JUDGMENT G.S. Ahluwalia J. - By this common judgment, Cr.A. No.687 of 2010 filed by Kedar Singh and Cr.A. No.691 of 2010 filed by Bharat Singh, Devaram, and Rampreet shall be decided. 2. It is not out of place to mention here that co-accused Surajbhan absconded during trial. Two witnesses, i.e., Bhanupratap (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W. 2) were examined in his presence, but thereafter he absconded and could be arrested only after the co-accused persons namely Kedar Singh, Ramhet, Bharat, Devaram and Rampreet were convicted. His trial resumed and the remaining witnesses were re- examined. In the light of the judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of K.T. Mydeen Vs. The Asstt. Commissioner, Department of Customs, decided on 29-12-2021 in Cr.A. No.1306 of 2021, his Criminal Appeal No.6213 of 2021 has also been heard simultaneously, but in order to avoid any confusion regarding evidence led in the Trial of accused persons, his appeal shall be decided by a separate judgment. 3. Further, a report was also received from the office of Superintendent of Central Jail, Gwalior that Ramhet, Appellant No. 2 in Cr.A. No.687 of 2010 has expired on 19-3-2019 during his treatment in J.A. Hospital, Gwalior, accordingly by order dated 11-1- 2022, his appeal has been dismissed as abated. 4. These two Criminal Appeals have been filed under Section 374 of Cr.P.C. against the judgment and sentence dated 28-7-2010 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Gohad, Distt. Bhind in S.T. No.118/2007, by which the Appellants have been convicted and sentenced for the following offences : Convicted under Section Sentence 302/149 of IPC Life Imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default 6 months R.I. 307/149 of IPC R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default 6 months R.I. 148 of IPC R.I. for 1 year All the sentences shall run concurrently. 5. According to prosecution story, the complainant Bhanupratap Singh Gurjar, lodged an FIR on 16-10-2006 at 10:45 A.M., on the allegation that at about 10:15 A.M., he, his father Pahalwan, uncle Darshan Singh, Cousin brother Ajab Singh were irrigating the field of Ajab Singh. At that time, the Appellants as well as Surajbhan and Dilip came to their field. They were armed with guns, lathi and other weapons and surrounded his Father, Uncle and Cousin brother and started abusing them. At that time, the Appellants as well as Surajbhan and Dilip came to their field. They were armed with guns, lathi and other weapons and surrounded his Father, Uncle and Cousin brother and started abusing them. Kedar Singh and Ramhet said that they (accused persons) would irrigate their fields first and in case if they (complainant party) do not agree for that, then they (complainant party) would be killed. His father replied, that some portion of his field is left for irrigation and let it be completed. Then Bharat Singh by using abusive language started insisting that he will irrigate his land. His uncle also tried to persuade Bharat Singh that he may wait for some time. Kedar Singh, Ramhet and Surajbhan were having mouser guns, whereas Bharat was having Farsa, Devaram, Dilip and Rampreet were having lathis. Kedar fired a gunshot causing injury on the head of his father. Ramhet also caused gunshot injury to his Uncle Darshan Singh. Surajbhan also fired gunshot causing injury on the head of his father. Dilip Singh, Rampreet, Devaram started assaulting Ajab Singh by means of lathi, Farsa as a result, he also fell down. Ajab Singh sustained injuries on his head, hands and legs as Bharat Singh had assaulted him by Farsa, whereas Devaram, Dilip and Rampreet had assaulted by lathis. His father Pahalwan and Darshan Singh died on the spot. Kedar Singh also chased him and fired gunshots, but he escaped and ran towards his house. Ravi and Brijendra have witnessed the incident. Kedar Singh has left his white shirt, photocopy of his license and diary with Rs.150/- on the spot, which he has brought. 6. On the basis of the report lodged by complainant Bhanupratap Singh, police registered offence under Sections 302, 307, 147, 148, 149, 120-B of I.P.C. The dead bodies of Pahalwan Singh and Darshan Singh were sent for post-mortem. The spot map was prepared. Statements of the witnesses were recorded. Police after completing the investigation, filed charge sheet against the Appellants and Surajbhan for offence under Section 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 120-B of I.P.C., whereas co-accused Dilip was shown absconding. 7. The spot map was prepared. Statements of the witnesses were recorded. Police after completing the investigation, filed charge sheet against the Appellants and Surajbhan for offence under Section 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 120-B of I.P.C., whereas co-accused Dilip was shown absconding. 7. The Trial Court by order dated 23-1-2008 framed charges against the Appellants Bharat Singh, Devaram and Rampreet for offence under Sections 148, 302/149 of IPC for causing murder of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh, and under Section 307/149 of IPC for making an attempt to kill Ajab Singh and Bhanupratap Singh. (It is not out of place to mention here that singular charge under Section 302/149 of IPC was framed for murder of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh, instead of framing charge on two counts. Similarly, singular charge under Section 307/149 of IPC was framed for attempting to kill Bhanupratap Singh and Ajab Singh, instead of framing charge on two counts.). Similarly charges under Sections 148, 302 or in the alternative 302/149, for murder of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh, 307 /149 of IPC for making an attempt to kill Bhanupratap Singh and Ajab Singh were framed against Kedar Singh, Ramhet and Surajbhan. (It is not out of place to mention here that singular charge under Section 302 or in the alternative 302/149 of IPC was framed for murder of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh, instead of framing charges on two counts. Similarly, singular charge under Section 307/149 of IPC was framed for attempting to kill Bhanupratap Singh and Ajab Singh, instead of framing charges on two counts.) 8. The Appellants abjured their guilt and pleaded not guilty. 9. The prosecution examined Bhanupratap (P.W.1), Ajab Singh (P.W.2), Dashrath Singh (P.W.3), Brijendra Singh (P.W.4), R.S. Rathore (P.W.5), Munnilal Morya (P.W.6), Bharat Singh (P.W.7), Mayaram (P.W. 8), Jabar Singh (P.W.9), Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10), and Ashok Kumar Bhardwaj (P.W.11). 10. The Appellants examined Ganga Singh Bhadauriya (D.W.1) in their defence. 11. The Trial Court by the impugned judgment and sentence convicted and sentenced the Appellants for the above mentioned offences. 12. Challenging the judgment passed by the Court below, it is submitted by the Counsel for the Appellant Kedar Singh that Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) are unreliable witnesses. The ocular evidence is not supported by medical evidence. The presence of rigor mortis indicates, that the deaths had already taken place much prior to the alleged time of incident. Challenging the judgment passed by the Court below, it is submitted by the Counsel for the Appellant Kedar Singh that Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) are unreliable witnesses. The ocular evidence is not supported by medical evidence. The presence of rigor mortis indicates, that the deaths had already taken place much prior to the alleged time of incident. In fact some unknown persons might have killed the deceased Pahalwan and Darshan Singh in the wee hours, but on account of previous enmity, the Appellants have been falsely implicated. Multiple fired cartridges were found on the spot, whereas according to prosecution witnesses, only four gunshots were fired. In the FIR it is alleged by Bhanupratap Singh that Kedar had left his white shirt on the spot, and he has brought the same, but in his evidence, he clearly stated that after leaving the place of incident, he did not return to the spot, therefore, it is clear that there was no occasion for the complainant to bring the white shirt of Kedar to the police station. The witnesses are related and interested witnesses, therefore, they are not reliable. 13. In addition, Shri Atul Gupta with Shri Ashok Jain, Counsel for Appellants Bharat and Rampreet as well as Shri V.D. Sharma, Counsel for Devaram submitted that there is nothing on record to show that the Appellants were the members of unlawful assembly or were sharing common object. No injuries which could have been caused by hard and blunt object were found on the body of the deceased persons or injured. 14. Per contra, the Counsel for the State has supported the findings recorded by the Trial Court. 15. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 16. Before adverting to the facts of the case, this Court would like to consider as to whether the deceased Pahalwan and Darshan Singh died a homicidal death or not? 17. Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) conducted the post-mortem of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh. The post-mortem of Pahalwan Singh was conducted on 16-10-2006 itself at 4:00 P.M. and found the following injuries : Dead body lying on supine position. Both hand and legs extended. 17. Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) conducted the post-mortem of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh. The post-mortem of Pahalwan Singh was conducted on 16-10-2006 itself at 4:00 P.M. and found the following injuries : Dead body lying on supine position. Both hand and legs extended. Wearing check shirt, white pajama, rigor mortis present all over body: Injuries (i)A oblique semi-lunar wound present over right forehead just above of right eye brow, edges contused, inverted, blackish, direction oblique, upwarded, size width 2 cm & oblique 3 cm; (ii) A semi-lunar wound present over right temporal region, edges contused, inverted, blackening, width 2 cm x 1 cm vertically. Rest of skull disrupted, and total brain tissue also absent and rest of skull (remaining part) is also fractured in small pieces. Total skull is disrupted at level of semi-lunar wound and whole around the skull part. Semi Undigested food material Un-digested food material Faecal matter in large intestine In my opinion mode of death due to coma and caused by head injury (due to gun shot) because total disruption of head and brain tissue. Time Duration about 6 to 12 hours since P.M. The Post-mortem report is Ex. P.18. 