ORDER : 1. By way of this writ-application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 the writ-applicant herein has prayed for the following reliefs :- “A) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to admit and allow the present Special Criminal Application; B) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to quash and set aside the order dated 05.02.2015 passed in No.M. REG. CRPC 145/HEARING CASE NO.1/15 by learned Executive Magistrate, Vansda (ANNEXURE - 'A') and the order dated 19.04.2017 passed in Criminal Revision Application No.28/2016 by learned 2nd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Navsari, Camp – Vansda (ANNEXURE - 'B') and thereby be pleased to allow Criminal Revision Application No.28/2016 filed by the petitioner, in the interest of justice; C) PENDING THE HEARING AND FINAL DISPOSAL OF THIS APPLICATION, BE PLEASED to grant stay on the effect, execution and implementation the order dated 05.02.2015 passed in no. M. REG. CRPC 145/HEARING CASE NO.1/15 by learned Executive Magistrate, Vansda (ANNEXURE - 'A') and the order dated 19.04.2017 passed in Criminal Revision Application No.28/2016 by learned 2nd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Navsari, Camp - Vansda (ANNEXURE - 'B'), in the interest of justice; D) Any other and further relief(s) as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper, in the interest of justice.” 2. The subject matter is land bearing block No.1098, ad measuring 02-98-63 H. Are. Sq. mtrs. and block No.1175, ad measuring 00-80-83 H. Are. Sq. mtrs, situated at Mouje: Vandarvela, Taluka : Vansda, District: Navsari originally owned by the present respondents No.7 to 10. 3. It is stated that the writ-applicant herein purchased the aforesaid land by Registered Sale Deed dated 5.9.2014 and thereby the right, title and interest alongwith possession of the aforesaid land was transferred in the name of the present writ-applicant. The writ-applicant herein has placed on record the Registered Sale Deed dated 5.9.2014 which is duly produced at Annexure-C. 4. It is stated that since the writ-applicant herein could not personally protect the property, the writ-applicant herein had posted one security personnel to take care of the property and affixed a board displaying the name of the writ-applicant on the land bearing block No.1098. 5. It is stated that since the writ-applicant herein could not personally protect the property, the writ-applicant herein had posted one security personnel to take care of the property and affixed a board displaying the name of the writ-applicant on the land bearing block No.1098. 5. It is further stated that it came to the knowledge of the writ-applicant herein that the respondent No.3 - Kantibhai Babubhai Patel of Village : Vandervel had instituted a suit being Special Civil Suit No.54 of 2014 against the original owner of the aforesaid land on 28.7.2014 seeking specific performance, declaration and injunction against erstwhile owners. 6. In the meantime, on 01.10.2014, the respondent no.3 broke the lock of the property in question and threatened the security personnel to leave the aforesaid lands and thereby committed criminal trespass. The respondent No.6 - son of the present writ-applicant was personally present at the place and immediately called Police Sub Inspector, Vansda and the police personnel in turn directed Kantibhai Babubhai Patel - present respondent no.3 to leave the aforesaid land. 7. On 04.10.2014, as a counter blast, the respondent no.3 lodged an FIR being II - C. R. No.80/2014 for the offences punishable under section 427, 447, 504, 506(2) & 114 of Indian Penal Code in connection of the above and the respondent No.6 came to be arrested for the aforesaid offences. 8. On 19.11.2014, the respondent No.3 herein alongwith 20 to 30 persons again committed criminal trespass on the aforesaid land and damaged the property of the writ-applicant, therefore the respondent No.6 – son of the writ-applicant again informed the police with regard to the aforesaid incident, and the police arrived at the spot and complaint came to be filed at Pratapnagar Police Station out post on 19.11.2014. Despite filing of the aforesaid complaint, no action was taken by the police and the respondent No.3 continued criminal trespass and illegal occupation on land in question. With regard to the aforesaid complaint dated 19.11.2014 Police Sub-Inspector, Vansda Police Station informed the learned Executive Magistrate with regard to the aforesaid incident and the case came to be registered being No.M. REG. CRPC 145/Hearing Case NO.1/15. 9. With regard to the aforesaid complaint dated 19.11.2014 Police Sub-Inspector, Vansda Police Station informed the learned Executive Magistrate with regard to the aforesaid incident and the case came to be registered being No.M. REG. CRPC 145/Hearing Case NO.1/15. 9. The respondent no.2 - Executive Magistrate, without issuance of notice to the writ-applicant herein and without offering opportunity of hearing to the writ-applicant herein and without verification of the documentary evidence, ex-parte declared the present respondents No.3, 4 & 5 in possession of the disputed property and directed that unless they are evicted in accordance with law, they would be entitled to remain in possession of the said land and granted mandatory injunction not to interfere in the possession of respondent No.3, 4 & 5. The impugned order dated 05.02.2015 is duly produced at Annexure-A. The said order reads thus :- “IN THE COURT OF MRS. Y.S. SHAIKH, EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE, VANSADA No. M. Reg./CRPC-145/Sunavani Case no.1/2015 Office of the Executive Magistrate, Vansada Vansada Police Station From a report of a police officer, It came to my notice that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace concerning land bearing Block No.1098, Account No.771 of Moje: Vandarvela, Taluka: Vansada, District: Navsari, within my local jurisdiction: The Complainant: The Police Sub-Inspector, Vansada The Applicants: 1) Kantilal Balubhai Patel 2) Ramilaben Kantilal Patel 3) Ketanbhai Kantilal Patel Residing at: Moje: Vandarvela (Kanabivas), Taluka: Vansada, District: Navsari, The Respondent: 1) Rajendrasinh Takatsinh Thakur Residing at: Kurel (Kanabiwad