JUDGMENT : Heard both side. Aggrieved by the compromise decree dated 08.04.2014 the petitioner in M.C.No.49/2011 on the file of the Civil Judge (Sr.Dn) & CJM, Chamarajanagar has preferred this appeal. 2. For the purpose of convenience, the parties will be referred according to their ranks before the trial Court. 3. The petitioner and respondent are Hindus. Their marriage was solemnized on 20.04.2007 as per their custom and rituals. The petitioner filed M.C.No.49/2011 under Section 13(1) (ia) and (ib) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (‘the Act, 1955’ for short) against the respondent seeking decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and desertion. The respondent contested the said petition by filing his statement of objection. 4. After both the parties adduced their evidence and when the matter was listed for arguments on 08.04.2014 a compromise petition was filed before the trial Court. It was stated in the compromise petition that the marriage between the parties is irretrievably broken down and at the advise of elders and well wishers the respondent has given consent for dissolution of marriage. It was further stated in the compromise petition that the petitioner has given up her right for permanent alimony. The trial Court by the impugned order on the same day recorded the said compromise petition and passed the impugned compromise decree dissolving the marriage. 5. The petitioner-wife challenges the said decree in this appeal on the ground that she is illiterate, does not know the contents of the compromise petition and the implications of the same was not explained to her and she had not received any amount as stated in Ex.R1. In other words, she states that the alleged compromise petition was fraudulent one and consequently the impugned compromise decree was the outcome of the fraud. She further claims that to evade his liability of permanent alimony, the respondent-husband managed to get such compromise petition and the compromise decree. 6. The contention of the counsel for the respondent-husband is that in view of Section 96(3) of CPC the appeal against the compromise decree is not maintainable. 7. This is an appeal preferred against the order of learned Senior Civil Judge & CJM, Chamarajanagar and this is not an appeal against the order passed by the Family Court. 6. The contention of the counsel for the respondent-husband is that in view of Section 96(3) of CPC the appeal against the compromise decree is not maintainable. 7. This is an appeal preferred against the order of learned Senior Civil Judge & CJM, Chamarajanagar and this is not an appeal against the order passed by the Family Court. Therefore, though the appeal memorandum is purportedly filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the applicable appeal provision is Section 28 of the Act, 1955. Section 28(1) of the Act, 1955 stipulates that all decrees made by the Court in any proceeding under the Act shall subject to provisions of the Act and are appealable as decrees of the Court and appeal lies to the Court to which the Court ordinarily lie from the decisions of the Court given in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. The exceptions are the one provided in Sub-Sections (2) to (4) of Section 28. Sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 28 state that no appeal lies against the interim order and against the order on costs. 8. In the present case, the appeal is not covered under the exceptions to Section 28(1) of the Act, 1955. Further the larger bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 7 of the judgment in Kishun @ Ramkishun (dead) through by LRs vs. Behari (dead) by LRs, (2008) 6 SCC 300 has held as follows : “7. That apart, we are of the view that the High Court was in error in holding that the appeal filed by Kishun against the decree of the trial court accepting a compromise which was disputed by him, was not maintainable. When on a dispute in that behalf being raised, an enquiry is made (now it has to be done in view of the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code added by Act 104 of 1976) and the suit is decreed on the basis of a compromise based on that enquiry, it could not be held to be a decree passed on consent within the meaning of Section 96(3) of the Code. Section 96(3) contemplates non-appealability of a decree passed by the court with the consent of parties. Section 96(3) contemplates non-appealability of a decree passed by the court with the consent of parties. Obviously, when one of the parties sets up a compromise and the other disputes it and the court is forced to adjudicate on whether there was a compromise or not and to pass a decree, it could not be understood as a decree passed by the court with the consent of parties. As we have noticed earlier, no appeal is provided after 1.2.1977, against an order rejecting or accepting a compromise after an enquiry under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3, either by Section 104 or by Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code. Only when the acceptance of the compromise receives the imprimatur of the court and it becomes a decree, or the court proceeds to pass a decree on merits rejecting the compromise set up, it becomes appealable, unless of course, the appeal is barred by Section 96(3) of the Code. We have already indicated that when there is a contest on the question whether there was a compromise or not, a decree accepting the compromise on resolution of that controversy, cannot be said to be a decree passed with the consent of the parties. Therefore, the bar under Section 96(3) of the Code could not have application. An appeal and a second appeal with its limitations would be available to the party feeling aggrieved by the decree based on such a disputed compromise or on a rejection of the compromise set up.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. The reading of the above judgment goes to show that when there is contest whether there was a compromise or not, the bar of Section 96(3) does not apply. Therefore the appeal lies against compromise decree. Under the circumstances, the contention that the appeal is hit by Section 96(3) of the Act, 1955 deserves no merit. 10. Next question is whether the compromise petition was executed by the appellant and the trial Court was justified in recording that. It is to be noted that the compromise petition was filed at the fag end of the proceedings when the matter was listed for final arguments. Till then the case was very seriously contested by the petitioner-wife. 10. Next question is whether the compromise petition was executed by the appellant and the trial Court was justified in recording that. It is to be noted that the compromise petition was filed at the fag end of the proceedings when the matter was listed for final arguments. Till then the case was very seriously contested by the petitioner-wife. When such contesting party came before the Court all of a sudden conceding for divorce, the trial Court should have given some reflecting time and held a detailed enquiry to ascertain whether such consent or compromise was voluntary. The records show that the same was not done in this case. That itself creates doubt about the compromise being voluntary and the validity of recording the compromise. 11. Even if the parties come before the Court with a petition for divorce by mutual consent, the law requires that they shall be given some time for reflection. That was not done in this case. Therefore the impugned judgment and decree is liable to be set aside and the matter requires to be remanded to the trial Court for fresh consideration. Hence the following: ORDER The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree is hereby set aside. The parties shall appear before the trial Court on 12.10.2022 without any further notice. On such appearance of the parties, the trial Court shall hear the parties on compromise petition and dispose of the compromise petition. If compromise petition is not accepted, the Trial Court shall hear the parties and dispose of the case on merits expeditiously.