ORDER 1. Heard finally, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. This order shall govern the disposal of Miscellaneous Petition No.1939/2021 and connected petitions being Miscellaneous Petition No.1967/2021, Miscellaneous Petition No.1972/2021, Miscellaneous Petition No.1986/2021, Miscellaneous Petition No.2025/2021, Miscellaneous Petition No.2026/2021, Miscellaneous Petition No.2029/2021, Miscellaneous Petition No.2041/2021, Miscellaneous Petition No.2114/2021 and Miscellaneous Petition No.2101/2021, having regard to the similarity of the issue involved. For the sake of convenience, the facts, as noted in Miscellaneous Petition No.1939/2021, are being taken into consideration. This Miscellaneous petition under Article 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner / National Highway Authority of India, Project Implementation Unit, Indore (MP) challenging order dated 9.2.2021 (Annexure P/1) passed by the learned 5th Additional District Judge, Ujjain (MP) in Miscellaneous Judicial Case bearing registration number MJC (AV) 31/2018, whereby the application filed by the petitioner for cancellation of the award dated 13.8.2018 passed by the Arbitrator-cum-Commissioner, Ujjain Division, Ujjain, under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (herein after referred to as the Act of 1996) has been rejected on the ground of territorial jurisdiction of the Court, in view of section 2 (d) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, while allowing the application filed by the respondents under section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 2. In brief, the facts of the case are that the respondents herein are the owners of land situated at District Dewas which was sought to be acquired by the petitioner National Highway Authority of India for construction of National Highway Number 3 (NH-3) in Shivpuri-Dewas Zone. In the aforesaid acquisition proceedings, the Competent Authority (Sub Divisional Officer, Revenue, Dewas) passed an award on 7.2.2013 (Annexure P/6). This award was challenged by the respondents before the statutory Arbitrator, National Highway Tribunal & Court of Commissioner, Ujjain Division, Ujjain (MP), who vide its order dated 13.8.2018 (Annexure P/2) passed the final award. The aforesaid final award was challenged by the petitioner before the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Ujjain under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (herein after referred to as the Act of 1996) for cancellation of the final award dated 13.8.2018. The aforesaid final award was challenged by the petitioner before the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Ujjain under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (herein after referred to as the Act of 1996) for cancellation of the final award dated 13.8.2018. In the aforesaid proceedings, the respondents filed an application dated 29.7.2019 under section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) read with sections 34 (2) and 34 (5) of the Act of 1996, contending that the Ujjain Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the aforesaid application filed by the National Highway Authority of India under section 34 of the Act of 1996, as the appropriate forum would be the Court at Dewas only, where the subject matter of the dispute is situated. 3. The learned Judge of the lower Court, vide its impugned order dated dated 9.2.2021, (Annexure P/1) has allowed the aforesaid application under section 16 of the CPC filed by the respondents and has rejected the application filed by the petitioner under section 34 of the Act of 1996; and also directing the petitioner to file the application under section 34 of the Act of 1996 before the appropriate Court of jurisdiction. 4. Ms. Anita Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside, as it has been erroneously held by the learned Judge of the lower Court that it has no jurisdiction to decide an application under section 34 of the Act of 1996, despite the fact that the arbitral proceedings took place at Ujjain only; and thus, the Court at Ujjain was competent enough to entertain an application under section 34 of the Act of 1996. 5. In support of her contentions, Ms. 5. In support of her contentions, Ms. Sharma has also relied upon a decision rendered by a coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Gopal v. National Highway Authority of India & others, Arbitration Appeal No.41/2018, order dated 17.12.2018, wherein also, in similar circumstances, this Court held that Dhar Court would have jurisdiction to here an application u/s.34 of the Act of 1996, and where the Additional District Judge, Dhar had rejected an application under section 34 of the Act of 1996 on the ground of jurisdiction, holding that the award has been passed by the Additional Commissioner, Indore, hence in terms of section 42 of the Act of 1996, Dhar Court has no jurisdiction to decide an application under section 34 of the Act of 1996. 6. The petition is opposed by the respondents. Shri Ravindra S. Trivedi, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that the impugned order is just and proper and no interference is called for. 7. In support of his contention, Shri Trivedi has also relied upon s.16 of CPC, as also on a decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Executive Engineer, Road Development Division No. III, Panvel & another v. Atlanta Limited reported in (2014) 11 SCC 619 ; and a decision dated 12.4.2022 of this Court in the case of Parenteral Drugs (India) Limited through Shri Nanalal Joshi authorized Signatory v. Gati Kintetsu Express Private Limited, Arbitration Appeal No.16/2022. 