18. The post-mortem of Darshan Singh was conducted at 4:30 P.M. and following injuries were found on the dead body: (i) Incised wound over right parietal region of scalp vertically 6x1xscalp deep. It is anti-mortem in nature. (ii) Entry wound - Oval shaped, edges contused, inverted blackish colour, bleeding with oozing coming out. Dept is unlimited at past. Axillary line of right post lower chest (iii) Exit wound- Level of 8th rib. 2 1/2 x 2 cm size exit wound present over at level of lower end of sternum, irregular size, inverted edges, 4 x 3 cm direction is oblique, backward right laterally, blackening of wound - liver of right side is ruptured and distorted, disrupted. Rupture of peritoneum at upper level Small Un-digested food material Un-digested food material Faecal matter (+) Liver : Ruptured, disrupted on right side. In my opinion, mode of death due to shock, hemorrhage, rupture of liver and esophagus and caused by gun shot. Time duration - 6 to 12 hours since P.M. The Post-mortem report is Ex. P.17. 19. This witness was cross-examined by the Appellants. He admitted that copy of FIR and documents of Lash Panchnamas were not sent by the police station. No Rojnamcha entries were also sent. Time duration - 6 to 12 hours since P.M. The Post-mortem report is Ex. P.17. 19. This witness was cross-examined by the Appellants. He admitted that copy of FIR and documents of Lash Panchnamas were not sent by the police station. No Rojnamcha entries were also sent. The weapon which had caused injury to deceased Pahalwan Singh was not sent to him. The deceased Darshan Singh had only one entry and exit wound which was caused by single gun. He admitted that in case blackening is found around the wound, then the injury must have been caused from a close range of utpo 4 feet. The food gets digested within 4-6 hours and stage of semi-digested food starts from 2 hours. It is possible that the deceased must have consumed food within 2-4 hours of death. He further admitted that although the incised wound was found on the head of Darshan Singh, but it had not damaged any vital organ. The gunshot injury no.1 found on the dead body of Pahalwan Singh was caused from a close range of within 4 feet. The injury no.2 was also caused from a close range of within 4 feet. The duration of death was 6-12 hours. 20. From the evidence of Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10), it is clear that the death of Darshan Singh and Pahalwan Singh was homicidal in nature caused due to gunshots. 21. Further, Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W. 10) had examined Ajab Singh and found following injuries on his body : (i) Four incised wound over scalp ++ Bleeding 6x1xscalp deep (each) over scalp in different area, caused by sharp weapon, (ii) Incised wound 2x1x cartilage deep over right ear caused by sharp weapon (iii) Swelling over right wrist joint caused by hard and blunt object All the injuries were fresh and nature of injuries were clinically simple The injured Ajab Singh was referred to J.A.H. Gwalior for further investigation. The M.L.C. is Ex. P.19. 22. Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W. 10) was also cross-examined regarding injuries sustained by Ajab Singh, who stated that the injuries were simple in nature and no weapon was sent to him. The injury no.2 could have been caused due to fall on pointed object. Injury no.3 could have been caused due to fall on hard surface. He had advised x- ray, but no x-ray report was placed before him. The injury no.2 could have been caused due to fall on pointed object. Injury no.3 could have been caused due to fall on hard surface. He had advised x- ray, but no x-ray report was placed before him. If injured had not sustained any fracture, then the nature of injuries was simple. 23. Thus, it is clear that the injured Ajab Singh (P.W.2) sustained 5 incised wounds and one swelling which could have been caused by hard and blunt object. 24. Now the moot question for consideration is that whether the Appellants are guilty of charges which were framed against them or not? 25. Bhanupratap Singh (P.W. 1) has stated that on 16-10-2006 at about 10-10:15 A.M., he, his uncle, his cousin brother and father were watering their field. At that time all the accused persons, i.e., Appellants, Surajbhan and Dilip came there. The field of Bharat Singh is adjoining to the field of this witness. The accused persons, in furtherance of common object, surrounded them. The Appellant Ramhet and Kedar said that they would give water to their field and in case, if the complainant party do not agree for that, then they would be killed. His father replied that watering is left only in a part of his field, therefore, they may irrigate their field thereafter. On this, the Appellant Bharat Singh started abusing. His uncle also asked them not to quarrel and they may give water to their field after some time. On this issue, the Appellants Ramhet, Kedar and Surajbhan came forward with their mouser guns. The Appellant Kedar took off his shirt and kept it on the earthen boundary of the field and challenged that he would open water for his field. The deceased Pahalwan asked him not to do so and requested that watering of his field would be completed within a short period of time. Then on this issue, the Appellant Kedar fired a gunshot on Pahalwan Singh, which hit on his head. Surajbhan also fired a gunshot which also hit on the head of the deceased. Ramhet fired a gunshot causing injury to Darshan Singh. His father Pahalwan and uncle Darshan Singh fell down on the ground. His father died on the spot. Darshan Singh was assaulted by Bharat Singh by Farsa, and by Dilip, Rampreet, Devaram by lathis. Dilip, Rampreet, Devaram and Bharat also assaulted Ajab Singh. Ramhet fired a gunshot causing injury to Darshan Singh. His father Pahalwan and uncle Darshan Singh fell down on the ground. His father died on the spot. Darshan Singh was assaulted by Bharat Singh by Farsa, and by Dilip, Rampreet, Devaram by lathis. Dilip, Rampreet, Devaram and Bharat also assaulted Ajab Singh. His uncle Darshan Singh also died, whereas Ajab Singh sustained grievous injuries. One day prior to the incident, the Appellants had shifted their women and children from their houses along with their belongings. After the incident, Kedar followed this witness and fired a gunshot with an intention to kill him, but he escaped unhurt. This witness ran towards his house and somehow succeeded in saving his life. The noise of gunshots were heard by villagers. After noticing that some villagers are coming, the assailants ran away. The incident was witnessed by Ravi and Brijendra. Thereafter, he went to Police Station Gohad to lodge FIR. Ravi and Brijendra had also accompanied him. The merg intimation is Ex. P.1 and FIR is Ex. P.2. Thereafter, they took the dead bodies of Pahalwan Singh and Darshan Singh as well as injured Ajab Singh to Gohad Hospital. The police went to spot along with this witness. Safina form, Ex. P.3 was issued. The Lash Panchnama of Pahalwan Singh is Ex. P.4 and Lash Panchnama of Darshan Singh, Ex. P.5. The dead bodies were received after post-mortem. The treatment of Ajab Singh had begun. The spot map was prepared on his instructions, Ex. P.6. His police statement was recorded. This witness was cross-examined and in cross-examination, this witness stated that he, his father, mother and wife resides in Gwalior. However, one week prior to incident, his father Pahalwan Singh had come to village and one day prior to incident, this witness had also come to village. He had heard that the accused persons had hatched conspiracy. This information was given by his uncle. The names of his uncles are Ghanshyam and Govind Singh who resides in Govind Ka Pura. He has personal relations with them. After gunshot was fired by Kedar on this witness, he came back to village. 10-12 villagers had gathered there including Ghanshyam and Govind Singh. This witness had informed the villagers that his father Pahalwan and Uncle have died due to gunshots. At that time, Ghanshyam had informed him about the conspiracy. He has personal relations with them. After gunshot was fired by Kedar on this witness, he came back to village. 10-12 villagers had gathered there including Ghanshyam and Govind Singh. This witness had informed the villagers that his father Pahalwan and Uncle have died due to gunshots. At that time, Ghanshyam had informed him about the conspiracy. He reached to the police station at about 10:45 A.M. They went to Police Station on motorcycle. The Motorcycle belongs to his friend Ravi. However, he stated that at the time of lodging of FIR, Ex. P.2, he had also informed the police about the conspiracy, but could not explain as to why the said fact is not mentioned. The Appellant Kedar had fired only one gunshot at him. All the three accused persons (Kedar, Ramhet and Surajbhan) had fired about 6-7 gunshots. The hot talk continued for 2-3 minutes prior to firing. He admitted that in spite of their distress shouts, no body had intervened. He denied that Bharat, Dilip, Rampreet and Devaram had not assaulted Ajab Singh. He further stated that after running away from the spot, he went to his house and again came back to the spot along with some persons and picked up the shirt of Kedar, copy of license etc and brought it to the police station. He admitted that he had not disclosed in his FIR, Ex. P.2 that he came back to the spot and picked up the shirt of Kedar which was having copy of license and diary. After lodging FIR, he came directly to the spot along with police. At the time of Lash Panchnama, he, Ravi and 10-15 more villagers were present. He admitted that at the time of preparation of Lash Panchnama, Ex. P.4, he had not disclosed that which accused caused injury by which weapon. He further stated that the accused persons had surrounded his uncle, father and cousin brother Ajab Singh. At the time of incident, he was at a distance of 50 ft.s from his father, uncle and cousin brother. Kedar had fired at his father from a distance of 25 ft., whereas Ramhet was 2 steps away from his uncle. Surajbhan was 5 steps away from his father and 10-12 steps away from his uncle. Second gunshot was fired by Surajbhan at his father Pahalwan, whereas the third gunshot was fired by Ramhet. Kedar had fired at his father from a distance of 25 ft., whereas Ramhet was 2 steps away from his uncle. Surajbhan was 5 steps away from his father and 10-12 steps away from his uncle. Second gunshot was fired by Surajbhan at his father