JUDGMENT : Bivas Pattanayak, J. 1. Both the appeals have been preferred by North Bengal State Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NBSTC) challenging the common judgment and order passed by learned Single Judge of this Court allowing WP no. 4177(W) of 2016 filed by respondents (hereinafter referred to as the applicants) and dismissing WP no. 33666(W) of 2014 filed by appellant-NBSTC. 2. The precise fact involved in the present appeals is that the respondents-applicants filed an application under Section 2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the 7th Industrial Tribunal, Government of West Bengal for reinstatement and absorption of labours appointed through contractors with the following contentions: (i) Since 11.07.1989 they were engaged in various sections of NBSTC having its depot/stand at Chandni Chawk, Esplanade, Ultadanga and Barasat as Supervisors/Security Guards/Majdoor and were appointed through various contractors since 1989 namely Bengal Protective Guard, Indian Military League, Indian Ex-Military Force, D & A Security Service, M/s Soin, etc. till 12.11.2006. (ii) The NBSTC, Cooch-Behar appointed respondent namely M/s Delta Security Services, a contractor on 13.11.2006 and the contract was extended from 01.10.2009 to 30.09.2011 and again till 01.10.2011 to 30.09.2012. (iii)The applicants were working under the said contractor namely M/s Delta Security Services since 13.11.2006 and were engaged in the said organization for more than 20 years performing similar types of jobs as is done ordinarily through regular workman such as operating pumps, electrical jobs, ticket selling, duties on reserve buses, etc. The applicants were issued Identity cards by the NBSTC management. However, in spite of doing jobs ordinarily done by regular and permanent workmen they did not get any service benefit. (iv) It was requested on behalf of Principal Secretary, Government of West Bengal, Finance Department vide Memorandum No.11794-F(P) dated 22.12.2010 and Memorandum No. 9008-F(P) dated 16.09.2011 to enquire into the matter and issue necessary direction to the appropriate authority in order to improve the service conditions of those workmen. (v) The applicants contended that they had not been paid their salary since December, 2011. (vi) On 12.01.2011, under the chairmanship of Managing Director Shri D.B. Lepcha, a meeting was convened for enhancement of remuneration and service conditions of the employees under the contractors. However, the applicants came to know through their contractor that their services were terminated with effect from 16.02.2012, which was arbitrary action on the part of the Management of NBSTC. (vi) On 12.01.2011, under the chairmanship of Managing Director Shri D.B. Lepcha, a meeting was convened for enhancement of remuneration and service conditions of the employees under the contractors. However, the applicants came to know through their contractor that their services were terminated with effect from 16.02.2012, which was arbitrary action on the part of the Management of NBSTC. (vii) Further respondent-M/s Delta Security Services which engaged the applicants for performing their job in different sections of NBSTC did not have valid license and as such in the absence of valid license the applicants, who were engaged in the jobs which were done by regular workmen, should be treated as permanent employees of NBSTC. On such basis the applicants prayed for their reinstatement in service in terms of Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and treat the applicants as employees of NBSTC. 3. The case being no. 49/2A (2) of 2012 before the learned Industrial Tribunal proceeded ex-parte as the opposite parties failed to appear and upon consideration of materials placed before it the learned Industrial Tribunal on 30.05.2014 passed the following order on the grounds that the contract between the NBSTC and the agency was not genuine. “All the 35 (thirty five) workmen/applicants be reinstated in service. The O.Ps are directed to treat the contract labours i.e the applicants as employees of the principal employer North Bengal State Transport Corporation without any further delay. This is my award.” 4. The appellants herein namely NBSTC filed a writ petition challenging the aforesaid order passed by the 7th Industrial Tribunal being WP No. 33666(W) of 2014 with a prayer for setting aside the award. The respondents-workmen also filed writ petition for implementation of the award passed by the 7th Industrial Tribunal being WP No. 4117(W) of 2016. 5. The learned Single Judge of this Hon’ble Court heard both the writ petitions together and disposed of the same by the following common judgment:- “In the backdrop of the above discussion WP 4117 (W) of 2016 stands allowed. WP 33666(W) of 2014 stands dismissed. Let a Writ issue in the nature of Mandamus granting prayers (a) and (e) of WP 4117(W) of 2016. There shall be, however, no order as to costs.” 6. Mr. WP 33666(W) of 2014 stands dismissed. Let a Writ issue in the nature of Mandamus granting prayers (a) and (e) of WP 4117(W) of 2016. There shall be, however, no order as to costs.” 