8. So far as the decision rendered by the co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Gopal (supra), is concerned, the relevant excerpts of the same read as under :-- “The record reflects that against the Arbitration Award dated 30th December, 2014 passed by the Addl. Commissioner, Indore Division, the petitioner had filed objection u/S.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Addl. District Judge, Dhar which has been rejected by the impugned order dated 10.3.2018 on the ground that in terms of Sec.42 of the Act of 1996, Dhar Court has no territorial jurisdiction. The record reflects that the property which was subject to the acquisition under the National Highways Act is located at village Utavad, District Dhar. The award dated 5.2.2011 in respect of the land acquisition proceedings under the National Highways Act, 1956 was also passed by the SDO Revenue and Competent Authority, National Highways 59, District Dhar. The record reflects that the property which was subject to the acquisition under the National Highways Act is located at village Utavad, District Dhar. The award dated 5.2.2011 in respect of the land acquisition proceedings under the National Highways Act, 1956 was also passed by the SDO Revenue and Competent Authority, National Highways 59, District Dhar. There is no arbitration agreement in existence and matter was referred to the notified arbitrator u/S.3G (5) of the Act of 1956. It is undisputed between the parties that by virtue of notification issued by the government, the Revenue Commissioner, Indore had acted as arbitrator. Hence the arbitration proceeding before the Revenue Commissioner, Indore was statutory arbitration proceedings. No seat of the Arbitrator was fixed, hence Indore where the arbitration took place was merely the venue of arbitration. Hence, the matter needs to be examined in the aforesaid back ground. Sec.2(e) of the Act of 1996 defines the Court as under :-- “Court” means— (i) In the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes; The subject matter of the arbitration was the compensation for acquisition of land which is situated at Dhar, therefore, Dhar is the Principal civil Court of original jurisdiction for the purpose of present dispute. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services INC (2012) 9 SCC 552 after taking note of Sec.2(e) and considering the issue of jurisdiction has held that :-- “96. Section 2(e) ——————————— We are of the opinion, the term “subject-matter of the arbitration” cannot be confused with “subject matter of the suit”. The term “subject-matter” in section 2(1)(e) is confined to Part I. It has a reference and connection with the process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to identify the Courts having supervisory control over the arbitration proceedings. Hence, it refers to a Court which would essentially be a Court of the seat of the arbitration process. The term “subject-matter” in section 2(1)(e) is confined to Part I. It has a reference and connection with the process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to identify the Courts having supervisory control over the arbitration proceedings. Hence, it refers to a Court which would essentially be a Court of the seat of the arbitration process. In our opinion, the provision in section 2(1)(e) has to be construed keeping in view the provisions in section 20 which give recognition to party autonomy. Accepting the narrow construction as projected by the learned counsel for the appellants would, in fact, render section 20 nugatory. In our view, the legislature has intentionally given jurisdiction to two Courts i.e. the Court which would have jurisdiction where the cause of action is located and the Courts where the arbitration takes place. This was necessary as on many occasions the agreement may provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be neutral to both the parties. Therefore, the Courts where the arbitration takes place would be required to exercise supervisory control over the arbitral process. For example, if the arbitration is held in Delhi, where neither of the parties are from Delhi, (Delhi having been chosen as a neutral place as between a party from Mumbai and the other from Kolkata) and the tribunal sitting in Delhi passes an interim order under section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, the appeal against such an interim order under section 37 must lie to the Courts of Delhi being the Courts having supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and the tribunal. This would be irrespective of the fact that the obligations to be performed under the contract were tobe performed either at Mumbai or at Kolkata, and only arbitration is to take place in Delhi. In such circumstances, both the Courts would have jurisdiction, i.e., the Court within whose jurisdiction the subject matter of the suit is situated and the Courts within the jurisdiction of which the dispute resolution, i.e., arbitration is located.” In terms of the aforesaid judgment also the