the Drop-In Centre where the appellant and the respondent were working. In his deposition, the said witness clearly stated that he saw the appellant and the respondent kissing when they had gone for a picnic. The respondent also examined himself as DW-1 and whatever he stated in his evidence has clearly been corroborated by the other defence witnesses. The learned counsel lastly submits that the appellant did not exhibit any documents during the trial in order to establish her case. The allegations made by her in the complaint application are not supported by any documentary evidence and therefore, under the circumstance, the learned Trial Court had rightly passed the impugned order giving the respondent the benefit of doubt and acquitted him from the charge. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of H. Siddiqui (Dead) by LRS Vs. A. Ramalingam, (2011) 4 SCC 240 . 12. I have heard the submissions made by the learned counsels for the rival parties and I have perused the materials available on record. The appellant filed a criminal complaint against the respondent before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate at Serchhip under Section 190 Cr.PC read with Section 499/500 IPC alleging that the respondent had defamed her and therefore, he should be punished under the relevant provisions of law. The appellant filed a criminal complaint against the respondent before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate at Serchhip under Section 190 Cr.PC read with Section 499/500 IPC alleging that the respondent had defamed her and therefore, he should be punished under the relevant provisions of law. After finding a prima facie case, the learned Trial Court formulated 2 (two) points for determination viz; whether the respondent had defamed the complainant by making false defamatory statements and if so, whether the respondent was guilty. To establish her case, the appellant examined 14 witnesses while the respondent examined 3 witnesses in defense. The complainant is PW-1 and PW-4 & PW-8 are her younger sister and brother respectively. Apart from the evidence of these 3 (three) prosecution witnesses, the learned Trial Court discarded the evidence of the remaining 11 (eleven) witnesses. The reason given by the learned Trial Court is that the evidence of these 11 (eleven) prosecution witnesses are not directed against the respondent and therefore, it has no relevance in determining the criminal liability of the opposite party and as such, there was no requirement for discussion or analysis of their evidence. 13. Because of the above stated view taken by the learned Trial Court, let us briefly examine some of the evidence led by the prosecution witnesses which were discarded by the learned Trial Court. PW-2 Smt. Lalrinngheti in her Examination-in-Chief deposed that sometime in the month of September, 2012, she sold dry fish for Smt. Nunsangi and over phone, she asked her to collect the money collected from the sale proceeds whenever she wanted to. As they were conversing, Smt. Nunsangi asked her if she knew a woman by the name of Saimawii but she did not answer. Smt. Nunsangi told her that Saimawii had feelings for her husband and that despite being one of the leaders of the MHIP, she would sleep with him and take him anywhere she wanted to and whenever she pleased. In response, PW-2 said that if what she said was true, she could keep her husband under her control. But Smt. Nunsangi said that Saimawii was a dangerous person. PW-2 then said that Saimawii was like a sister to her and that she will scold her for having such an illicit relationship with somebody’s husband and to which, the latter requested not to tell anything to Saimawii. But Smt. Nunsangi said that Saimawii was a dangerous person. PW-2 then said that Saimawii was like a sister to her and that she will scold her for having such an illicit relationship with somebody’s husband and to which, the latter requested not to tell anything to Saimawii. However, PW-2 later asked Saimawii as to whether she had any boyfriend by the name Hmingmawia and to which she angrily replied that she would not have any affair with anyone especially with somebody’s husband considering her age. The appellant then showed her the text messages sent to her by the respondent saying he could not live without her and that he used his wife only to satisfy his sexual urges. The appellant in reply rebuked the respondent and asked him not to contact her anymore. In her cross examination, PW-2 reiterated that Nunsangi told her that her husband and the appellant had an affair. 14. PW-3 Smt. Lalnunzami in her Examination-in-Chief deposed that she was the Assistant Secretary of MHIP Sub-Headquarters, Serchhip during 2014-2016 and was currently holding the post of General Secretary from the year 2016 – 2018. On the night of 01.10.2015, she received a phone call from Lucy, the then Finance Secretary of MHIP Sub-Headquarters, Serchhip informing her that their leader appears to have acted immorally and therefore, suggested that perhaps they should all resign from their respective posts. She then asked as to what the matter was and in reply, Lucy said that a complaint letter will be submitted soon and as and when the matter is taken up by the Officer Bearers, she will get to know about the details. However, no complaint letter was submitted but only a verbal complaint and for which, the Office Bearers met on 02.10.2015 to discuss about the issue. The appellant was said to have assaulted the wife of the respondent and on this issue, PW-3 stated that as it was a personal issue therefore, it should not be deliberated upon amongst the office bearers but left for settlement between the families concerned. However, on 03.10.2015, the respondent submitted an