JUDGMENT : 1. By way of this Civil Revision Application, the challenge is made to the order below Exhibit 12 in Regular Civil Suit No.268 of 2018 dated 01.07.2021 passed by the learned 3rd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Anand whereby the learned Judge rejected the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to in short as ‘CPC’), wherein prayer was made for rejection of the plaint, by heirs of the deceased Bhailalbhai Muljibhai Thakor, questioning the maintainability of the Suit claiming bar of jurisdiction under Section 85 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to in short as ‘the Tenancy Act’). 2. Learned Advocate for the applicants Mr. Hemang H. Parikh contends that the Civil Suit No.26 of 2018 was not even required to be admitted, since the pleadings made by the plaintiff shows that the Suit was barred under Section 85 of the Tenancy Act and no Civil Court has jurisdiction to settle or decide or deal with the matters dealt with by the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal or the Collector or the State Government in Appeal or revision. The Civil Court ought to have rejected the plaint outright even without registering the same. It was further submitted that by Exhibit 12, an application was given under Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC for rejection of the plaint. The facts and the documentary evidence alongwith the plaint were referred and relied upon during the course of arguments before the learned Civil Judge, still however, the application of the applicants / the defendants of the Suit came to be rejected on 01.07.2021. 3. It is submitted by learned Advocate Mr. The facts and the documentary evidence alongwith the plaint were referred and relied upon during the course of arguments before the learned Civil Judge, still however, the application of the applicants / the defendants of the Suit came to be rejected on 01.07.2021. 3. It is submitted by learned Advocate Mr. Hemang H. Parikh that the issue had been raised of being the tenant of the land and there was a Dispute Case No.4 of 2003 before the Mamlatdar, Anand and on 29.05.2004, the Mamlatdar had rejected the change Entry No.71446 dated 03.08.2002 which was in relation to Sale Deed executed on 06.06.2002 in favour of the plaintiff, aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff preferred RTS Appeal No.1 of 2004 before the Deputy Collector, Anand which was dismissed on 30.08.2017 and against that order, the plaintiff had filed RTS Revision No.79 of 2017 before the Collector, Anand and that too was also dismissed and against that, the plaintiff had approached the SSRD, Ahmedabad, which is pending for consideration. 4. Learned Advocate Mr. Hemang H. Parikh contended that the issue is with regard to the land bearing Survey No.2609 admeasuring hectare 0-71 are – 81 sq. meters, the defendants had put up a Claim as a tenant of the land under Section 70(b) of the Tenancy Act before the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, under the provision, to enquire whether the person is or was a tenant or a protected tenant or a permanent tenant preferring Tenancy Case No.283 of 2002. It is submitted that at the time of filing of the application, interim injunction was sought for under Section 70(nb) of the Tenancy Act which was granted ex-parte, on being vacated by Final Order the present applicants preferred Tenancy Appeal No.13 of 2002 before the Deputy Collector which was allowed on 03.06.2006 who issued injunction under Section 70(nb) of the Tenancy Act. Against the said order, the plaintiff had raised Revision Application as TENBA 207/2006 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which was partly allowed and the matter is remanded back to the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal for final decision after drawing the panchnama. 5. It is submitted by learned Advocate Mr. Against the said order, the plaintiff had raised Revision Application as TENBA 207/2006 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which was partly allowed and the matter is remanded back to the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal for final decision after drawing the panchnama. 5. It is submitted by learned Advocate Mr. Hemang H. Parikh that the judgments were filed alongwith the plaint at Mark 3/10 and the order was also produced to show that the name of the plaintiff had not been entered in the Extract of Village Form 7/12. The judgment dated 09.08.2018 of Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Revision Application No.207 of 2006 was produced to submit that the ultimate paragraph of the judgment orders maintaining the status-quo of the suit property which was directed to be maintained till the final disposal of the matter before the Tribunal. Thus it is submitted that since the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal had passed an order to maintain status-quo, the learned Civil Judge ought to have considered this aspect and should not have entertained the registration of the Suit taking into consideration the provisions of the Tenancy Act, where Civil Court jurisdiction is totally barred. 