Dhar civil Court has the jurisdiction. In such circumstances, both the Courts would have jurisdiction, i.e., the Court within whose jurisdiction the subject matter of the suit is situated and the Courts within the jurisdiction of which the dispute resolution, i.e., arbitration is located.” In terms of the aforesaid judgment also the Dhar civil Court has the jurisdiction. So far as Sec.42 of the Act of 1996 on which the reliance has been placed by the trial Court, the same is attracted when an application under Part I of the Act was made in a Court, but in the present case nothing has been pointed out to show that before filing the objection u/S.34, any application in any Court was made, therefore, the trial Court has committed an error in attracting Sec.42. The trial Court has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of W.B. and others v. Associated Contractors AIR 2015 SC 260 but in this case also it has been held that if first application ie. application u/S.9 is made to a Court having jurisdiction, then the subsequent applications will be made in that Court, but in the present case no prior application made in any other Court has been pointed out. Having regard to the aforesaid factual and legal position, I am of the opinion that the trial Court has committed an error in rejecting the application u/S.34 on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. Hence, the impugned order of the trial Court cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. The Arbitration Appeal is accordingly allowed.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. So far as the case of Atlanta Limited (supra), is concerned, it has been held by the Supreme Court as under :-- “24.3. Under the Arbitration Act, therefore, the legislature has clearly expressed a legislative intent different from the one expressed in section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The respondent had chosen to initiate proceedings within the area of Greater Mumbai, it could have done so only before the High Court of Bombay. There was no other Court within the jurisdiction of Greater Mumbai, where the respondents could have raised their challenge. The respondent had chosen to initiate proceedings within the area of Greater Mumbai, it could have done so only before the High Court of Bombay. There was no other Court within the jurisdiction of Greater Mumbai, where the respondents could have raised their challenge. Consequently, we have no hesitation in concluding that the respondent by initiating proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, before the Original Side of the High Court of Bombay, had not violated the mandate of section 2(1)( e ) of the Arbitration Act. Thus viewed, we find the submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants, by placing reliance on section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, wholly irrelevant. (Emphasis supplied) 10. On a comparative reading of both the aforesaid decisions, with due respect, this Court finds itself unable to agree with the observations made by the co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Gopal (supra), which read as under :-- “So far as Sec.42 of the Act of 1996 on which the reliance has been placed by the trial Court, the same is attracted when an application under Part I of the Act was made in a Court, but in the present case nothing has been pointed out to show that before filing the objection u/S.34, any application in any Court was made, therefore, the trial Court has committed an error in attracting Sec.42.” This is for the reason that the aforesaid observation made by the coordinate bench of this Court stands nullified by the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Atalanta Limited (supra), where it held in para 18, as under :-- “18. The respondent had chosen to initiate proceedings within the area of Greater Mumbai, it could have done so only before the High Court of Bombay. There was no other Court within the jurisdiction of Greater Mumbai, where the respondents could have raised their challenge. Consequently, we have no hesitation in concluding that the respondent by initiating proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, before the Original Side of the High Court of Bombay, had not violated the mandate of section 2(1)( e ) of the Arbitration Act.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Meaning thereby that an application filed u/s.34 of the Act of 1996 shall be treated to be an application for the purposes of s.42 of the Act. Meaning thereby that an application filed u/s.34 of the Act of 1996 shall be treated to be an application for the purposes of s.42 of the Act. S.42 which reads as under :-- “42. Jurisdiction.—Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this Part has been made in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, it is held that an application u/s. 34 of the Act of 1996 cannot be treated to be mere objections, but in effect, an application under Part I of the Act of 1996. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, as also on the strength of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Aluminium Company (supra), as relied upon by the coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Gopal (supra), this Court has no hesitation to hold that the Court at Ujjain where the application u/s.34 of the Act of 1996 was filed has the jurisdiction to decide the same as the arbitration proceedings also took place before the Divisional Commissioner, Ujjain. 