JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Krishna Mohan Misra, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent No.1 and 4-State, Sri Sunil Kumar Misra, learned counsel for the respondent No.2 and 3 and Sri Rakesh Pande, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Radhey Krishna Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent No.5. 2. The petitioner-committee of management has assailed the order dated 22.06.2021 entered by the learned appellate authority /Joint Secretary, Co-operative Department, U.P. Government, Lucknow passed in purported exercise of appellate powers conferred under Section 98(n) of the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1965. 3. Sri Krishna Mohan Misra, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the learned appellate authority /Joint Secretary, Co-operative Department, U.P. Government, Lucknow has passed the impugned order dated 22.06.2021 despite inherent lack of jurisdiction. Failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction at the stage of the appeal, does not preclude the petitioners from canvassing the same before this Court. The issue of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter. 4. Sri Krishna Mohan Misra, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on authorities in point which are discussed in the body of the judgement. 5. Per contra, Sri Rakesh Pande, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Radhey Krishna Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent No.5 submits that the issue of jurisdiction has to be taken in the first instance before the concerned authority. Admittedly, the petitioner-committee of management failed to do so and he is raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time before this Court. Sri Rakesh Pande, learned Senior Counsel places reliance on A.V.G.P. Chettiar and Sons & Ors. Vs. T. Palanisamy Gounder, 2002 (5) SCC 337 . 6. The facts in brief giving rise to this writ petition are these. There exists a cooperative society running in the name and style of “Krishna Sahkari Awas Samiti Limited, Yashoda Nagar, Kanpur Nagar” (hereinafter referred to as the 'cooperative society'). A resolution was passed by the petitioner-committee of management on 13.11.2017 accepting the resignation of the respondent No.5, as the honorary Secretary of the Cooperative Society. On behalf of the respondent No.5, the fact of resignation was seriously disputed. It was contended that the resignation letter and other consequential proceedings are all forged. A resolution was passed by the petitioner-committee of management on 13.11.2017 accepting the resignation of the respondent No.5, as the honorary Secretary of the Cooperative Society. On behalf of the respondent No.5, the fact of resignation was seriously disputed. It was contended that the resignation letter and other consequential proceedings are all forged. Subsequently, an order was passed by the Chairman of the Cooperative Society on 19.12.2017 directing the concerned authorities not to recognize and act upon the signatures of the respondent No.5 as an office bearer of the society. 7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 19.12.2017, the respondent No.5 took out the proceedings under Section 128 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 before the competent authority/Additional Housing Commissioner/Additional Registrar, Co-operatives Department, U.P. Awas & Vikas Parishad, Lucknow. 8. Section 128 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 being relevant to the controversy is extracted hereunder for ease of reference : “Section 128. Registrar's powers to annul resolution of a cooperative society or cancel order passed by an officer of a cooperative society in certain cases.-The Registrar may - (i) annul any resolution passed by the committee of management, or the general body of any co-operative society; or (ii) cancel any order passed by an officer or a co-operative society; if he is of the opinion that the resolution or the order, as the case may be is not covered by the objects of the society, or is in contravention of the provisions of this Act, the rules or the bye-laws of the society, where upon every such resolution or order shall become void and in-operative and be deleted from the records of the society. [Provided that, the Registrar shall, before making any order, require the Committee of Management, general body or officer of the co-operative society to reconsider the resolution, or as the case may be, the order, within such period as he may fix but which shall not be less than fifteen days, and if he deems fit may stay the operation of that resolution or the order during such period]” 9. The competent authority/Additional Housing Commissioner/Additional Registrar, Co-operatives Department, U.P. Awas & Vikas Parishad, Lucknow while passing the order dated 31.12.2018 under Section 128 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 directed the committee of management of the society to review the order dated 19.12.2017. 10. The competent authority/Additional Housing Commissioner/Additional Registrar, Co-operatives Department, U.P. Awas & Vikas Parishad, Lucknow while passing the order dated 31.12.2018 under Section 128 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 directed the committee of management of the society to review the order dated 19.12.2017. 10. In compliance of the said order, the petitioner-committee of management re-examined the issue but with no better results for the respondent No.5. The resolution passed by the committee of management of the cooperative societies on 17.02.2019 in this regard declined to recall the resolution dated 19.12.2017 and reaffirmed the same. 11. Validity of the said resolutions were thereafter examined by the Additional Housing Commissioner/Additional Registrar, Co-operatives Department, U.P. Awas & Vikas Parishad, Lucknow under Section 128 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 on a representation made by the respondent No.5. The Additional Housing Commissioner/Additional Registrar, Co-operatives Department, U.P. Awas & Vikas Parishad, Lucknow by order dated 04.06.2019 under Section 128 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 upheld the decisions of the committee of management and rejected the representation of the respondent No.5. 