6. In support of his submissions, learned Advocate for the applicant Mr. Hemang H. Parikh has relied on the following decisions :- a) Decision of this Court in the case of Baluben W/o. Fatehsinh Nanabhai v. Sadhuram Bhailabhai Patel reported in 1979 (2) G.L.R. 708 ; b) Decision of this Court in the case of Rajnikant Bhogilal Patel v. Bhudarbhai Hakkabhai Bhrambhatt Lh of Decd. reported in 2022 (2) GLH 499 ; 7. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah for the respondents contended that the Suit was filed for injunction and declaration under the Specific Relief Act thus only the Civil Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain the Suit. It is further submitted that the plaintiff had filed a Suit which claimed protection of his property which is described in paragraph (1) of the registered Sale Deed No.2734 of 2002 and relief was prayed for, against the defendants and their persons, agents, assignees and other guarantors not to interfere or create any hinderances in possession and occupation of the plaintiffs and not to create any lien/loan on the suit property. It is further submitted that the suit was filed under the ownership title of the plaintiff and thus, submitted that the suit was absolutely maintainable. 8. Further, arguing on the facts of the case, it is submitted by learned Advocate Mr. Shah that the defendants of the Suit had never earlier led any claim of tenancy over suit property and for the very first time in the year 2003, objection was raised before the Mamlatdar when the plaintiffs had purchased the property on 06.06.2002 by a registered Sale Deed from the Power of Attorney and co-owner of the property Natubhai H. Patel, with :- (a) Shirishbhai Harmanbhai Patel (b) Shardaben, Widow of Ambalal Harmanbhai (c) Natubhai Ambalal Patel (d) Manishbhai Ambalal Patel (e) Natwarlal Harmanbhai Patel 9. It is submitted that the total consideration amount had been paid and the plaintiff was put in possession of the property and since then he has been in continuous possession and occupation of the suit property. 10. A copy of the order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, Ahmedabad dated 09.08.2018 was given for perusal of the Court. The order is under Revision Application No.207 of 2006 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and the cause title of the Revision Application shows the plaintiff of the suit as an applicant, while the original owner and Power of Attorney of other original owner – Natwarbhai Harmanbhai Patel is the opponent No.1 while other co-owners, predecessor in title had been joined as opponents No.3 to 6, the defendants of Suit as heirs of Muljibhai Ravabhai are as opponents No.2.1. to 2.9, with the power of attorney holder as Mehbhoobsha Gulam Mohammedshah Diwan. The plaintiff of the suit being the applicant before the GRT had informed the Tribunal about the purchase of the land by way of Sale Deed and Transfer Entry No.71466 on the basis of the Sale Deed dated 03.08.2012 in Village Abstract No.6, the plaintiff as an applicant before the Tribunal had informed about the application made by the opponent No.2 which was before the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Tribunal, Anand on 21.09.2022 under Sections 70(b) and 70(nb) of the Tenancy Act. Before the Revenue Tribunal, it was urged that the order of injunction was ex-parte and the stay was prayed to be vacated and stood vacated and against the order, the opponent No.2 had filed an Appeal before the Deputy Collector, Anand and it was allowed on 30.06.2006 and the injunction was granted under Section 70(nb) of the Tenancy Act. Against that, the applicant moved a Revision Application and it was urged that the Deputy Collector did not give any reasons for not believing the order of Mamlatdar and Agricultural Land Tribunal, Anand and it was also urged that Deputy Collector had not taken into consideration that the land was within the Municipality limits and the original owners are residing in a foreign country, the land was sold under the Sale Deed and thus, it was urged by the plaintiff of the Suit before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal that inspite knowing the fact, he was not joined as a party to the matter. 11. It is submitted that fact of the land being in Municipality limits, shows that the defendants could not be the tenants of the land and further, the original owners are in a foreign country and no cause of action arises for claim made under Section 70(b) and 70(nb) of the Tenancy Act. It is submitted that as per the Mamlatdar Court, the Suit has to be instituted within six months and merely relying upon the Village Abstract 7/12, the claim was made. Learned Advocate submitted that the Deputy Collector ought to have rejected the Appeal only on the basis of limitation. It is further submitted that the Deputy Collector ought to have relied on the fact that the panchnama was drawn in favour of the applicant and the plaintiff is in the possession of the suit property. 