13. Accordingly, the petitions stand allowed and the impugned order (s) is stand set aside. The matter is remanded back to the concerned Court at Ujjain to decide the case on merits. Parties are also directed to appear before the Court at Ujjain (5th Additional District Judge, Ujjain, MP) on 2nd of November, 2022 so as to avoid any further delay in issuance of notice to the parties. With the aforesaid observation and direction, Miscellaneous Petition No.1939/2021, Miscellaneous Petition No.1967/2021, Miscellaneous Petition No.1972/2021, Miscellaneous Petition No.1986/2021, Miscellaneous Petition No.2025/2021, 15 MP No.1939/2021_AFR_Bunch Miscellaneous Petition No.2026/2021, Miscellaneous Petition No.2029/2021, Miscellaneous Petition No.2041/2021, Miscellaneous Petition No.2114/2021 and Miscellaneous Petition No.2101/2021 stand disposed of. Let the original signed order be kept in Miscellaneous Petition No.1939/2021 and a copy thereof be kept in other connected cases. All the other pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. .......... Let the original signed order be kept in Miscellaneous Petition No.1939/2021 and a copy thereof be kept in other connected cases. All the other pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. .......... 2022 (4) JLJ 299 Dinesh Kumar Paliwal, J. A v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Another Criminal Revision No. 2865 of 2022 (Jabalpur): against the judgment dated 21.7.2022 passed by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Waidhan, District Singrauli in Criminal Appeal No. 36/2022; Decided on 29.9.2022 Anirudha Pratap Singh for applicant; Manoj Kushwaha, Panel Lawyer for respondents/State. (1) Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 -- S. 12 -- bail -- intention of legislature is to grant bail to juvenile irrespective of nature or gravity of alleged offence -- bail can be declined only cases where there are reasonable grounds to believe that release is likely to bring juvenile into association of any known criminal or expose him to moral, physical, or psychological danger, or that his release would defeat ends of justice -- gravity of offence is not relevant consideration for declining bail to juvenile. 2005 SCC (Cr.) 742 and 2006 (55) SCC 480 followed. ILR (2012) MP 796, Criminal Revision No. 5159 of 2018 decided on 14.1.2019 and Criminal Revision No. 509 of 2021 decided on 17.3.2021 relied on. [Paras 12 & 13 (2) Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 -- S. 12 -- Penal Code, 1860 -- Ss. 302 and 377 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 -- S. 5/6 – bail -- no named FIR against juvenile -- bail application dismissed only on ground that he has committed heinous offence – held – both Courts below have not properly appreciated mandatory provisions of S. 12 of JJ Act -- in absence of any material or evidence with reasonable grounds, it cannot be said that his release would defeat ends of justice -- bail granted. 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The Present criminal revision has been preferred under section 102 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as “J.J. Act, 2015”) against the judgment dated 21.7.2022 passed by IInd Additional Sessions Judge Waidhan Distrit Singrauli, in Criminal Appeal No. 36/2022 arising out of Crime No. 665/2022 whereby the appellate Court has rejected the appeal and affirmed the order dated 12.7.2022 passed by Member, Juvenile Justice Board, Singrauli. The Juvenile Justice Board has rejected the bail application of Juvenile A, which had been filed by his natural guardian/father, under section 12 of “J.J. Act, 2015”, in Crime No. 665/2022 under sections 302 and 377 of the I.P.C. and under section 5/6 of POCSO Act. 2. The Juvenile Justice Board has rejected the bail application of Juvenile A, which had been filed by his natural guardian/father, under section 12 of “J.J. Act, 2015”, in Crime No. 665/2022 under sections 302 and 377 of the I.P.C. and under section 5/6 of POCSO Act. 2. Being aggrieved by the appeal judgment and order dated 21.7.2022 passed by the Appellate Court as well as the order dated 12.7.2022 passed by Juvenile Justice Board, the Juvenile-A through his father has filed this criminal revision before this Court. 3 . Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that at the time of commission of offence, Juvenile was below 18 years of age. He was 12 years and 9 months old at the time of incident as per educational certificate date of birth of Juvenile-A is 5.9.2009. He has no criminal antecedent. 4 . It is further submitted that Juvenile-A is not named in the first information report and has been falsely implicated during the investigation without any material evidence. It is further submitted that after three days of incident, the Juvenile-A has been implicated and apprehended by the police on 15.5.2022 on the basis of suspicion. It is further submitted that there is no evidence to show that if the Juvenile-A is released on bail, his release is likely to bring him into association with any known criminal, or expose him to moral, physical, or psychological danger, or that his release would defeat the ends of justice. No such findings were recorded as to how he will come in contact with known criminals and how he will be exposed to moral, physical, or psychological danger, or that his release would defeat the ends of justice. The Juvenile-A is in custody in an observation home since 16.5.2022. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant has further submitted that the Juvenile-A has not committed any offence and has no criminal antecedent except the present case. He is not a previous convict and is not associated with any kind of other criminal activities. There is no report regarding any previous criminal antecedents of the family of the applicant and there is no chance of the juvenile-A re-indulgence to bring him into association with known criminal. The natural guardian/father of the applicant is a government servant as he is employed in a school. There is no report regarding any previous criminal antecedents of the family of the applicant and there is no chance of the juvenile-A re-indulgence to bring him into association with known criminal. The natural guardian/father of the applicant is a government servant as he is employed in a school. He is ready to give an undertaking that if Juvenile-A’s is released on bail, he will keep him in his custody and look after him properly and has assured on behalf of the juvenile that he is ready to cooperate with the process of law and shall make the juvenile available before the J.J. Court whenever required and is ready to accept all the conditions whatsoever are imposed by the Court upon him. 6 . It has been further submitted that the J.J. Board as well as the appellate Court have not appreciated the Social Information Report of the Probation Officer in its right perspective and passed the impugned order and judgment in a cursory manner without considering the object of the law enacted for the benefit of the Juvenile and have refused to release the applicant on bail. It is submitted that a perusal of the impugned orders demonstrates that the same has been passed on flimsy grounds, which have occasioned a gross miscarriage of justice. The judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below are erroneous and bad in law and are based on erroneous appreciation of the facts and law. 7. On the other hand, learned Panel Lawyer for the respondent/State has supported the impugned judgment and order passed by the Courts below and has submitted that Juvenile-A has committed a heinous offence in a preplanned manner and gruesome murder has been committed by the Juvenile- A after fulfilling his carnal lust. There is every possibility that if the juvenile-A is released, he will come into contact with known criminals and will get expose to moral, physical, or psychological danger, Therefore, he has prayed that considering the gravity of the offence, the present criminal revision filed by the father of Juvenile is liable to be dismissed. 8 . I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicant and learned P.L. for the State and perused the material on record. 9. 8 . I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicant and learned P.L. for the State and perused the material on record. 9. It is undisputed that the date of birth of Juvenile conflict with law is 5.9.2009 and as such it is apparent that at the time of commission of offence, he was 12 years and 9 months old on the basis of age mentioned in the school education certificate. 10. The bail application under section 12 of “J.J. Act, 2015” has been rejected by the Juvenile Justice Board vide order dated 12.7.2022 observing that the ghastly crime of carnal intercourse against ordinary course of nature and murder has been committed by the Juvenile-A, there appears a reasonable ground for believing that the guardian and family member of the juvenile-A can create no confidence in the mind of common people and society at large. It is further observed that as per the social report, it reveals that his parents are not able to take care of the Juvenile-A. It is also observed that guardian of the Juvenile have no effective control over him and there is a possibility of reoccurrence of the offence after his release which is likely to bring him into association with other known criminals. Learned Appellate Court has also affirmed the order passed by the Juvenile Justice Board and observed that Juvenile-A has committed the heinous offence as he not only committed a carnal assault upon the deceased boy but killed him also. It was further observed by the appellate Court that the moral level of the child is very poor. He has committed the offence of moral turpitude and there is no discipline at his house. 11. Before considering the legality, correctness and validity of he order passed by the Courts below. It would be useful to look at the relevant provision of the Act. section 12 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 reads as under : “12. 11. Before considering the legality, correctness and validity of he order passed by the Courts below. It would be useful to look at the relevant provision of the Act. section 12 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 reads as under : “12. Bail to a person who is apparently a child alleged to be in conflict with law.