ORDER : 1. This Contempt Case has been filed seeking to punish the respondent for willful disobedience and violation of the order, dated 24.11.1997 passed in S.A. No. 403 of 1995. 2. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner are that the petitioner Ashramam was established in the year 1926 by Sri Maharshi Sadguru Sri Malayala Swamy and now he is the Peetadhi Pathi of the said Ashramam. The petitioner Ashramam is having so many properties including the land in an extent of Ac. 1-52 cents in Sy. No. 679/1 of Chittoor Town of Chittoor District, Andhra Pradesh. The father of the respondent was the leaseholder of the subject land. In spite of so many demands made by the petitioner Ashramam, the father of the respondent did not hand over the subject land. 3. Thereafter, the petitioner filed O.S. No. 935 of 1986, on the file of the II Additional District Munsif Court, Chittoor, for delivery of possession of the subject land. The learned II Additional District Munsif Court, Chittoor, on 15.07.1993 decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the father of the respondent filed A.S. No. 1 of 1995, on the file of the District Judge’s Court, Chittoor. The learned District Judge, Chittoor dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree and judgment of the trial Court. Aggrieved by the Judgment of the District Judge, Chittoor, the father of the respondent preferred S.A. No. 403 of 1995 before the Hon’ble High Court. 4. During the pendency of the 2nd appeal, the father of the respondent died and the respondent, his mother and sisters came on record as Legal Representatives. Thereafter, the respondent compromised the issue with the petitioner Ashramam. Accordingly, a Compromise Memo was filed in CMP No. 18816 of 1997. The Hon’ble Court on 24.11.1997, after considering the compromise memo and recording the terms of the compromise, passed the decree in S.A. No. 402 of 1995, which is extracted herein-under: (1) That the appellants, who are the Legal Representatives of Sri Vuppalapati Ananda Naidu, admit unequivocally the title of Peetadhipathi of Vyasasramam Mutt to the said property, which consist of an extent of Ac. 1-20 cents in Sy. No. 679/1, Chittoor and building thereon. (2) It is also agreed that lease deed shall be operative till 28.08.2020 subject to all the conditions set out in the lease deed, dated 28.08.1990. 1-20 cents in Sy. No. 679/1, Chittoor and building thereon. (2) It is also agreed that lease deed shall be operative till 28.08.2020 subject to all the conditions set out in the lease deed, dated 28.08.1990. (3) That the appellants undertake to surrender possession of the suit properties along with structures to the respondent on or before 28.08.2020 without any notice or demand from the respondent. (4) In case the appellants default in payment of rent for three consecutive months, the lease arrangements shall stand terminated and the respondents shall become entitled to enter into and take possession of the properties without necessity for approaching any court or authority. The appellants undertake that in such in event they will not resist the entry of the respondent and will peacefully handover the possession of all properties. 5. As per the terms of the compromise, despite the petitioner approached the respondent, he did not handover the possession of the subject land even after completing the lease deed, dated 28.08.1990. As such, the respondent willfully disobeyed the orders of this Hon’ble Court. 6. Complaining the action of the Respondent in not implementing the orders of this Court, the petitioner filed this Contempt Case. 7. The Respondent filed his counter-affidavit. Reply affidavit also filed by the Petitioner to the Counter-affidavit of Respondent. 8. The respondent filed Counter Affidavit contending that basing on the compromise decree entered between both parties, the respondent handover the theatres to the petitioner. Thereafter, the respondent sent an Written Letter dated 20.07.2020 to the petitioner through Courier seeking extension of lease agreement over the Theatres for further 11 years. The respondent met the petitioner personally and requested to extend the lease period in view of Covid-19. Thereupon, the petitioner, while directing him to deposit the Theatre Rentals in his Mutt Account, handed over the theatres to the respondent orally on 21.08.2020 i.e., before the end of lease period i.e., 28.08.2020 and since then he is sending rents regularly to his account at Union Bank of India. The petitioner, by suppressing the said facts, filed the Contempt Case before this Court on 12.08.2021 contending that the respondent had not complied the terms and conditions of the compromise decree. The petitioner did not file any Execution Proceedings till today over the Compromise Decree. The petitioner, by suppressing the said facts, filed the Contempt Case before this Court on 12.08.2021 contending that the respondent had not complied the terms and conditions of the compromise decree. The petitioner did not file any Execution Proceedings till today over the Compromise Decree. As the respondent came to know that the petitioner is misappropriating the Mutt Properties, he lodged a complaint on 02.09.2021. Further, the respondent also lodged a Petition before the Dharmika Parishad, Endowment Commissioner, Vijayawada, A.P. under Section 92 of A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 vide Endt. No. 3390/M and E. No. 5315178, dated 17.12.2021 and the same