JUDGMENT : The petitioner has approached this Court with the following prayers:- I. For quashing of Memo No. 120/d dated 27.03.2018 issued by Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, whereby and whereunder, the order of demotion to the Rank of Constable for 3 years passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Parganas Range, Dumka against the petitioner has been converted into that of dismissal from services and the petitioner has been dismissed from service w.e.f., 27.03.2018. II. To quash and set aside the order of Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Parganas Range, Dumka contained in Memo No. 281/go dated 25.01.2017, whereby the petitioner has been awarded the punishment of demotion to the rank of Constable for 3 years. III. To quash the entire enquiry report submitted by the Inspector of Police, Sadar Circle, Deoghar-cum-Conducting Officer dated 11.06.2016 in the Departmental Proceeding No. 11/2016 conducted against the petitioner. IV. To quash and set aside the entire departmental proceeding bearing No. 11/16 initiated under the orders of Superintendent of Police, Deoghar as contained in Memo No. 781/R.Ka. dated 18.03.2016. V. To quash the Memo of charges as contained in Memo No. 1241/R.KA. dated 05.05.2016 issued by the Superintendent of Police, Deoghar. VI. To quash the entire departmental proceeding conducted by the Inspector of Police, Sadar, Deoghar. VII. To grant all the consequential financial and administrative benefits including consideration for promotion to the rank of Inspector of Police since the juniors to the petitioner have already been promoted. 2. The case of the petitioner lies in a narrow compass. The petitioner was initially appointed as a constable on 31.10.1977 in the district- Giridih. In July 1989, the petitioner was promoted and appointed as an Assistant Sub Inspector of Police (ASI) at Dhanbad and as such, the D.I.G. of Police became the appointing cum disciplinary authority of the petitioner. In the year, 2009, he was transferred and posted as ASI in the District of Dhanbad. On 15.03.2016, an FIR was registered against the petitioner U/s 341, 323, 504, 354 and 354(B) of IPC by one Laxmi Hansda on the allegation of physical assault. Pursuant to the same, the petitioner was asked for explanation vide Memo dated 18.03.2016, mentioning therein as to why a departmental proceeding be not initiated against him on the basis of charges mentioned in the said Memo. Pursuant to the same, the petitioner was asked for explanation vide Memo dated 18.03.2016, mentioning therein as to why a departmental proceeding be not initiated against him on the basis of charges mentioned in the said Memo. However, on 21.03.2016, the Informant-Laxmi Hansda sworn an Affidavit before the Notary Public, Deoghar that no misconduct has been done against her and she had filed a false case against the petitioner. Later on, the petitioner submitted his reply vide order reply dated 06.04.2016, wherein he drew the attention of the said affidavit sworn by Laxmi Hansda-Informant to the Superintendent of Police, Deoghar, but the said reply of the petitioner was not found satisfactory and departmental proceeding was initiated against him vide order dated 15.04.2016 and accordingly, Conducting Officer was appointed on 05.05.2016, whereas no presenting officer was appointed. On 11.06.2016, the Conducting Officer submitted his enquiry report, wherein the petitioner was held guilty of the charges of indiscipline, dereliction of duty and loose of character but the said enquiry report was not furnished to the petitioner at that point of time. It is further the case of the petitioner that vide letter dated 19.12.2016, the Superintendent of Police Deoghar furnished the petitioner a copy of the enquiry report as well as recommendation sent by her to the DIG, Santhal Pargana Range, Dumka with regard to the punishment proposed to be awarded against the petitioner and as such, the petitioner was asked to furnish his last explanation with regard to the charges levelled against him. Pursuant to the same, the petitioner submitted his explanation to the Superintendent of Police, Deoghar on 05.01.2017, wherein he drew the attention of the S.P., Deogahr towards the affidavit dated 21.03.2016, filed by Laxmi Hansda, wherein she clearly stated that nothing indecent had been done against her and the charges levelled against the petitioner are absolutely false. However, the Disciplinary/Appointing Authority i.e., DIG of Police, Santhal Parganas Range, Dumka vide Memo dated 25.01.2017 awarded the punishment of demotion to the rank of Constable for three years, without issuance of any show cause or explanation. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner, on 12.07.2017, filed an appeal before the Director General cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand against the punishment awarded to him. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner, on 12.07.2017, filed an appeal before the Director General cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand against the punishment awarded to him. On 15.12.2017, the Superintendent of Police, Deoghar sent the petitioner a copy of the decision dated 27.11.2017 passed by the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police on appeal filed before him and sought his explanation on the proposed punishment of dismissal from service. Pursuant to the same, the petitioner on 10.02.2018 submitted his explanation to the Director General cum Inspector General of Police through S.P., Deoghar. Accordingly, vide order dated 27.03.2018, the Director General cum Inspector General of Police dismissed the petitioner from services and as such, punishment of demotion for three years to the rank of constable awarded by the DIG of Police Santhal Praganas Range, Dumka was converted into that of dismissal from service. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has been constrained to knock the door of this Court. 