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Allahabad High Court · body

2022 DIGILAW 1230 (ALL)

Prem Pal Singh v. State of U. P.

2022-08-04

J.J.MUNIR, RAJESH BINDAL

body2022
ORDER : 1. This writ petition is directed against an order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer (Joint Organization), Aligarh dated 30.04.2022, rejecting the petitioner’s application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’) as not maintainable. 2. The short facts giving rise to the petition are that the petitioner, Prem Pal Singh moved an application under Section 28A of the Act on 04.08.1999 saying that his land comprising Khasra No. 404/1, measuring 1.533 hectares, situate in the Revenue Village Devsaini, Pargana and Tehsil Koil, District Aligarh had been acquired by the State for planned industrial development by the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Limited, Kanpur. L.A.R. No. 42 of 1996, Mohd. Salim vs. State of U.P. and others, being a reference made by the Collector on the basis of objections to the award by the ousted landholder in that case, was allowed and compensation enhanced to Rs.80/-per square yard vide award dated 22.05.1999. It was prayed that the petitioner’s land was covered by the same notification and, therefore, he was entitled to a re-determination of the compensation awarded to him in accordance with the award made by the Court. 3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer found on facts that the petitioner had said in Paragraph No.6 of his application under Section 28A of the Act that against the award passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, he had preferred objections under Section 18 of the Act, submitting them for the purpose of a reference to be made to the Court but his objections were not referred to the District Judge, but were rejected as time barred. The Special Land Acquisition Officer construed the provisions of Section 28A of the Act to mean that a person, whose land was acquired under the provisions of the Act and who is aggrieved against the Collector’s award, may make an application for re-determination of compensation if he has not made an application under Section 18 for a reference to the Court against the award. It has been opined that since the petitioner had admittedly made an application, seeking a reference against the Special Land Acquisition Officer’s award to the Court, which was withheld on the ground of limitation, his application under Section 28A of the Act was not maintainable. 4. It has been opined that since the petitioner had admittedly made an application, seeking a reference against the Special Land Acquisition Officer’s award to the Court, which was withheld on the ground of limitation, his application under Section 28A of the Act was not maintainable. 4. Apparently, the understanding of the Special Land Acquisition Officer about the scope of a person aggrieved by the award of compensation made by the Collector is not correct. The Special Land Acquisition Officer has thought that the moment a person ‘aggrieved’ by the Collector/ Special Land Acquisition Officer’s award, moves an application to the Collector under Section 18 of the Act seeking a reference, the right to re-determination of the compensation under Section 28A, based on the Court’s award in another case arising out of the same acquisition, is extinguished. 5. To the understanding of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, there is no distinction whether the application under Section 18 of the Act preferred by a person aggrieved by the Collector’s award is withheld by the Collector and never entertained, and a case where it is entertained with a reference made to the Court that is answered. In either case, the Special Land Acquisition Officer seems to think that an application under Section 28A of the Act, based on an award of the Court made in the case of another landholder covered by the same notification for re-determination under Section 28A of the Act, would not be maintainable. 6. As already remarked, the construction placed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer upon the scope of the right under Section 28A of the Act is manifestly illegal, inasmuch as unless the Collector entertains an application objecting to the Collector’s award or the Special Land Acquisition Officer’s award and makes a reference under Section 18, there is no reference under Section 18 of the Act at all. It is only after a reference is made and answered by the Court, that the right under Section 28A to seek re-determination based on an award passed by the Court at the instance of another landholder in a reference under Section 18 would be extinguished. The right under Section 28A of the Act can logically not be extinguished by the petitioner making an unsuccessful attempt to get a reference made to the Court. The right under Section 28A of the Act can logically not be extinguished by the petitioner making an unsuccessful attempt to get a reference made to the Court. In the latter case, there is no reference made at the instance of a person whose case is withheld by the Collector on the ground of limitation or otherwise not adjudicated upon by the Court under Section 18 on merits. This question has been authoritatively considered and answered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. Hansoli Devi and others, (2002) 7 SCC 273 , where it has been held: 9. Before we embark upon an inquiry as to what would be the correct interpretation of Section 28-A, we think it appropriate to bear in mind certain basic principles of interpretation of a statute. The rule stated by Tindal, C.J. in Sussex Peerage case [(1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 : 8 ER 1034] still holds the field. The aforesaid rule is to the effect : (ER p. 1057) “If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver.” It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In Kirkness v. John Hudson & Co. Ltd. [(1955) 2 All ER 345 : 1955 AC 696 : (1955) 2 WLR 1135 ] Lord Reid pointed out as to what is the meaning of “ambiguous” and held that : (All ER p. 366 C-D) “A provision is not