is still pending for enquiry. The schedule properties are not stand in the name of the petitioner and they are also not shown in Mutt properties list by the petitioner. After complying the order of this Court, the petitioner intentionally trying to dispossess the respondent from the schedule properties and is trying to alienate the same in favour of third parties. The respondent never violated nor wilfully breached the undertaking in compromise decree as alleged by the petitioner. Therefore, the respondent prayed to close the Contempt Case. 9. The petitioner filed Reply to the Counter Affidavit filed by the respondent stating that the respondent never complied with the decree of compromise dated 24.11.1997. The respondent never met the petitioner for extension of lease. The respondent did not comply with compromise decree and handed over the possession to the petitioner and as such giving re-possession does not arise. The contention of the respondent is that the respondent is paying rents with the consent of the petitioner from 21.08.2020 and continued to pay rents every month without fault is not correct. In the Letter dated 02.09.2021, the respondent requested the Commissioner, Endowments, to extend the lease period for 11 years. If really, the petitioner/Aashramam extended the lease period on 21.08.2020, the respondent would not have an occasion to write the said Letter to the Commissioner, Endowments. In the said Letter dated 02.09.2021, the respondent nowhere stated that he handed over the possession to the petitioner and thereupon the petitioner re-handed over the possession to him. The petitioner neither given any permission to deposit the rents nor extended the lease period. Only to escape from liability of handing over the possession to the petitioner, the respondent started depositing rents from 21.08.2020. The petitioner neither given any permission to deposit the rents nor extended the lease period. Only to escape from liability of handing over the possession to the petitioner, the respondent started depositing rents from 21.08.2020. The respondent has not stated any ground to exonerate him from Contempt Proceedings and on the other hand, he made misleading statement to deceive this Hon’ble Court and therefore, he is liable for punishment under the present Contempt Case. 10. Heard Sri G. Ramesh babu, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri K. Mallikarjuna Murthy, learned counsel for the respondent. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated the contentions averred in the affidavit filed along with the Second Appeal. To substantiate his arguments, the learned counsel relied on the decision reported in Suman Chadha and Another vs. Central Bank of India, 2021 (5) ALD 172 (SC) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as extracted herein-under: 25. It is true that an undertaking given by a party should be seen in the context in which it was made and (i) the benefits that accrued to the undertaking party and (ii) the detriment/injury suffered by the counter party. It is also true that normally the question whether a party is guilty of contempt is to be seen in the specific context of the disobedience and the wilful nature of the same and not on the basis of the conduct subsequent thereto. While it is open to the court to see whether the subsequent conduct of the alleged contemnor would tantamount to an aggravation of the contempt already committed, the very determination of an act of contempt cannot simply be based upon the subsequent conduct. 26. But the subsequent conduct of the party may throw light upon one important aspect namely whether it was just the inability of the party to honour the commitment or it was part of a larger design to hoodwink the court. 27. 26. But the subsequent conduct of the party may throw light upon one important aspect namely whether it was just the inability of the party to honour the commitment or it was part of a larger design to hoodwink the court. 27. In this case, the series of acts committed by the petitioners (i) in issuing postdated cheques, which were dated beyond the date within which they had agreed to make payment; (ii) in allowing those cheques to be dishonoured; (iii) in not appearing before the Court on the first date of hearing with an excuse that was found to be false; (iv) in coming up with an explanation about their own debtors committing default and (v) in getting exposed through the report of the SFIO, convinced the High Court to believe that the undertaking given by the petitioners on 08.04.2015 was not based upon good faith but intended to hoodwink the Court. Therefore, we are unable to find fault with the High Court holding the petitioners guilty of contempt. The Hon’ble Apex Court while holding as extracted herein above, refused to interfere with the finding of the High Court that the contemnor therein is guilty of Contempt. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent also reiterated the averments made in the Counter Affidavit during his arguments. The learned counsel also filed Written arguments and placed reliance on the following decisions: (i) Pankaj Bhargava and Another vs. Mohinder Nath and Another, (1994) 6 SCC 4 (ii) Future Coupons Private Limited and Others vs. Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC and Others, 2022 SCC Online SC 126 (iii) Hukum Chand Deswal vs. Satish Raj Deswal, AIR 2020 SC 2100 (iv) Kanwar Singh Saini vs. High Court of Delhi, 2012 (3) SCJ 665 (v) Noor Saba vs. Anoop Mishra, 2013 (7) SCJ 1004 13. The learned counsel for the respondent on relying the above mentioned decisions, submitted that there is no willful disobedience or negligence on the part of the respondent. In fact, he has complied with the decree passed by the Court and if the petitioner is under the impression that the decree was not complied with, he has to approach the Civil Court to work out his remedies by initiating the execution proceedings and requested to dismiss the Contempt Case against the respondent. 14. This Court has carefully considered the rival contentions advanced on behalf of the parties. 14. This Court has carefully considered the rival contentions advanced on behalf of the parties. In our view, it is appropriate to extract the terms and conditions of the Memorandum of Compromise which became part and parcel of the decree dated 24.11.1997 as extracted herein-under for proper adjudication of the case: “(2) In consideration of the appellants transferring to the Peethadhipathi of Vyashramam an extent of 7 cents of land adjoining the south ease of Venkateswara Theatre and paying a monthly rent of Rs. 5000/- permensum of advance on or before the 5th each month, the respondent agrees to waive he default in payment of rent under lease deed dated 28.08.1970 and agreed that the lease deed shall be operative till 28.08.2020. Subject to all the conditions set out in the said lease deed dated 28.08.1970. The respondents further agree to waive their claim for mesne profits upto the date of the compromise decree. (3) The Appellants undertake to surrender possession of the suit properties along with the structures to the respondent on or before 28.08.2020. Without any notice or demand from the respondent. (4) In case the appellants default in payment of rent for three consecutive months, the lease arrangements shall stand terminated and the respondents shall become entitled to enter into and take possession of the properties without necessity for approaching any court or authority. The appellants undertake that in such in event they will not resist the entry of the respondent and will peacefully handover the possession of all properties.” 15. On careful perusal of the above terms and conditions, which have became part and parcel of the decree passed by the Court on 24.11.1997 in Second Appeal No. 403 of 1995, the following directions are issued: (1) The appellants (Respondents herein) admit unequivocally the title of the petitioner herein. (2) The respondent herein has to pay Rs.5000/- per month on or before the 5th of Every Month towards rent. (3) The lease would be operative till 28.08.2020. (4) The respondent herein had untaken to surrender the possession of the property along with the structures. (5) In case, the respondent herein committed default in payment of rent for three consecutive months, the lease shall stand terminated and the petitioner shall become entitled to enter into the property without there being any necessity for approaching any Court or authority. (4) The respondent herein had untaken to surrender the possession of the property along with the structures. (5) In case, the respondent herein committed default in payment of rent for three consecutive months, the lease shall stand terminated and the petitioner shall become entitled to enter into the property without there being any necessity for approaching any Court or authority. (6) The respondent herein shall not resist the entry of the petitioner and will peacefully handover the possession of all properties to the petitioner herein. 16. As seen from the above decree dated 24.11.1997, it is clear that the respondent has to handover the possession of the schedule property in S.A. No. 403 of 1995 without any further demand or notice on order 28.08.2020. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent did not handover the possession as per the terms of the decree dated 24.11.1997 and as such, the respondent is liable for punishment under the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act. 17. Per contra, it is the case of the respondent that pursuant to the decree dated 24.11.1997, he handed over the possession of the property to the petitioner prior to the dates specified by the Court and the petitioner again re-handed over the possession to the respondent by extending the lease orally. But, there is no any material placed by the respondent before this Court to support his contention. As such, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, which are continuing from the year 1996, the contention of the respondent is not acceptable on this aspect. Besides this, the respondent filed a Letter dated 02.09.2021 said to have been submitted to the Commissioner, Endowments Department, wherein he requested the Endowment Commissioner to extend the lease for the said property and it is also mentioned that he submitted application to the petitioner for the extension of the lease, but the petitioner orally instructed to forward his application for extension of lease by five more years and the petitioner did not pass any resolution to that effect. As such, the contention of the respondent that he complied the Order dated 24.11.1997 appears to be incorrect and contradictory. 18. As such, the contention of the respondent that he complied the Order dated 24.11.1997 appears to be incorrect and contradictory. 