JUDGMENT : Heard the parties. 2. This second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 20.01.2020 (decree signed on 24.01.2020), passed by learned District Judge-V, Dhanbad in Title Appeal No. 30 of 2019, whereby and whereunder the learned first Appellate Court has dismissed the said title appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 20.11.2018 (decree signed on 06.12.2018), passed by learned Addl. Civil Judge (Jr. Div.)-II, Dhanbad in Money Suit No. 05 of 2009, decreeing the suit. 3. As per the factual matrix, the plaintiff-respondent is the Secretary of Chhatabad Malkera Adarsh Shramik Sahayog Samiti Ltd., Dhanbad and the defendant No. 1 is the employee of M/s. BCCL to conduct the work of M/s. BCCL as General Manager at Katras Area No. IV, Dhanbad, whereas, the defendant No. 2 is the Director (Finance), M/s. BCCL. The plaintiff and the defendants have entered into an agreement for transportation of sand from river ghats @ 15% escalation from the rate of 1989-89 determined by the Authority. The plaintiff has transported 8751.16 cub. Mtrs. of sand from river ghats to Katras Chaitudi Colliery nine pit within 10 months commencing from 25.06.1997 to 30.04.1992. The society had transported sand from river ghats to Chaitudih Colliery of M/s. BCCL for which it is entitled for 15% escalation rate i.e. Rs.93,057.48 over the rate of 1988-89 determined by the authority but the same was not paid to the Society. The Society thereafter made several representations and personal requests but the management of M/s. BCCL were sitting tight over the matter. The Society communicated the matter to the higher authorities of M/s. BCCL including the CMD, Director (Finance), Chairman, Coal India Ltd., GOIL, Ministry of Coal for proper action and justice, but all went into vain. 4. Finding no other alternative, the Society approached the District Consumer Forum for redressal of its grievances, however, the Forum was pleased to dismiss the said case with the observation that the Society may file the case for redressal of its grievance before the competent Court or Forum. Thereafter, the plaintiff-respondent filed Money Suit No. 05 of 2009, with the following prayers: (a) For a decree be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants for declaration that the plaintiff had transported sand to M/s. BCCL Riverghat to Katras Chaitudih Colliery 9 pit and the plaintiff is entitled to get the transportation cost of Rs.93,057.48. Thereafter, the plaintiff-respondent filed Money Suit No. 05 of 2009, with the following prayers: (a) For a decree be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants for declaration that the plaintiff had transported sand to M/s. BCCL Riverghat to Katras Chaitudih Colliery 9 pit and the plaintiff is entitled to get the transportation cost of Rs.93,057.48. (b) For a decree for direction to the defendants to pay the escalation rate of 15% on transportation to the plaintiff with interest thereon so that it may be paid to the labourers who have claimed or demanded from the plaintiff. 5. Upon receipt of the notice, the defendant-M/s. BCCL appeared and contested the case. It was the case of the defendants before the learned Trial Court that the money suit preferred by the plaintiff is not maintainable in law as well as on fact and barred by law of limitation, non-joinder/ mis-joinder of the necessary party, barred by principles of res-judicata, provisions of Indian Contract Act, principles of waiver, estoppels and acquiescence. 6. On the basis of rival pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court framed the following issues: (I) Whether the suit is maintainable as framed? (II) Whether the plaintiff has a valid cause of action and right to sue the defendants? (III) Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation? (IV) Whether the suit is barred by the mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary party? (V) Whether the suit is barred by the principle of Estoppel, waiver and acquiescence? (VI) Whether the suit is barred by the principle of res-judicata? (VII) Whether the both parties entered into an agreement for transportation of sand from River ghats with 15% escalation rate from the rate of 1988-89 determined by the authorities? (VIII) Whether the plaintiff has already received its full and final payment without any protest? (IX) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover an amount of Rs.93,057.48 from the defendants? (X) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the relief claimed or any relief? 7. In support of their cases the parties had adduced both oral as well as documentary evidences. The learned Trial Court after hearing the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, discussed each and every issues in detailed and thereafter, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff vide judgment dated 20.11.2018 and decree dated 06.12.2018. 8. 7. In support of their cases the parties had adduced both oral as well as documentary evidences. The learned Trial Court after hearing the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, discussed each and every issues in detailed and thereafter, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff vide judgment dated 20.11.2018 and decree dated 06.12.2018. 8. Against the order of the learned Trial Court, the defendants- appellants preferred Title Appeal No. 30 of 2019, which also stood dismissed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court has been affirmed by the 1st Appellate Court. Hence, the appellants preferred the instant second appeal challenging the orders passed by both the Courts below. 