FIR against the complainant and the rival parties after having a discussion in the Police Station mutually agreed not to bring up the issue again. However, on 03.10.2015, the respondent submitted an FIR against the complainant and the rival parties after having a discussion in the Police Station mutually agreed not to bring up the issue again. Despite the amicable settlement, the issue flared up again on Whatsapp and the parties were again summoned in the police station wherein, the respondent said that he wanted to close the matter as it was embarrassing for a government servant to often appear in the police station. PW-3 then asked the respondent why he did not withdraw the complaint letter that was submitted to the P&E Branch MHIP as per their agreement and to which, he said that he tried but he was not permitted to withdraw the same by a person named Angeli. PW-3 then said that Angeli perhaps want to use the complaint personally against the appellant. To this by saying that they no longer have anything to say in the matter, Angeli and her associates from the P&E Branch MHIP left the place. Thereafter, at the initiation of the SDPO, another agreement was made by the rival parties. However, even after such amicable settlement, the respondent upon realizing that he could dislodge the appellant from her position as office bearer in the MHIP organization with the power and influence of MHIP Headquarters, once again started making false accusations upon the appellant and PW-3 found this to be unacceptable. According to her, the voice recording said to be in the possession of the MHIP should be made public so as to find out the truth on the accusations made. 15. PW-5 Smt. H. Lalremsiami similarly is also associated with the MHIP Sub-Headquarters as Executive Member and she deposed in favour of the appellant stating that she has known the appellant since her childhood. She stated that in the awareness campaign on the topic ‘Infant Mortality Rate’ held in the New Serchhip YMA Hall on 17.06.2016, Smt. F. Lalngaihawmi Financial Secretary, General Headquarters, MHIP said to the gathering that the respondent could sleep with the appellant whenever he wanted and that they even had the video. Those who attended the gathering were given Rs.300/-each as TA. According to her, all those responsible for defaming the complainant should be severely punished. She deposed that she stands witness to the fact that the appellant had done nothing wrong and all the accusations made against her are false. 16. Those who attended the gathering were given Rs.300/-each as TA. According to her, all those responsible for defaming the complainant should be severely punished. She deposed that she stands witness to the fact that the appellant had done nothing wrong and all the accusations made against her are false. 16. Similar to the above mentioned depositions of the prosecution witnesses, the evidence of the other discarded prosecution witnesses viz; PW Nos. 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14 have relevance to the complaint made by the appellant that the respondent has caused defamation to her for having made open derogatory statements in front of her family members and also in the complaint submitted before the MHIP Sub-Headquarters, Serchhip. Therefore, the learned Trial Court could not have discarded the evidence of the said witnesses. Be it stated herein that irrespective of the acceptance or non-acceptance of the evidence led by the rival parties, it is incumbent upon the court to examine and appreciate the same and then to give reasons for forming its opinion or view before drawing a conclusion. But here is a case where the learned Trial Court has found the evidence of as many as 11 out of the 14 prosecution witnesses to be of no relevance and has discarded them wholesale without any analysis. This in the considered view of this Court and in view of the brief examination of the discarded prosecution witnesses cannot be accepted. 17. Therefore, under the facts and circumstances, without expressing anything on the merit or otherwise, this Court finds it to be a fit case for remanding the matter back to the learned Trial Court for reconsideration by taking into account all the evidences led by the parties. Having taken this view, none of the authorities relied upon by the parties is being discussed. In the result, the impugned order dated 30.05.2018 is hereby set aside and the matter remanded back to the learned Trial Court from the stage of hearing for fresh consideration and decision. As the parties are represented by their respective counsels before this Court, they are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court i.e., the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Serchhip on 14th November, 2022. On their appearance, the learned Trial Court shall fix a date for hearing and for submission of fresh written arguments by the parties, if so advised. As the parties are represented by their respective counsels before this Court, they are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court i.e., the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Serchhip on 14th November, 2022. On their appearance, the learned Trial Court shall fix a date for hearing and for submission of fresh written arguments by the parties, if so advised. Thereafter, upon hearing the parties, the learned Trial Court shall make an endeavour to dispose the case expeditiously. It is also made clear that any observation made in this order should not influence the learned Trial Court in any manner in arriving at its own conclusion and decision on merit. 18. With the above observations and directions the appeal stands disposed of. Registry shall communicate a copy of this Order to the learned Trial Court.