-- (1) When any person, who is apparently a child and is alleged to have committed a bailable or non-bailable offence, is apprehended or detained by the police or appears or brought before a Board, such person shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other law for the time being in force, be released on bail with or without surety or placed under the supervision of a probation officer or under the care of any fit person : Provided that such person shall not be so released if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that the release is likely to bring that person into association with any known criminal or expose the said person to moral, physical or psychological danger or the person’s release would defeat the ends of justice, and the Board shall record the reasons for denying the bail and circumstances that led to such a decision. (2) When such person having been apprehended is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the officer-in-charge of the police station, such officer shall cause the person to be kept only in an observation home in such manner as may be prescribed until the person can brought before a Board. (3) When such person is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the Board, it shall make an order sending him to an observation home or a place of safety, as the case may be, for such period during the pendency of the inquiry regarding the person, as may be specified in the order. (4) When a child in conflict with law is unable to fulfill the conditions of bail order within seven days of the bail order, such child shall be produced before the Board for modification of the conditions of bail.” 12. Provisions of section 12 of “J.J. Act, 2015” manifest that ordinarily, the Juvenile Justice Board is under obligation to release the juvenile on bail with or without surety. Provisions of section 12 of “J.J. Act, 2015” manifest that ordinarily, the Juvenile Justice Board is under obligation to release the juvenile on bail with or without surety. The juvenile shall not be released in certain circumstances as the latter part of the section also uses the word ‘shall’ imposing certain mandatory conditions prohibiting the release of the juvenile by the J.J. Board. If there are any reasonable grounds for believing; (a) that the release is likely to bring him into association with any known criminal; (b) that release is likely to expose him to moral, physical, or psychological danger and (c) that release of the juvenile is in conflict with law and would defeat the ends of justice. 13. From a bare reading of the provisions of section 12 of “J.J. Act, 2015", it appears that the intention of the legislature is to grant bail to the juvenile irrespective of the nature or gravity of the offence alleged to have been committed by the juvenile, and bail can be declined only in such cases where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the release is likely to bring the juvenile into an association of any known criminal or expose him to moral, physical, or psychological danger, or that his release would defeat the ends of justice. The gravity of the offence is not a relevant consideration for declining the bail to the juvenile. A juvenile can be denied the concession of bail if any of the three contingencies specified under section 12(1) of “J.J. Act, 2015” is available. 14. In case of “Narayan Sharma v. State of MP ILR (2012) MP 796 A Coordinate Bench of this Court while considering the provision of the section 12 of the Act observed as under :-- “In the opinion of this Court, the Juvenile Justice Board may be justified in denying bail to a juvenile involved in a heinous crime only if there is material before it to form a prima facie opinion on the aspects carved out as exception to rule of bail in section 12 of the Act it self. There must be some mechanism with the Juvenile Justice Board to gather material and form an opinion as to whether the juvenile need to be denied bail by bringing his case under the exceptions to bail engrafted in section 12. There must be some mechanism with the Juvenile Justice Board to gather material and form an opinion as to whether the juvenile need to be denied bail by bringing his case under the exceptions to bail engrafted in section 12. The opinion to be formed by the Board, by no means, can be subjective and has to be objective. Either the prosecution should place some prima facie material before the Board or the Court to show that release of a juvenile on bail may expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger of the Board may obtain a report from the Probation Officer attached to the Board regarding antecedents and circumstances attended to the juvenile, both pre and post crime and it is only thereafter the Board or the Court should crystallized its opinion regarding release or non release of the juvenile on bail, though involved in a heinous crime. A reference to the statutory provisions governing bail to a juvenile contained in section 12 would show that there is a mandate of law that the juvenile has to be released on bail, except only in those cases where the case fall in one or the other exception engrafted by the legislature in section 12 itself.” 