3. Dr. A.K. Singh, learned counsel assisted by Mr. Shivam Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner and the impugned order of dismissal from service awarded against the petitioner on the ground that the proposal for the initiation of departmental proceeding, Memorandum of charges and appointment of Conducting/ Enquiry Officer was never approved by the Appointing cum Disciplinary Authority i.e. D.I.G. of Police. Even post facto approval of DIG of police was not taken and as such, this has vitiated the entire departmental proceeding and was not sustainable in the eyes of law. While the Superintendent of Police appointed a Conducting/ Enquiry Officer, to conduct the departmental proceeding, no Presenting Officer was appointed to present facts and related documents on behalf of the respondents and as such, the Conducting Officer himself presented all facts and documents and did examination in chief to record the statement of two formal witnesses in this proceeding. While the Superintendent of Police appointed a Conducting/ Enquiry Officer, to conduct the departmental proceeding, no Presenting Officer was appointed to present facts and related documents on behalf of the respondents and as such, the Conducting Officer himself presented all facts and documents and did examination in chief to record the statement of two formal witnesses in this proceeding. He further submitted that in the departmental proceeding, not a single eye witness or independent witness was produced and examined as witness, even Laxmi Hansada, whose allegations as contained in the FIR formed the basis of the charges as contained in the Memorandum of charges approved for this departmental proceeding, was not produced as witness and not examined and as such, the conclusion drawn by the Enquiry/Conducting Officer in the instant case are based on no evidence and the same are perverse and as such, punishment awarded on the basis of such a perverse finding is bad in law and is fit to be quashed. 4. He further submitted that it is a settled proposition of law that FIR and the evidence collected during investigation of a criminal case cannot be relied upon as an evidence in a departmental proceeding. Charges contained in the Memorandum of charges have to be proved independently on the basis of independent witness and documents produced before the Enquiry Officer. During the course of departmental proceeding, the copies of documents i.e. copy of FIR and report of the officer in Charge Deoghar P.S. to Superintendent of Police, Deoghar were not supplied to the petitioner, which formed the basis of the Memorandum of Charges against him, this caused grave prejudice to the petitioner. He further submitted that during the departmental proceeding, no opportunity was provided to the petitioner to cross examine even the two formal witnesses who proved the signature of S.P. and Officer in Charge, Deoghar. In the instant case, the entire departmental proceeding was conducted in hot haste with a premeditated mind. He further submitted that no second show cause was issued by the Disciplinary Authority i.e. DIG of Police with a copy of enquiry report being served upon the petitioner to defend himself against the punishment proposed to be awarded by the Disciplinary Authority. In the instant case, the entire departmental proceeding was conducted in hot haste with a premeditated mind. He further submitted that no second show cause was issued by the Disciplinary Authority i.e. DIG of Police with a copy of enquiry report being served upon the petitioner to defend himself against the punishment proposed to be awarded by the Disciplinary Authority. The DIG being the Appointing cum Disciplinary Authority passed an order for demotion for 3 years on 25.01.2017, whereas, the petitioner had to retire on 28.02.2019, thus he had only 2 years and one month of service left on 25.01.2017 when he was demoted for three years. This shows a total non-application of mind and vindictive attitude of the disciplinary authority. This is also against the provisions contained in Rule No. 824 (3) of Jharkhand Police Manual. 5. He further submitted that in the instant case the Enquiry/ Conducting Officer has not considered the show cause/ reply to the charges submitted by the petitioner at all. He has assigned no reason for rejection of the argument/ facts/ law points submitted by the petitioner. He has in fact made no comments on the arguments/facts/ law points advanced by the petitioner. Learned counsel further submitted that when the petitioner filed an appeal before the I.G.- 5 cum-Director General of Police he was given a copy of the comments/order passed by him on 27.11.2017 through S.P. Deoghar vide Annexure-14 to the writ petition. The S.P. asked the petitioner to explain why he should not be dismissed from service, this show cause was not asked by DGP but by S.P., Deoghar, which is not tenable in the eyes of law. The appellate authority has made no independent application of mind to the charges, evidence and defence offered by the proceedee. The impugned order of I.G. cum D.G.P. has been passed on the ground of moral degradation of the petitioner which (moral degradation) has brought down the image of entire police force. This charge does not figure in the Memorandum of Charges on which the departmental proceeding was conducted against the petitioner, thus the impugned punishment of dismissal from service has been passed on a charge different from what has been mentioned in the Memorandum of Charges. The only evidence led against the petitioner in the departmental proceeding was the FIR instituted against him vide Annexure-1 to the instant writ petition. The only evidence led against the petitioner in the departmental proceeding was the FIR instituted against him vide Annexure-1 to the instant writ petition. In the criminal trial following the institution of this FIR, the petitioner has been acquitted honourably in GR Case No. 387/2016 corresponding to TR No. 169/2020 on 14.10.2020. Since the petitioner has been acquitted honourably in the criminal case launched against him on the same set of charges as contained in the departmental proceeding conducted against him, his dismissal order has to go. He lastly submitted that mere involvement in a criminal case cannot be a ground to deprive a person of his means of livelihood by imposing upon him the punishment of dismissal from service (as in the instant case) or compulsory retirement. 