JUDGMENT: State Government is the appellant. The appeal is filed under Section 100 C.P.C. It questions the correctness of judgment dated 05.03.2010 in A.S.No.87 of 2009 of learned VII Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vijayawada. By the impugned judgment, the first appellate Court agreed with the findings and conclusions reached by the trial Court in O.S.No.851 of 2002 of learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada. 2. It was an appeal against sole respondent. Respondent was plaintiff before the trial Court and was the respondent before the first appellate Court. During pendency of the appeal, respondent/plaintiff died on 10.08.2019. Thereafter, respondent No.2, who is proper and necessary party to the appeal; respondent Nos.3 and 4, who purchased a part of the plaint schedule property, and respondent No.5 in whose favour the deceased respondent No.1/plaintiff executed a Will are impleaded. The entire dispute revolves around an erroneous entry in revenue records, which was sought to be rectified through the civil Courts by way of mandatory injunction. Both the Courts below granted the relief to the plaintiff and thereby directed the appellant to rectify the wrong classification in their revenue records. 3. On 21.10.2011 a learned judge of this Court admitted this appeal on the following substantial question of law: “Whether the plaintiff without seeking a declaration to his title can seek mandatory injunction to change the revenue record according to his title?” 4. The alleged incorrect entry is with reference to immovable property which is mentioned in the plaint schedule. It is Ac.1.45 cents vacant dry agricultural land in R.S.No.225/3A in Ibrahimpatnam Village. The boundaries to it are that: on East: it is Budameru Diversion Canal Bund; on South: it is Road; on West: it is Krishna River Flood Bank; on North: it is P.W.D. Poramboke land. 5. Sri Koganti Jagannada Rao filed O.S.No.851 of 2002 stating that Sri Koganti Kotaiah is his grandfather and Sri Naraiah is father of the plaintiff. That from the time of ancestors, their family owned and possessed Acs.5.79 cents of land, which includes the plaint schedule land. All throughout, the ancestors and thereafter the plaintiff are shown in the revenue records as owners and pattadar of this land. In the year 1957 for the purpose of Budameru Flood Diversion Channel, State of Andhra Pradesh acquired Acs.4.35 cents of land from out of Acs.5.79 cents of land. All throughout, the ancestors and thereafter the plaintiff are shown in the revenue records as owners and pattadar of this land. In the year 1957 for the purpose of Budameru Flood Diversion Channel, State of Andhra Pradesh acquired Acs.4.35 cents of land from out of Acs.5.79 cents of land. Thus, there remained Ac.1.45 cents of land, which is shown in the plaint schedule. Thus, the plaint schedule property has been in continuous and exclusive possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff. The plaintiff does not have any other land anywhere in the country. 6. In the year 2001 this plaint schedule land was noted as Government Poramboke in the revenue records though it is a private land. The plaint schedule land was not acquired by the defendant or any other authority for any purpose. Thus, there is wrong entry and it must have been made because of a private grudge cherished by Village Administrative Officer. Seeking for rectification of it, plaintiff got issued a notice under Section 80 C.P.C. on 27.01.2002. It was received by defendant on 29.01.2002. On 16.02.2002 proceedings were issued to Mandal Revenue Officer, Ibrahimpatnam and its copy was served on the counsel for plaintiff. However, after such proceedings, there was no further response from the defendant. It is in those circumstances, plaintiff filed the suit with a prayer that is extracted here: “Directing the defendant to rectify the wrong classification of plaint schedule land in the revenue records by changing it as plaintiff’s patta land by way of mandatory injunction or other direction and for costs and such other reliefs?” 7. In response to it, the District Collector, Krishna representing the defendant filed a written statement. In it, it is stated that Koganti family had got Acs.5.79 cents in R.S. No.225, Ibrahimpatnam Village. As per R.S.R., the above extent situate in .S.No.225/3. During the year 1957, some portion of the land in R.S.No.225 was acquired for Budameru Flood Division Channel. After classification, the details of the land in R.S.No.225 are furnished in the written statement. It consists of four items. They are extracted below: Sl.No. R.S.No. Extent in Acres Name of the Ryot 1. 225/1 2.23 1.Chalasani Venkateswara Rao 2. 225/2A 0.98 2.Koneru Radhakrishna Murthy 3. 225/2B 5.24 Manda Kanakaiah 4. 