Pahalwan, whereas the third gunshot was fired by Ramhet. He denied that since a copy of license was found in the shirt, therefore, he is claiming that incident was committed by Kedar. The dead bodies of his father and uncle were lying at a distance of 6-7 steps. He admitted that villagers have agricultural fields around the field of this witness. He denied for want of knowledge that if watering is going on in the field of one agriculturist, then without breaking wall, whether the other agriculturists can irrigate their fields or not? He denied that his dispute with other villagers on the question of irrigating their lands is going on. He on his own stated that except the accused, he did not have dispute with any other villager. He stated that at the time of preparation of site map, he had disclosed the place, whereas Ajab Singh was assaulted. He did not go to hospital along with Ajab Singh. Since, the proceedings for recording FIR were going on, therefore, he do not know as to whether Ravi and Brijendra had gone to hospital or not? He admitted that Ravi is the resident of Pinto Park but claimed that he was not his close friend. Ravi had no good reason to come to village. He denied for want of knowledge that Ravi has been killed in Police Encounter. He denied for want of knowledge that Ravi was a History Sheeter Goon. He denied that because of criminal activities of this witness, he had developed friendship with Ravi. 26. Ajab Singh (P.W.2) is the injured eyewitness. He also stated that it was 10 A.M. on 16-10-2006. He, his uncles Pahalwan, Darshan Singh and cousin brother Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) were irrigating their fields. The field of Bharat Singh is adjoining to his field. Devaram, Ramhet, Kedar Singh and Bharat Singh are real brothers, whereas Surajbhan and Rampreet are sons of Bharat Singh. This witness and the accused persons are resident of Chaudhari Ka Pura. He, his uncles Pahalwan, Darshan Singh and cousin brother Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) were irrigating their fields. The field of Bharat Singh is adjoining to his field. Devaram, Ramhet, Kedar Singh and Bharat Singh are real brothers, whereas Surajbhan and Rampreet are sons of Bharat Singh. This witness and the accused persons are resident of Chaudhari Ka Pura. One day prior to incident, the accused persons had hatched a conspiracy that when Pahalwan Singh would start watering his field, then they would kill him. Accordingly, the women, children and costly belongings were shifted to somewhere else. In furtherance of common object, they surrounded the field and started abusing them. Kedar said that they would irrigate their field, and if the complainant party do not agree for that, then they would kill them. On this issue, his uncles, Pahalwan Singh and Darshan replied that only a few portion of their field remains to be irrigated, therefore, they may irrigate their fields thereafter. On this, the accused persons started assaulting him. When his uncles Pahalwan and Darshan Singh tried to intervene, then Kedar Singh fired a gunshot on Pahalwan. Surajbhan fired gunshot causing injury to Pahalwan. Ramhet fired gunshot causing injury to Darshan Singh. Bharat, Devaram, Dilip Singh and Rampreet assaulted this witness as well as caused injury to Darshan Singh. As he had sustained multiple injuries therefore, he fell unconscious, therefore, do not know that who shifted him to Hospital, but he regained consciousness in Gwalior Hospital. This witness was cross-examined. In cross-examination, this witness has stated that he himself had not seen the accused persons hatching conspiracy, but got suspicious after noticing that they were shifting women, children and costly belongings. He further stated that after hearing his shouts, when his uncles Pahalwan and Darshan Singh came to save him, then Kedar Singh fired gunshot. After he regained consciousness in hospital, his relative Girraj was present, but did not tell about the incident. He admitted that at the time of his beating, Kedar, Ramhet and Surajbhan were having guns, but they did not fire gunshots at him. He further admitted that generally the work of irrigating the fields start at 3-4 A.M. However, he stated on his own, that the work of irrigating the fields continues for 24 hours. He admitted that at the time of his beating, Kedar, Ramhet and Surajbhan were having guns, but they did not fire gunshots at him. He further admitted that generally the work of irrigating the fields start at 3-4 A.M. However, he stated on his own, that the work of irrigating the fields continues for 24 hours. He denied that in case, a person do not start irrigating his fields at 3-4 A.M., then he would not be able to irrigate his field as the person who has started irrigating his field would finish his work first. He admitted that the dispute arose on the question of watering the field and as some portion of his field was left for irrigation, therefore, the accused persons were disputing. He denied that for the last one week, dispute with villagers was going on. He denied that unidentified persons had assaulted this witness and had killed his uncles Pahalwan and Darshan Singh. He admitted that Darshan Singh had come to village about 2-3 days back. 27. Dashrath Singh (P.W.3) has stated that the police had issued Safina form, Ex. P.3 and Lash Panchnama of Pahalwan Singh, Ex. P.4 and Lash Panchnama of Darshan Singh, Ex. P.5 were prepared. At the time of site inspection, the police had seized blood stained earth, plain earth, empty cartridges as well as one golden frame of glasses of Pahalwan Singh, vide seizure memo Ex. P. 7. 28. Brijendra Singh (P.W.4) is also an eyewitness. He stated that after answering the call of nature, he was returning back. The moment he reached near Bamba, he saw that hot talk was going on between Darshan Singh, Pahalwan Singh, Ajab Singh and the accused persons. After hearing the noise, he went towards these persons. He saw that Devaram, Bharat, Rampreet and Dilip started assaulting Ajab Singh (P.W.2). Kedar fired a gunshot which hit on the right side of the head of Pahalwan Singh. Surajbhan fired another gunshot hitting on the forehead of Pahalwan Singh. Ramhet fired a gunshot, hitting on the chest of Darshan Singh. After Darshan Singh fell down on the ground, Bharat Singh assaulted him by Farsa which landed on the back side of neck. After noticing that some people from Chaudhary ka pura are coming, the accused persons ran away. Surajbhan fired another gunshot hitting on the forehead of Pahalwan Singh. Ramhet fired a gunshot, hitting on the chest of Darshan Singh. After Darshan Singh fell down on the ground, Bharat Singh assaulted him by Farsa which landed on the back side of neck. After noticing that some people from Chaudhary ka pura are coming, the accused persons ran away. Although this witness was cross-examined, but none of the Counsel for the Appellants, referred to the cross-examination of this witness. In fact, none of the Counsel touched the evidence of this witness, merely by saying that even the Trial Court has not relied on him. But they could not point out any findings by the Trial Court to show that this witness was disbelieved by the Trial Court. 29. R.S. Rathore (P.W. 5) was posted as S.H.O., Police Station Gohad. On the said date, he recorded the FIR, Ex. P.2 on the information given by Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.2) for offence under Sections 302, 307, 147, 148, 149, 120-B of IPC. He also issued Safina form, Ex. P.3. Lash panchnama of dead body of Pahalwan Singh, Ex. P4, Lash Panchnama of dead body of Darshan Singh, Ex. P5 were prepared. On the instructions of Bhanupratap Singh, he prepared spot map, Ex. P.6. On 16-10-2016, he seized blood stained earth, plain earth, golden frame of glasses of Pahalwan and four empty cartridges vide seizure memo Ex.P..7. On 29-10-2006 he further seized one brass shell of cartridge vide seizure memo Ex. P.8. On 16-10-2006, he vide seizure memo, Ex. P.9, had seized one white shirt of Kedar, photocopy of his license and diary on production of the same by Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1). On 9-11-2006, Bharat Singh was arrested vide arrest memo Ex. P.10. Devaram was arrested vide arrest memo Ex. P.11. On 10-11-2006, he had seized one lathi with farsa affixed on it from Bharat Singh vide seizure memo Ex. P.12. On 10-11-2006, he had seized one lathi from Devaram, Ex. P.13. The blood stained earth which was seized near the dead body of Pahalwan Singh is Article 'C'. Plain earth is article 'D'. Golden frame is article 'E'. Four empty cartridges are article 'F'. The blood stained earth seized near the body of Darshan Singh is Article 'G', plain earth is Article 'H' and one fired cartridge which was seized subsequently is Article 'I'. Plain earth is article 'D'. Golden frame is article 'E'. Four empty cartridges are article 'F'. The blood stained earth seized near the body of Darshan Singh is Article 'G', plain earth is Article 'H' and one fired cartridge which was seized subsequently is Article 'I'. The cross-examination of this witness was referred by the Counsel for the Appellants only for the purpose of submitting that the omissions and contradictions in the police statements of the prosecution witnesses were also pointed out to this witness. It was further stated that this witness had not put any specimen of seal on the seizure memo Ex. P.8. 30. Munnilal Morya (P.W. 6) had recorded the merg intimation, Ex. P.1. This witness had also seized the packets containing cloths of Darshan Singh and Pahalwan Singh which were brought by constable Ramdas from the hospital, vide seizure memo Ex. P.14. The packet containing cloths of Pahalwan is Article 'L' and packet containing cloths of Darshan is Article 'M'. 31. Bharat Singh (P.W.7), Mayaram (P.W.8) turned hostile. 32. Jabra Singh (P.W.9) has stated that one brass shell of cartridge was seized by police from his field vide seizure memo Ex. P.8. 33. Ashok Kumar Bhardwaj (P.W.11) is also an Investigating Officer. The Counsel for the Appellants accepted that guns and lathis from the possession of Kedar Singh, Ramhet and Rampreet were seized and accordingly, the weapons were not called in the Court, and only the arrest memo and seizure memos were proved by this witness. Whether the witnesses have changed the sequence of incident and if so, then its effect. 