12. It is further submitted that the Deputy Collector had not verified the fact whether the power of attorney of the defendants was actually an agriculturist and without entering into the details, the Deputy Collector’s order dated 30.06.2003 was passed which is suspicious and bad in law and therefore, the Revision was filed by the plaintiff of the Suit. 13. 12. It is further submitted that the Deputy Collector had not verified the fact whether the power of attorney of the defendants was actually an agriculturist and without entering into the details, the Deputy Collector’s order dated 30.06.2003 was passed which is suspicious and bad in law and therefore, the Revision was filed by the plaintiff of the Suit. 13. It is further submitted that the revenue records do not support the tenant’s claim of being a tenant, the name of the predecessors were deleted by the changed Entry No.7221 dated 17.10.1956 and the Sale details of crops and the expense vouchers which are produced could not be relied, since it has not been verified whether it was in connection with the suit property. Since there was no prima-facie case as a tenant before Mamlatdar and Revenue Tribunal and therefore, the Injunction Application was rejected. Thus, it was submitted by learned Advocate Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah that the Suit would not get affected under Section 85 of the Tenancy Act, since it is the title of the plaintiff, as purchaser of the Suit property, which has to be protected. 14. In support of his submissions, learned Advocate for the respondents Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah has relied on the following decisions :- a) Decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Biswanath Banik and Another v. Sulanga Bose and Others reported in 2022 Law Suit (SC) 313; b) Decision of this Court in the case of Raijibhai Ramatubhai Gohel v. Khodabhai Girdharbhai Brambhatt reported in 1975 GLR 578 ; c) Decision of this Court in the case of Usman Ismail Asmal (Nana) v. Khatija Wd/o. Yakub Ahmed Hussain Amra and Others reported in 2018 Law Suit (Guj) 81. 15. In the case of Baluben (supra), referred by learned Advocate Mr. Parikh it was held as under :- “2. It is now very clear that the power to issue an injunction is conferred on the Mamlatdar by virtue of sec. 70(nb) of the Tenancy Act. That power admittedly was exercised by the competent authority namely the Mamlatdar and still the Civil Judge was made to exercise his power. Parikh it was held as under :- “2. It is now very clear that the power to issue an injunction is conferred on the Mamlatdar by virtue of sec. 70(nb) of the Tenancy Act. That power admittedly was exercised by the competent authority namely the Mamlatdar and still the Civil Judge was made to exercise his power. I am prepared to accept that the Civil Judge was kept in dark about that injunction issued by the Mamlatdar but in the course of the bearing he must been appraised of the earlier exercise of jurisdiction by the Mamlatdar and still the Civil Judge not only did not visit the landlord with the penalty for playing fraud on the court but also proceeded further with the matter. Judicial comity required that the Civil Judge should have refused to proceed further with the matter soon on coming to know of the earlier tenancy proceedings before the Mamlatdar. The learned Civil Judge unfortunately did not do anything of the sort and proceeded to make the injunction absolute. When the matter was before the District Court the learned Assistant Judge committed the same mistake. On the day he took up the matter the competent authority namely the Prant Officer had already allowed the appeal of the petitioners and made absolute the temporary injunction. The learned Assistant Judge was fully alive to it and still he observed as follows :- “When that the order was passed by the Prant Officer the order of the Civil Court which is not questioned before me was effective and brought to the notice of Prant Officer. Hence in the fitness of things the Prant Officer should not have passed an order with the full knowledge that it will be in conflict with the order of the Civil Court and will result in unnecessary complications.” Had the observations of the learned Assistant Judge been not in the context of the present case the matter would have been different. The learned Assistant Judge referred to the judicial propriety on the part of the Prant Officer but the very basis should have been adopted by him while dealing with the appeal against the order of the Civil Judge who had continued to clutch at the matter with full knowledge that prior to his taking