Patel Faliya) Taluka & District: Navsari M. No. 9427707210 2) Namrata Rupi Shaher Residing at: Flat No.301 C/o. Vipul Bhagvat, Vivekanand Apartment, Tithal Road, Valsad 3) Shehnaz Rupi Shaher 4) Preeti Rupi Shaher Both residing at: 3/6/393, Flat No.405 Siraj Plaza, Street No.3, Himayatnagar, Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh) 5) Parveen Rupi Shaher Residing at: Abhushan Bungalows, Swaminarayan Mandir, B/s. Italva, Navsari. Hence, all the aforesaid parties were directed to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute being land bearing Block No.1098, Account No.771 of Moje: Vandarvela, Taluka: Vansada, District: Navsari. After inquiring into the matter as per rules, I am satisfied that, without entering into the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess, the claim of actual possession of (1) Kantilal Balubhai Patel (2) Ramilaben Kantilal Patel and (3) Chetanbhai Kantilal Patel is true. After inquiring into the matter as per rules, I am satisfied that, without entering into the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess, the claim of actual possession of (1) Kantilal Balubhai Patel (2) Ramilaben Kantilal Patel and (3) Chetanbhai Kantilal Patel is true. Therefore, I order and declare that they are entitled to the possession of land bearing Block No.1098, Account No.771 of Moje: Vandarvela, Taluka: Vansada, District: Navsari until evicted therefrom in due course of law, and I forbid all the disturbance of such possession until such eviction. Date: 05th February, 2015” 10. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned order dated 05.02.2015 the writ-applicant herein preferred Criminal Revision Application No.28 of 2016 before the District & Sessions Judge, Navsari. The said revision application came to be rejected by the revisional Court by order dated 19.4.2017 on the ground of delay and declined to assess the merits of the matter. The operative part reads thus :- “It appears clearly that the said ground has been made up to bring the revision application within the time-limit. Thus, as discussed about the said fact, the applicant and the respondent no.4 are mother and son respectively, the respondent no.4 remained actively present in the proceedings under Section-145 and it can be assumed that the order passed therein has been communicated to the present applicant and therefore, as the revision application has not been filed against the said order by the applicant within 90 days, this court is of the view that present revision application is clearly barred by time-limit as provided in Article-131 and accordingly, the present revision application is not tenable. Therefore, the answer of issue no.1 arose in this case is given in negative. Issue No.2: As discussed in issue no.1 above in this case, as present revision application is barred by time-limit and not tenable, the subject matter arose in issue no.2 is not required to be discussed and therefore, the said issue is decided and accordingly,. Following final order is hereby passed pertaining to the issue no.3. || ORDER || 1) Present Revision Application No.28/2016 of the applicant is hereby rejected as it is barred by time-limit. 2) Original record with copy of this order be sent to the subordinate court of the Ld. Executive Magistrate. Pronounced in the open court today on 19th April, 2017.” 11. || ORDER || 1) Present Revision Application No.28/2016 of the applicant is hereby rejected as it is barred by time-limit. 2) Original record with copy of this order be sent to the subordinate court of the Ld. Executive Magistrate. Pronounced in the open court today on 19th April, 2017.” 11. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned order dated 05.02.2015 passed by the Executive Magistrate, Vansda in No.M. REG. CRPC 145/Hearing Case NO.1/15 and Criminal Revision Application No.28 of 2016 passed by the 2nd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Navsari, Camp - Vansda , the writ-applicant herein has preferred the present writ-application. 12. Mr. Jay Thakkar, the learned advocate appearing for the writ-applicant submitted that the writ-applicant is absolute owner of the subject land by way of Registered Sale Deed dated 05.09.2014 (Pg. No. 24), therefore right, title and interest along with the possession of the subject land was transferred to the writ-applicant. 12.1 Mr. Thakkar, the learned advocate submitted that the respondent no. 3 - Kantilal Babubhai Patel filed a Special Civil Suit No.54/2014 (Pg. No. 88) against the erstwhile owners before the competent Civil Court praying for specific performance of agreement to sale dt.09.03.1979 (Pg. No.135) & 31.01.1986 (Pg. No. 136) alongwith an application below Exh.5 praying for protection of possession. The respondent no.3 has specifically asked for a relief with regard to possession, therefore the learned Civil Court is seized with the issue of possession. The said documents at page no.135 & 136 do not even reflect name of the respondent no.3. 12.2 Mr. Thakkar, the learned advocate submitted that the respondent No.3 - plaintiff therein also filed an application below Exh.53 in Special Civil Suit No.54/2014 inter alia, praying for amendment of the plaint for cancellation of registered sale deed in favor of writ-applicant and also prayed for joining the writ-applicant as a party to the said suit. 12.3 Mr. Thakkar, the learned advocate submitted that the Application below Exh.5 (praying for interim relief) & application below Exh.53 (for amendment of plaint & joining party) are still pending before the learned Civil Court and no orders are passed. 12.4 Mr. Thakkar, the learned advocate submitted that the defendants in suit had filed application under Order 7 Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code for rejection of plaint which is rejected. 12.4 Mr. Thakkar, the learned advocate submitted that the defendants in suit had filed application under Order 7 Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code for rejection of plaint which is rejected. The said order is assailed before this Court by way of Civil Revision Application No.404 of 2015 wherein by order 02.11.2015, notice is issued and proceedings of the suit is stayed (Pg. No.115). 