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2022 DIGILAW 120 (MEG)

Phiyola Myrthong v. State of Meghalaya

2022-05-12

WANLURA DIENGDOH

body2022
JUDGMENT Wanlura Diengdoh, J. - An FIR being Sohra P.S. Case No. 20(6) of 2020 under Section 376 IPC was registered, the contents of which would reveal that the petitioner herein was allegedly raped by the respondent No. 3. On investigation being launched and the Investigating Officer having filed the final report as required under Section 173 Cr.P.C., the matter was taken up for trial by the learned Sessions Judge, Shillong in Sessions Case No. 23(T) of 2021. The stage of the case is for consideration of charge. 2. The petitioner has come before this Court with an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a prayer to quash the said FIR and the subsequent proceedings in Sessions Case No. 23(T) of 2021. 3. Ms. S. Nongsiej, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the FIR was filed on account of wrong advice and misunderstanding of communication between the parties when actually nothing happened between the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 who are mother and son respectively. However, since the said FIR has been registered the respondent No. 3 has been arrested in connection with the same, but was subsequently enlarged on bail. 4. The learned counsel has further submitted that since the case has proceeded for trial, with the intervention of near and dear ones, the petitioner and the accused/respondent No. 3 have entered into a compromise and does not want to pursue with the case. 5. A Memorandum of understanding/compromise deed dated 29.11.2021 was annexed to this petition and the essence of the same would show that the parties, that is, the petitioner herein and the respondent No. 2 as the First and Second party respectively, acknowledging that the said FIR was filed on the premise of a misunderstanding, wrong advice and miscommunication when actually nothing has happened as alleged, therefore, on the said misunderstanding having been resolved, the parties have also agreed to approach this Court with an appropriate application with a prayer to quash the criminal proceedings as mentioned above. 6. The learned counsel has chosen to rely on certain judgments in this regard. In the case of Ananda D.V. v. State and Anr. 6. The learned counsel has chosen to rely on certain judgments in this regard. In the case of Ananda D.V. v. State and Anr. wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 394-395 of 2021 had vide order dated 12.04.2021 allowed the appeal against the order of the High Court refusing to quash the related FIR in a case of a dispute between the parties emanating from a promise by the appellant to the private respondent to marry her which promise was not kept by the appellant leading to the filing of an FIR. However, the dispute between the parties was soon resolved and they eventually got married on 11.10.2014. Taking into account the joint application of the parties for quashing of the stated FIR, the Apex court has allowed the same and has set aside the impugned judgment and order. 7. Another case cited is the case of Ashiq N.A. v. State of Kerala & Anr. wherein vide order dated 23.05.2019, in CRL. MC. No. 381 of 2018, the Hon'ble Kerala High Court considering the application for quashing of the proceedings in S.C. No. 533/2015 wherein, in a case under Sections 366A, 376 IPC & Section 3(a) r/w Section 4 of the POCSO Act, the petitioner and the second respondent have settled the disputes amicably and have eventually got married with a daughter born to them and as such, continuing with the criminal proceedings would be a futile exercise, the application was allowed. 8. Per contra, Mr. K.P. Bhattacharjee, learned GA appearing for the State respondent has submitted that though this Court is empowered under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to exercise its inherent power even to the extent of quashing of a criminal proceeding when the parties therein have come to a compromise, however, in cases where the nature of the offence is serious or heinous such as rape, murder, dacoity, etc, the Court would be cautious before exercising its inherent power to quash proceedings related thereto. 9. To support his contention, the learned GA has cited the case of Gold Quest International Private Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.: (2014) 15 SCC 235 , paragraph 8 and also the case of Vimlesh Agnihotri & Ors. v. State & Anr. with reference to the order dated 16.08.2021 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in CRL.MC. 1524/2021. 10. v. State & Anr. with reference to the order dated 16.08.2021 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in CRL.MC. 1524/2021. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gold Quest International Private Limited (supra) at paragraph 8 has expressed the view that in disputes which are substantially matrimonial in nature, or the civil property disputes with criminal facets, if the parties have entered into settlement, and it has become clear that there are no chance of conviction, there is no illegality in quashing the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. read with Article 226 of the Constitution. However, the same would not apply where the nature of offence is very serious like rape, murder, robbery, dacoity, cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, cases under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and other similar kinds of offences in which punishment of life imprisonment or death can be awarded. 11. In the case of Vimlesh Agnihotri (supra) the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has echoed the same sentiment and has also elaborately cited circumstances where the High Court may not exercise its power for quashing an offence of rape on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise. At paragraph 9 in the case of Shimbhu & Anr. v. State of Haryana: (2014) 13 SCC 318 , paragraph 20 was cited, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- '20. Further, a compromise entered into between the parties cannot be construed as a leading factor based on which lesser punishment can be awarded. Rape is a non-compoundable offence and it is an offence against the society and is not a matter to be left for the parties to compromise and settle. Since the Court cannot always be assured that the consent given by the victim in compromising the case is a genuine consent, there is every chance that she might have been pressurised by the convicts or the trauma undergone by her all the years might have compelled her to opt for a compromise. In fact, accepting this proposition will put an additional burden on the victim. The accused may use all his influence to pressurise her for a compromise. In fact, accepting this proposition will put an additional burden on the victim. The accused may use all his influence to pressurise her for a compromise. So, in the interest of justice and to avoid unnecessary pressure/harassment to the victim, it would not be safe in considering the compromise arrived at between the parties in rape cases to be a ground for the Court to exercise the discretionary power under the proviso of Section 376(2) IPC.' 12. Of late, it has been observed that there has been a growing number of crimes against women and children and the number of institution of cases under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences has been on the rise which offences are usually connected with incidents of sexual assault and the like. To say that rape is an offence against society apart of an affront against a particular individual cannot be off the mark and in cases where the facts and circumstances prima facie establishes the commission of such an offence, the Court would be wont to interfere with the due process of criminal law, except in exceptional circumstances where the golden rule of securing ends of justice and ensuring that there is no abuse of the process of the Court can be applied. 13. Viewed thus, this Court finds that the petitioner has not been able to make out a case for interference into the proceedings referred to and as such, this petition is hereby dismissed as devoid of merits. 14. Petition disposed of. No costs.