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2022 DIGILAW 1177 (JHR)

Janta Mazdoor Sangh, Dhanbad v. State of Jharkhand

2022-09-19

RAJESH SHANKAR

body2022
JUDGMENT : RAJESH SHANKAR, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed for a declaration that the respondent No. 2 has no authority or jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Section 10 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act 1926’] except on an application of a Trade Union or suo-motu and hence exercising said power at the instance of any other person including a political person is not permitted under Section 10 of the Act, 1926. Further prayer has been made for issuance of direction upon the respondent No. 2 restraining him from exercising the power conferred under Section 10 of the Act, 1926, as on a complaint received from a person other than a Trade Union, the said respondent has illegally issued notice in Form-D expressing his intention to cancel/withdraw the registration of the petitioner-Trade Union, which is a registered body. 2. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner, submits that issuance of notice dated 15.07.2022 in Form-D (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) to the petitioner-Trade Union by the respondent No. 2 under proviso to Section 10 of the Act, 1926 read with Clause 6(2) of the Bihar Trade Unions Regulations, 1928 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Regulations, 1928’] is contrary to the power conferred to the said respondent under Section 10 of the Act, 1926. The respondent No. 2 can proceed to cancel the registration of a Trade Union either on an application of a Trade Union under the provisions of Section 10(a) of the Act, 1926 or by exercising power suo-motu as provided under Section 10(b) of the Act, 1926. However, the Registrar, Trade Union cannot initiate a proceeding for cancellation of registration on a complaint or application made by a third party (in the present case, a Member of Legislative Assembly). The said suo-motu power conferred to the Registrar, Trade Union under Section 10(b) of the Act, 1926 cannot be prompted by any other person as has happened in the present case. The said suo-motu power conferred to the Registrar, Trade Union under Section 10(b) of the Act, 1926 cannot be prompted by any other person as has happened in the present case. It is further submitted that initially a notice as contained in Letter No. 68 dated 18.01.2022 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) was issued to the petitioner by the Deputy Secretary, Office of the Labour Commissioner, Jharkhand, Ranchi, to which a reply was submitted by the petitioner on 24.01.2022 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) giving the complete details of the General Body Meetings of the petitioner-Trade Union held from time to time. However, the respondent No. 2 has issued the notice dated 15.07.2022 in Form-D completely ignoring the factual as well as the legal submission made on behalf of the petitioner in the reply dated 24.01.2022. It is also submitted that before issuing the said notice, the respondent No. 2 failed to consider that the identity of any person as the President of the Trade Union was inconsequential for the propose of registration, even if such person had ceased to be the same under Section 21(A) of the Act, 1926. Moreover, it was already put to the notice of the Deputy Secretary, Office of the Labour Commissioner, Jharkhand, Ranchi by way of filing the said reply that the erstwhile President, who was convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC, did not participate in the meetings of the petitioner-Trade Union and he was also not the applicant seeking registration of the petitioner-Trade Union. Irrespective of the said fact, the President of the petitioner-Trade Union was immediately substituted by another duly qualified person. 3. Ms. Pinki Tiwari, learned A.C. to A.G. appearing on behalf of the respondents, raises a preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the present writ petition and submits that the present writ petition is premature as the respondent No. 2 has merely issued a notice to the petitioner-Trade Union in Form-D and no final order has yet been passed by the respondent No. 2 in terms with the provisions of Section 10 of the Act, 1926. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the contents of the present writ petition. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the contents of the present writ petition. The petitioner is aggrieved with the notice dated 15.07.2022 issued to it by the respondent No. 2 in Form-D showing its intention to proceed for withdrawal/cancellation of its certificate of registration under Section 10(b) of the Act, 1926. It appears that the petitioner instead of filing reply to the said notice, has directly filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India. 5. The legal principle with respect to the extent of intervention by the writ Court at the stage of issuance of show cause notice has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Another vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28 , the relevant paragraphs of which read as under: “14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. 15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet. 16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter.” 6. 16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter.” 6. Thus, except rare and exceptional circumstance, the High Court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not entertain a writ petition at the stage of issuance of show cause notice. The petitioner has not made out any such exceptional case so as to convince this Court to entertain the present writ petition at this stage. 7. Hence, the aforesaid submission made by learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner cannot be appreciated on merit at this stage, particularly, considering that as per proviso to Section 10 of the Act, 1926, the Registrar, Trade Union while exercising suo-motu power i.e. the power to be exercised other than on an application of the Trade Union, is required to provide previous notice of not less than two months to the concerned Trade Union specifying the grounds on which it proposes to withdraw or cancel the certificate of registration issued under the Act, 1926. Since the respondent No. 2 has already issued Form-D under proviso to Section 10 of the Act, 1926 read with Clause 6(2) of the Regulations, 1928, I am of the view that the present writ petition filed by the petitioner is premature and the same is accordingly disposed of as not maintainable at this stage. 8. At this juncture, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner submits that the very first paragraph of the notice dated 15.07.2022 suggests that the respondent No. 2 may pass an order in this regard on 21.09.2022. 9. Considering the said submission, the representative of the petitioner is at liberty to appear before the respondent No. 2 on or before 21.09.2022 and to file reply to the notice dated 15.07.2022 taking all the available points. 10. It goes without saying that the respondent No. 2 shall take an appropriate informed decision in accordance with law after providing due opportunity of hearing to the representative of the petitioner.