15. It has been observed in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand & another 2005 SCC (Criminal) 742, that:- “ the whole object of the Act is to provide for the care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of neglected delinquent juveniles. It is a beneficial legislation aimed at to make available the benefit of the Act to the neglected or delinquent juveniles. It is settled law that the interpretation of the Statute of beneficial legislation must be to advance the cause of legislation to the benefit for whom it is made and not to frustrate the intendment of the legislation. 16. Further it has been observed in Sanjay Chaurasia v. State of U.P. and another 2006 (55) SCC 480 that :-- “10. In case of the refusal of the bail, some reasonable grounds for believing above mentioned xx exceptions must be brought before the Court concerned by the prosecution but in the present case, no such ground for believing any of the above mentioned exception has teen brought by the prosecution before the Juvenile Justice Board and appellate Court. In case of the refusal of the bail, some reasonable grounds for believing above mentioned xx exceptions must be brought before the Court concerned by the prosecution but in the present case, no such ground for believing any of the above mentioned exception has teen brought by the prosecution before the Juvenile Justice Board and appellate Court. The appellate Court dismissed the appeal only oh the presumption that due to commission of this of fence, the father and other relatives of other kidnapped boy had developed enmity with the revisionist, that is why in case of his release, the physical and mental life of the revisionist will be In danger and his release will defeat the ends of justice but substantial to this presumption no material has been brought before the appellate Court and the same has not been discussed and only on the basis of the presumption, Juvenile Justice Board has refused the bell of the revisionist which is In the present case is unjustified and against the spirit of the Act.” 17. Coordinate Benches of this Court in case of Karan v. State of MP in Cr.R. No. 5159/2018 decided on 14.1.2019 and Girdhar v. State of MP in Cr.R. No. 509/2021 decided on 17.3.2021 has held that the bail application of a child in conflict with the law cannot be rejected merely on the ground of seriousness of the crime. The only exception to grant of bail to a child in conflict with the law is the reasonable ground for believing that release would bring him into association with any known criminal or expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger or his release would defeat the ends of justice. 18. Section 13(1)(ii) of “JJ Act, 2015” provides that the Probation Officer shall submit a social investigation report within two weeks from when a child is apprehended or brought to the Board, containing information regarding the antecedents and family background of the child and other material circumstances likely to be of assistance to the Board for making the inquiry. The “social investigation report” which has been defined in rule 2(xvii) of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016, means the report of a child containing detailed information pertaining to the circumstances of the child, the situation of the child on economic, social, psycho-social and other relevant factors, and the recommendation thereon. The “social investigation report” which has been defined in rule 2(xvii) of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016, means the report of a child containing detailed information pertaining to the circumstances of the child, the situation of the child on economic, social, psycho-social and other relevant factors, and the recommendation thereon. This report becomes important for the inquiry to be done by the Board while passing such orders in relation to such a child as it deems fit under sections 17 and 18 of this Act. The purpose behind this provision is to enable the Juvenile Justice Board to get a glimpse of the social circumstances of the child before any order regarding bail or of any other nature is passed. 19. ‘Form-6’ of the Model Rules, 2016, contains a detailed proforma of the social investigation report. The social investigation report submitted by Probation Officer and Child Welfare Officer and it is incumbent upon the juvenile Justice Board to take into consideration the social investigation report and make an objective assessment on the reasonable grounds for rejecting the bail application of the juvenile. 20. The social investigation report submitted by Probation Officer and Child Welfare Officer and it is incumbent upon the juvenile Justice Board to take into consideration the social investigation report and make an objective assessment on the reasonable grounds for rejecting the bail application of the juvenile. 