9. Ms. Swati Shalini, learned counsel appearing for the appellants-M/s. BCCL vociferously argues that the agreement entered into between the parties are final and conclusive and any correspondence or decision taken by a party contrary to or prior to execution of the contract but not incorporated in the contract, cannot be made a basis for allowing the additional claim. Learned counsel further argues that in view of the specific clause in the agreement barring claim of escalation, the learned Trial Court as well as the 1st Appellate Court was not justified in holding the respondent-plaintiff entitled for any escalation. Learned counsel further argues that in view of the settled proposition of law that the parties to a contract is presumed to have signed the contract with open eyes and after understanding all terms and conditions of the same, the Court while deciding a claim is not permitted to read into contract clauses not actually incorporated in it. Learned counsel further argues that on conclusion of the contract, the plaintiff-respondent had received the entire contractual amount without any demure or protest and as such, it is not open for him to raise any dispute with regard to payment of additional amount. Learned counsel accordingly submits that for the aforesaid facts and reasons, the orders passed by learned Courts below is fit to be quashed and set aside. 10. I have heard counsel for the appellants on the point of admission and formulating substantial question of law. Learned counsel accordingly submits that for the aforesaid facts and reasons, the orders passed by learned Courts below is fit to be quashed and set aside. 10. I have heard counsel for the appellants on the point of admission and formulating substantial question of law. After hearing learned counsel for the appellants upto a length and on perusal of findings of fact recorded concurrently by the courts below, I find that findings of fact as recorded by both courts below do not suffer from any illegality or perversity warranting any interference in this appeal. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Krishnan v. Backiam and another, reported in 2007(12) SCC 190 has held as under: “11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect.” It is settled principle of law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse, as has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in paragraph-10 of the case of Gurvachan Kaur and Others Vs. Salikram (dead) through LRS. reported in (2010) 15 SCC 530 as under:- “10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. reported in (2010) 15 SCC 530 as under:- “10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent.” Learned counsel for the appellants could not point out any specific instance of any particular evidence being not considered. Learned counsel for the appellants also could not point out any illegality or error in the impugned judgment and decree of the lower appellate court giving rise to any substantial question of law to be framed and decided by this Court. When trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff and the first appellate court has affirmed the judgment of learned Trial Court, then such findings of facts are binding on the High Court. This second appeal does not involve any question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of Code to enable High Court to admit the appeal on any such question much less answer it in favour of the appellants. 11. In the case of Kulwant Kaur V. Gurdial Singh Mann, reported in (2001) 4 SCC 262 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the limited leeway available to the High Court in second appeal. Para-34 of the said Judgment reads as under: “34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Para-34 of the said Judgment reads as under: “34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-à-vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication – what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: ‘103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact. – In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal.- (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by both the court of first instance and the lower appellate court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100.’ The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that Section 100 of the Code stands complied with.” Though there are plethora of case laws on this issue, the law is well settled that where there is concurrent finding of the Courts below, the High Court should not interfere with the findings of the trial court and the first appellate court on pure question of fact. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in catena of decisions has specifically held that the strained effort made by the High Court in second appeal to arrive at a different finding is wholly unwarranted apart from being impermissible under law. It is settled principle of law that second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, cannot be admitted unless there is substantial question of law involved in it. The findings of fact recorded by the two courts below are based on proper appreciation of evidence and the materials on record. There is no perversity, illegality or irregularity in those findings. The findings, therefore, does not require to be upset in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC. After considering all the issues involved, the trial court has rightly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff and the same has been affirmed by the first appellate court. The substantial question of law as formulated by the appellants-defendants are not substantial questions of law for consideration in the instant appeal and as such, the appeal fails. In this view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that this second appeal does not involve any question of law, much less substantial questions of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code to enable the High Court to admit the appeal on any such question. 12. In view of the foregoing discussions, no substantial question of law arises for determination in this appeal. Hence it is dismissed at admission stage itself.