JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC is directed against the judgment of conviction recorded for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentence awarded i.e. imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for one month by the Sessions Judge, Dakshin Bastar Dantewada by the impugned judgment dated 6.3.2013 in Sessions Trial No.185/2011. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 10.1.2011 at about 5 p.m. the appellant murdered deceased Oyami Hoonga by kadari (sharp edged weapon). It is further case of the prosecution that on the fateful day of 10.1.2011 at about 5 p.m. the deceased was taking rest along with his minor daughter Ku.Oyami Sukdo (PW6), at that time the appellant came on the spot and on the pretext of disturbing him and stopping him from cutting salfi and on the pretext of witchcraft, the accused caused him one stab injury in his neck by which he suffered grievous injury and died instantaneously on the spot and thereby committed the offence and immediately the appellant absconded from the spot. Thereafter Smt.Nande Oyami (PW8), wife of deceased Oyami Hoonga and mother of Ku.Oyami Sukdo (PW6), came to the spot after grazing cattles and since they were advised to lodge the FIR, FIR (Ex.P12) was lodged by Ku.Oyami Sukdo (PW6) along with Up-Sarpanch and other villagers for offence under Section 302 of the IPC. Dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem to Primary Health Center, Kirandul, where Dr.K. Goutam (PW9) conducted postmortem vide Ex.P9. After completion of investigation, chargesheet was filed before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bacheli, who was committed the case to the Court of Session, Dakshin Bastar Dantewada for trial in accordance with law. The accused abjured the guilt and entered into defence. 3. In order to prove the prosecution case, the prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses and exhibited 18 documents Exs.P1 to P18. Statement of the accused/appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC in which he denied guilt. However, he examined none in his defence. 4. The accused abjured the guilt and entered into defence. 3. In order to prove the prosecution case, the prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses and exhibited 18 documents Exs.P1 to P18. Statement of the accused/appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC in which he denied guilt. However, he examined none in his defence. 4. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record and relying upon testimony of child witness Ku.Oyami Sukdo (PW6), convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him as noticed hereinabove, against which, this criminal appeal has been preferred. 5. Mr.Keshav Dewangan, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, would submit that the trial Court has committed grave legal error in relying upon sole testimony of child witness Ku.Oyami Sukdo (PW6) without further corroboration, which is unsafe. In absence of any corroboration, testimony of Ku.Oyami Sukdo (PW6) could not have been relied upon in view of decision of the Supreme Court in the matters of Hamza v. Muhammedkutty alias Mani and others (2013) 11 SCC 150 and Shivasharanappa and others v. State of Karnataka (2013) 5 SCC 705 . He would further submit that the prosecution has failed to bring home the offence under Section 302 of the IPC and even otherwise, single stab injury is said to have been caused by the appellant, therefore, his case would fall under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. Therefore, the appeal be allowed and the judgment and order be set-aside/ modified. 6. On the other hand, Mr.Soumya Rai, learned Panel Lawyer for the respondent/State, would support the impugned judgment and submit that statement of Ku.Oyami Sukdo (PW6) is wholly reliable and trustworthy as she was 15 years at the time of examination and her testimony inspires confidence and she has rightly been relied upon and it is not universal rule that unless testimony of child witness is corroborated by further evidence, her testimony cannot be relied upon and no conviction can be recorded on sole testimony of child witness. He would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matters of Shivji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1973 SC 55 and submit that the appellant has rightly been convicted by the trial Court and as such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. He would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matters of Shivji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1973 SC 55 and submit that the appellant has rightly been convicted by the trial Court and as such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. The first question for consideration would be, whether death of deceased Oyami Hoonga was homicidal in nature, which the trial Court has recorded to be homicidal in nature based upon testimony of Medical Officer Dr.K.Goutam (PW9), who has conducted postmortem and submitted report vide Ex.P9, in which he has clearly opined incised wound of 13 cm. X 3 cm. in left part of neck and injury was muscle deep. All the injuries were antemortem, which could have been caused by sharp edged weapon and cause of death according to the doctor was excessive bleeding and thereby causing cardio respiratory arrest and death was homicidal in nature. In view of medical evidence available on record, finding recorded by the trial Court that death of the deceased was homicidal in nature is a binding based on evidence available on record. We hereby affirm the said finding. 