cognizance a competent tenancy forum had taken seizing of the matter. The learned Assistant Judge therefore should have seen that the earlier proceedings before the Mamlatdar were allowed with full sway and swing and the civil court having been subsequent forum should have been maintained Judicial dignity and refrained from taking up the matter in the face of the cognizance by the competent tenancy forum under sec. 70(nb) of the Act and sec. 74 read with sec. 70(nb) of the Act. 3. In the above view of the matter the appellate order passed by the learned Assistant Judge in the civil misc. appeal no.56 of 1975 confirming the injunction order made absolute by the learned Civil Judge in the civil suit no.179 of 1974 on his file cannot be allowed to stand. The parties rights and liabilities in respect of injunction would abide by the decision of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal as it might have been delivered or might be delivered in future. 4. The view which I have taken above is the view expressed on the earlier occasion by this very court in the case of Gordhanbhai V/s. Ramji Mandir Ahmedabad 16 G.L.R. 1009. There J.M. Sheth J of the court as he then was has observed as follows : “Two authorities should have respect of each other and should follow the principle of judicial comity. If one authority has already decided the Question the other should stay its hands taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case. Even if the authority which should have stayed its hands in view of the facts and circumstances of the case omits to do it. Party aggrieved can have a remedy by approaching the proper higher authority. No set formula can be laid down in such cases.” 16. In the case of Usman Ismail Asmal (Nana) (supra), relied upon by learned Advocate Mr. Shah the relevant part of the judgment reads as under :- “A question would certainly arise whether the prayer of the plaintiff for decelaration of the Sale Deed as invalid can be decided by the Civil Court or by the Revenue Court. In the case of Usman Ismail Asmal (Nana) (supra), relied upon by learned Advocate Mr. Shah the relevant part of the judgment reads as under :- “A question would certainly arise whether the prayer of the plaintiff for decelaration of the Sale Deed as invalid can be decided by the Civil Court or by the Revenue Court. Sub-section (1) of section 84C of the Tenancy Act provides that whether in respect of the transfer or acquisition of any land made on or after the commencement of the Amending Act, 1995, the Mamlatdar suo motu or on the application of any person interested in such land has reason to believe that such transfer or acquisition is or becomes invalid under any of the provisions of the Act, the Mamlatdar shall issue a notice and hold an inquiry as provided for in section 84B and decide whether the transfer or acquisition is or is not valid. Sub section (1) of Section 85 of the Tenancy Act provides no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar or Tribunal etc. Sub section (2) of section 85 further under order of the Mamlatdar, the Tribunal etc. made under this Act would be questioned in any civil or criminal court. Section 85A of the Tenancy Act provides for suits involving issues required to be decided under the Act. Sub section (1) thereof provides that if any suit instituted whether before or after the specified date in any Civil Court involves any issues which are required to be decided, settled or dealt with by any competent authority to settle, decide or deal with such issue under the said Act the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issue to such competent authority for determination. (6) If the validity of the sale deeds was the sole prayer of the plaintiff whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction under section 85 of the Tenancy Act would become an important issue. (6) If the validity of the sale deeds was the sole prayer of the plaintiff whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction under section 85 of the Tenancy Act would become an important issue. However, this being one of the prayers and not the sole prayer, the prayer of section 85A of the Act would apply and the Civil Court even if it is of the opinion that such issue can be decided only by the Revenue Court would refer the issue under sub-section (1) of Section 85A of the Tenancy Act and await outcome thereof.” 17. Section 70(b) of the Tenancy Act is to decide whether a person [is or was a tenant] or a protected tenant [or a permanent tenant]. Section 70(nb) of the Tenancy Act is to issue temporary injunction. 