20. Social Investigation Report (SIR) given by the Probation Officer is as under :-- 40- os ifjfLFkfr;ka ftuesa ckyd dks fxj~rkj fd;k x;k Fkk & ckyd ds vuqlkj eSusa dqN ugha fd;k eq>s >wBk Qalk;k x;k gSA ckyd ds vuqlkj iqfyl us eq>s cgqr ekjk Fkk rFkk eq>ls tcjnLrh vijk/k dcwy djok;k Fkk ckyd ds vuqlkj eSa vkSj Hkb;k 'kknh esa x;s Fks rFkk [kkuk&ihuk [kkdj okil vk x;s Fks eSa ml yM+ds ls feyk Hkh ugha FkkA ckyd ds vuqlkj iqfyl us x.ks'k o f'koiwtu dks Hkh idM+k Fkk ysfdu mu nksuksa dks NksM+ fn;k vkSj eq>s Qalk fn;kA ckyd ds firk ds vuqlkj ftl yM+ds dk eMZj gqvk mlds firk Hkh dg jgs Fks fd f'koiwtu us esjs yM+ds dks ekjk gS iqfyl us f'koiwtu dks idM+k Hkh Fkk ysfdu fQj mls NksM+ fn;kA 41- vijk/k esa ckyd dh rFkkdfFkr Hkwfedk & vijk/k esa ckyd dh D;k Hkwfedk gS dqN Hkh dguk laHko ugha gS ysfdu ftl dzwjrk ds lkFk eMZj fd;k x;k gS bruh de mez dk ckyd ;g dSls dj ldrk gS lkspus dk iz'u gS xyk nck dj ekjuk le> esa vkrk gS ekjus ds ckn iRFkj ls lj dqpyuk ,d 12&13 lky dk ckyd dSls dj ldrk gS le> ds ijs gSA 7- ifjoh{kk vf/kdkjh@ cky dY;k.k vf/kdkjh@lkekftd dk;ZdrkZ }kjk iquokZl ds laca/k esa flQkfj'k & ckyd ds xkao o ifjokj dk okrkoj.k vPNk gS ifjokj ds lnL;ksa dk HkkokRed okrkoj.k Hkh vPNk gS ckyd dk dksbZ vkijkf/kd fjdkMZ ugha gSA ckyd dks mlds ifjokj ds lkFk j[kus ls ckyd dks fdlh rjg dh 'kkjhfjd ekufld ;k uSfrd gkfu gksus dh dksbZ laHkkouk ugha fn[krh gS] u fdlh vkijkf/kd izÑfr ds O;fDr ds laidZ esa vkus dh laHkkouk fn[krh gSA ckyd vHkh flQZ 12 o"kZ 3 ekg dk gks jgk gS ;fn ;g eku Hkh fy;k tk;s fd ckyd us eMZj fd;k gS rks Hkh ckyd vijk/k ds ifj.kke dks le>us esa l{ke ugha gSA lkFk gh ckyd bl lky 7oh esa vr% fd'kksj U;k; cksMZ dks mfpr QSlyk djuk pkfg, ftlls ckyd dks fdlh rjg ls dksbZ gkfu u gks o ckyd dk Hkfo"; mTtoy gks lds rFkk U;k; dh Hkh gkfu u gksA 21. In this case, FIR has been lodged on 13.5.2022 by the father of deceased. As per the First Information Report on 12.5.2022 there was a marriage function of his neighbor Ram Sajeeva Shah’s daughter. Barat had come, in that program at around 9:00 pm, he along with his son who was 11 years and along with his brother’s son who is 08 years had gone to attend the marriage function. He came back from there. At around 10:30 pm his deceased son brought snack from the marriage function and handed over the same to his younger sister and went back by informing his mother that he will return home after having meal. At around 11:30 pm his wife informed that child has not returned from the marriage function. He went to the house of Ramsajeevan and other places to search him but he could not be traced. Next morning he came to know that dead body of his son is lying in the field of Teerath Prasad Shah. When he went there he found his son was dead having injuries. His son’s pant is not at the proper place. Blood stained half brick and some pieces of broken bricks are lying there. Someone has murdered. 22. Thus, it is clear that no named FIR has been lodged against the Juvenile-A. Bail application of the Juvenile-A has been dismissed only on the ground that he has committed heinous offence but in view of the above discussion, the reason and conclusion arrived by the Appellate Court as well as the the Juvenile Justice Board in the impugned judgment and order for dismissing the application for giving the Juvenile on supurdagi, I am of the view that both the Courts below have not properly appreciated the mandatory provisions of section 12 of “J.J. Act, 2015” as well as other provisions in relation to juvenile ‘A’ and have declined to grant bail merely on the basis of unfounded apprehension. In the absence of any material or evidence with reasonable grounds, it cannot be said that his release would defeat the ends of justice. In the absence of any material or evidence with reasonable grounds, it cannot be said that his release would defeat the ends of justice. Thus, it is explicit that J.J. Board and Appellate Court both have not recorded the findings on the three contingencies for declining the bail to the juvenile A. Therefore, I am of the considered view that order dated 12.7.2022 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board and appeal Judgement dated 21.7.2022 passed by the appellate Court are not sustainable. Hence, the above-mentioned orders are set aside and the present criminal revision filed by the father of juvenile is allowed as he is ready to take care of his son. 23. It is directed that Juvenile-A through his guardian/father be released on bail in Crime No. 665/2022 of P.S. Waidhan District Singrauli for commission of under sections 377 and 302 of IPC and section 5/6 of POCSO Act upon furnishing a personal bond of his father of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Only) with two solvent sureties of his relatives in the amount of the Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only) each to the satisfaction of Juvenile Justice Board, Waidhan District Singrauli, subject to the following conditions :-- (1) During bail period, applicant/juvenile-A will remain in his supervision and control and he shall be responsible for his maintenance, well being and other activities. (2) Father shall undertake that upon release on bail juvenile-A will not be permitted to go into contact or association with any known criminal or allowed to be exposed to any moral, physical, or psychological danger and further that the father will ensure that the juvenile will not repeat the offence. Juvenile will pursue his study and not allowed to waste his time in unproductive and excessive recreational pursuits. (3) Juvenile and natural guardian/father will report to the Probation Officer on the every last date of the calendar month and Probation Officer will keep a strict vigil on the activities of the juvenile and regularly draw up his social investigation report that would be submitted to the J.J. Board, on such a periodical basis as the Juvenile Justice Board may determine. (4) Natural guardian/father shall also ensure of the appearance of the Juvenile-A before J.J. Board on all the dates fixed by it till the final disposal of the case pending before it. 24. This criminal revision is Allowed accordingly.