225/3A 1.45 Budameru Channel (Land in Old S.No.225/4 included in this land ) Total 9.90 Road Approach 8. It consists of four items. They are extracted below: Sl.No. R.S.No. Extent in Acres Name of the Ryot 1. 225/1 2.23 1.Chalasani Venkateswara Rao 2. 225/2A 0.98 2.Koneru Radhakrishna Murthy 3. 225/2B 5.24 Manda Kanakaiah 4. 225/3A 1.45 Budameru Channel (Land in Old S.No.225/4 included in this land ) Total 9.90 Road Approach 8. It is then stated in the written statement that the disputed land is classified as road approach in the revenue records. Therefore, the claim of the plaintiff that he is continuing his possession over the said land is not possible. At the time of acquisition or subsequent to it, the plaintiff or his parents never took any interest in this land. The allegations made against Village Administrative Officer are baseless and without any evidence. After keeping silence for so many years, plaintiff has all of a sudden come up with this suit. Rest of the plaint averments are denied. That the plaintiff is not concerned with the suit property and the plaintiff has no right over the land and the suit is liable for dismissal. 9. On hearing both sides, learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, framed the following issues for trial: “1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mandatory injunction as prayed for? 2) To what relief?” 10. At the trial, the plaintiff gave evidence as PW.1 and got examined two other neighbours, who deposed as PWs.2 and 3. The Mandal Revenue Officer, Ibrahimpatnam gave evidence as DW.1. On behalf of plaintiff, Exs.A.1 to A.12 were marked. For defendant, Exs.B.1 to B.7 were marked. Those documents are: For Plaintiff: Ex.A1: Printed detailed list of joint registered holders for the village of Ibrahimpatnam, Bezawada Taluq, Krishna District (1932). Ex.A2: Printed detailed list of joint registered Inamdars at Page No.1. Ex.A3: Resettlement Register. Ex.A4: Printed Re-settlement Register of the village Ibrahimpatnam, Krishna District (19 Pages). Exs.A5 Sketches relating to the suit land. to A7: Ex.A8: Office copy of legal notice issued to the defendant by the plaintiff Dt.27.01.02. Ex.A9: Postal Acknowledgment. Ex.A10: Letter addressed by the defendant to M.R.O. Dt.16.02.2002. Ex.A11: Photostat copy of Report of Mandal Revenue Officer to the Collector, Krishna, Machilipatnam Dt.26.05.2000. Ex.A12: Endorsement given by the M.R.O. Ibrahimpatnam Village, to the plaintiff Dt.08.04.2002. For Defendant: Ex.B1: Filled measurement book for survey No.225. Ex.B2: FMB record for survey number 225 noted as changes effected, as per RC B2-7-8A. Ex.B3: Combined sketch for Ibrahimpantam. Ex.A11: Photostat copy of Report of Mandal Revenue Officer to the Collector, Krishna, Machilipatnam Dt.26.05.2000. Ex.A12: Endorsement given by the M.R.O. Ibrahimpatnam Village, to the plaintiff Dt.08.04.2002. For Defendant: Ex.B1: Filled measurement book for survey No.225. Ex.B2: FMB record for survey number 225 noted as changes effected, as per RC B2-7-8A. Ex.B3: Combined sketch for Ibrahimpantam. Ex.B4: Page No.14 of R.S.R.Register. Ex.B5: Photostat copy of Ex.B4. Ex.B6: Endorsement made in R.S.R. towards changes of classification. Ex.B7: Photostat copy of Ex.B6. 11. In his evidence PW.1 asserted his title and possession over the plaint schedule land and stated that only in the year 2001 he learnt about Government entering this land in revenue records as Government Poramboke. He deposed that plaint schedule land was not acquired by the defendant. PWs.2 and 3 also deposed about title and possession of PW.1. The Mandal Revenue Officer, through his evidence spoke to the facts that were narrated in the written statement. In his evidence he stated that the disputed suit land was classified as road approach and stated that the possession claimed by plaintiff is incorrect. He said that according to R.S.R, the disputed land is classified as road approach. During his cross-examination, DW.1 stated that as per R.S.R., Acs.5.79 cents in Ibrahimpatnam Village in R.S.No.225/3 was owned by the family of plaintiff. Out of the above said land, Government acquired Acs.4.34 cents. For the remaining Ac.1.45 cents, survey number is given as 225/3A (that is the suit schedule property). He stated that he does not have any record to show that the Government acquired the suit schedule land also. He further admitted that he does not have any record in his office to show that any compensation was paid to the plaintiff for these Ac.1.45 cents of suit land. His evidence is to the effect that as per Exs.B.1 and B.2-FMB and Ex.B.3-Combined sketch he stated that land was acquired. He was specifically questioned about land acquisition records. In response to it finally, he stated that he required two months’ time for production of such records. Various suggestions were given to him referring to Exs.B.4 to B.7 that they