18. With regard to the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent are concerned: (1) Pankaj Bhargava’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held at Para No. 11 as follows: “Inasmuch as the respondent, Ram Prakash has violated the order of this Court dated 17-12-1990 and came forward with a false case and tried to support the same by producing fabricated documents, he is held guilty of contempt of court. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondent, Ram Prakash is sentenced to two weeks' imprisonment in addition to a fine of Rs. 2000. In case, the fine is not paid within 15 days from today, he shall suffer further imprisonment for another two weeks. This Judgment is not helpful to the respondent, as nowhere it has been stated or pleaded with compelling reasons, as the reason for non-compliance on the respondent in previous paragraphs, it is held that the respondent’s non-compliance of the Court Order and filing false affidavit which are contradictory. (2) In Future Coupons’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to be established that disobedience of the order is “wilful.” The word “wilful” introduces a mental element and hence, requires looking into the mind of a person/contemnor by gauging his actions, which is an indication of one's state of mind. “Wilful” means knowingly intentional, conscious, calculated and deliberate with full knowledge of consequences flowing therefrom. It excludes casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability. Wilful acts does not encompass involuntarily or negligent actions. The act has to be done with a “bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or perversely.” Wilful act is to be distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not include any act done negligently or involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a person means that he knows what he is doing and intends to do the same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated action with evil motive on his part. It does not include any act done negligently or involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a person means that he knows what he is doing and intends to do the same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated action with evil motive on his part. Even if there is a disobedience of an order, but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemnor to comply with the order, the contemnor cannot be punished. “Committal or sequestration will not be ordered unless contempt involves a degree of default or misconduct.” This judgment is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case as no complex questions of fact are involved in this Order. The Apex Court after noticing the fact that the respondent therein handed over the possession to the other party pursuant to the Order and that interference is only for the payment of disputed amount. (3) In Hukum Chand Deswal’s case (supra), the Apex Court held as follows: Pertinently, the special leave petitions were filed by the respondent against the order dated 28.1.2019, which as aforesaid, did not deal with the question regarding the monthly rent payable by the respondent but explicitly left the parties to pursue the same before the executing Court. The plaintiff/petitioner having acquiesced of that observation of the High Court, cannot be allowed to contend to the contrary. This Court in Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Another vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly and Others, (2002) 5 SCC 352 in paragraph 11, opined thus: “11.....The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the applicant. The court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have contained. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. If this limitation is borne in mind then criticisms which are sometimes levelled against the courts exercising contempt of court jurisdiction “that it has exceeded its powers in granting substantive relief and issuing a direction regarding the same without proper adjudication of the dispute” in its entirety can be avoided. This will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings because the party which is prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed in the contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing fresh directions is likely to challenge that order and that may give rise to another round of litigation arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain the majesty and image of courts.” 21. In any case, that being a complex question of fact, need not be adjudicated in the contempt proceedings. We leave it open to the petitioner to pursue even that claim in execution proceedings or such other proceedings as may be permissible in law. We may not be understood to have expressed any final opinion in respect of condition of the suit premises, whilst handing over possession to the petitioner. We hold that even this issue under consideration does not warrant initiation of contempt action against the respondent. 