12. The respondent No.5 appealed the order dated 04.06.2019 passed by the Additional Housing Commissioner /Additional Registrar, Co-operatives Department, U.P. Awas & Vikas Parishad, Lucknow under Section 128 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965. The appeal purportedly filed under Section 98(n) of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 by the respondent No.5 was instituted before the learned appellate authority / Joint Secretary, Co-operative Housing, U.P. Government, Lucknow, and came to be registered as Appeal No.21 of 2019 (Ambar Tripathi Vs. Additional Housing Commissioner/Additional Registrar, Housing, Lucknow and another). 13. The learned appellate authority / Joint Secretary, Co-operative Housing, U.P. Government, Lucknow by the impugned order dated judgment dated 22.06.2021 has allowed the said appeal. The impugned order invalidates the resolution passed by the committee of management on 13.11.2017, and also the order dated 04.06.2019 passed by the Additional Housing Commissioner/Additional Registrar, Cooperative Department, U.P. Awas & Vikas Parishad, Lucknow/competent authority under Section 128 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965. 14. The preliminary issue of maintainability of the appeal shall be decided in the first instance. 15. The powers of appeal are vested in the appellate authority under Section 98 (n) of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965. 14. The preliminary issue of maintainability of the appeal shall be decided in the first instance. 15. The powers of appeal are vested in the appellate authority under Section 98 (n) of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965. The controversy turns on the scope of the said provision and the same is extracted below for ease of reference : “98(n) an order passed by the Registrar under Section 128 annulling any resolution or cancelling any order, may, within thirty days of the communication of the order, decision or award to be appealed against, be preferred by the aggrieved party to the authorities mentioned in sub-section (2) in the manner prescribed.” 16. The order dated 04.06.2019, which was appealed before the learned appellate authority/Joint Secretary, Cooperative Housing, U.P. Government, Lucknow clearly did not fall within the ambit of Section 98(n) of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 as reproduced above. The order 04.06.2019 does not annul any resolution nor cancel any order as contemplated in Section 98(n) of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965. 17. It is well settled law that the appeal is a creature of the statute. The scope of the appellate jurisdiction is defined and circumscribed by statute. The appeal in issue is relatable to Section 98(n) of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965. The appellate authority cannot go beyond the statutory mandate of Section 98(n) of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965. In this case admittedly it has done so. 18. The discussion has the advantage of good authorities. While deciding the scope of appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in Arcot Textile Mills Ltd. Vs. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and others, (2013) 16 SCC 1 has held as under : “17. Ms. Aparna Bhat, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 would contend that the payment of interest by the employer in case of belated payment is statutorily leviable and a specified rate having been provided, the authority has no discretion and, therefore, it is only a matter of computation and there cannot be any challenge to it. Be it noted, it was canvassed by the said respondents before the High Court that an appeal would lie against an order passed under 7Q. On a scrutiny of Section 7I, we notice that the language is clear and unambiguous and it does not provide for an appeal against the determination made under 7Q. Be it noted, it was canvassed by the said respondents before the High Court that an appeal would lie against an order passed under 7Q. On a scrutiny of Section 7I, we notice that the language is clear and unambiguous and it does not provide for an appeal against the determination made under 7Q. It is well settled in law that right of appeal is a creature of statute, for the right of appeal inheres in no one and, therefore, for maintainability of an appeal there must be authority of law. This being the position a provision providing for appeal should neither be construed too strictly nor too liberally, for if given either of these extreme interpretations, it is bound to adversely affect the legislative object as well as hamper the proceedings before the appropriate forum. Needless to say, a right of appeal cannot be assumed to exist unless expressly provided for by the statute and a remedy of appeal must be legitimately traceable to the statutory provisions. If the express words employed in a provision do not provide an appeal from a particular order, the court is bound to follow the express words. To put it otherwise, an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law and that explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute. (See : Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and others, Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Ors., State of Haryana v. Maruti Udyog Ltd. and others, Super Cassettes Industries Limited v. State of U.P. and another, Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement and another, Competition, Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Limited and another” (emphasis supplied) 19. Consent of parties will not confer jurisdiction of appeal where none has been vested by law. Similarly failure to raise the objection in regard to the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal will not cure the defect of inherent lack of jurisdiction in this case. It is true that issue of jurisdiction has to be raised at the earliest stage. However, it is equally well settled that the plea regarding inherent lack of jurisdiction can be taken at any stage and also in collateral proceedings. Ample authorities in point support these propositions. 