12.5 Mr. Thakkar, the learned advocate submitted that present respondent no.3 committed criminal trespass, broke down lock and threatened the security personnel to leave the land and therefore, present respondent no. 6 - son of the petitioner, who was personally present at the said place immediately called No.100 at Police Control Room. Police Personnel reached the said place and directed the respondent no. 3 to leave the land. 12.6 Mr. Thakkar, the learned advocate submitted that as a counter blast, respondent no.3 filed FIR being II - C. R. No. 80/2014 for offence punishable u/s. 427, 447, 504, 506 (2) & 114 of IPC. In pursuance of the above, as well as the other incidents of respondent no.3 illegally trespassing the subject lands, a case under Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure was registered by Executive Magistrate as CRPC/145/Case No.1/15 wherein vide order dated 05.02,2015, Executive Magistrate declared respondents No.3, 4 and 5 in possession of the subject land and directed that they are entitled to remain in possession unless evicted in accordance with law and granted mandatory injection to not to interfere in the possession of respondents No.3, 4 and 5 (Pg. No. 2A) and the said order is confirmed by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Navsari in Criminal Revision Application No. 28/2016 (Pg. No. 14). 12.7 Mr. Thakkar, the learned advocate submitted that initiation of Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are initiated by the respondent authority after filling of the Special Civil Suit No.54/2014 and application below Exh.5 praying for interim relief and the same is not permissible in eye of law. The Special Civil Suit and the application below Ex.5 with regard to specific performance and possession of the said property are pending. The Civil Court being seized of the Civil Suit, any appropriate relief could be obtained from Civil Court itself by the respondent no.3 being the plaintiff in the said suit. 12.8 Mr. The Special Civil Suit and the application below Ex.5 with regard to specific performance and possession of the said property are pending. The Civil Court being seized of the Civil Suit, any appropriate relief could be obtained from Civil Court itself by the respondent no.3 being the plaintiff in the said suit. 12.8 Mr. Thakkar, the learned advocate submitted that there is no preliminary order stating grounds of Magistrate's satisfaction and that such dispute exists, though mandatory under Sections 145(1) of the Code. There is no satisfaction reflected in order of Magistrate, no reference of any panchmana having been drawn, no subjective satisfaction is reflected in the order of the learned Magistrate, no reference of any panchnama having been drawn, no finding that there would be breach of peace and the said order is an un-reasoned order. 12.9 Mr. Thakkar, the learned advocate submitted that Magistrate has no jurisdiction to entertain application under Section 145 of the Code as the issue of possession is pending before the civil court and the civil court would be the appropriate forum to take care of such grievances and to pass such interim orders as it would deem necessary in given set of facts. The learned Executive Magistrate should not take action under Section 145 of the Code when before the action of Magistrate, Civil Suit concerning the very property is filed and pending. 12.10 Mr. Thakkar, the learned advocate submitted that the respondents No. 3 to 5 are illegal trespassers and land grabbers and section 145 of the Code does not intend to protect such illegal trespassers and land grabbers. The respondent No.3 to 5 cannot take advantage of their own wrong of criminal trespass and thereby raise a plea of likelihood to cause breach of peace. 12.11 Mr. Thakkar, the learned advocate submitted that the learned Executive Magistrate passed the impugned order in violation of principles of natural justice as without joining the writ-applicant as party to the proceedings as the same is without joining the writ-applicant without providing opportunity of hearing or to lead evidence though possession of subject land vested in favor of writ-applicant by way of registered sale deed dated 05.09.2014. 12.12 Mr. 12.12 Mr. Thakkar, the learned advocate submitted that the respondent No.6 had not represented the writ-applicant and is having no right and/or power of attorney to represent the writ-applicant in the proceedings before the respondent No.2 and, therefore, the learned Magistrate erred in inferring that the writ-applicant had knowledge of proceedings before the respondent No.2. 12.13 Mr. Thakkar, the learned advocate further submitted that even otherwise the respondent No.6 is residing separately from the writ-applicant since many years and, therefore, knowledge cannot be inferred qua the writ-applicant. 13. Mr. Vishwas S. Dave, the learned advocate appearing for the respondents No.3, 4 and 5 submitted that the order passed by the Courts below is just and proper and the said order is passed considering the documents on record. 13.1 Mr. Dave, the learned advocate submitted that the son of the present writ-applicant i.e. respondent No.6 was present at the proceeding before Court below and also participated in the proceeding and, therefore, the order impugned cannot be said to be an order just passed ex-parte as notices were issued to all the respondents and the said order was passed after hearing the learned advocates for both the sides. It was also submitted that the learned Executive Magistrate has rightly exercised the powers under Section 145 of the Code and protected the possession of the respondents No.3, 4 and 5 in view of the fact that the respondent No.6 was forcefully trying to take possession of the respondents No.3, 4 and 5. 13.2 Mr. Dave, the learned advocate submitted that since no satisfactory explanation for delay was stated by the writ-applicant herein on the ground that the writ-applicant herein was unaware of the order passed by the learned Magistrate. The learned Revisional Court rightly rejected the revision application on the ground of delay. 13.3 Mr. Dave, the learned advocate submitted that the writ-applicant is not a party in the Special Civil Suit No.54 of 2014 pending before the Court of learned Principal Civil Judge, Navsari and application under Order 1 Rule X of the Code is pending and yet to be decided by the trial and hence no civil litigation is pending between the parties. 