ambiguous merely because it contains a word which in different contexts is capable of different meanings. It would be hard to find anywhere a sentence of any length which does not contain such a word. It would be hard to find anywhere a sentence of any length which does not contain such a word. A provision is, in my judgment, ambiguous only if it contains a word or phrase which in that particular context is capable of having more than one meaning.” It is no doubt true that if on going through the plain meaning of the language of statutes, it leads to anomalies, injustices and absurdities, then the court may look into the purpose for which the statute has been brought and would try to give a meaning, which would adhere to the purpose of the statute. Patanjali Sastri, C.J. in the case of Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose [ AIR 1952 SC 369 : 1953 SCR 1 ] had held that it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. In Quebec Railway, Light Heat & Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry [ AIR 1920 PC 181 ] it had been observed that the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. Similarly, it is not permissible to add words to a statute which are not there unless on a literal construction being given a part of the statute becomes meaningless. But before any words are read to repair an omission in the Act, it should be possible to state with certainty that these words would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by the legislature had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill had passed into a law. At times, the intention of the legislature is found to be clear but the unskilfulness of the draftsman in introducing certain words in the statute results in apparent ineffectiveness of the language and in such a situation, it may be permissible for the court to reject the surplus words, so as to make the statute effective. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, let us now examine the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, to answer the questions referred to us by the Bench of two learned Judges. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, let us now examine the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, to answer the questions referred to us by the Bench of two learned Judges. It is no doubt true that the object of Section 28-A of the Act was to confer a right of making a reference, (sic on one) who might have not made a reference earlier under Section 18 and, therefore, ordinarily when a person makes a reference under Section 18 but that was dismissed on the ground of delay, he would not get the right of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act when some other person makes a reference and the reference is answered. But Parliament having enacted Section 28-A, as a beneficial provision, it would cause great injustice if a literal interpretation is given to the expression “had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18” in Section 28-A of the Act. The aforesaid expression would mean that if the landowner has made an application for reference under Section 18 and that reference is entertained and answered. In other words, it may not be permissible for a landowner to make a reference and get it answered and then subsequently make another application when some other person gets the reference answered and obtains a higher amount. In fact in Pradeep Kumari case [ (1995) 2 SCC 736 ] the three learned Judges, while enumerating the conditions to be satisfied, whereafter an application under Section 28-A can be moved, had categorically stated (SCC p. 743, para 10) “the person moving the application did not make an application to the Collector under Section 18”. The expression “did not make an application”, as observed by this Court, would mean, did not make an effective application which had been entertained by making the reference and the reference was answered. When an application under Section 18 is not entertained on the ground of limitation, the same not fructifying into any reference, then that would not tantamount to an effective application and consequently the rights of such applicant emanating from some other reference being answered to move an application under Section 28-A cannot be denied. When an application under Section 18 is not entertained on the ground of limitation, the same not fructifying into any reference, then that would not tantamount to an effective application and consequently the rights of such applicant emanating from some other reference being answered to move an application under Section 28-A cannot be denied. We, accordingly answer Question 1(a) by holding that the dismissal of an application seeking reference under Section 18 on the ground of delay would tantamount to not filing an application within the meaning of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. (emphasis by Court) 7. In the present case, since on the petitioner’s application under Section 18 of the Act, no reference was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, which was declined on the ground of limitation, it cannot be said that there was any reference made at the petitioner’s instance that was decided by the Court so as to curtail the petitioner’s right to take advantage of the remedy under Section 28A of the Act. 8. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order declining to re-determine the compensation payable to the petitioner on an application filed under Section 28A of the Act is manifestly illegal and based on a flawed understanding of the provisions of Section 28A. The petitioner’s application under Section 28A is competent and maintainable. 9. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 30.04.2022 passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer (Joint Organization), Aligarh (Annexure No.1 to the writ petition) is hereby quashed. In consequence, the petitioner’s application under Section 28A of the Act is restored to file, which the Special Land Acquisition Officer shall consider and decide by a reasoned and speaking order after hearing the parties concerned expeditiously.