6. To buttress his argument, learned counsel for the petitioner placed heavy reliance on the following judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court : I. Union of India Vs. B.V. Gopinath & Ors., (2014) 1 SCC 351 II. Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National bank & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 570 III. Allahabad Bank & Ors. Vs. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SACC 308 IV. State of U.P. & ors. Vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772 V. Union of India & Ors. Vs. Bishambhar Das Dogra, (2009) 13 SCC 102 VI. Punjab National Bank & ors. Vs. Kunj Bihari Mishra, (1998) 7 SCC 84 VII. Smt. Nisha Sinha Vs. State of Jharkhand & ors., (2020) 4 JBCJ 617 HC VIII. Murari Bhagat Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., (2019) 4 JBCJ 94 HC. IX. Raj Kumar Mehrotra Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., (2005) 12 SCC 256 7. Per contra counter-affidavit has been filed. 8. Mr. Indranil Bhaduri, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that Petitioner forced Laxmi Hansda (informant) to leave the rickshaw and offered her money to meet his sexual lust and on her refusal, he started to assault her with filthy language and thereafter informant i.e. Laxmi Hnasda lodged a written complaint in Deoghar Police Station, which was registered as Deoghar P.S. Case No. 157/2016. He further submitted that in view of the serious misconduct of the petitioner, he was put under suspension and ‘Prapatra Ka’ was also issued and a departmental proceeding was initiated against him. He further submitted that in view of the serious misconduct of the petitioner, he was put under suspension and ‘Prapatra Ka’ was also issued and a departmental proceeding was initiated against him. There is no procedural latches in the departmental proceeding as Conducting officer found that allegations were proved and the conduct of petitioner is contrary to the conduct of a Disciplined Force. The Disciplinary Authority inflicted the punishment of reduction of rank upon the petitioner and on appeal, the Director General of Police-cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand converted the punishment of reduction of rank into dismissal from service and there is no illegality or infirmity in the order of Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority has the power to reduce, enhance, confirm and also to set aside the punishment. Thus, it is obvious that the order of enhancement of punishment is passed in accordance with law. He has further submitted that the memo No.781 dated 18.03.2016 is self-explanatory and alleged affidavit of informant is a glaring example of tampering prosecution evidence(s). A copy of the enquiry report was also made available to the petitioner vide memo no. 6024/con dated 19.12.2016. 9. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties, this Court is of considered view that the case of the petitioner needs consideration. Admittedly, the Deputy Inspector General of Police-cum-Disciplinary Authority is the appointing authority of an Assistant Sub-Inspector, which is apparent from Rule 660 of the Jharkhand Police Manual, which reads as under:- 660. Appointment of Assistant Sub-Inspectors.—(a) Assistant shall be appointed by promotion from the ranks (Rule 729). Promotion of the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector shall be made by the Deputy Inspector least 14 days before passing orders of promotion, the Deputy Inspector-General shall publish by range order the names of those, they propose to promote in order that those who are not to be promoted may have an opportunity of representing their eases before the promotions are actually made. Constables having such representations to make should be given interviews and their eases examined with them. 10. In the instant case, the order was passed by the Superintendent of Police for initiation of departmental proceeding and accordingly, the petitioner was served the memo of charge. Constables having such representations to make should be given interviews and their eases examined with them. 10. In the instant case, the order was passed by the Superintendent of Police for initiation of departmental proceeding and accordingly, the petitioner was served the memo of charge. The Superintendent of Police was empowered to initiate a departmental proceeding and serve the memo of charge, but whether the same was approved by the Appointing cum Disciplinary Authority i.e. D.I.G. of Police is not clear. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the charges levelled against the petitioner and very initiation of departmental proceeding was ever approved or even post facto approval of DIG of police was taken. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of the Union of India Vs. B.V. Gopinath & Ors. (supra), has held as under:- 44. Under Clause (9), the department firstly puts up the file before the Finance Minister seeking “approval for issuing charge memo/sanction of prosecution”. The department is seeking an order as to whether the officer is to be proceeded against departmentally or criminal proceedings are to be initiated or both proceedings are to be commenced simultaneously. When the decision is taken by the Finance Minister that the departmental proceedings are to be held (initiation), only then the question of approval of charge memo arises. The department would thereafter complete the necessary formalities and then place the file before the Finance Minster, for “approval of” charge memo. This provision is in harmony with the mandate contained under Articles 311(1) and (2) that no civil servant shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The second limb of the same direction is that punishment on a public servant of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank can only be imposed when the charges have been proved against him in a departmental enquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice. 45. Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules provides for holding a departmental enquiry in accordance with the provisions contained in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Clause (8) also makes it clear that when the Finance Minister is approached for approval of charge memo, approval for taking ancillary action such as appointing an inquiry officer/presiding officer should also be taken. Clause (8) also makes it clear that when the Finance Minister is approached for approval of charge memo, approval for taking ancillary action such as appointing an inquiry officer/presiding officer should also be taken. Clause (9) in fact reinforces the provisions in Clause (8) to the effect that it is the Finance Minster, who is required to approve the charge memo. Clause (9) relates to a stage after the issuance of charge-sheet and when the charge-sheeted officer has submitted the statement of defence. It provides that in case the chargesheeted officer simply denies the charges, CVO will appoint an inquiry officer/presiding officer. In case of denial accompanied by representation, the Chairman is to consider the written statement of defence. In case the Chairman comes to a tentative conclusion that written statement of defence has pointed out certain issues which may require modification/amendment of charges then the file has to be put up to the Finance Minister. So the intention is clearly manifest that all decisions with regard to the approval of charge memo, dropping of the charge memo, modification/amendment of charges have to be taken by the Finance Minister. 52. In our opinion, the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General is not factually correct. The primary submission of the respondent was that the charge-sheet not having been issued by the disciplinary authority is without authority of law and, therefore, non est in the eye of the law. This plea of the respondent has been accepted by CAT as also by the High Court. The action has been taken against the respondent in Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules which enjoins the disciplinary authority to draw up or cause to be drawn up the substance of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charges. The term “cause to be drawn up” does not mean that the definite and distinct articles of charges once drawn up do not have to be approved by the disciplinary authority. The term “cause to be drawn up” merely refers to a delegation by the disciplinary authority to a subordinate authority to perform the task of drawing up substance of proposed “definite and distinct articles of charge-sheet”. These proposed articles of charge would only be finalised upon approval by the disciplinary authority. The term “cause to be drawn up” merely refers to a delegation by the disciplinary authority to a subordinate authority to perform the task of drawing up substance of proposed “definite and distinct articles of charge-sheet”. These proposed articles of charge would only be finalised upon approval by the disciplinary authority. Undoubtedly, this Court in P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. CAG [ (1993) 1 SCC 419 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 206 : (1993) 23 ATC 645] has held that Article 311(1) does not say that even the departmental proceeding must be initiated only by the appointing authority. However, at the same time it is pointed out that: (SCC p. 422, para 4) “4. … However, it is open to the Union of India or a State Government to make any rule prescribing that even the proceeding against any delinquent officer shall be initiated by an officer not subordinate to the appointing authority. It is further held that: (SCC p. 422, para 4) “4. … Any such rule shall not be inconsistent with Article 311 of the Constitution because it will amount to providing an additional safeguard or protection to the holders of a civil post.” 56. For the reasons stated above, we see no merit in the appeals filed by the Union of India. We may also notice here that CAT had granted liberty to the appellants to take appropriate action in accordance with law. We see no reasons to disturb the liberty so granted. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed. 11. Further, from perusal of the entire departmental proceedings it appears that there was not a single eye witness or independent witness, who came forward to depose against the petitioner. The complainant, Laxmi Hansada and her associates, who were said to be with the complainant at the time of incident i.e. Baraki Soren and Sunita Marandi, whose names also figured in the FIR, were never called for recording their evidences nor they were examined in the departmental proceeding. The FIR becomes the ground for initiation of departmental proceeding and it is a settled proposition of law that FIR and the evidence collected during investigation of a criminal case cannot be relied upon as an evidence in a departmental proceeding. Charges contained in the Memorandum of charges have to be proved independently on the basis of independent witness and documents produced before the Enquiry Officer. Charges contained in the Memorandum of charges have to be proved independently on the basis of independent witness and documents produced before the Enquiry Officer. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors.(Supra), has held thus: 10. The appellant made a representation against the said order before the appellate authority. The appellate authority noticed his contentions in detail. Inter alia, on the premise that the appellant had been given an opportunity of personal hearing, the appeal was dismissed, opining: “In view of the above, the submissions made by the appellant in his appeal dated 23-2-2001 and his verbal submissions made during personal hearing are devoid of merits. As such I find no reasons to interfere or alter the order of the disciplinary authority. Thus, keeping in view the nature and gravity of the proven charges, punishment of ‘dismissal from bank service’, imposed upon Shri Negi by the disciplinary authority vide its order dated 24-1-2001 is hereby confirmed and appeal of Shri Negi is rejected.” 11. The appellate authority also did not apply its mind to the contentions raised by the appellant; no reason was assigned in support of its conclusion. On what evidence, the appellant was found guilty was not stated. 12. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said orders, the appellant filed a writ petition. The same by reason of the impugned judgment has been dismissed, stating: “… The writ jurisdiction can be exercised by this Court only in exceptional circumstances which have not been mentioned by the petitioner in the petition. However, once the petition was admitted for hearing in exercise of the writ jurisdiction after a lapse of so many years since the writ petition was admitted in the year 2001, it may not be appropriate for this Court to pass an order now that the petitioner should make out a case for reference to the Industrial Tribunal and therefore the petition filed by the petitioner is being considered.” 13. The High Court noticed the decision of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [ (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429], Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [ (2006) 4 SCC 713 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 840] and Bhagwati Prasad Dubey v. Food Corpn. The High Court noticed the decision of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [ (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429], Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [ (2006) 4 SCC 713 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 840] and Bhagwati Prasad Dubey v. Food Corpn. of India [1987 Supp SCC 579 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 243 : (1987) 5 ATC 321 : AIR 1988 SC 434 ] whereupon reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, and held: “All the aforesaid decisions are not directly attracted to the present facts though the law laid down applies to the present facts. But in the facts of the case it is not a case of no evidence but only in regard to the conclusions drawn based upon the evidence which reappraisal cannot be done by this Court. Coming to the arguments that there can be no reappraisal of the evidence by this Court once the findings have been given by the enquiry officer considering the evidence, it is not the case of the petitioner that there was no evidence at all as against him led before the enquiry officer, but the dispute is in regard to the conclusion drawn by the enquiry officer based upon evidence. According to law even if two views are possible to be drawn against the petitioner on the basis of the enquiry report one which has been drawn by the enquiry officer cannot be held to be wrong taking the plea that the second view was also possible to be drawn based upon evidence. The decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Narinder Mohan Arya case [ (2006) 4 SCC 713 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 840] clearly lays down that the proceedings of departmental enquiry report are quasi criminal in nature. Therefore, the guilt of the delinquent official is not required to be proved beyond any reasonable doubt as in a criminal case. We have considered the report of the enquiry officer and the penalty imposed by the Bank is based upon evidence as such it is not open to this Court to consider that some other view was also possible and since it was not a case of no evidence therefore there cannot be reappraisal of evidence or draw its own conclusion by this Court based upon evidence. The findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the punishment imposed by the respondent Bank or its officers call for no interference by this Court and as such there is no merit in the petition which is dismissed accordingly.” 14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. 15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the enquiry officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. The appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left. 16. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [ AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 4 SCR 718 ] it was held: (AIR pp. 369-70, paras 22-23) “22. … The two infirmities are separate and distinct though, conceivably, in some cases both may be present. 16. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [ AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 4 SCR 718 ] it was held: (AIR pp. 369-70, paras 22-23) “22. … The two infirmities are separate and distinct though, conceivably, in some cases both may be present. There may be cases of no evidence even where the Government is acting bona fide; the said infirmity may also exist where the Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of the Government not supported by any evidence may be the result of mala fides but that does not mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorari will not issue without further proof of mala fides. That is why we are not prepared to accept the learned Attorney General's argument that since no mala fides are alleged against the appellant in the present case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the respondent. 23. That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by the appellant is a reasonably possible view this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent's case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that Charge 3 was proved against him? In exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well founded, because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that Charge 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence.” 17. In Moni Shankar v. Union of India [ (2008) 3 SCC 484 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 819] this Court held: (SCC p. 492, para 17) “17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the Department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely, preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality.” 12. Further, it can be comfortably said that there is no evidence against the petitioner to prove the case, even the petitioner was not given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses during the departmental proceedings. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality.” 