18. Section 85 of the Tenancy Act reads as under :- “85. Bar of jurisdiction. - (1) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar or Tribunal, a Manager, [the Collector, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal or the State Government] in appeal or revision or the [State] Government in exercise of their powers of control. (2) No order of the Mamlatdar, the Tribunal, the Collector or the [Gujarat Revenue Tribunal] or the [State] Government made under this Act shall be questioned in any civil or criminal court. Explanation. - For the purposes of this section a Civil Court shall include a Mamlatdar's Court constituted under the Mamlatdars' Courts Act, 1906 (Bombay II of 1906) 19. Section 85A of the Tenancy Act reads as under :- “[85A. Suits involving issues required to be decided under this Act. - (1) If any suit [instituted, whether before or after the specified date, in any Civil Court] involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority competent to settle, decide or deal with such issues under this Act (hereinafter referred to as the "competent authority") the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to such competent authority for determination. (2) On receipt of such reference from the Civil Court, the competent authority shall deal with and decide such issues in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall communicate its decision to the Civil Court and such court shall thereupon dispose of the suit in accordance with the procedure applicable thereto. Explanation. - For the purposes of this section a Civil Court shall include a Mamlatdar's court constituted under the Mamlatdar's Courts Act, 1906 (Bombay II of 1906.]” 20. The above referred judgment of Usman Ismail Asmal (Nana) on which learned Advocate Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah for the respondent has placed reliance becomes distinguishable on facts, since in that case, the plaintiffs claimed to be a tenant of the agricultural land, who instituted proceedings under 70(b) of the Tenancy Act and for being declared as a tenant. Such an application was granted by the Mamlatdar and ALT and he was declared as a tenant. An Appeal was filed by the land owners which was rejected by the Deputy Collector and thereafter, further proceedings were carried on, by the land owners against the orders of the revenue authorities. The tenant thereafter, filed an application under Section 32G of the Tenancy Act for fixing the sale price of the land. The Mamlatdar and ALT by an order asked him to pay the same as decided, within one year and upon payment of such sum, the necessary Certificate under Section 32M of the land was to be granted. He was to become the purchaser of the land, subject to restrictions under Section 43 of the Tenancy Act. The tenant paid the sum as ordered. Challenge was given to the order of the Mamlatdar before the Deputy Collector, who rejected such an Appeal. Thereafter, the land owners filed a Revision Application before the GRT. The Tribunal in its judgment held that the plaintiff was related to the land owners and therefore, could not be declared as tenant of the land. In view of such observations, the orders passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT under Section 32G of the Act came to be set aside. The plaintiff filed a writ petition before the High Court which was pending and during the pending proceedings, the land owners sold the suit land. In view of such observations, the orders passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT under Section 32G of the Act came to be set aside. The plaintiff filed a writ petition before the High Court which was pending and during the pending proceedings, the land owners sold the suit land. Therefore, the plaintiff filed a suit making prayers for declaration that he is the sole owner of the subject land and in possession of the same and the defendants should not interfere with the possession of the land. Further, on the basis of the Sale Deed, the plaintiff may not be prevented from giving up the land in any manner including conversion of land into non-agricultural use and pleaded to declare the sale deed under which the suit land was sold as illegal and invalid and in consequence a prayer was made to injunct the defendants from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff on the suit land. Thereafter, an application was filed by the defendants under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, with a contention that the entire dispute raised by the plaintiff in the suit is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Court. The plaintiff is not the tenant of the suit land by virtue of the order passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT, which was reversed by the Tribunal. The Suit therefore disclosed no cause of action and in the meantime, the land owners had sold the suit property. The fourth contention that was raised was that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to declare plaintiff as tenant of suit land which can be done by the Revenue Court only. Further, it was contended that on the basis of the admitted facts, the plaintiff does not have cause of action for filing of the Suit. It was also contended that the plaintiff had not approached the Court with clean hands and the land owners are residing abroad since long and the plaintiff had tried to exploit the said situation by creating false evidence of his tenancy. 