34. By referring to the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1), it is submitted by the Counsel for the Appellants that according to this witness, the gunshots were fired at the earliest thereby killing Pahalwan and Darshan Singh and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) was assaulted subsequently. However, Ajab Singh (P.W.2) has stated that he was assaulted first and when Pahalwan and Darshan Singh tired to intervene in the matter, only then gunshots were fired resulting in deaths of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh. Therefore, in view of major variance in the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2), both the witnesses are not reliable. 35. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the parties. 36. Therefore, in view of major variance in the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2), both the witnesses are not reliable. 35. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the parties. 36. As already pointed out, the Trial Court has not disbelieved the evidence of Brijendra (P.W.4), but on the contrary, in para 23 of the judgment, it has been held that the evidence of Brijendra (P.W. 4) corroborates the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2). As already held, none of the Counsel for the Appellants, challenged the evidence of Brijendra (P.W.4) but merely relied on para 27 of the judgment and submitted that since, the Trial Court has held that Bhanupratap (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) are reliable witnesses and has not referred to Brijendra (P.W.4), therefore, it is to be presumed that Brijendra (P.W.4) was disbelieved by Trial Court. This submission of the Counsel for the Appellants cannot be accepted in the light of findings given by the Trial Court in para 23 of judgment. 37. Further, Brijendra (P.W.4) has stated in his evidence that initially Ajab Singh (P.W.2) was assaulted and when Pahalwan and Darshan Singh intervened in the matter, then gunshots were fired by Kedar, Ramhet and Surajbhan. Even Ajab Singh (P.W.2) has stated that while he was being assaulted by Bharat Singh, Rampreet, Dilip (absconding) and Devaram, no gunshots were fired by Kedar, Ramhet and Surajbhan. Further, Ajab Singh (P.W.2) is an injured witness, and he enjoys a special status in comparison to other witnesses. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Naresh, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 324 has held as under : 27. The evidence of an injured witness must be given due weightage being a stamped witness, thus, his presence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. The witness would not like or want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to implicate a third person falsely for the commission of the offence. Thus, the evidence of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. (Vide Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, Balraje v. State of Maharashtra and Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P.) * * * 29. A mere relationship cannot be a factor to affect credibility of a witness. The evidence of a witness cannot be discarded solely on the ground of his relationship with the victim of the offence. The plea relating to relatives' evidence remains without any substance in case the evidence has credence and it can be relied upon. In such a case the defence has to lay foundation if plea of false implication is made and the court has to analyse the evidence of related witnesses carefully to find out whether it is cogent and credible. (Vide Jarnail Singh, Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan and Balraje) 30. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and other witnesses also make material improvement while deposing in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However, minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety. The court has to form its opinion about the credibility of the witness and record a finding as to whether his deposition inspires confidence. '9. Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. The court has to form its opinion about the credibility of the witness and record a finding as to whether his deposition inspires confidence. '9. Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test credibility of the prosecution version, when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility.'* Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements of a witness cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited. [Vide State v. Saravanan, Arumugam v. State, Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. and Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra.] 38. The Supreme Court in the case of Baleshwar Mahto v. State of Bihar, reported in (2017) 3 SCC 152 has held as under : 12. Here, PW 7 is also an injured witness. When the eyewitness is also an injured person, due credence to his version needs to be accorded. On this aspect, we may refer to the following observations in Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P.: (SCC pp. 271-72, paras 28-30) '28. The question of the weight to be attached to the evidence of a witness that was himself injured in the course of the occurrence has been extensively discussed by this Court. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. 'Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness.' [Vide Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar, Malkhan Singh v. State of U.P., Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, Bonkya v. State of Maharashtra, Bhag Singh, Mohar v. State of U.P. (SCC p. 606b-c), Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan, Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy v. State of A.P. and Balraje v. State of Maharashtra.] 29. While deciding this issue, a similar view was taken in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, where this Court reiterated the special evidentiary status accorded to the testimony of an injured accused and relying on its earlier judgments held as under: (SCC pp. 726-27, paras 28-29) '28. Darshan Singh (PW 4) was an injured witness. He had been examined by the doctor. His testimony could not be brushed aside lightly. He had given full details of the incident as he was present at the time when the assailants reached the tubewell. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka this Court has held that the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies, for the reason that his presence on the scene stands established in case it is proved that he suffered the injury during the said incident. 29. In State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand a similar view has been reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. In case the injured witness is subjected to lengthy cross- examination and nothing can be elicited to discard his testimony, it should be relied upon (vide Krishan v. State of Haryana). Thus, we are of the considered opinion that evidence of Darshan Singh (PW 4) has rightly been relied upon by the courts below.' 30. The law on the point can be summarised to the effect that the testimony of the injured witness is accorded a special status in law. This is as a consequence of the fact that the injury to the witness is an inbuilt guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and because the witness will not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely implicate a third party for the commission of the offence. Thus, the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein.' 39. Thus, the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein.' 39. Thus, the fact that a witness had suffered injuries in an incident, is by itself a guarantee that the said witness was present on the spot. Further, unless and until, there are strong reasons, the testimony of injured witness should not be discarded. 40. In the present case, although Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) was also present on the spot, but he has stated that he had witnessed the incident from a distance of 50 ft., whereas Ajab Singh (P.W.2) had sustained injuries in the same incident. Ajab Singh had sustained five incised wounds, out of which 4 incised wounds were on the head and 1 was on right ear, whereas he also sustained swelling over right wrist which was caused by hard and blunt object. Thus, it is clear that injuries were caused on vital parts of the body of Ajab Singh (P.W.2). Furthermore, the FIR, Ex. P.2 was lodged within 30 minutes from the incident and in the FIR. Ex.P.2, itself it is specifically mentioned that Ajab Singh (P.W.2) has been assaulted by the accused persons. Thus, if there is some discrepancy regarding the sequence of the incident, then, due weightage is to be given to the testimony of an injured witness. Further, the evidence of Ajab Singh (P.W.2) is corroborated by Brijendra (P.W.4), whose testimony was not challenged by any of the Counsel under a wrong notion that he has been disbelieved by the Trial Court. Thus, it is held that gunshot injuries were caused to Pahalwan and Darshan Singh only after they tried to intervene in order to save Ajab Singh (P.W.2). In the opinion of the Court, the variance in the sequence of incident, cannot be said to be of major in nature, as not only the incident took place in a quick session, but Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) was watching the incident from the distance of 50 ft.s. Thus, with regard to sequence of incident, the evidence of Ajab Singh (P.W.2) to the effect that initially he was assaulted by Bharat Singh, Rampreet, Devaram and Dilip and thereafter, Pahalwan and Darshan Singh were killed by causing gunshot injuries, is accepted. Whether Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) had picked up the White Shirt, Copy of arm license, diary of Kedar from the spot or not? 41. Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) in his FIR, Ex. P.2 has stated that Kedar had left his white shirt, copy of license and a diary on the spot, which he has brought. By referring to the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W. 1), it is submitted by Shri R.K.S. Kushwaha, Counsel for Kedar that, after Pahalwan and Darshan were killed, this witness had ran towards his house and from there he went to police station and thus, he had no occasion to pick up the white shirt of Kedar from the spot. 42. Heard the learned Counsel for the Appellants. 