13.4 Mr. Dave, the learned advocate submitted that in view of the aforesaid submissions the application filed by the writ-applicant herein be not entertained. 14. Ms. 13.4 Mr. Dave, the learned advocate submitted that in view of the aforesaid submissions the application filed by the writ-applicant herein be not entertained. 14. Ms. Maithili Mehta, the learned APP appearing for the respondent No.1 – State submitted that the application filed by the respondent No.1 – State before the learned Magistrate invoking Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not maintainable in view of the fact that the civil proceedings between the respective parties are pending adjudication. 15. Position of law :- (a) (1985) 1 SCC 427 – Ram Sumer Pari Mahant vs. State of U.P. & Ors., Para-2 :- “2. ….When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the civil court is binding on the criminal court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for respondents 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the civil court, the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed. We accordingly allow the appeal and quash the order of the learned Magistrate by which the proceeding u/s. 145 of the Code has been initiated and the property in dispute has been attached. We leave it open to either party to move the appellate Judge in the civil litigation for appropriate interim orders, if so advised, in the event of dispute relating to possession.” (b) 2000 (2) GLH 587 – Parwatiben wd/o Ramsinh Rajput & Anr., Vs. We leave it open to either party to move the appellate Judge in the civil litigation for appropriate interim orders, if so advised, in the event of dispute relating to possession.” (b) 2000 (2) GLH 587 – Parwatiben wd/o Ramsinh Rajput & Anr., Vs. Parulben Wd/o Rajendrasinh Rajput & Ors., Paragraphs 11 to 13 :- “(11.) So far as first contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioners regarding interlocutory order is concerned, the position of law is very well made clear by a decision of this Court in the matter of Mohmad Zayauddin V/s. Noorbibi (supra). After relying the decision of the Apex Court, this Court ruled that the order which affects ultimately the rights of the parties are not the interlocutory order and hence the order passed by the Executive Magistrate under Sec. 146(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code by no stretch of reasoning said to be an interlocutory order. This makes abundantly clear that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned order being interlocutory in nature, not subject to revisional jurisdiction is required to be negatived. So far as the other contention of learned Advocate for the petitioners is concerned, the learned Sessions Judge has rightly observed that this was not a case of emergency in which the Executive Magistrate had passed the order for sealing of the property because as mentioned above, case falls in category No. 3 that the Executive Magistrate was unable to satisfy himself as to who was in possession on the date of passing of the order under Sec. 145(1) for sealing of the property. At the time of passing of the order under category No. 3 above, the Executive Magistrate ought to have borne in mind that a civil litigation is pending between the parties. In the above mentioned case of Ram Sumer Puri (supra), the Apex Court has observed that while a Civil Court is seized of the matter regarding the possession, the Criminal Court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the Civil Court and parties are in a position to approach the Civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver. Learned Addl. City Session Judge has rightly placed reliance on this decision and had allowed the Revision. Learned Addl. City Session Judge has rightly placed reliance on this decision and had allowed the Revision. So far as the decision of the Supreme Court as cited on behalf of the petitioners in the matter of Mathuralal V/s. Bhanwarlal Noorbibi (supra) is concerned, the facts and the principle both of the abovementioned case will not be helpful to the present petitioners because the question which came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Mathuralal V/s. Bhanwarlal (supra) was whether in the case of emergency after passing of an order under Sec. 145(1) for sealing of the property, whether the Executive Magistrate had jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry. The Apex Court ruled in positive, but in this case, this is admittedly not a case of emergency, but simply the Executive Magistrate could not satisfy himself of the order under Sec. 145(1) and, therefore, learned Addl. Sessions Judge was right in holding that since civil litigation is pending between the parties, Executive Magistrate ought not to have passed the above said order. (12.) On scrutinising the record, going a step ahead from what is observed by the Court of Addl. City Sessions Judge, it is felt that the present case would not even fall within any of the three categories mentioned above, when a matter is pending before a Civil Court, wherein the possession is disputed between the parties, then, it could not be said to be a case of "Magistrate could not satisfy himself as to which of the parties was in possession at the time of passing of the order under Section 145(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code." Once it comes to the knowledge of the Executive Magistrate that the Civil Court is seized of the matter regarding the possession, being a Criminal Court, Executive Magistrate cannot invoke its jurisdiction in category No. 3 mentioned above. There are obvious reasons for this proposition. There are obvious reasons for this proposition. One and most important reason is a party litigating before a Civil Court and which is likely to be declared by the civil court to be entitled to be in possession, would be deprived of its legal rights of having enjoyment of the possession by the order of the Executive Magistrate, and second reason is when the parties are already on litigation, at any time, may approach the civil court for proper adjudication at the interim stage also and that order of the Civil Court will be binding finally to the parties. While the order under Sec. 145 is only temporary order and a provisional police order only for the maintenance of peace in the locality. The order of the Executive Magistrate in such circumstances would result in outser and summary eviction of a party who is legally entitled to possession. Further when civil litigation is pending between parties, such order of Executive Magistrate will amount to interference in adjudication process of civil court and thereby will be obstruction to course of justice. (13.) Now reverting to Sec. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it clearly lays down in Sec. 145 sub-sec. (10) that nothing in this section shall deemed to be in derogation of the powers of the Magistrate to proceed under Sec. 107. Therefore, in the circumstances which have arisen in this case, since the prime object of Secs. 145 and 146(2) to maintain peace, the Executive Magistrate may resort to Sec. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code, if the Executive Magistrate is satisfied that breach of peace is likely between the parties. But by police order, the Executive Magistrate cannot assume jurisdiction of Civil Court and to deprive indirectly any party of the enjoyment of the possession of property to which a Civil Court in future may declare that the said party may be entitled to retain the possession.” (c) 2001 (2) GLR 1216 – Bhanumatiben Suryakant Doshi vs. Vanrajsinh Hirabhai Chavda & Ors. Paragraphs 7 to 9 :- “(7.) The learned Sessions Judge, placing reliance upon the pronouncement of the Apex Court in Amresh Tiwari V/s. Lalit Prasad Dube AIR 2000 S.C. p. 1504 has observed that, "The proceedings under Sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure initiated after the institution of the Civil Suit is bad in the eyes of law." Hence, the impugned order also becomes illegal. (8.) Ms. Avani Mehta has urged that this case is distinguishable on facts. And moreover, in this case, it was never laid down by the Apex Court that, in no case proceedings under Sec. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code could be initiated during pendency of the Civil Suit or after institution of the Civil Suit. Her contention has been that, it is only in cases where Civil Suit is for possession or for declaration of title in respect of same property and where relief regarding protection of the property concerned can be applied for and granted by the Civil Court, that proceeding under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code should not be allowed to continue. From para 8 of the plaint, it is clear that the plaintiffs apprehended illegal dispossession from the defendant. They also apprehended cloud on their title, and as such, they sought declaration of title. Thus, for all purposes, the Civil Suit No. 19/99 was for declaration of title, as well as for protecting possession and seeking permanent injunction. It is, thus, immaterial that relief clause in para 12 was worded in a different way. Even, from relief clause (1) as contained in para 12 of the plaint, it is clear that permanent injunction was sought by the plaintiffs against the defendant restraining him from disturbing occupation or possession of the plaintiffs over the suit property and to get the same vacated from the plaintiffs, in any manner whatsoever. (9.) Para 2 of the relief clause further shows, though not happily worded, that injunction was sought that the defendant has no authority to sale the suit property to anybody else. In this way permanent injunction against the transfer or sale was also sought by the plaintiffs. If this is so, then the distinction suggested by the learned Counsel for the revisionist can hardly be accepted that this was not a case where question of possession, question of title or question of declaration was not involved. In this way permanent injunction against the transfer or sale was also sought by the plaintiffs. If this is so, then the distinction suggested by the learned Counsel for the revisionist can hardly be accepted that this was not a case where question of possession, question of title or question of declaration was not involved. It is then immaterial that the respondent No. 1 herein was not a party or the defendant in Civil Suit No. 19/99. If the injunction was refused by the Trial Court after hearing the parties and the appeal was also dismissed, its consequence would be that the defendant-Shardaben Shah was not restrained from transferring property to third person and if so, she transferred the property or portion thereof to the respondent No. 1 herein and the respondent No. 1 herein wanted to create disturbance, relief could be sought in the pending Civil Suit against the respondent No. 1 herein by impleading him as defendant No. 2 and the Civil Court could have taken cognizance of the matter effectively. It was hardly necessary to rush the Police Inspector or the Executive Magistrate for taking action under Sec. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code.” (d) (2001) 10 SCC 758 - Para 2 Mahant Ram Saran Dass vs. Harish Mohan and Anr. "2. The short question that arises for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, a civil suit for declaration under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure being pending before the competent forum, the civil court, the respondent was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 145 CrPC, and the Magistrate was entitled to initiate the proceedings and pass any interim order of appointment of receiver therein. It is not disputed that in the civil suit itself the court has passed interim order of injunction, and put certain restrictions on the parties with regard to alienation of the property in question. It is not disputed that in the civil suit itself the court has passed interim order of injunction, and put certain restrictions on the parties with regard to alienation of the property in question. It is true that the applicant before the Magistrate, has not been arrayed as party-defendant in the civil suit, but that will not alter the position in any manner since in our view the civil court being in seisin of the matter, any appropriate relief could be obtained from the civil court itself and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction in the case in hand to entertain the application under Section 145, and to pass any orders thereon. In the circumstances, the impugned order of the High Court as well as the proceedings initiated before the Magistrate under Section 145 CrPC stand set aside. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. Needless to mention the status quo as of today to be maintained to enable the parties to move the civil court for appropriate orders." (e) (2004) 13 SCC 421 – Mahar Jahan & Ors. Vs. State of Delhi & Ors., Paragraphs 4 and 5 :- “(4.) It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the parties that this very property which is the subject-matter of these criminal proceedings is also the subject-matter of the civil suit pending in the civil court. The question as to possession over the property or entitlement to possession would be determined by the civil court. The criminal proceedings have remained pending for about a decade. We do not find any propriety behind allowing these proceedings to continue in view of the parties having already approached the civil court. Whichever way proceedings u/s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may terminate, the order of the criminal court would always be subject to decision by the civil court. Inasmuch as the parties are already before the civil court, we deem it proper to let the civil suit be decided and therein appropriate interim order be passed taking care of the grievances of the parties by making such arrangement as may remain in operation during the hearing of the civil suit. (5.) We direct the criminal proceedings initiated u/s. 145 Code of Criminal Procedure to be quashed. The parties are allowed liberty of approaching the civil court. (5.) We direct the criminal proceedings initiated u/s. 145 Code of Criminal Procedure to be quashed. The parties are allowed liberty of approaching the civil court. As we have already noted that Civil Suit No. 404 of 2003 pending in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Delhi, is a suit only for issuance of permanent injunction. We allow the parties liberty of filing any application for interim relief therein.” (f) 2015 (2) GLR 1680 – Kanaiyanand @ Kanaiyalal Rambasant Pandey Vs. Bindadevi Hiranand Pandey & Ors., Paragraphs 29 to 35 and 38 :- “(29.) In Mahar Jahan (supra), the Supreme Court made the following observations : "4. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the parties that this very property which is the subject-matter of these criminal proceedings is also the subject-matter of the civil suit pending in the civil court. The question as to possession over the property or entitlement to possession would be determined by the civil court. The criminal proceedings have remained pending for about a decade. We do not find any propriety behind allowing these proceedings to continue in view of the parties having already approached the civil court. Whichever way proceedings under Section 145 Cri.P.C. may terminate, the order of the criminal court would always be subject to decision by the civil court. Inasmuch as the parties are already before the civil court, we deem it proper to let the civil suit be decided and therein appropriate interim order be passed taking care of the grievances of the parties by making such arrangement as may remain in operation during the hearing of the civil suit. 5. We direct the criminal proceedings initiated under Section 145 Cri.P.C. to be quashed. The parties are allowed liberty of approaching the civil court. As we have already noted that Civil Suit No.404 of 2003 pending in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Delhi, is a suit only for issuance of permanent injunction. We allow the parties liberty of filing any application for interim relief therein. 6. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants before us that Respondent 2 brings antisocial elements and causes disturbance in their peaceful living in the house. We allow the parties liberty of filing any application for interim relief therein. 6. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants before us that Respondent 2 brings antisocial elements and causes disturbance in their peaceful living in the house. On the contrary, it is submitted by the learned counsel for Respondent 2 that Respondent 2 is an old-aged person and without any shelter over his head and presently he is almost at the mercy of others and it would only be fair if he is allowed to live in at least a part of the suit property which belongs to him. We do not propose to enter into merits of the pleas raised by either party before us. 7. We have simply noted the contentions raised by the parties. The civil court, in our opinion, would be the most appropriate forum to take care of such grievances and pass such interim order as would reasonably protect the interests of both the parties. The civil court may issue an ad interim injunction, may appoint a Commissioner or Receiver or may make any other interim arrangement as to possession or user of the property which is the subject-matter of proceedings in the civil court exercising the power conferred on it by Sections 94 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. In view of what has been stated herein above, the appeal is allowed. The proceedings under Section 145 Cri.P.C. are directed to be quashed. The parties may approach the civil court. We make it clear that looking to the relationship of the parties, the civil court shall feel free to make such ad interim order as it deems fit consistently with the facts and circumstances of the case without feeling embarrassed by the limited scope of the suit which is a suit for permanent injunction. 9. The civil court would be at liberty to grant interim relief without regard to the fact whether the application for that purpose is moved by the plaintiffs or the defendant. 