21. It is to be noted from the facts as referred above that the proceedings almost stood concluded that the order for payment of the sum of Rs.15,257/- within the provision under Section 32G of the Tenancy Act was made and on payment, Certificate under Section 32M was granted. 21. It is to be noted from the facts as referred above that the proceedings almost stood concluded that the order for payment of the sum of Rs.15,257/- within the provision under Section 32G of the Tenancy Act was made and on payment, Certificate under Section 32M was granted. However, during the challenge it was noted by the GRT that the tenant is a relative of the land owners and in that circumstances, he could not be declared as tenant of land. The Orders passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Tibunal under Section 32G of the Act came to be set aside. 20.1. While in the present matter, the proceedings is yet to receive any conclusion from the revenue authorities. 22. The order of the GRT, Ahmedabad dated 09.08.2018 set aside, the order dated 30.06.2006 of Deputy Collector and the order dated 16.11.2002 of the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Tribunal, Anand in Tenancy Case No.70NB/283/2002. The matter was remanded with a direction to decide afresh after conducting the panchnama of the place and further till the final decision is taken, the order was passed to maintain status-quo of the disputed land in accordance with Injunction order dated 20.01.2007. 23. The very proceedings itself suggests that the matter is yet to be decided, as to whether the person before them is a tenant and as per the facts of the case, when such issue is at large before the concerned Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal or before Revenue Authority in hierarchy as per Section 85 of the Tenancy Act, then, no Civil Court would have jurisdiction to decide and settle any question which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or adjudicated by the Mamlatdar. Sub-section (2) of Section 85 clarifies that no order of the Mamlatdar, Tribunal or GRT or the State Government made under the Act shall be questioned in any other Civil or Criminal Court. 24. The plaintiff in the suit had very clearly laid down about the order before the GRT and the order of remand. The facts also disclose that the said issue is yet to be decided by the Mamlatdar and Revenue authorities. The grounds on which the Suit No.268 of 2018 was filed is to declare the plaintiff to be the owner in independent possession and occupation of the suit land in consequences, the injunction against the defendants. The facts also disclose that the said issue is yet to be decided by the Mamlatdar and Revenue authorities. The grounds on which the Suit No.268 of 2018 was filed is to declare the plaintiff to be the owner in independent possession and occupation of the suit land in consequences, the injunction against the defendants. When the defendants as applicants before the Mamlatdar has made a prayer to declare them as tenant and consecutive prayer is also made under Section 70(nb) for issuance of temporary injunction and further, when the GRT had already passed an order of maintaining status-quo, this fact itself restrains the Civil Court from entertaining the Suit, which becomes barred under Section 85 of the Tenancy Act and the institution would not be maintainable. 25. Section 85A of the Tenancy Act would also not be applicable in the matter, since the provision is to the effect that while any Suit is before the Court which involves any issues which are required to be settled, dealt with and decided by the competent authorities, then it would be for the Civil Court to stay the Suit and refer such issues to the said competent authority for determination, while here in the present case, already the matter was pending before the competent authority for decision afresh on the issue, whether to declare the applicant before the Mamlatdar as tenant of suit land. The fact was also made known to the Civil Court by way of pleadings in the Suit about the pendency of the matter and hence, there would not be any case for referring the same issues when it was already at large before the revenue authorities. Taking these facts into consideration, the Suit itself is not maintainable under Section 85 of the Tenancy Act and the provisions of Section 85A of the Tenancy Act could not be invoked. 