12. Further, it can be comfortably said that there is no evidence against the petitioner to prove the case, even the petitioner was not given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses during the departmental proceedings. It is also an admitted fact that no second show cause notice was issued by the Disciplinary Authority i.e. DIG of Police with a copy of enquiry report to the petitioner to defend himself against the punishment proposed to be awarded by the Disciplinary Authority. The learned counsel for the respondents has tried to impress the Court that a copy of enquiry report was served, whereas, a copy of enquiry report was earlier given to the petitioner along with a copy of recommendation of the Superintendent of Police, Deoghar to D.I.G. for awarding the punishment, it was incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority i.e., DIG to issue notice with a copy of enquiry report, which was not done in the instant case, which is mandatory provision and as per the law, issuance of showcause notice with the enquiry report by the Disciplinary Authority is sine qua non. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Punjab National Bank and Ors. Vs. Kunj Bihari Mishra (supra), has held thus:- 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer. 13. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Managing Director, ECIL Hyderabad & Ors. Vs. 13. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Managing Director, ECIL Hyderabad & Ors. Vs. B. Karunkar & Ors., (1993) 4 SCC 727 has held thus:- 25. While the right to represent against the findings in the report is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the Forty-second Amendment. 26. The reason why the right to receive the report of the enquiry officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer form an important material before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the enquiry officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the enquiry officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the enquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the enquiry officer's findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it. 27. It will thus be seen that where the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee's right to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of the inquiry. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee's right to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of the inquiry. If this right is denied to him, he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings. 28. The position in law can also be looked at from a slightly different angle. Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a “reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him”. The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. What is further, when the proviso to the said Article states that “where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed”, it in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee's reply to the enquiry officer's report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. The second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. But before the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officer's report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges. 14. The DIG being the Appointing cum Disciplinary Authority did not ask a show cause notice for enhancement of punishment rather it was asked by the Superintendent of Police as to why, the petitioner should not be dismissed from service, which is not tenable in the eyes of law. Reference be made to Rule 853 A of the Police Manual, which reads thus;- 853-A. (a) Inspector-General may call for the file in any case even when no appeal lies and pass such order as lie may deem fit. The Deputy Inspector-General may call for any file but he should refer it to the Inspector-General with his recommendation for his order. The above action should be taken within a reasonable time from the date of final order in departmental proceeding. (b) Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules the State Government may call for the proceedings in any disciplinary case even when no appeal or memorial lies, and pass such order as it may deem fit. (c) When an appeal has been filed and the Inspector-General on applying his mind thinks that he should enhance the punishment," he can dismiss the appeal but must simultaneously mention in that order that as per powers Given in the Rule 853-A (a), he has decided to review it for enhancement and take action for obtaining a show cause, etc. where necessary. 15. where necessary. 15. The Appellate Authority ought to have applied his independent mind, taking into consideration the power given to him under Rule 853 A of the Police Manual. The Appellate Authority has failed to exercise his power in a correct perspective, which vitiates the entire proceedings. From the entire proceedings, it can be comfortably inferred that there are several procedural latches, the impugned order of dismissal from service dated 27.03.2018 is liable to be quashed and set aside and same is hereby quashed and set aside. 16. However, from the charges levelled against the petitioner, it appears that charges are serious in nature and looking to the charges and allegations made by a lady, the petitioner cannot be left scot-free. In a Disciplined Force, even minor allegations are to be taken very seriously. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner has been acquitted in criminal proceeding, which was the basis of awarding the punishment of dismissal, impugned order of dismissal may be quashed and set aside, this Court is not in agreement with the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Since there is gross procedural illegalities by the high-ranking officers in the departmental proceedings, this Court thinks it appropriate to remit the matter back to the Appellate Authority i.e., D.G.P to pass an appropriate order on the quantum of punishment, other than dismissal from service as the petitioner has served the Department for long years and he was at the verge of retirement on the date of issuance of impugned order of dismissal. 17. Resultantly, writ petition stands disposed of.