were interpolated and the attention of the Court was drawn to absence of signatures or initials at certain places and absence of signatures at all at certain places and use of a pen at certain places. Various suggestions were given to him referring to Exs.B.4 to B.7 that they were interpolated and the attention of the Court was drawn to absence of signatures or initials at certain places and absence of signatures at all at certain places and use of a pen at certain places. It was also indicated that the signature portion on Ex.B.6 was torn off. On that evidence, learned trial Court considered the rival submissions. It recorded that the defendant-Government was contending that the suit schedule land was also acquired. It recorded that no evidence was produced before it indicating such acquisition. It found that from the evidence of PWs.1 to 3, the plaint schedule land has been in possession and enjoyment of plaintiff. It found it is a dry land and observed that simply because crops were not raised, the possession claimed by plaintiff could not be disbelieved in the light of sworn evidence of PWs.2 and 3. It further referred to Ex.A.11 and the evidence of DW.1, wherein the revenue authorities have physically verified the land and found that there was no need for any road approach since there was no connecting route to that road approach. It observed that Government did not acquire the suit schedule land. It also observed that Government failed to show when the revenue records made an entry that it is a road or a Government Poramboke. It stated that there is absolutely no evidence to show that public ever used the suit schedule property as a road. It said that except making entries in the revenue records that it is a road approach, there is absolutely no evidence to believe the case of the Government. 12. It seems, before the learned trial Court one of the contentions raised was that a civil suit was not maintainable. Learned trial Court held that the suit was not questioning the land acquisition and not questioning any issues concerning compensation, but the suit questions only the correctness of entries maintained in the revenue records. Such relief is within the jurisdiction of civil Court in terms of Section 9 C.P.C. Therefore, it held that civil suit is maintainable. For the above reasons, it decreed the suit as prayed for. 13. Aggrieved of it, Government preferred the first appeal. Such relief is within the jurisdiction of civil Court in terms of Section 9 C.P.C. Therefore, it held that civil suit is maintainable. For the above reasons, it decreed the suit as prayed for. 13. Aggrieved of it, Government preferred the first appeal. Learned first appellate Court, on considering the material and the submissions of both sides, recorded that there was no dispute about plaintiff’s family originally owning Acs.5.79 cents and Government acquiring only Acs.4.35 cents and the crux of the problem pertains to Ac.1.45 cents and whether it was acquired or not. On a keen reading of the written statement the first appellate Court pointed out that the averments in the written statement are vague since it mentioned that only some portion of the land in R.S.No.225 was acquired without making specifics clear. It observed that important documents such as award and land acquisition proceedings are deemed to have been in the custody of State Government and they may be with land acquisition officer or they may be with Irrigation Department for whose benefit land was acquired. The District Collector is in-charge of the District and holds control over all these departments. Though Government is custodian of the records, it did not produce them and suppressed them. It then verified the evidence of DW.1 and the other evidence on record and concluded that plaintiff is owner and title holder of the suit schedule land and the Government has wrongly entered his land as a road approach in the revenue records. It approved the findings of the trial Court and agreed with its final conclusions and dismissed the appeal. 14. Aggrieved of it, Government is in this second appeal. The substantial question of law it raised is: “Whether the suit filed for mandatory injunction seeking rectification of alleged incorrect classification made in the revenue records is maintainable without seeking declaration of title?” 15. Having raised such contention, it is expected that it would base its contention either on statute or on precedent. Before this Court appellant has not shown support for the contention under any law. 16. Learned counsel for respondents also has not brought to the notice of this Court anything against the contentions raised. 17. It is in the above context, the substantial question of law that is raised has to be addressed. 18. It is convenient to notice what the statute speaks. 