26. In the case of Raijibhai Ramatubhai Gohel (supra), it has been observed in Paragraphs 2 and 3 as under :- “2. The question posed is whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to grant an interim order as regard possession in relation to agricultural lands is ousted by reason of clause (nb) of sec. 70 read with sec. 85 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act of 1948 hereinafter called the Act. 3. The question posed is whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to grant an interim order as regard possession in relation to agricultural lands is ousted by reason of clause (nb) of sec. 70 read with sec. 85 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act of 1948 hereinafter called the Act. 3. Clause (nb) was introduced in Sec. 70 of the Act by Gujarat Act V of 1973. Before the introduction of the said provision it was well settled for more than 7 or 8 years that a Civil Court had jurisdiction to pass appropriate interim orders in pending suits as regards possession even in cases where one of the parties claimed to be a tenant. This point was urged at length before J.B. Mehta in C.R.A. No.273 of 1967 (Parmar Misrikhan V/s. Damaji Virji Gaman) and it was decided therein that a Civil Court had undoubted jurisdiction to pass appropriate interim orders as regards possession notwithstanding the fact that one of the parties to the suit claimed to be a tenant. It was argued before J.B. Mehta J. that having regard to the observations made by M.R. Mody J. in Mohan Moti V/s. Indravadan 4 Guj. Law Reporter 387 at page 394 the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to grant interim orders in such matters. After quoting the relevant passage from the decision in Mohan Motis Case (supra) J.B. Mehta J. has observed as under : Mr. Sheth strongly relied upon this paragraph to urge that it is not open to the Civil Court to consider even a prima facie case when this issue of tenancy is involved which can be decided only by the competent authorities under the Act. We do not agree with Mr. Sheths reading of this decision of Mr. Justice Mody. The short question which Mody J. had to deal with was whether a prima facie case was necessary to be proved before a reference was to be made to the competent authorities under the Act and his answer was that as soon as a plea was raised about the tenancy the question was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authorities under the Act and a civil Court had no jurisdiction. It is in this context that Mody J. emphasised this aspect that it was a mere raising of this plea which excluded jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine such an issue and it was not open to the Civil Court to go into the question whether there was any prima facie case or that the contention was rightly or wrongly raised. That view of Mody J. was clearly based on the interpretation of the aforesaid Dhondi Tukarams case and it is clearly as per the settled law on this question. The question before me is not however as to when the reference ought to be made. There can be no dispute that once that plea is raised the Civil Court would have to refer this question for determination to the competent authority under the Act. What Mr. Sheth contends is that the civil Courts jurisdiction is excluded even for granting an interlocutory relief. In fact the entire approach of Mr. Sheth in connection is wholly misconceived. The civil Court while considering the question of an interim injunction had only to consider a prima facie case alongwith the other relevant factors of balance of convenience etc. for exercising its discretion in passing this interlocutory order. It was for this limited purpose that the Civil Court had gone into the question as to who was prima facie in possession. Both the Courts found that actual physical possession prima facie was with the plaintiff and the plaintiff having a prima facie case and as balance of convenience was in his favour he was threatened with irreparable loss unless interim relief was granted. All the observations which the lower Court has made are only from that limited consideration and the Civil never purported to decide the question of tenancy. Mr. Sheth argued that the factum of possession was one of the fact in issue for determining the issue of tenancy the finding will have to be reached by the competent authority under the Act on all the ingredients of definition of a tenant. In the present case the Civil Court had not arrived at any decision on the controversy but for granting interim relief it had only arrived at a tentative conclusion as to who was prima facie in possession. In the present case the Civil Court had not arrived at any decision on the controversy but for granting interim relief it had only arrived at a tentative conclusion as to who was prima facie in possession. Such a consideration of a prima facie case even though it may be based on affidavits and the documentary evidence before the Court can never be equated with the process of determination of an issue of tenancy. Therefore there is no substance in the contention of Mr. Sheth that the lower Court had no jurisdiction to pass the present interim order.” 