6. Mr. Soumya Majumder, learned advocate for the appellant-NBSTC at the outset submitted that while passing an ex-parte order in absence of one of the parties the court must deal with the case as if the absentee-party is present, however, the learned tribunal has passed the ex-parte award merely affirming the application filed by the workmen-applicants by way of reference. He further submitted that the learned tribunal made an erroneous finding that the contract between the appellant-NBSTC and respondent-M/s Delta Security Services was a sham contract. He further pointed out that the respondents-workmen were engaged by different contractors throughout their tenure of service and the appellant-NBSTC only deployed them. Although respondent-M/s Delta Security Services did not have a valid license for engaging contract labour yet such aspect does not ipso facto mean that the workmen-respondents can be described to be in direct employment of appellant-NBSTC. Further placing reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai versus K.V Shramik Sangh and others, (2002) 4 SCC 609 he submitted that whether the contract in issue was a sham or a camouflage are disputed questions of fact, which finding must be recorded based on evidence and the writ court cannot be a court of fact finding. There was no acceptance of service of the respondents-workmen by the appellant-NBSTC and it cannot be presumed that they are direct employees of the principal employer. Further, the identity cards issued in favour of the workmen-respondents also does not culminate to the fact that they are direct employees under the appellant-NBSTC and in support of his contention he relied on the decision of this court passed in Shakti Sankar Dey versus Union of India, 2005 (3)CHN 161 . Moreover placing reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Dena Nath versus National Fertilizers, AIR 1992 SC 457 he submitted that merely because the contractor or the employer had violated any provisions of the Act or the Rules the court cannot issue any writ for deeming the contract labour as having become the employees of the principal employer. He further placed reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Steel Authority of India Ltd and Others versus National Union Waterfront Workers and others, (2001) 7 SCC 1 and submitted that a contract labour cannot automatically be absorbed as regular employee after the promulgation of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. In view of his above submissions he prayed for setting aside the order passed in the writ petition as well as in the reference before the Industrial Tribunal for reinstatement of respondents-workmen. 7. In reply to the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant-NBSCT, Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, learned Senior advocate appearing for the respondents-workmen submitted that in spite of due service of notice the appellant-NBSTC did not contest the case and the contractor respondent-M/s Delta Security Services although appeared by filing written statement but ultimately did not contest the proceeding before the Industrial Tribunal. As such proceeding taken up by the Tribunal ex parte cannot be termed to be unjust or arbitrary or contrary to law. He further submitted that learned Industrial Tribunal have examined several documents as well as the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondents-workmen and came to a precise finding that the contract between the appellant-NBSTC and the contractor namely M/s Delta Security Services was a sham. Furthermore, it is submitted on behalf of the respondents-workmen that they were continuously employed since 1989 under the appellant-NBSTC as supervisors, security guards, majdoor etc. through several agencies and contractors. The appellant entered into a fresh contract with respondent-M/s Delta Security Services in the month of November, 2006, and the said contract was extended up to September 2012. The respondents-workmen continued to serve under the appellant-NBSTC till their services were abruptly terminated with effect from 16th February, 2012. He further drew our attention that the learned tribunal after examining the evidence before it came to a conclusion that the respondents-workmen were entitled to be treated as employees of the principal employer namely the appellant-NBSTC. He further submitted that the termination of the respondents-workmen was made without notice which is absolutely contrary to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and such termination amounts to retrenchment under Section 25F of the Act. He further submitted that the termination of the respondents-workmen was made without notice which is absolutely contrary to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and such termination amounts to retrenchment under Section 25F of the Act. Furthermore, he submitted referring to Section 17(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 that upon receipt of the award the Appropriate Government within a period of 30 days from the date of its receipt shall publish such award and subject to the provisions of Section 17A of the Act, the award so published under Section 17(1) of the Act, shall be enforceable after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication and shall not be questioned by any court in any manner whatsoever. As no order rejecting the award or modifying it has been passed, in terms of the provision enshrined under Section 17AA (8) of the State Amendment, the award issued on 30th May, 2014 has become final on 4th October, 2014, upon expiry of 90 days of its publication on 3rd July 2014, and is immune to any challenge on expiry of such period and hence writ petition challenging such award is not maintainable. He drew the attention of the court that the challenge to the award was made by way of writ petition filed on 17th December, 2014 by the appellant, when the award under challenge had already reached its finality. Further relying on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Pandurang Sitaram Jadhav and others versus State of Maharashtra, (2020) 17 SCC 393 , he submitted that the respondents-workmen were performing jobs of regular employees, which was not seasonal or temporary, hence are entitled for regularization. In light of his aforesaid submissions he prays for dismissal of the appeals and issuing necessary direction for implementation of the award passed in favour of the respondents-workmen. 