16. Learned counsel for respondents also has not brought to the notice of this Court anything against the contentions raised. 17. It is in the above context, the substantial question of law that is raised has to be addressed. 18. It is convenient to notice what the statute speaks. Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short, ‘the Act’) provides for mandatory injunction. The same is extracted below:- “39. Mandatory Injunction:-When, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the court may in its discretion grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel performance of the requisite acts. It is also relevant to notice Section 40 of the Act. The same is extracted below:- 40. Damages in lieu of, or in addition to, injunction:- (1) The plaintiff in a suit for perpetual injunction under section 38, or mandatory injunction under section 39, may claim damages either in addition to, or in substitution for, such injunction and the court may, if it thinks fit, award such damages. (2) No relief for damages shall be granted under this section unless the plaintiff has claimed such relief in his plaint: Provided that where no such damages have been claimed in the plaint, the court shall, at any stage of the proceedings, allow the plaintiff to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including such claim. (3) The dismissal of a suit to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in favor of the plaintiff shall bar his right to sue for damages for such breach. Principles concerning declaration of rights are provided in Section 34 of the Act. The same is extracted below:- 34. Declaration of Courts as to declaration of status or right:- Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. Explanation: A trustee of property is a “person interested to deny” a title adverse to the title of some one who is not in existence, and whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee.” 19. A reading of Section 39 of the Act extracted above would show that it is not made dependent on making any other prayer in the suit. Reading of this provision shows that a mere suit for mandatory injunction is also maintainable. Section 40 extracted above would further show that under certain circumstances how damages could be awarded instead of granting mandatory injunction. In other words, seeking declaration of title before seeking mandatory injunction is not the principle that could be directly inferred from the above provisions. It cannot be denied that Government maintains revenue records and it has to maintain them truthfully. It has an obligation to maintain them accurately. The obligation in the suit is that out of some vengeance for a Village Administrative Officer entries were changed and private patta land is incorrectly shown as road approach or Government Poramboke. To bring back the records to their truthful position, the remedy chosen by the plaintiff and agreed by Courts below is mandatory injunction as Section 39 of the Act permits a Court to grant such a relief to “compel performance of the requisite acts.” By filing the suit, respondent/plaintiff was only asking that an act that was down in contravention of law being void is to be rectified. In the case at hand, by the pleadings and evidence on both sides, there is absolute agreement between parties that the family of the plaintiff originally owned and possessed Acs.5.79 cents in R.S.No.225/3 of Ibrahimpatnam Village. While according to both sides, there was land acquisition to an extent of Acs.4.35 cents, it is undeniable that if no further acquisition was there, the remaining Ac.1.45 cents belonged to plaintiff. According to the version of the Government that was also acquired and that was used for road approach. It is not the case of Government that at no point of time this land ever belonged to plaintiff or his family. Therefore, till the years 1957 and 1958 this land belonged to plaintiff. It has never disputed the title of the plaintiff and in fact its evidence in the form of DW.1/M.R.O. abundantly clarifies that position. It is not the case of Government that at no point of time this land ever belonged to plaintiff or his family. Therefore, till the years 1957 and 1958 this land belonged to plaintiff. It has never disputed the title of the plaintiff and in fact its evidence in the form of DW.1/M.R.O. abundantly clarifies that position. When the Government never questioned the title of the plaintiff, there was never any occasion for the plaintiff to seek the relief under Section 34 of the Act and ask the Court to declare his title. Therefore, facts on record never gave any occasion to any of the Courts below or even to this Court about the legal need for respondents herein to seek for declaration of title. If by evidence plaintiff is able to show that the revenue entry has no legal basis, then