22. Taking overall view of the matter, therefore, we decline to precipitate the matter any further against the respondent. Instead, we deem it appropriate to discharge the show cause notices and relegate the parties to such remedies as may be permissible in law to espouse their causes/claims including mentioned in the present contempt petition. All questions in that regard are left open to be decided by the concerned forum/Court appropriately as per law. Instead, we deem it appropriate to discharge the show cause notices and relegate the parties to such remedies as may be permissible in law to espouse their causes/claims including mentioned in the present contempt petition. All questions in that regard are left open to be decided by the concerned forum/Court appropriately as per law. The Apex Court allowed the case of the respondent therein on the ground that the High Court had no jurisdiction to try the Contempt Case for the infringement of a decree of a Civil Court. As such, this Order is not applicable to the present facts and circumstances of the case. (4) In Kanwar Singh’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as extracted hereunder: “In an appropriate case where exceptional circumstances exist, the court may also resort to the provisions applicable in case of civil contempt, in case of violation/breach of undertaking/judgment/order or decree. However, before passing any final order on such application, the court must satisfy itself that there is violation of such judgment, decree, direction or order and such disobedience is wilful and intentional. Though in a case of execution of a decree, the executing court may not be bothered whether the disobedience of the decree is wilful or not and the court is bound to execute a decree whatever may be the consequence thereof. In a contempt proceeding, the alleged contemnor may satisfy the court that disobedience has been under some compelling circumstances and in that situation, no punishment can be awarded to him. [See: Niaz Mohammad and Others vs. State of Haryana and Others, (1994) 6 SCC 332 , Bank of Baroda vs. Sadruddin Hasan Daya and Another, AIR 2004 SC 942 and Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang and Another, AIR 2006 SC 1883 ]. The contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal in nature, the standard of proof requires in the same manner as in other criminal cases. The alleged contemnor is entitled to the protection of all safeguards/rights which are provided in the Criminal Jurisprudence, including the benefit of doubt. There must be a clear-cut case of obstruction of administration of justice by a party intentionally to bring the matter within the ambit of the said provision. The case should not rest only on surmises and conjectures. The alleged contemnor is entitled to the protection of all safeguards/rights which are provided in the Criminal Jurisprudence, including the benefit of doubt. There must be a clear-cut case of obstruction of administration of justice by a party intentionally to bring the matter within the ambit of the said provision. The case should not rest only on surmises and conjectures. (5) In Noor Saba’s case (supra), the Apex Court held at paragraph No. 12 as extracted herein-under: “To hold the respondents or anyone of them liable for contempt this Court has to arrive at a conclusion that the respondents have wilfully disobeyed the order of the Court. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction is summary in nature and an adjudication of the liability of the alleged contemnor for wilful disobedience of the Court is normally made on admitted and undisputed facts. In the present case not only there has been a shift in the stand of the petitioner with regard to the basic facts on which commission of contempt has been alleged even the said new/altered facts do not permit an adjudication in consonance with the established principles of exercise of contempt jurisdiction so as to enable the Court to come to a conclusion that any of the respondents have wilfully disobeyed the order of this Court dated 1.9.2010. We, accordingly, hold that no case of commission of any contempt of this Court’s order dated 1.9.2010 is made out. Consequently, Contempt Petition No. 3/2012 is dismissed. For reasons already recorded, Contempt Petition Nos. 6/2009 and 7/2009 shall also stand closed. The above two decisions relied on by the respondent are also not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 19. In the considered opinion of this Court, once the respondent by filing a compromise Memo invited the decree dated 24.11.1997 and as such, he has to implement the same without any deviation. Avoiding to implement the decree is deliberate violation of the Order of the Court, which is punishable under the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act. As such, in our considered view, the respondent has committed Contempt of Court and therefore, he is liable for the punishment under the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act. 20. Accordingly, the Contempt Case is allowed and the contemnor is sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of Two months and to pay a fine of Rs. As such, in our considered view, the respondent has committed Contempt of Court and therefore, he is liable for the punishment under the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act. 20. Accordingly, the Contempt Case is allowed and the contemnor is sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of Two months and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- (Rupees Two Thousand only). In default of the payment of the amount, the respondent shall undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of Two weeks. (ii) The Contemnor is directed to surrender before the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court on or before 14-11-2022. 21. There shall be no order as to costs. 22. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this case shall stand closed.