8. We have heard the rival contentions raised by learned advocates of both the sides at length and accordingly for the sake of brevity and convenience we proceed to decide the present appeals on the following relevant issues upon which the case hinges:- (i) Whether there was any valid contract between the agency namely M/s Delta Security Services (respondent) and the appellant -NBSTC for employing contract labour? (ii) In the absence of valid contract between the agency and the appellant or valid licence of the contractor what will be the consequence? (ii) In the absence of valid contract between the agency and the appellant or valid licence of the contractor what will be the consequence? (iii) Whether the order passed in the Industrial Tribunal has attained finality? 9. As point nos.1 and 2 are squarely related to each other, hence both of the issues are taken up together for proficiency in discussion. 9.1. The learned tribunal on the basis of evidence came to a finding that the alleged contract between the appellant-NBSTC and respondent-M/s Delta Security Services was found not to be genuine. At this juncture the pertinent question that arises is whether such finding can be interdicted by a writ court, when the learned Industrial Tribunal being the fact finding court has come to such a finding. Mr. Majumder, learned advocate placing reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (supra) has submitted that whether the contract in issue was a sham or a camouflage are disputed questions of fact which finding must be recorded based on evidence and the writ court cannot be a court of fact finding and the High Court must restrain itself from answering it in writ jurisdiction. We concur with such proposition of law so advanced. Be that as it may, it would be profitable to refer the decision of Hon’ble Apex Supreme Court passed in International Airport Authority of India vs. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union & Anr., (2009) 13 SCC 374 is reproduced hereunder:- “47. It is true that in exercising the writ jurisdiction, the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings and award of the Industrial Tribunal and therefore, cannot re-appreciate evidence. The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority should ordinarily be considered as final. The findings of the Tribunal should not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction merely on the ground that the material on which the Tribunal had acted was insufficient or not credible. It is also true that as long as the findings of fact are based on some materials which are relevant, findings may not be interfered with merely because another view is also possible. It is also true that as long as the findings of fact are based on some materials which are relevant, findings may not be interfered with merely because another view is also possible. But where the Tribunal records findings on no evidence or irrelevant evidence, it is certainly open to the High Court to interfere with the award of the Industrial Tribunal” There is nothing on record to suggest that such finding by the learned Industrial Tribunal is perverse. The learned Tribunal has arrived at such conclusion on the basis of evidence placed before it. Bearing in mind the aforesaid observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in International Airport Authority of India (supra) and in the absence of any perversity in the finding of the learned tribunal that the contract between the agency and the appellant-NBSTC were not genuine, such finding is ordinarily considered as final. Therefore, the finding of the tribunal that the agency did not have valid contract with the appellant-NBSTC for employing contract labour is acceptable in the eye of law. 9.2. Now we advert to the second issue regarding the consequence of absence of valid contract between the agency and the appellant-NBSTC or valid license of the contractor. The learned Industrial Tribunal has referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Secretary H.S.E.B versus Suresh and others, (1999) 3 SCC 601 . In the aforesaid decision the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that once the so-called contractor was not a licensed contractor under the Act, the inevitable conclusion that had to be reached was to the effect that so-called contract system was a mere camouflage, smoke screen and disguised in almost a transparent veil which could easily be pierced and the real contractual relationship between the principal employer, on the one hand, and the employees, on the other could be clearly visualized. The Hon’ble Supreme Court after finding that the contract is sham and bogus upheld the order of High Court that the ‘Safaikarmacharis’ are employees of the Board and ordered for their reinstatement. Following such decision the learned Industrial Tribunal has ordered for reinstatement of respondents-applicants. Further the learned Single Judge has referred to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Brijbhushan Yadav & Ors. versus Union of India & Anr., (2007) 7 SCC 794 . Following such decision the learned Industrial Tribunal has ordered for reinstatement of respondents-applicants. Further the learned Single Judge has referred to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Brijbhushan Yadav & Ors. versus Union of India & Anr., (2007) 7 SCC 794 . It is found from the aforesaid decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court that it has been observed that the stand of the workmen to be continued as security guards under the Telecom Department is to be accepted in the event there is no valid contract between the security agency and the department. Accordingly, the matter was remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal on the issue as raised above. 