such a revenue entry is void. When what is available is void, law does not command a party to seek for a declaration that it is void. The relief in the form of deleting the void entry by replacing it with correct entry is always available. As a principle of law that in a suit for mandatory injunction, a party should also ask for declaration is one contention that was specifically raised and negatived on many occasions by Courts. A reference could be made to a judgment of this Court in M.Muthamma v. E.Anantha Lakshmi Bai, 2004 (2) ALD 762 . In that case also specific substantial question of law was framed at point No.2 at page No.763 and was specifically answered at para No.11 at page No.769. Therefore, the substantial question of law raised in this appeal shall be held against the appellant and in favour of the respondents. In other words, a suit for mandatory injunction filed, tried, decided by the trial Court and approved by the first appellate Court has to be approved as correct. 20. The appellant filed I.A.No.1 of 2014 (S.A.M.P.No.688 of 2014) under Order XLI Rule 27 C.P.C. to permit it to file additional evidence in the form of three documents and mark them as Exs.B.9 to B.11. The description of those documents is as below:- 1. Letter D.O.No.RC.A.4/58, dated 19.08.1958 2. RC.A.4/58, dated 09.12.1958 3. Land Acquisition Check Memorandum, dated 27.12.1959 21. The appellant filed I.A.No.1 of 2014 (S.A.M.P.No.688 of 2014) under Order XLI Rule 27 C.P.C. to permit it to file additional evidence in the form of three documents and mark them as Exs.B.9 to B.11. The description of those documents is as below:- 1. Letter D.O.No.RC.A.4/58, dated 19.08.1958 2. RC.A.4/58, dated 09.12.1958 3. Land Acquisition Check Memorandum, dated 27.12.1959 21. Document No.1 is a letter addressed by Special Tahsildar, Land acquisition on 19.08.1958 and it was addressed to the Executive Engineer, Special Division, Vijayawada and a copy of it was marked to District Collector, Krishna. In this letter, it is mentioned that land in R.S.No.225/3A and four other survey numbers, the information concerning taking possession was not received and as a consequence award could not be passed though the enquiry was over on 18.07.1958. Thus, it indicates that some acquisition proceedings took place but the status of possession of the lands was not known and therefore that communication was entered into. 22. By document No.2 addressed to the District Collector, Krishna, the Special Tahsildar mentioned that those lands were handed over on 04.12.1958 to the Assistant Engineer, P.W.D. at Kondapalli. This document further mentioned award was passed on 01.11.1958 and Award number is 8 of 1958. Thus, as per this document, award proceedings were over and possession of the land was taken. 23. Document No.3 is land acquisition check memorandum. It mentions about dispatch of certain forms to Registration Department on 23.02.1959. 24. In support of this petition, Special Tahsildar, Land Protection Cell, Krishna Collectorate, Krishna District swore an affidavit stating that Ac.1.45 cents of land in Survey No.225/3A of Ibrahimpatnam Village was acquired by the Government and award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 01.11.1958. It further states that the respondent/original plaintiff participated in the award proceedings and the same could be seen through the award itself and that the award is also filed herewith. That all this record was not available with the Government at the relevant time and it could not be traced for all these years and they were ultimately traced during the year 2010. That the suit was filed 43 years after land acquisition and the plaint does not disclose about land acquisition. Plaintiff having kept silence over all these years came up with suit for mandatory injunction. The record could be found only after thorough search. That the suit was filed 43 years after land acquisition and the plaint does not disclose about land acquisition. Plaintiff having kept silence over all these years came up with suit for mandatory injunction. The record could be found only after thorough search. In these circumstances, these documents are relevant to prove the case of the appellant. The worthiness of essential material evidence touching upon the core issue is a matter that could be considered by the Courts sitting in second appeal is the argument of the learned Government Pleader. To sustain it, learned Government Pleader cited a judgment of a learned judge of this Court in S.A.No.251 of 2020 decided on 21.09.2022. That was a suit for permanent injunction. The additional documents were found relevant to resolve that dispute between the parties on the principle that pending litigation if new facts are traced and relevant to the issue, it is in the interest of justice the Court should resolve