27. In the above referred judgment, it has been held that the power to issue injunction is conferred upon the Mamlatdar by virtue of clause (nb) of Section 70 of the Tenancy Act. Prior to that amendment in 1973, a Tenancy Court exercising powers under the Act had no jurisdiction to grant interim orders. It was thus elaborated that the power to issue temporary injunction conferred on a Tenancy Court is referable only to the exercise of such power in the course of a proceedings pending before the Tenancy Court. The power to issue a temporary injunction is referable to the ancillary power conferred on the competent authority in order to enable it to preserve status quo during the pendency of a litigation. Here when it was brought to the notice of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Anand of order of status quo passed by GRT, Ahmedabad by order dated 09.08.2018 in Revision Application No.207 of 2006, was it just for the learned Judge to entertain the Suit and take it within his jurisdiction to pass any order of injunction only on the plea that presently Mamlatdar and Agricultural Tribunal is not working on permanent basis where the matter is remanded. While in the case of Baluben (supra) it was observed that possibly the Civil Judge was kept in the dark about the injunction issued to the Mamlatdar and further observed that it may in the course of hearing, the Civil Judge may then been apprised of the earlier exercise of the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar, and still it was observed that the Civil Judge not only did not visit the landlord with penalty for playing fraud on the Court but also proceeded with the matter. The learned Judge has further observed in Baluben (supra) that the Judicial Committee required that the Civil Judge should have refused to proceed further with the matter on coming to know of the earlier tenancy proceedings before the Mamlatdar, and in that matter the learned Civil Judge unfortunately did not do anything of that sort and proceeded to make the injunction absolute and, even, when the matter was carried before the District Court, the learned Assistant Judge failed to see that the earlier proceedings before the Mamlatdar were allowed with full sway and swing and was further observed that the Civil Court having been a subsequent forum should have maintained judicial dignity and refrained from taking up the matter in face of the cognizance by the competent forum under Section 70(nb) and Section 74 of the Tenancy Act read with Section 70(nb) of the Tenancy Act. 28. Here in this case too, the Civil Judge, though, through the pleadings was apprised of the fact that the proceedings were in full swing before the Revenue Authority under Sections 70(b) and (nb) and when the GRT had passed the order of maintaining status-quo till a decision is made, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, as was barred by Section 85 of the Act. 29. Section 70 of the Tenancy Act deals with the duties and functions to be performed by the Mamlatdar. It is the function of the Mamlatdar to decide whether a person is or was a tenant or a protected tenant or permanent tenant, and when such function is to be performed only by the Mamlatdar under the Act, Section 85 of the Tenancy Act completely puts a bar on the Civil Court to decide settle, or even deal with any question which are to be settled, decided and dealt with by the Mamlatdar. Here the GRT, Ahmedabad has considered certain facts and dealt with certain evidence and thereafter, has asked the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Tribunal to consider the matter afresh, while passing order of status-quo. This fact itself precluded the learned Civil Judge to admit the Suit where he was required to maintain judicial restraint. 30. Here the GRT, Ahmedabad has considered certain facts and dealt with certain evidence and thereafter, has asked the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Tribunal to consider the matter afresh, while passing order of status-quo. This fact itself precluded the learned Civil Judge to admit the Suit where he was required to maintain judicial restraint. 30. The learned Additional Senior Civil Judge had exceeded the jurisdiction by registering the case and had also failed to take into consideration the issues which have been raised by way of an Application – Exhibit 12 by the defendants showing the Court about the non-maintainability of the Suit. The learned 3rd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Anand had fallen in error by entertaining the Suit. Hence, the order below Exhibit 12 in Regular Civil Suit No.268/2018 dated 01.07.2021 passed by the learned 3rd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Anand is quashed and set aside. Thus, while allowing Exhibit 12, the plaint of Regular Civil Suit No.268 of 2018 is rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC. The suit decree be drawn accordingly. 31. The Civil Revision Application is allowed in the aforesaid terms.