9.3. Mr. Majumder, referring to the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Dena Nath and others (supra) submitted that the effect of non-registration does not ipso facto lead to regularization of the employees under the principal employer. Where the principal employer does not get registration under Section 7 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act and/or the contractor does not get a license under Section 12 of the Act, the person so appointed by the principal employer through the contractor would not deemed to be the direct employees of the principal employer. In order to consider the aforesaid submission, the aims, objects and the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act must be looked at. The preamble to the Act states that it has been enacted to regulate contract labour in certain establishments and to provide for its abolition, in certain cases. Under Section 2(1)(b) of the Act a workman is deemed to be employed as contract labour when he is hired by or through a contractor and the terms of employment of workmen may be express or implied as per Section 2(1)((i). Section 7 of the Act makes it compulsory for every principal employer to register the establishment. Section 9 of the Act provides that no principal employer can employ contract labour unless the establishment is registered. Section 10 of the Act empowers the Appropriate Government to abolish contract labour in respect of any process, operation or work in any establishment. Under Section 12 of the Act no contractor can undertake or execute any work through contract labour except under and in accordance with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing officer. Section 10 of the Act empowers the Appropriate Government to abolish contract labour in respect of any process, operation or work in any establishment. Under Section 12 of the Act no contractor can undertake or execute any work through contract labour except under and in accordance with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing officer. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act provides that the licence will stipulate conditions as to hours of work, fixation of wages and other essential amenities in respect of contract labour. Under Section 20 of the Act if a contractor fails to provide any amenities, which he is bound to provide, the principal employer has to provide the same. Under Section 21 of the Act the contractor has to disburse wages in the presence of a representative of the principal employer. If the contractor fails to make payment or makes short payment, the principal employer is bound to make payment of wages in full or of the unpaid balance. Under Section 29 of the Act the principal employers as well as the contractors are to maintain registers and records giving all particulars. Notices containing particulars about hours of work, nature of duty, etc., have to be exhibited within the premises of the establishment. The combined effect of these provisions makes it clear that for a valid employment of contract labour, two conditions must be fulfilled namely (i) every principal employer of an establishment must be registered; and (ii) the contractor must have valid licence. 9.4. While considering the provisions of the Act, it must be kept in mind that this Act is a piece of beneficial legislation. The aim of the Act is to regulate conditions of service of contract labourers and to abolish contract labour under certain circumstances. It is, therefore, meant for securing proper conditions of service to workmen under contract labour. It is not the purpose of the Act to render workmen jobless. The interpretation which must be given is one which would further these objects and not one which results in greater hardship. It must be noted that there is no provision which states that the relationship of principal employer and workmen comes to an end on the abolition of contract labour. On the contrary as already stated there is a deemed contract labour only if the two conditions of registration and licence are fulfilled. It must be noted that there is no provision which states that the relationship of principal employer and workmen comes to an end on the abolition of contract labour. On the contrary as already stated there is a deemed contract labour only if the two conditions of registration and licence are fulfilled. In such a case, where either or both the conditions are not fulfilled, the necessary implication would be that the workmen remain workmen of the principal employer. It must be remembered that on a failure of the contractor to provide amenities or to pay wages the principal employer remains liable for the same. The same would be the position on a failure by reason of there being no valid contract. 9.5. Mr. Majumdar, however, submitted that the Act provides certain penal consequences for non-registration. He submitted under the Act, the workmen do not become the direct employees of the employer and there being no such provision in the Act, the same cannot be implied. He further submitted that in the absence of any such provision the Court cannot give any direction to that effect. In our opinion, the penal provisions are provided to dissuade employers from attempting to commit a breach of the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. They do not detract from the position that there can be no deemed contract labour if the two conditions are not satisfied. If the protection or right given by reason of a deeming provision is not available, then the natural consequence must follow in addition to the penal consequence, unless there is a provision to the contrary. As already stated, in the Act there is no provision that the services of the workmen, qua the principal employer, stand terminated on the contract labour becoming invalid and/or abolished. We are of the view that for the purpose of these appeals, it is not necessary to go into the controversy as to whether the appellant-NBSTC or respondent-M/s Delta Security Services were not registered for any particular period. There