the dispute and even it could mould the relief. It observed that a petition for additional evidence filed before the first appellate Court was dismissed without valid reasons. On consideration of the facts available before this Court in that case, the learned judge set aside the impugned judgments and directed the first appellate Court to receive the additional documents as additional evidence and dispose of the appeal afresh. Learned Government Pleader also cited Gaiv Dinshaw Irani v. Tehmtan Irani, (2014) 8 SCC 294 . For the proposition that whenever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the Court is not precluded from taking a ‘cautious cognizance’ of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief. 25. Learned counsel on both sides argued this petition. 26. Learned counsel for respondent/plaintiff submit that even if these documents are considered as correct, the fact remains that there is absolutely no averment and no evidence to show that for the allegedly acquired suit schedule land compensation was paid by the Government to the plaintiff. It is pointed out that in the affidavit filed in support of this petition, at para No.7 the deponent says that if compensation was not paid, the land owner would not have kept quite all these years. It is pointed out that in the affidavit filed in support of this petition, at para No.7 the deponent says that if compensation was not paid, the land owner would not have kept quite all these years. Referring to this, learned counsel for respondent/plaintiff submits that even at this stage the Government is only groping in dark and has not come up with any evidence to show that compensation was paid. Learned counsel submits that if compensation was not paid, title does not vest with the Government despite the fact that it acquired the land and took the possession of the land. In this regard, learned counsel cites S.Sidda Reddy v. District Collector (Social Welfare), Cuddapah, 2002 (4) ALT 207 (AP). That was also a case of land acquisition and by evidence it was found that compensation was not paid though award was passed and that the Government decided to pay compensation by way of installments and it paid two installments and defaulted in paying remaining installments. It was in the context of those facts when the writ was filed, the learned judge had cited the statute and held that vestiture of title under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act would take place on the payment of compensation. If compensation is not paid, it cannot be said that a valid vestiture in the Government takes place. In the case at hand, nothing contrary is cited by the Government. As one could see from the pleadings, the oral and documentary evidence and the judgments of the trial Court and the first appellate Court that there was no material to show that Government paid compensation to the plaintiff with reference to acquisition of plaint schedule land. Even in the present petition, it is not the case of Government that it paid compensation. Having acquired the land, it is the duty of the Government to pay compensation and it is for the Government to show that it had paid the compensation. No such material is sought to be brought on record. Thus, the facts that emanated from the record and recorded by the Courts below that no compensation was paid to the plaintiff remains unaltered despite admitting the proposed evidence coming forth from the Government. No such material is sought to be brought on record. Thus, the facts that emanated from the record and recorded by the Courts below that no compensation was paid to the plaintiff remains unaltered despite admitting the proposed evidence coming forth from the Government. Even if decades elapsed, though the pointed dispute is clearly known, though the law in regard to these aspects is well-known, the appellant has not chosen to produce any record indicating payment of compensation. In that view of the matter, the additional evidence even if received serves no purpose since title over the land never stood vested with the Government. Since title never stood vested with the Government, it had no right to maintain its records that the plaint schedule land is now a road approach. Thus, the Courts below are still right in holding that classification of land is incorrectly made and that should be rectified. 