9. The next question is that the appellant has been convicted on sole testimony of Ku.Oyami Sukdo (PW6), daughter of deceased Oyami Hoonga. Her testimony has been questioned by the learned counsel for the appellant on the ground that sole testimony of child witness should not be relied upon to base conviction unless it is corroborated by other appropriate valid piece of evidence. 10. In order to answer the question, it would be appropriate to notice the provisions contained in Section 118 of the Evidence Act, which states as under:- “118. Who may testify.- All persons shall be competent to testify unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them, or from giving rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind.” 11. Before discussing the evidence of the child witness, it would be advantageous to refer to the law relating to child witness. Section 118 of the Evidence Act deals with the question of competency of persons to testify. Before discussing the evidence of the child witness, it would be advantageous to refer to the law relating to child witness. Section 118 of the Evidence Act deals with the question of competency of persons to testify. Under this section, all persons are competent to testify, unless they are, in the opinion of the Court, (a) unable to understand the questions put to them, or (b) to give rational answers to those questions, owing to (I) tender years, (ii) extreme old age, (iii) disease of mind or body, or (iv) any other such cause. Even a lunatic, if he is capable of understanding the questions put to him and giving rational answers, is a competent witness. With respect to children, no precise age is fixed by law within which they are absolutely excluded from giving evidence on the presumption that they have not sufficient understanding. A child is not an incompetent witness by reason of its age. A child of tender years is not, by reason of its youth, as matter of law, disqualified as a witness. There is no precise age which determines the question of competency. According to Section 118 of the Evidence Act, a child of tender age is a competent witness if it appears that it can understand the questions put to it and give rational answers thereto. This section vests in the Court the discretion to decide whether an infant is or is not disqualified to be a witness by reason of understanding or lack of understanding. When a young child is a witness, the first step for the Judge or Magistrate to take is to satisfy himself that the child is the competent witness within the meaning of Section 118 of the Evidence Act and for this purpose, preliminary inquiry should be held. It is the duty of the Court to ascertain in the best way, which it can, whether from the extent of his intellectual capacity and understanding the child witness is able to give a rational account of what he has seen, heard or done at a particular occasion or in other words, the witness understands the duty of speaking truth or not. Competency of young children can be ascertained by putting a few questions to them in order to find out whether they are intelligent enough to understand what they had seen and afterwards inform the court thereof. Competency of young children can be ascertained by putting a few questions to them in order to find out whether they are intelligent enough to understand what they had seen and afterwards inform the court thereof. The holding of a preliminary inquiry is merely a rule of prudence and is not a legal obligation upon the judge. It is desirable that after holding a preliminary inquiry, Judges and Magistrates maintain record incorporating opinion that the child understands the duty of speaking truth. Though no precise criteria for appraising the evidence of a child witness can be laid down, yet one broad test is whether there was possibility of any tutoring. If this test is found in positive, the Court will not, as a rule of prudence, convict the accused of a major offence on the basis of child evidence unless it is corroborated to material extent in material particulars, directly connecting the accused with the crime. At the same time, if otherwise the testimony of a child witness is not shown to be tainted with any such infirmities, it calls for due credence. A child in the innocent purity of its mind and unsophistication is more likely to come forth with version which is unbiased, unsoiled, natural and forthright. It is less prone to manipulation, motivation and spirit of vendetta. It can as well be spontaneous and inspiring, once the child is enabled to overcome the initial shock and awe, and ensured protection, security, compassion and given confidence to come out with what was seen. Further, some of the children are fairly intelligent, truthful and straight forward, and there is no reason to start with a presumption of untrustworthiness in the assessment of their evidence. The merit of evidence has to be judged on the touchstone of its own inherent intrinsic worth. 12. In the matter of Panchhi v. State of U P (1998) 7 SCC 177 the Supreme Court has held as under:- “..... It cannot be said that the evidence of a child witness would always stand irretrievably stigmatized. It is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable. It cannot be said that the evidence of a child witness would always stand irretrievably stigmatized. It is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable. The law is that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring.” 13. With regard to the testimony of child witness the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Shantappa Madivalappa Galapuji & others (2009) 12 SCC 731 had noticed the case law and held as under: “The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not prescribe any particular age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent one. On the contrary, Section 118 of the Evidence Act envisages that all persons shall be competent to testify, unless the court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to these questions, because of tender years, extreme old age, disease whether of mind, or any other cause of the same kind. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. The evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se, but the court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality thereof and reliability can record conviction, based thereon. {See Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka (2001) 9 SCC 129 }. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra [ (1997) 5 SCC 341 ] it was held as follows : (SCC p.343, para 5) :- “A child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis of conviction. In other words even in the absence of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the questions and able to given rational answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. In other words even in the absence of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the questions and able to given rational answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored.” 14. The position of law relating to the evidence of a child witness has been dealt with also by the Supreme Court in Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate and others v. State of Maharashtra 2008 (12) SCC 565 and Golla Yelugu Govindu v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2008(4) SCALE 569 . In the case of State of U.P. Vs. Krishna Master & Others (2010) 47 OCR (SC) 263 the Supreme Court also has gone a step ahead in observing that a child of tender age who has witnessed the gruesome murder of his parents is not likely to forget the incident for his whole life and would certainly recapitulate facts in his memory when asked about the same at any point of time notwithstanding the gap of about ten years between the incident and recording his evidence. 15. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court noticed hereinabove, in the present case, at the time of recording of the evidence of Ku.Oyami Sukdo (PW6), she was aged about 15 years. In order to satisfy himself, learned Sessions Judge asked certain questions from her like, in which class she is studying, for which purpose she has come to the Court, whether she should speak truth or not and having satisfied that she understand the questions put to her, the Court has appointed interpreter as she was not able to understand Hindi and she used to speak Gondi (local language of Bastar) and thereafter her statement was recorded. Ku.Oyami Sukdo (PW6) has clearly stated that on the date of incident his father was taking rest/sleeping with bonfire. Ku.Oyami Sukdo (PW6) has clearly stated that on the date of incident his father was taking rest/sleeping with bonfire. She has further stated that she was sitting beside her father and thereafter the accused got down from salfi tree and came to their house with churi/kadari (sharp edged weapon) and made one stab injury to her father's neck, by which her father died instantaneously, which she informed to her father's sister Smt.Madkami Bheeme (PW7) as her mother was out of house and gone for grazing cattles and thereafter on consultation, she reported the matter to the police station vide Ex.P12, which has also been proved by Santosh Degal (PW10). She has been subjected to cross-examination, but nothing has been elicited to hold that she was not present at the time when the appellant made stab injury to deceased Oyami Hoonga. She has also refuted the fact that the deceased was intoxicated at the time of incident and some unknown person has murdered him. As such, testimony of Ku.Oyami Sukdo (PW6) remained uncontroverted and merely on account that she is child witness, her testimony cannot be discarded. Furthermore, the appellant's lungi and bloodstained soil were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory and report is available at page-32 of paper book, in which blood was found in the appellant's lungi and blood seized from the spot. 16. At this stage, submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that since one stab injury caused by the appellant herein found to have been established, therefore, it is a fit case that offence under Section 302 of the IPC should be converted under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC as the appellant is in jail since 12.1.2011 and his sentence should be modified accordingly. 17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, having gone through the records and the manner in which the appellant came armed with sharp edged weapon and caused one stab injury to neck of the deceased by which he died instantaneously on the stop and the appellant immediately absconded, we are unable to hold that the act of the appellant would fall within Exception of Part-II of Section 304 of the IPC. In our opinion, the learned Sessions Judge is absolutely justified in holding that the appellant has committed the offence under Section 302 of the IPC and he has rightly been sentenced for imprisonment for life. In our opinion, the learned Sessions Judge is absolutely justified in holding that the appellant has committed the offence under Section 302 of the IPC and he has rightly been sentenced for imprisonment for life. We do not find any reason to interfere with the finding recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. We hereby affirm the said finding. 18. Accordingly, the criminal appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.