43. This witness in para 13 of his cross-examination has stated that after the incident took place, he rushed back to his house and thereafter, he came back to the spot along with 10-12 persons and picked up the white shirt of Kedar which was containing photocopy of his license and a diary and went to police station to lodge the F.I.R. Although in para 14 of his cross-examination, he has stated that he did not mention in his FIR, Ex. P.2 that he went back to the spot and picked up the white shirt of Kedar containing photocopy of license and diary and came to lodge the FIR, but in the considered opinion of this Court, this omission in the FIR, Ex. P.2 is not a major omission going to the root of the credibility of this witness. 44. It is well established principle of law that FIR is not an encyclopedia and need not to contain each and every minute details of the incident. The FIR must contain the broad features of the incident. The Supreme Court in the case of V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand, reported in (2015) 9 SCC 588 has held as under : 13. FIR is not meant to be an encyclopaedia nor is it expected to contain all the details of the prosecution case. It may be sufficient if the broad facts of the prosecution case are stated in the FIR 45. The Supreme Court in the case of Kamal Kant Dubey Vs. FIR is not meant to be an encyclopaedia nor is it expected to contain all the details of the prosecution case. It may be sufficient if the broad facts of the prosecution case are stated in the FIR 45. The Supreme Court in the case of Kamal Kant Dubey Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2015) 11 SCC 145 has held as under : 18 it is a well-accepted principle that the first information report need not contain every single detail and every part of the case of the prosecution 46. Any improvement which does not effect the basic substratum of the matter will not make the evidence of a person unreliable. However, in the present case, the complainant Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) at the time of lodging FIR itself, brought the white shirt of Kedar along with photocopy of arms license and diary, which was duly seized on 16-10-2006 itself vide seizure memo Ex. P. 9 at 10:55 A.M. 47. Furthermore, it is well established principle of law that minor omissions and contradictions will not make the witness unreliable. The Supreme Court in the case of Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P., reported in (2011) 6 SCC 288 has held as under : 32. It is a settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence of a witness, minor discrepancies on trivial matters, which do not affect the core of the prosecution's case, may not prompt the court to reject the evidence in its entirety. 'Irrelevant details which do not in any way corrode the credibility of a witness cannot be labelled as omissions or contradictions.' Difference in some minor details, which does not otherwise affect the core of the prosecution case, even if present, would not itself prompt the court to reject the evidence on minor variations and discrepancies. After exercising care and caution and sifting through the evidence to separate truth from untruth, exaggeration and improvements, the court comes to a conclusion as to whether the residuary evidence is sufficient to convict the accused. Thus, an undue importance should not be attached to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness. As the mental capabilities of a human being cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb all the details, minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the statements of witnesses. As the mental capabilities of a human being cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb all the details, minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the statements of witnesses. (See State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, State v. Saravanan and Prithu v. State of H.P.) 48. The Supreme Court in the case of Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh, reported in (2017) 11 SCC 195 has held as under : Discrepancies in evidence 29. It is well settled in law that the minor discrepancies are not to be given undue emphasis and the evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. The test is whether the same inspires confidence in the mind of the court. If the evidence is incredible and cannot be accepted by the test of prudence, then it may create a dent in the prosecution version. If an omission or discrepancy goes to the root of the matter and ushers in incongruities, the defence can take advantage of such inconsistencies. It needs no special emphasis to state that every omission cannot take place of a material omission and, therefore, minor contradictions, inconsistencies or insignificant embellishments do not affect the core of the prosecution case and should not be taken to be a ground to reject the prosecution evidence. The omission should create a serious doubt about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of a witness. It is only the serious contradictions and omissions which materially affect the case of the prosecution but not every contradiction or omission. (See Rammi v. State of M.P., Leela Ram v. State of Haryana, Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh, Vijay v. State of M.P., Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of Police, Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. and Mritunjoy Biswas v. Pranab.) 49. Thus, it cannot be said that the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) is unreliable. On the contrary, he has explained as to how he came in possession of white shirt of Kedar Singh. Whether Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) are unreliable, being related and interested witnesses? 50. Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) is the cousin brother of Ajab Singh (P.W.2), son of deceased Pahalwan and nephew of deceased Darshan Singh. Similarly, Ajab Singh (P.W.2) is nephew of deceased Pahalwan Singh and Darshan Singh and cousin brother of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1). Whether Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) are unreliable, being related and interested witnesses? 50. Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) is the cousin brother of Ajab Singh (P.W.2), son of deceased Pahalwan and nephew of deceased Darshan Singh. Similarly, Ajab Singh (P.W.2) is nephew of deceased Pahalwan Singh and Darshan Singh and cousin brother of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1). Although the evidence of Brijendra (P.W.4) was not challenged by the Counsel for the Appellants, but he is brother-in-law (lkyk) of deceased Darshan Singh. 51. Now the moot question is that whether the evidence of witnesses can be discarded merely on the ground that they are 'related witnesses' or it has to be proved that they are 'interested witnesses'. 52. The Supreme Court in the case of Rupinder Singh Sandhu v. State of Punjab, reported in (2018) 16 SCC 475 has held as under : 50. The fact that PWs 3 and 4 are related to the deceased Gurnam Singh is not in dispute. The existence of such relationship by itself does not render the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 untrustworthy. This Court has repeatedly held so and also held that the related witnesses are less likely to implicate innocent persons exonerating the real culprits. 53. The Supreme Court in the case of Shamim Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2018) 10 SCC 509 has held as under : 9. In a criminal trial, normally the evidence of the wife, husband, son or daughter of the deceased, is given great weightage on the principle that there is no reason for them not to speak the truth and shield the real culprit 54. The Supreme Court in the case of Rizan v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 661 has held as under : 6. We shall first deal with the contention regarding interestedness of the witnesses for furthering the prosecution version. Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal the actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases, the court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible. 7. It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal the actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases, the court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible. 7. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab it has been laid down as under: (AIR p. 366, para 26) '26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalization. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.' 8. The above decision has since been followed in Guli Chand v. State of Rajasthan in which Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras was also relied upon. 9. We may also observe that the ground that the witness being a close relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not be relied upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by this Court as early as in Dalip Singh case in which surprise was expressed over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the Members of the Bar that relatives were not independent witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed: (AIR p. 366, para 25) '25. We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed: (AIR p. 366, para 25) '25. We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in - 'Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan' (AIR at p. 59). We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgments of the courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel.' 10. Again in Masalti v. State of U.P. this Court observed: (AIR pp. 209-10, para 14) 'But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses. ... The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hardand- fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct.' 11. To the same effect is the decision in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh and Lehna v. State of Haryana. 55. Why a 'related witness' would spare the real culprit in order to falsely implicate some innocent person? There is a difference between 'related witness' and 'interested witness'. 