is nothing on record to show that the contractor M/s Delta Security Services employed by the appellant-NBSTC had a valid licence. It was for the appellant-NBSTC to establish that they were employing contract labour through licensed contractors. The fact that they have failed to do so speaks volumes. There is nothing on record to show that the contractor M/s Delta Security Services employed by the appellant-NBSTC had a valid licence. It was for the appellant-NBSTC to establish that they were employing contract labour through licensed contractors. The fact that they have failed to do so speaks volumes. Under the Act it is compulsory for the appellant-NBSTC to maintain registers and records, which would disclose all particulars. During the course of hearing learned advocate fairly conceded that respondent-M/s Delta Security Services did have valid license. Further enquiry made by the appellant-NBSTC itself regarding validity of license has been referred to in the reference vide memo no. 1437/14/PB/PROF/F133 dated 08.03.2011 which reads as follows:- “The M.D’s enquiry regarding the Registration documents of these private labour/security agencies produced alarming results. It was observed most of these agencies have no registration number as labour suppliers/forms or as security agencies. Equally most of these agencies have no P.F registration or P.F code. It was noticed that some of the agencies had applied for such registration but are yet to get the same.” It is also not possible to believe that the appellant-NBSTC were not aware of the respondents-applicants was working in their premises for the last so many years. The applicants-respondents have averred that they have been working uninterruptedly without break for several years. Thus there can be no doubt that the applicants-respondents have been working in NBSTC for a number of years. The contractor did not have a valid licence for employing the applicants. The relationship of appellant-NBSTC and the applicant remains that of employer and workmen and this must be so as there is no provision which states that the employment comes to an end on there being no valid contract. The question which falls for determination is as to what would be the fate of such contract labour which is engaged by the contractor who is not having a valid licence under Section 12 of the Act or where the principal employer has not got itself registered under Section 7 of the Act. The initial judicial thinking was that consequence of violation of Sections 7 and 12 of the Act would be that establishment or the contractor, as the case may be, would attract penalty under the provisions of the Act but that would not make employees engaged by the contractor direct employees of the principal employer. The initial judicial thinking was that consequence of violation of Sections 7 and 12 of the Act would be that establishment or the contractor, as the case may be, would attract penalty under the provisions of the Act but that would not make employees engaged by the contractor direct employees of the principal employer. Registration/licensing were only a regulatory measure and it did not create any privilege in favour of contract workers as in Dena Nath (Supra).The recent judicial trend shows that in such cases directions can be given to the principal employer to treat such contract workers as its direct employees, if the contract labour is engaged violating Section 7 and/or 12 of the Act. The Supreme Court also has in the case of HSEB (supra) has categorically held such a consequence to follow. Therefore, one can conclude that in case the establishment is not registered under Section 7 of the Act or the contractor, to which this Act applies has not taken licence under Section 12 of the Act and still contract labour is engaged such contract workers would be treated as direct employees of the principal employer. Further if the argument advanced by Mr. Majumdar is accepted it would be open field for the principal employer to freely flout the provisions of the Act and engage employees in defiance of the Act and adopt principle of hire and fire making it possible to exploit the appalling conditions in which the workmen are placed. The object of the Act gets rudely shattered and easily defeated. The Statutory obligation for holding licence by the principal employer under Section 7 of the Act and contractor under Section 12 of the Act is to ensure compliance of the law. 9.6. It would be profitable to reproduce the upshot of its discussion outlined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision passed in Steel Authority of India Ltd (supra) as hereunder, which also considered the aforesaid decision in Dena Nath (supra) along with others decisions: “125. 9.6. It would be profitable to reproduce the upshot of its discussion outlined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision passed in Steel Authority of India Ltd (supra) as hereunder, which also considered the aforesaid decision in Dena Nath (supra) along with others decisions: “125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus: ………(1) ………..(2) ………..(3) ………..(4) (5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the establishment for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so called contract labour will have to be treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularize the services of the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder……..” Bearing in mind the ratio as above and the discussion made hereinabove as it is found that the contract between the agency and appellant-NBSTC was not genuine but a mere camouflage, we are the view that the so called contract labour will have to be treated as employees of the principal employer. We also concur with the submissions of Mr. Bhattacharyya relying on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court made in Pandurang Sitaram Jadhav (supra). 