27. When DW.1 was cross-examined, during the pendency of the trial, he was specifically asked about these proposed documents. He sought for two months’ time. That two months elapsed. Thereafter, decades elapsed. Now, the appellant says that after thorough search these records were traced in the year 2010. It does not specify whether they were traced subsequent to 05.03.2010 on which date the first appellate Court disposed of the appeal or earlier to it. Be that as it may. After receiving them in the year, 2010, after filing this appeal in the year 2011, it is only in the year 2014 Government has come up with this application for additional evidence. Inter departmental cohesiveness is conspicuously absent leading to these belated efforts on part of the Government to salvage its stand. District Collector, as pointed out by the Courts below, is the authority, who is deemed to have custody of all the records. These records were available with the Government. It seems only lethargy prevented the Government servants from producing them at relevant time. In the above reported judgments cited by learned Government Pleader reference always was made to Order XLI Rule 27 C.P.C. That provision says additional evidence could be received only when such evidence could not be produced despite due diligence. Due diligence is not a matter of mere words. Under Ex.A.11, the Mandal Revenue Officer addressed to the District Collector requiring the need for records concerning land acquisition. Due diligence is not a matter of mere words. Under Ex.A.11, the Mandal Revenue Officer addressed to the District Collector requiring the need for records concerning land acquisition. All that happened prior to the institution of the suit in the year 2002. It is now the year 2022. That the Government is now urging for these additional evidence. In a way it is a case where one could say that the record does not permit this Court to say that there was due diligence. Nothing more need be stated on this aspect. Despite the consideration of the proposed documents, in terms of available and established and undisputed facts and the undisputed law since the compensation was never paid to the respondent/plaintiff by this appellant/Government, the point boils down to the fact that title in the plaint schedule property never vested with the Government. When that being the case, consideration of this additional evidence serves no purpose. In that view of the matter, this Court finds no merit in the prayer for additional evidence. Therefore, I.A.No.1 of 2014 is dismissed. 28. Learned Government Pleader urges that more than 40 years after acquisition, the plaintiff had come to Court seeking for rectification of entries in revenue records and the suit is barred by limitation. As against it, learned counsel for respondents submits that necessary pleadings are missing in the written statement concerning limitation and no issue was settled at the trial and such point was not argued earlier. There is merit in the submissions of the learned counsel for respondents. Besides it, in the plaint it is mentioned and PW.1 deposed that it was in the year 2001 the wrong entry crept up. Throughout the proceedings before Courts below, never Government stated the date on which it brought the changes in the entries in the revenue records. Therefore, there are no facts to examine the starting point of limitation. Perhaps for this reason, Government did not take a stand on the principle of limitation when it filed its written statement. In this second appeal, the contention that the suit is barred by limitation is to be negatived since it is not based on any fact that is part of the record. 29. Learned Government Pleader appearing for the appellant argued that though land was acquired, plaintiff suppressed that fact and therefore, he is not entitled for relief. In this second appeal, the contention that the suit is barred by limitation is to be negatived since it is not based on any fact that is part of the record. 29. Learned Government Pleader appearing for the appellant argued that though land was acquired, plaintiff suppressed that fact and therefore, he is not entitled for relief. Having considered this submission, it is to be stated that in the written statement or in the evidence of DW.1 or before the appellate Court, Government failed to show that plaint schedule land was also acquired. As rightly pointed out by the learned first appellate Court the written statement has vagueness as it only mentioned that some land in the relevant survey number was acquired. When the Government itself was not able to assert facts with certainty by mentioning the date and number of the award, one cannot attribute mala fides against the plaintiff about some event that may have occurred decades ago. Therefore, one cannot say that plaintiff suppressed material facts intentionally. Therefore, that contention is negatived. 30. On a total consideration of the record, it is seen that both the Courts below properly appreciated the facts and reached to appropriate conclusions. There are no merits in the grounds urged in this appeal. Point is answered against the appellant. 31. In the result, this Second Appeal is dismissed confirming the lower Courts judgments. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.