20. Hindustan Zinc Limited Vs. It is true that issue of jurisdiction has to be raised at the earliest stage. However, it is equally well settled that the plea regarding inherent lack of jurisdiction can be taken at any stage and also in collateral proceedings. Ample authorities in point support these propositions. 20. Hindustan Zinc Limited Vs. Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, (2019) 17 SCC 82 reaffirmed the well settled position of law by holding as under : “We are of the view that it is settled law that if there is an inherent lack of jurisdiction, the plea can be taken up at any stage and also in collateral proceedings.” 21. Kiran Singh and others Vs. Chaman Paswan and others, (1955) 1 SCR 117 affirmed that lack of jurisdiction nullifies the order and challenge to its validity can be set up at any point or forum whenever the order is sought to be enforced or relied upon by holding thus : “20....It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was coram non judice, and that its judgment and decree would be nullities.” (emphasis supplied) 22. In Zuari Cement Limited Vs. Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Hyderabad and others, (2015) 7 SCC 690 it was held that acquiescence to jurisdiction where the authority lacked the same is of no avail : “Para 12. As discussed earlier, in terms of Section 87 of the Act, only the appropriate government has the power to grant exemption to a factory or establishment or class of factories or establishments from the operation of the Act. As discussed earlier, in terms of Section 87 of the Act, only the appropriate government has the power to grant exemption to a factory or establishment or class of factories or establishments from the operation of the Act. In fact, the appellant-factory itself has obtained exemption from the appropriate Government-State Government under Section 87 of the Act for the period from 1986 to 1993. Likewise, the rejection of exemption was also under Section 87 of the Act. While so, seeking the relief of declaration from the ESI Court that the appellant is entitled to exemption from the operation of the Act is misconceived. Contrary to the scheme of the statute, the High Court, in our view, cannot confer jurisdiction upon the ESI Court to determine the issue of exemption. ESI Corporation, of course, did not raise any objection and subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the ESI Court. The objection as to want of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage when the Court lacks jurisdiction, the fact that the parties earlier acquiesced in the proceedings is of no consequence.” Before considering the correctness of the decision of the High Court, we take up for consideration a preliminary objection raised by the appellants that the appellants were estopped from impugning the High Court's decision because they had requested for time to vacate the suit premises and such request had been granted by the High Court. The objection is unsustainable. First, an objection to the maintainability of the appeal, like other points of demurrer, may be relevant at the time of the admission of the appeal. Once the appeal is admitted without reserving the issue of maintainability and the matter is heard on merits, such a preliminary objection does not survive. Second, the appellants had no doubt requested for a stay of the execution of the decree. That had been granted by the High Court subject to furnishing of an undertaking by the appellants to vacate the premises within a period of six months. The appellants did not in fact give any such undertaking. Second, the appellants had no doubt requested for a stay of the execution of the decree. That had been granted by the High Court subject to furnishing of an undertaking by the appellants to vacate the premises within a period of six months. The appellants did not in fact give any such undertaking. Even if they had, they could not be denied the right to appeal to this Court on any principle of estoppel unless the respondent could show that the appellants had thereby gained an advantage which was otherwise not available to them; for example, if the appellants had given an undertaking and obtained a stay of the order of eviction beyond the period allowed for preferring the appeal or if the landlord had consented not to execute the decree of eviction in consideration of the appellants' undertaking to vacate. If such or other like circumstances exist, this Court may have refused to exercise discretion in favour of the tenant under Article 136 of the Constitution. Otherwise merely giving an undertaking does not foreclose a tenant from availing of any statutory remedies available to him by way of appeal or revision or under the Constitution.” 23. The judgment being relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents handed down in A.V.G.P. Chettiar and Sons and others Vs. T. Palanisamy Gounder, 2002 (5) SCC 337 . In that case the objection to the jurisdiction was not taken before the High Court where the proceedings were pending. In the instant case the matter was being adjudicated by an appellate authority created by the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1965. The distinction between the constitutional courts and statutory authorities is obvious to be stated. Reliance on A.V.G.P. Chettiar and Sons (supra) by the learned counsel for the respondents is misconceived. The ruling is not applicable to this case. 24. The impugned order dated 22.06.2021 passed by the learned appellate authority/Joint Secretary, Cooperative Department, U.P. Government, Lucknow has been passed despite inherent lack of jurisdiction and is a nullity in the eyes of law. 25. In the wake of preceding discussions, the impugned order 22.06.2021 is vitiated. The impugned order dated 22.06.2021 passed by the learned appellate authority/Joint Secretary, Cooperative Department, U.P. Government, Lucknow is liable to be set aside and is set aside. 26. The writ petition is allowed. 27. 25. In the wake of preceding discussions, the impugned order 22.06.2021 is vitiated. The impugned order dated 22.06.2021 passed by the learned appellate authority/Joint Secretary, Cooperative Department, U.P. Government, Lucknow is liable to be set aside and is set aside. 26. The writ petition is allowed. 27. It is open to the respondents to avail any other alternative remedy as may be advised in law.