9.7. Mr. Majumder, learned advocate drew our attention to the fact that some identity cards have been issued in favour of the employees. However, relying on the decision of this court passed in Shakti Sankar Dey and others (supra) he submitted that the issuance of identity cards in favour of respondents-applicants does not automatically make the workmen-applicants direct employees under the department. At the first instance, in the case in hand, the order passed by the learned tribunal as well as learned Single Judge does not base its finding on the mere issuance of identity card. At the first instance, in the case in hand, the order passed by the learned tribunal as well as learned Single Judge does not base its finding on the mere issuance of identity card. The workmen-respondents have also not made reference only on the basis of identity card. The decision cited precisely deals with the aspect whether issuance of identity cards in favour of the petitioners makes the employee a direct one under the department. Thus, the facts of the cited decision are distinguishable from the case in hand. 10. Now with regard to the last issue as to whether the award passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal has reached finality. Mr. Bhattacharya, learned Senior advocate referring to Section 17, Section 17A and Section 17AA of the Industrial Disputes Act fervently argued that the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal has attained finality in terms of the aforesaid provisions of law and is immune to challenge and accordingly writ petition challenging such award is not at all maintainable. In order to find an answer to the ground of maintainability of the writ petition on award reaching finality, we may profitably refer to few decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10.1. In its decision passed in Burn and Co., Calcutta versus Their Employees, AIR 1957 SC 38 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: “ An Award of Industrial Tribunal is intended to have long term of operation , and can be reopened under S.19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, No. 14 of 1947, only when there has been material change in the circumstances on which it is based” The aforesaid decision has been followed in India General Navigation and Railway Co Ltd. Calcutta versus Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 1286 . 10.2 Further in the decision of State of Haryana versus The Haryana Cooperative Transport and Others, AIR 1977 SC 237 the Hon’ble Supreme court while dealing with the provisions of Section 9(1) of Industrial Disputes Act which provides that no order of Appropriate Government or of the Central Government appointing any person as the chairman or any other member of a Board or Court or as the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be called in question in any manner, observed that the rights conferred by Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be abridged only by an appropriate amendment of the Constitution and their operation cannot be whittled down by a provision like the one contained in Section 9(1) of the Act and held that the High Courts in exercise of their writ jurisdiction can consider the validity of appointment under the said provision. 10.3. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision of Parry and Co. Ltd, Dare House, Madras versus Commercial Employees Association, Madras and Another, AIR 1952 SC 179 while dealing with Section 51 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, which lays down that the decision of Labour Commissioner would be final and incapable of being challenged in any Court of Law, observed that in spite of such statutory provisions the superior court is not absolutely deprived of the power to issue writ, although it can do so only on the ground of either a manifest defect of jurisdiction in the tribunal that made the order or of a manifest fraud in the party procuring it. Thus from the aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Court it is clear that an award under the Act cannot said to be immune to challenge and no writ petition is maintainable. Rather it goes without saying that the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction can intervene where there is irregularity in the procedure or where there is error apparent or contrary to principles of natural justice. Accordingly, the argument advanced on behalf of the respondents in this regard fall short of merit. 10.4. However, having observed so, now we advert to facts of the case in hand. In the present case the learned Tribunal was certainly bound to decide the questions and it decided the same. Accordingly, the argument advanced on behalf of the respondents in this regard fall short of merit. 10.4. However, having observed so, now we advert to facts of the case in hand. In the present case the learned Tribunal was certainly bound to decide the questions and it decided the same. There is nothing on record which discloses any error apparent on the face of the proceeding or any irregularity in the procedure adopted by the learned Industrial Tribunal which goes contrary to the principles of natural justice. In the aforesaid backdrop we may now assess whether such award passed by the tribunal has reached finality or not. 10.5. While dealing with the aforesaid aspect it will be proficient to reproduce the relevant provisions of the Act for the sake of convenience of discussion. “17. Publication of reports and awards:-(1) Every report of a Board or Court together with any minute of dissent recorded therewith, every arbitration award and every award of the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of its receipt by the appropriate Government, be published in such manner as the appropriate Government thinks fit. (2) Subject to the provisions of Section 17-A, the award published under sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be called in question by any Court in any manner whatsoever. 