9. The civil court would be at liberty to grant interim relief without regard to the fact whether the application for that purpose is moved by the plaintiffs or the defendant. Such an application as and when made, shall be heard and decided expeditiously." (30.) In Ram Sumer Puri Mahant (supra), the Supreme Court made the following observations : "When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the Civil Court is binding on the criminal court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for respondents 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceeding should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the Civil Court, the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during dependency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed. We accordingly allow the appeal and quash the order of the learned Magistrate by which the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code has been initiated and the property in dispute has been attached. We leave it open to either party to move the appellate judge in the civil litigation for appropriate interim orders, if so advised, in the event of dispute relating to possession." (31.) The Supreme Court in the case of Amresh Tiwari v. Lalta Prasad Dubey and another, (2000)4 SCC 440 has held that : "We clarify that we are not stating that in every case where a civil suit is filed, Section 145 proceedings would never lie. It is only in cases where civil suit is for possession or for declaration of title in respect of the same property and where reliefs regarding protection of the property concerned can be applied for and granted by the civil court then proceedings under Section 145 should not be allowed to continue. This is because the civil court is competent to decide the question of title as well as possession between the parties and the orders of the civil court would be binding on the Magistrate." (32.) The Supreme Court in the case of Kunjbihari v. Balram and another, (2006)11 SCC 66 has held that : "Proceeding u/S. 145 Cri.P.C. would be an abuse of process of court and if any party claims to be in possession of property and seeks its protection, it is for the party to approach the civil court and get an appropriate order, but the proceeding u/S. 145 Cri.P.C. cannot be allowed to be continued in the facts and circumstances of the case." (33.) It is thus quite clear from the perusal of the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court that in view of the pendency of the civil suit in respect of the same property the proceedings under Section 145 of Cri.P.C. should not be allowed to continue. In the present case, I have noticed two material infirmities in the impugned order. The promulgation of a preliminary order as contemplated under Section 145(1) of Cri.P.C. is the foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Executive Magistrate. (34.) The jurisdiction conferred upon an Executive Magistrate under Section 145 of the Code is an exceptional one and the provisions of the section should have to be strictly followed while taking action under it. The object of the section is not to provide parties with an opportunity of bringing their civil disputes before a Criminal Court or of manoeuvering for possession for the purpose of the subsequent civil litigation, but to arm the Magistrate concerned with power to maintain peace within his local area. Therefore, a duty is cast on the Magistrates, to guard against abuse of provisions by persons using it with the object of getting possession of property while attempting to drive the other side to a Civil Court. Therefore, a duty is cast on the Magistrates, to guard against abuse of provisions by persons using it with the object of getting possession of property while attempting to drive the other side to a Civil Court. The very jurisdiction of the Magistrate to proceed under this section, arises out of his satisfaction, of a dispute likely to cause breach of peace either on a report of a Police Officer or upon other information, which satisfaction must be reflected in the order which he should make in writing, stating the grounds of his satisfaction. This order which is the sine qua non of the proceedings, initiated under Section 145, Cri.P.C., must require the parties concerned in such dispute, to attend his Court in person or by pleader on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as regards the facts of actual possession of the subject of dispute. After the passing of the preliminary order, a copy of the order shall be served in the manner provided for the service of summons by the Criminal Procedure Code, upon such person or persons as may be directed by the said Magistrate and at least one copy should be affixed at some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute. This service of the copy of the order is provided under Section 145(1) and (3) together. It is apparent that the service of a separate summons is not contemplated and the preliminary order itself shall have to be served in the same pattern as service of the summons. This Court on more than one occasion, had held, that under Section 145(1), Cri.P.C., a Magistrate having jurisdiction, shall make an order in writing that he was satisfied either from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace existed, and the grounds of his satisfaction should be stated clearly to indicate the application of the mind of the Magistrate in passing the preliminary order. The provision of making the order in writing after initial satisfaction and stating the grounds of his satisfaction have been held to be mandatory. The provision of making the order in writing after initial satisfaction and stating the grounds of his satisfaction have been held to be mandatory. Though the Magistrate is not obliged to elaborately set out the entire details of the information received by him, yet the preliminary order, on the face of it, should set out the grounds of the Magistrate being so satisfied or at least employ language to similar effect so as to indicate that he had applied his judicial mind to the information, in coming to the conclusion that there was in existence a dispute, which dispute was likely to cause the breach of peace, necessitating initiation of proceedings under Section 145, Cri.P.C. If there was absolutely nothing in the preliminary order showing expressly the grounds of his being so satisfied, which are in the nature of conclusions arrived at by him, on the report or information placed before him, it would be impossible for the parties called upon to put in their claims before