'Interested witness' is a witness who is vitally interested in conviction of a person due to previous enmity. The 'Interested witness' has been defined by the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Rojali Ali v. State of Assam, reported in (2019) 19 SCC 567 as under : 13. As regards the contention that all the eyewitnesses are close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-settled that a related witness cannot be said to be an 'interested' witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim. Rojali Ali v. State of Assam, reported in (2019) 19 SCC 567 as under : 13. As regards the contention that all the eyewitnesses are close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-settled that a related witness cannot be said to be an 'interested' witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim. This Court has elucidated the difference between 'interested' and 'related' witnesses in a plethora of cases, stating that a witness may be called interested only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation, which in the context of a criminal case would mean that the witness has a direct or indirect interest in seeing the accused punished due to prior enmity or other reasons, and thus has a motive to falsely implicate the accused (for instance, see State of Rajasthan v. Kalki; Amit v. State of U.P.; and Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy). Recently, this difference was reiterated in Ganapathi v. State of T.N., in the following terms, by referring to the three-Judge Bench decision in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki: (Ganapathi case, SCC p. 555, para 14) '14. 'Related' is not equivalent to 'interested'. A witness may be called 'interested' only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be 'interested'.' 14. In criminal cases, it is often the case that the offence is witnessed by a close relative of the victim, whose presence on the scene of the offence would be natural. The evidence of such a witness cannot automatically be discarded by labelling the witness as interested. Indeed, one of the earliest statements with respect to interested witnesses in criminal cases was made by this Court in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, wherein this Court observed: (AIR p. 366, para 26) '26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person.' 15. In case of a related witness, the Court may not treat his or her testimony as inherently tainted, and needs to ensure only that the evidence is inherently reliable, probable, cogent and consistent. We may refer to the observations of this Court in Jayabalan v. State (UT of Pondicherry): (SCC p. 213, para 23) '23. We are of the considered view that in cases where the court is called upon to deal with the evidence of the interested witnesses, the approach of the court, while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses must not be pedantic. The court must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim.' 56. As already pointed out, Ajab Singh (P.W.2) is an injured witness and he enjoys a special status in comparison to other witnesses. The Counsel for the Appellants could not point out any thing from the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1), Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and Brijendra (P.W.4) to show that they had an intention to falsely implicate the Appellants. Thus, Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1), Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and Brijendra (P.W.4) cannot be disbelieved only on the ground that they are 'related witnesses.'. Whether Ocular Evidence is contrary to Medical Evidence? 57. It is next contended by the Counsel for the Appellants that the Ocular Evidence is contrary to Medical Evidence. To substantiate their submissions, it is submitted that Bhanupratap Singh (P.W. 1) has stated that Kedar had caused gunshot injury to his father Pahalwan from a distance of 25 ft.s but in the post-mortem report, blackening was found around the wounds, therefore, the Ocular Evidence is contrary to Medical Evidence. 58. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the Appellants. 59. 58. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the Appellants. 59. Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) has stated that Kedar had caused gunshot injury to his father Pahalwan Singh from a distance of 25 ft.s whereas Ramhet was 2 steps away from Darshan Singh, and Surajbhan was 5 steps away from Pahalwan Singh. In post-mortem report, Ex. P.18, Dr. G.R. Shakya has mentioned that blackish skin was found around injury no.1 and blackening was found around injury no.2. The injury no.2 was found over right temporal region and rest of skull was disrupted and total brain tissues were also absent and rest of skull was also fractured in small pieces. Even in the spot map, Ex.P/6 the brain matter of the deceased Pahalwan was found scattered on the ground. Further, R.S. Rathore (P.W. 5) had himself seen that the brain matter of Pahalwan was lying scattered on the ground, thus, this aspect of the matter is admissible as it was not based on the information given by Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1). The Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Narain v. State of U.P., reported in (1996) 8 SCC 199 has held as under : 9 In our opinion neither the criticism of the trial court nor the reason ascribed by the High Court in its rebuttal can be legally sustained. While preparing a site plan an Investigating Police Officer can certainly record what he sees and observes, for that will be direct and substantive evidence being based on his personal knowledge; but as, he was not obviously present when the incident took place, he has to derive knowledge as to when, where and how it happened from persons who had seen the incident. When a witness testifies about what he heard from somebody else it is ordinarily not admissible in evidence being hearsay, but if the person from whom he heard is examined to give direct evidence within the meaning of Section 60 of the Evidence Act, 1872 the former's evidence would be admissible to corroborate the latter in accordance with Section 157 CrPC (sic Evidence Act). However such a statement made to a police officer, when he is investigating into an offence in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be used to even corroborate the maker thereof in view of the embargo in Section 162(1) CrPC appearing in that chapter and can be used only to contradict him (the maker) in accordance with the proviso thereof, except in those cases where sub-section (2) of the section applies. That necessarily means that if in the site plan PW 6 had even shown the place from which the shots were allegedly fired after ascertaining the same from the eyewitnesses it could not have been admitted in evidence being hit by Section 162 CrPC. The law on this subject has been succinctly laid down by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Tori Singh v. State of U.P. In that case it was contended on behalf of the Appellant therein that if one looked at the sketch map, on which the place where the deceased was said to have been hit was marked, and compared it with the statements of the prosecution witnesses and the medical evidence, it would be extremely improbable for the injury which was received by the deceased to have been caused on that part of the body where it had been actually caused if the deceased was at the place marked on the map. In repelling the above contention this Court observed, inter alia: '... the mark on the sketch-map was put by the Sub- Inspector who was obviously not an eyewitness to the incident. He could only have put it there after taking the statements of the eyewitnesses. The marking of the spot on the sketch-map is really bringing on record the conclusion of the Sub-Inspector on the basis of the statements made by the witnesses to him. This in our opinion would not be admissible in view of the provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for it is in effect nothing more than the statement of the Sub-Inspector that the eyewitnesses told him that the deceased was at such and such place at the time when he was hit. This in our opinion would not be admissible in view of the provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for it is in effect nothing more than the statement of the Sub-Inspector that the eyewitnesses told him that the deceased was at such and such place at the time when he was hit. The sketch-map would be admissible so far as it indicates all that the Sub- Inspector saw himself at the spot; but any mark put on the sketch-map based on the statements made by the witnesses to the Sub-Inspector would be inadmissible in view of the clear provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as it will be no more than a statement made to the police during investigation.' 60. Now where the whole skull had shattered and the bullet had hit right temporal region, then due to scalp hair, it is clear that it is difficult to find out as to whether there was any blackening around the wound or not. 61. It is submitted that since, Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) is a prosecution witness, therefore, his evidence is binding on the prosecution. 62. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the Appellants. 63. The question is that whether, the post-mortem report which is an opinion of the Doctor, is binding on the Court or the Court can reappreciate the evidence in order to find out the truth. 64. The medical report has to be read in conjunction with other evidence and then Court has to form is final opinion. 65. The Supreme Court in the case of Dayal Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 263 has held as under : 40. We really need not reiterate various judgments which have taken the view that the purpose of an expert opinion is primarily to assist the court in arriving at a final conclusion. Such report is not binding upon the court. The court is expected to analyse the report, read it in conjunction with the other evidence on record and then form its final opinion as to whether such report is worthy of reliance or not. Just to illustrate this point of view, in a given case, there may be two diametrically contradictory opinions of handwriting experts and both the opinions may be well reasoned. Just to illustrate this point of view, in a given case, there may be two diametrically contradictory opinions of handwriting experts and both the opinions may be well reasoned. In such case, the court has to critically examine the basis, reasoning, approach and experience of the expert to come to a conclusion as to which of the two reports can be safely relied upon by the court. The assistance and value of expert opinion is indisputable, but there can be reports which are, ex facie, incorrect or deliberately so distorted as to render the entire prosecution case unbelievable. But if such eyewitnesses and other prosecution evidence are trustworthy, have credence and are consistent with the eye- version given by the eyewitnesses, the court will be well within its jurisdiction to discard the expert opinion. An expert report, duly proved, has its evidentiary value but such appreciation has to be within the limitations prescribed and with careful examination by the court. A complete contradiction or inconsistency between the medical evidence and the ocular evidence on the one hand and the statement of the prosecution witnesses between themselves on the other, may result in seriously denting the case of the prosecution in its entirety but not otherwise. 