17A.Commencement of the award:-(1) An award (including an arbitration award) shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under Section 17: Provided that-(a) if the appropriate Government is of opinion, in any case where the award has been given by a Labour Court or Tribunal in relation to an industrial dispute to which it is a party; or (b) if the Central Government is of opinion, in any case where the award has been given by a National Tribunal, that it will be inexpedient on public grounds affecting national economy or social justice to give effect to the whole or any part of the award, the appropriate Government, or as the case may be, the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that the award shall not become enforceable on the expiry of the said period of thirty days. (2) Where any declaration has been made in relation to an award under the proviso to sub-section (1), the appropriate Government or the Central Government may, within ninety days from the date of publication of the award under Section 17, make an order rejecting or modifying the award, and shall, on the first available opportunity, lay the award together with a copy of the order before the Legislature of the State, if the order has been made by a State Government, or before Parliament, if the order has been made by the Central Government. (3) Where any award as rejected or modified by an order made under subsection (2) is laid before the Legislature of a State or before Parliament, such award shall become enforceable on the expiry of fifteen days from the date on which it is so laid; and where no order under sub-section (2) is made in pursuance of a declaration under the proviso to sub-section (1), the award shall become enforceable on the expiry of the period of ninety days referred to in subsection (2). (4) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) regarding the enforceability of an award, the award shall come into operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein, but where no date is so specified, it shall come into operation on the date when the award becomes enforceable under sub-section (1) or subsection (3), as the case may be.] STATE AMENDMENT SECTION 17AA West Bengal,-After Section 17A, insert the following section, namely:-“17AA. Pronouncement and commencement of award, etc.-Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 17 and 17A,-1) Every award, other determination or decision by an arbitrator or a Labour Court or a Tribunal shall be pronounced on a date notified for the purpose and shall be dated and signed by the person or persons pronouncing the award, determination or decision and such award, determination or decision once signed and dated shall not be altered save in the manner provided in this Act; 2) The award, determination or decision of an arbitrator shall be pronounced in his office and the award, determination of decision of a Labour court or a Tribunal shall be pronounced in open Court; 3) A copy of every award, other determination or decision referred to in clause(1) certified in such manner as may be prescribed, shall be given by the arbitrator, Labour Court or Tribunal ,as the case may be, to each of the parties to the dispute free of cost and a copy of the award, determination of decision as so certified shall be sent by the arbitrator, Labour court or Tribunal, as the case may be, to the appropriate Government; 4) Every award, other determination or decision referred to in clause (1) shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of pronouncement: Provided that if the appropriate Government is of the opinion, in any case where the award, other determination or decision has been given by an arbitrator or a Labour Court or a Tribunal, in relation to an industrial dispute in which it is a party, that it will be inexpedient on public grounds affecting national economy or social justice to give effect to the whole or any part of the award, other determination or decision, the appropriate Government may, by notification, declare that such award, determination or decision shall not become enforceable on expiry of the said period of thirty days; 5) Where any declaration has been made in relation to an award, other determination or decision under the proviso to clause(4), the appropriate Government may, within ninety days from the date of such award, determination or decision, by notification, make an order rejecting or modifying such award, determination or decision, and shall, on the first available opportunity, lay the same and a copy of such order (where any such order has been made) before the Legislature of the State; 6) Where any award, other determination or decision is rejected by the appropriate Government under clause (5) is shall not be enforceable; 7) Where any award, other determination or decision is modified by an order made under clause (5) such award, determination or decision as so modified shall become enforceable on the expiry of fifteen days from the date on which the order making the modification is published in the Official Gazette. 