him, to predicate as to what had led the Magistrate to pass such an order and to make their effective representations before him. (35.) What I find from the materials on record available with me is that except the summons dated 17th December 2011, there is no material on record to indicate the promulgation of a preliminary order as contemplated under Section 145(1) of Cri.P.C., which, as stated earlier, is the foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction by the authority. I am not impressed by the submission canvassed on behalf of the respondents that the reference in the summons to the dispute regarding the property and proceedings having been initiated under Section 145 of Cri.P.C. would be sufficient to presume not only the application of mind by the Magistrate to the facts placed before him but also his satisfaction arrived at on the materials so placed. (38.) I have no doubt in this case that the proceedings have to be quashed as it is a clear abuse of the process of Court. The proper course for the Magistrate is to proceed against the respondents under Section 107, Cri.P.C. to see that they keep the peace and that by their attempt to interfere with the possession of the petitioners of this land, they do not disturb public tranquility or create a breach of the peace.” 16. The proper course for the Magistrate is to proceed against the respondents under Section 107, Cri.P.C. to see that they keep the peace and that by their attempt to interfere with the possession of the petitioners of this land, they do not disturb public tranquility or create a breach of the peace.” 16. Heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. 17. The respondent No.3 herein instituted Special Civil Suit No.54 of 2014 before the competent Civil Court on 28.7.2014, prior to filing of the FIR being II - C. R. No.80/2014 for the offences punishable under section 427, 447, 504, 506(2) & 114 of Indian Penal Code. The respondent No.1 authority pursuant to the said FIR filed by the respondent No.3 preferred an application below Ex.1 before the learned Magistrate, Vansda invoking Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Magistrate by order dated 5.2.2015 allowed the said application. The writ-applicant herein being the owner of the subject land preferred Criminal Revision Application No.28 of 2016 challenging the order passed by the learned Magistrate on the ground that the said order was passed ex-parte and that the writ-applicant being the owner of the land by registered sale deed 6.9.2014 was not heard. The said application came to be rejected by the Revisional Court on the ground of delay. The rejection of the aforesaid criminal revision application is a cause of filing the present writ-application. 18. Considering the facts of the present case and the ratio as discussed above the civil proceeding being Special Civil Suit No.54 of 2014 is pending adjudication before the concerned Court, wherein the respondent No.3 is the plaintiff. The defendants preferred an application below Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code for rejecting the plaint which came to be dismissed by the concerned Civil Court. The defendant challenged the same by filing Civil Revision Application No.404 of 2015 before this Court. By order dated 2.11.2015 notice came to be issued and the proceedings before the Court below are stayed. 19. The learned Magistrate while allowing the application below Ex.1 has mechanically passed the order without taking into consideration the fact that the civil proceedings pertaining to the same subject matter are pending adjudication. It is pertinent to note that the civil proceedings have been initiated at the instance of the respondent No.3. 19. The learned Magistrate while allowing the application below Ex.1 has mechanically passed the order without taking into consideration the fact that the civil proceedings pertaining to the same subject matter are pending adjudication. It is pertinent to note that the civil proceedings have been initiated at the instance of the respondent No.3. The respondent No.3 has preferred an application seeking impleadment of the present writ-applicant by preferring application below Ex.53, which is pending before the competent civil court. It appears that the learned Magistrate passed the impugned order without taking into consideration the documentary evidence and the law as laid down. Though the writ-applicant preferred revision application before the learned Sessions Court challenging the aforesaid order passed by the learned Magistrate, the said application was rejected on the ground of delay and also on the ground that the respondent No.6 i.e. son of the writ-applicant herein was present when the matter was conducted before the learned Magistrate and that it was not open for the writ-applicant to contend that the writ-applicant was not aware about the impugned proceedings and that the writ-applicant was not heard. 20. In view of this Court, the impugned order dated 05.02.2015 passed in No.M. REG. CRPC 145/HEARING CASE NO.1/15 by learned Executive Magistrate, Vansda (ANNEXURE - 'A') and the impugned order dated 19.04.2017 passed in Criminal Revision Application No.28/2016 by learned 2nd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Navsari, Camp – Vansda are required to be quashed and set aside in view of the fact that the civil proceedings are pending between the parties wherein the civil rights between the parties are yet to be adjudicated. 21. This Court is therefore inclined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 read with Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and quash and set aside the impugned order dated 05.02.2015 passed in No.M. REG. CRPC 145/HEARING CASE NO.1/15 by learned Executive Magistrate, Vansda (ANNEXURE - 'A') and the impugned order dated 19.04.2017 passed in Criminal Revision Application No.28/2016 by learned 2nd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Navsari, Camp – Vansda. Keeping it open for the parties to agitate their grievance before the competent forum wherein civil dispute is pending. 22. The present writ-application is required to be allowed and the same is allowed. Consequently the criminal misc. application stands disposed of. Direct service is permitted.