66. Therefore, under the facts and circumstances of the case, it is held that merely because Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) had mentioned blackening around the wound, it would not be sufficient to discard the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) specifically when no such question was asked to Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and Brijendra (P.W.4) about the distance from which the gunshots were fired by the appellants and Surajbhan. Whether the incident took place at 10-10:15 A.M., or the deceased persons as well as Ajab Singh (P.W. 2) were killed/assaulted by unknown persons at early hours of 16-10- 2006? 67. It is next contended by the Counsel for the Appellants that since, rigor mortis was present all over the bodies of the deceased Pahalwan and Darshan Singh, and the post-mortem of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh was conducted at 4:00 P.M./4:30 P.M. therefore, it is clear that the death must have taken place much before 10 A.M. and in view of the specific admission by Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) that the work of watering the fields starts at 3-4 in the morning, it is clear that the incident must have taken place in the wee hours. 68. 68. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the parties. As per Modi's Medical Jurisprudence, the development of rigor mortis primarily depend upon the weather conditions. Therefore, there cannot be any universal and uniform development of Rigor Mortis. Thus, in each and every case, the defence must put a specific question to the autopsy surgeon as to whether the rigor mortis could have developed under the prevailing weather conditions or not? 69. No specific question was put to Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) in this regard. Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) had specifically opined that the duration of death was 6-12 hours since post-mortem. The incident is alleged to have taken place at 10-10:15 A.M. and the post-mortem of Pahalwan was conducted at 4:00 P.M. and of Darshan Singh at 4:30 P.M. Thus, it is clear that the post-mortem of dead bodies of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh was done after 6 hours of incident. The defence should have specifically asked Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) about the basis on which he had formed the opinion about the duration of death, but that was not done. Further, the submissions made by the Counsel for the Appellants cannot be accepted for another reason. Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W. 10) had found undigested food material in stomach and small intestine. A specific question was put to Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) in this regard and in para 5 of his cross-examination, this witness specifically opined that the food gets digested within 4-6 hours and the position of semi-digested food starts after 2 hours. Therefore, the deceased must have consumed food prior to 2-4 hours of his death. If the submission of the Counsel for the Appellants, that the death must have taken place at around 3-4 hours is considered, then it is clear that the deceased should have taken food at around 1 A.M. in the night. Semi-digested food was found in the small intestine of both the deceased persons. It is a matter of common knowledge that no-body consumes food at 1:00 A.M.. On the contrary, the prosecution story is that the incident took place at around 10-10:15 A.M., therefore, the deceased persons must have taken their breakfast at around 8-8:15 A.M., which is probable and supports the prosecution case. The Supreme Court in the case of Charan Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (1975) 3 SCC 39 has held as under : 18. The Supreme Court in the case of Charan Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (1975) 3 SCC 39 has held as under : 18. The first information report about the present occurrence was lodged promptly and this is apparent from the fact that a copy of the first information report was received by the Judicial Magistrate concerned at Ludhiana at 8.12 p.m. the same evening. We are not impressed by the suggestion that the occurrence took place not at 5 p.m. but much earlier. According to the post-mortem examination reports, the stomach of each one of the two deceased persons was empty at the time of the post-mortem examination. Normally a vegetable diet containing mostly farinaceous food as usually taken by an Indian does not leave the stomach completely within six to seven hours after its ingestion (see p. 151 of Modi's Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, Sixteenth Edn). If the occurrence had taken place at 2 or 3 p.m. as suggested on behalf of the accused-Appellants, the mid-day meals usually taken by the Villagers at about 11 a.m. would still be in their stomachs and the same would not have been empty at the time of the post-mortem examination. The fact that the stomach of each of the deceased persons was empty lends assurance to the prosecution version that the occurrence took place at about 5 p.m. Whether Bharat, Rampreet, Devaram were members of Unlawful Assembly and had acted in furtherance of Common Object or not? 70. This Court has already referred the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1), Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and Brijendra (P.W.4). The FIR was lodged within 30 minutes of incident. The names of Bharat, Rampreet and Devaram were already disclosed as one of the assailants. Even according to the evidence of Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and Brijendra (P.W.4), the Appellants Bharat, Rampreet and Devaram had assaulted Ajab Singh (P.W.2) as well as Darshan Singh, one of the deceased. Bharat Singh was armed with Farsa. Darshan Singh had suffered one incised wound over right parietal region, which corroborates the ocular evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1), Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and Brijendra (P.W.4). Similarly, Ajab Singh sustained 5 incised wounds i.e., four on scalp and one over right ear. Therefore, the allegations against Bharat Singh that he had assaulted the injured Ajab Singh (P.W.2) as well as deceased Darshan Singh are corroborated by Medical Evidence. Similarly, Ajab Singh sustained 5 incised wounds i.e., four on scalp and one over right ear. Therefore, the allegations against Bharat Singh that he had assaulted the injured Ajab Singh (P.W.2) as well as deceased Darshan Singh are corroborated by Medical Evidence. Thus, it is clear that Bharat Singh had actively participated in the incident. 71. The allegations against Devaram and Rampreet are that they were armed with lathis and assaulted Ajab Singh (P.W.2). One swelling on the wrist of Ajab Singh (P.W.2) was found in his MLC, Ex. P.19. Thus, it is clear that Ajab Singh (P.W.2) had sustained atleast one injury which could have been caused by hard and blunt object. 72. The Supreme Court in the case of Manjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2019) 9 SCC 529 has held as under : Unlawful assembly and rioting with deadly weapons 14. It has been vehemently argued on behalf of both the Appellants that the essential ingredients of Section 141 IPC for the formation of unlawful assembly with the common object having not been established, the conviction of the Appellants with the aid of Section 149 IPC is not justified. 14.1. The relevant part of Section 141 IPC could be usefully extracted as under: '141. Unlawful assembly.-An assembly of five or more persons is designated an 'unlawful assembly', if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is- * * * Third.-To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or * * * Explanation.-An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly.' 14.2. Section 149, rendering every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object reads as under: '149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object. -If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.' 14.3. We may also take note of the principles enunciated and explained by this Court as regards the ingredients of an unlawful assembly and the vicarious/constructive liability of every member of such an assembly. We may also take note of the principles enunciated and explained by this Court as regards the ingredients of an unlawful assembly and the vicarious/constructive liability of every member of such an assembly. In Sikandar Singh, this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 483-85, paras 15 & 17-18) '15. The provision has essentially two ingredients viz. (i) the commission of an offence by any member of an unlawful assembly, and (ii) such offence must be committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly or must be such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. Once it is established that the unlawful assembly had common object, it is not necessary that all persons forming the unlawful assembly must be shown to have committed some overt act. For the purpose of incurring the vicarious liability for the offence committed by a member of such unlawful assembly under the provision, the liability of other members of the unlawful assembly for the offence committed during the continuance of the occurrence, rests upon the fact whether the other members knew beforehand that the offence actually committed was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. * * * 17. A 'common object' does not require a prior concert and a common meeting of minds before the attack. It is enough if each member of the unlawful assembly has the same object in view and their number is five or more and that they act as an assembly to achieve that object. The 'common object' of an assembly is to be ascertained from the acts and language of the members composing it, and from a consideration of all the surrounding circumstances. It may be gathered from the course of conduct adopted by the members of the assembly. For determination of the common object of the unlawful assembly, the conduct of each of the members of the unlawful assembly, before and at the time of attack and thereafter, the motive for the crime, are some of the relevant considerations. It may be gathered from the course of conduct adopted by the members of the assembly. For determination of the common object of the unlawful assembly, the conduct of each of the members of the unlawful assembly, before and at the time of attack and thereafter, the motive for the crime, are some of the relevant considerations. What the common object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular stage of the incident is essentially a question of fact to be determined, keeping in view the nature of the assembly, the arms carried by the members, and the behaviour of the members at or near the scene of the incident. It is not necessary under law that in all cases of unlawful assembly, with an unlawful common object, the same must be translated into action or be successful. 