8) Where a declaration under the proviso to clause(4) has been made but no order is made under clause(5), the award, determination or decision shall become enforceable on expiry of the period of ninety days referred to in clause(5), 9) Subject to the provisions of clauses (6),(7) and (8) regarding the enforceability of an award, other determination or decision, the same shall come into operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein, and where no date is so specific it shall come into operation on the date when the same becomes enforceable under clause (4),clause (7) or clause (8), as the case may be; 10) The award, other determination or decision pronounced under clause (1) shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be final and shall not be called in question by any Court in any manner whatsoever.” On bare reading of the aforesaid provisions it appears that every award of a Labour Court and other tribunals shall within a period of 30 days of its receipt be published by the Appropriate Government. Section 17(A)(1) provides that an award shall become enforceable on expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17. Section 17A further provides certain grounds where the Appropriate Government/Central Government may by notification in the official gazette declare that the award shall not become enforceable on expiry of said period of 30 days. It is pertinent to note that no notification has been made declaring that the award is not enforceable on the grounds as noted in Section 17A of the Act. As envisaged under Section 17AA(8), upon expiry of 90 days, the award is immune to challenge in any Court of Law. Section 17(2) of the Act also provides that award published under sub-section (1) shall not be called in question by any Court. Award has been published on 3rd July, 2014. The period of 90 days from 3rd July, 2014 (date of publication) expired on 4thOctober, 2014. The writ petition has been filed on 17th December, 2014, after the period of 90 days. Thus, there is sufficient substance in the argument advanced by Mr. Bhattacharya that the award published on 3rd July, 2014, has attained finality on 4th October, 2014 so far its execution/implementation is concerned. The writ petition has been filed on 17th December, 2014, after the period of 90 days. Thus, there is sufficient substance in the argument advanced by Mr. Bhattacharya that the award published on 3rd July, 2014, has attained finality on 4th October, 2014 so far its execution/implementation is concerned. However it is made clear that finality as per the aforesaid provisions cannot construe to be immune to challenge or puts an embargo of the award being called in question in any court of law. 11. The appellant-NBSTC has thrown challenge to the award of it being passed without giving opportunity of being heard. At the first instance nothing has been shown of appellant’s absence from taking part in the adjudication proceedings was unavoidable and was not due lack of bona fide. The order of learned Tribunal shows that summons have been duly served upon all the opposite parties. Section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act makes it the duty of the tribunal to make award and submit it to the ‘Appropriate Government’. Rule 10B of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 prescribed the procedure to be adopted by the tribunal when a reference is made to it and the scheme of the rules makes it clear that the tribunal must make a pronouncement on the validity of the claim made by any one party and repudiated by the other. Rule 22 empowers that tribunal to proceed ex parte, when one of the parties to the proceedings before it fails to appear and the adjudicator is not absolved of his duty to make determination of the dispute which he is called upon to decide. The scheme of the Act and the rules make it obvious that even though a party is placed ex parte, the tribunal must pronounce on the dispute and record its findings with respect to the matter. It appears from the order dated 30.05.2014 of the learned tribunal that one Ajay Ghatak filed his written examination-in-chief and was examined as PW1. Several documents were exhibited namely (i) Copies of agreement between North Bengal State Transport Corporation, Coochbehar and M/s Delta Security Services dated 07.11.2006, 16.09.2009 and 30.09.202(marked Exhibit 1 series) (ii) Copies of Identity Card issued by the M/s N.B.S.T.C and Memorandum dated 22.12.2010 an 16.09.2011 which is (marked Ext.2 collectively), (iii) Copies of the Minutes of meeting dated 01.01.2011and 12.01.2011. Several documents were exhibited namely (i) Copies of agreement between North Bengal State Transport Corporation, Coochbehar and M/s Delta Security Services dated 07.11.2006, 16.09.2009 and 30.09.202(marked Exhibit 1 series) (ii) Copies of Identity Card issued by the M/s N.B.S.T.C and Memorandum dated 22.12.2010 an 16.09.2011 which is (marked Ext.2 collectively), (iii) Copies of the Minutes of meeting dated 01.01.2011and 12.01.2011. The copy of the minutes of meeting is (marked Ext.3 collectively), (iv) Copies of the office order dated 15.02.2010 and 16.02.2012 and letter of M/s Delta Security Services dated 18.02.2012(marked Ext. 4 series), and (v) Copy of the Office Memo dated 08.03.2011 which is (marked Ext. 5) on behalf of the applicants. On consideration of the evidence of PW1, exhibited documents submitted on behalf of the applicants, the learned tribunal passed ex parte order. Further inspite of due service of summons the appellant-NBSTC did not contest the case as is appearing in the order of the learned Tribunal. As such there is no perversity or infirmity or irregularity in the ex parte order passed by the learned tribunal. Accordingly, in the absence of any unreasonableness or arbitrariness of the tribunal to conclude the proceeding ex parte, it cannot be said to bad in law and hence the argument advanced in this regard falls short of merit. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion the judgment and order dated 17.05.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP no. 4177(W) of 2016 with WP no. 33666(W) of 2014 is upheld. Both FMA 2147 of 2018 and FMA 2148 of 2018 filed at the instance of appellant-NBSTC stands dismissed. No order as to cost. 13. All connected applications stands disposed of. 14. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated. 15. Urgent Photostat Certified copy, if applied for, be supplied to the parties expeditiously after complying with all necessary legal formalities. I Agree.