18. In Masalti v. State of U.P. a Constitution Bench of this Court had observed that: (AIR p. 211, para 17) 17. ... Section 149 makes it clear that if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence; and that emphatically brings out the principle that the punishment prescribed by Section 149 is in a sense vicarious and does not always proceed on the basis that the offence has been actually committed by every member of the unlawful assembly.'' 14.4. In Subal Ghorai, this Court, after a survey of leading cases, summed up the principles as follows: (SCC pp. 632- 33, paras 52-53) '52. The above judgments outline the scope of Section 149 IPC. We need to sum up the principles so as to examine the present case in their light. Section 141 IPC defines 'unlawful assembly' to be an assembly of five or more persons. They must have common object to commit an offence. Section 142 IPC postulates that whoever being aware of facts which render any assembly an unlawful one intentionally joins the same would be a member thereof. Section 143 IPC provides for punishment for being a member of unlawful assembly. They must have common object to commit an offence. Section 142 IPC postulates that whoever being aware of facts which render any assembly an unlawful one intentionally joins the same would be a member thereof. Section 143 IPC provides for punishment for being a member of unlawful assembly. Section 149 IPC provides for constructive liability of every person of an unlawful assembly if an offence is committed by any member thereof in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or such of the members of that assembly who knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. The most important ingredient of unlawful assembly is common object. Common object of the persons composing that assembly is to do any act or acts stated in clauses 'First', 'Second', 'Third', 'Fourth' and 'Fifth' of that section. Common object can be formed on the spur of the moment. Course of conduct adopted by the members of common assembly is a relevant factor. At what point of time common object of unlawful assembly was formed would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Once the case of the person falls within the ingredients of Section 149 IPC, the question that he did nothing with his own hands would be immaterial. If an offence is committed by a member of the unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object, any member of the unlawful assembly who was present at the time of commission of offence and who shared the common object of that assembly would be liable for the commission of that offence even if no overt act was committed by him. If a large crowd of persons armed with weapons assaults intended victims, all may not take part in the actual assault. If weapons carried by some members were not used, that would not absolve them of liability for the offence with the aid of Section 149 IPC if they shared common object of the unlawful assembly. 53. But this concept of constructive liability must not be so stretched as to lead to false implication of innocent bystanders. Quite often, people gather at the scene of offence out of curiosity. They do not share common object of the unlawful assembly. If a general allegation is made against large number of people, the court has to be cautious. 53. But this concept of constructive liability must not be so stretched as to lead to false implication of innocent bystanders. Quite often, people gather at the scene of offence out of curiosity. They do not share common object of the unlawful assembly. If a general allegation is made against large number of people, the court has to be cautious. It must guard against the possibility of convicting mere passive onlookers who did not share the common object of the unlawful assembly. Unless reasonable direct or indirect circumstances lend assurance to the prosecution case that they shared common object of the unlawful assembly, they cannot be convicted with the aid of Section 149 IPC. It must be proved in each case that the person concerned was not only a member of the unlawful assembly at some stage, but at all the crucial stages and shared the common object of the assembly at all stages. The court must have before it some materials to form an opinion that the accused shared common object. What the common object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular stage has to be determined keeping in view the course of conduct of the members of the unlawful assembly before and at the time of attack, their behaviour at or near the scene of offence, the motive for the crime, the arms carried by them and such other relevant considerations. The criminal court has to conduct this difficult and meticulous exercise of assessing evidence to avoid roping innocent people in the crime. These principles laid down by this Court do not dilute the concept of constructive liability. They embody a rule of caution.' 14.5. We need not expand on the other cited decisions because the basic principles remain that the important ingredients of an unlawful assembly are the number of persons forming it i.e. five; and their common object. Common object of the persons composing that assembly could be formed on the spur of the moment and does not require prior deliberations. The course of conduct adopted by the members of such assembly; their behaviour before, during, and after the incident; and the arms carried by them are a few basic and relevant factors to determine the common object. 73. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwan Jagannath Markad v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2016) 10 SCC 537 has held as under : 21. 73. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwan Jagannath Markad v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2016) 10 SCC 537 has held as under : 21. An offence committed in prosecution of common object of an unlawful assembly by one person renders members of unlawful assembly sharing the common object vicariously liable for the offence. The common object has to be ascertained from the acts and language of the members of the assembly and all the surrounding circumstances. It can be gathered from the course of conduct of the members. It is to be assessed keeping in view the nature of the assembly, arms carried by the members and the behaviour of the members at or near the scene of incident. Sharing of common object is a mental attitude which is to be gathered from the act of a person and result thereof. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when common object can be inferred. When a crowd of assailants are members of an unlawful assembly, it may not be possible for witnesses to accurately describe the part played by each one of the assailants. It may not be necessary that all members take part in the actual assault. In Gangadhar Behera, this Court observed: (SCC pp. 398-99, para 25) '25. The other plea that definite roles have not been ascribed to the accused and therefore Section 149 is not applicable, is untenable. A four-Judge Bench of this Court in Masalti case observed as follows: (AIR p. 210, para 15) '15. Then it is urged that the evidence given by the witnesses conforms to the same uniform pattern and since no specific part is assigned to all the assailants, that evidence should not have been accepted. This criticism again is not well founded. Where a crowd of assailants who are members of an unlawful assembly proceeds to commit an offence of murder in pursuance of the common object of the unlawful assembly, it is often not possible for witnesses to describe accurately the part played by each one of the assailants. Besides, if a large crowd of persons armed with weapons assaults the intended victims, it may not be necessary that all of them have to take part in the actual assault. Besides, if a large crowd of persons armed with weapons assaults the intended victims, it may not be necessary that all of them have to take part in the actual assault. In the present case, for instance, several weapons were carried by different members of the unlawful assembly, but it appears that the guns were used and that was enough to kill 5 persons. In such a case, it would be unreasonable to contend that because the other weapons carried by the members of the unlawful assembly were not used, the story in regard to the said weapons itself should be rejected. Appreciation of evidence in such a complex case is no doubt a difficult task; but criminal courts have to do their best in dealing with such cases and it is their duty to sift the evidence carefully and decide which part of it is true and which is not.'' 74. It is next contended by the Counsel for the Appellants that since, only one injury was found on the body of Ajab Singh (P.W.2) which could have been sustained by hard and blunt object, whereas two persons, namely Devaram and Rampreet were having lathis, therefore, it is clear that the allegations of assault by Devaram and Rampreet by lathis is false. 75. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the Appellants. 76. The Supreme Court in the case of Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v. Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel, reported in (2018) 7 SCC 743 has held as under : 43. The High Court recorded a finding with reference to 4 accused (A-2, A-4, A-9 and A-15) who according to the prosecution were alleged to have carried sticks, that there is no evidence on record to prove the same on three grounds: (i) that their names were not to be found in the FIR (ii) that there were improvements in the evidence of the PWs at various stages regarding the presence of the four accused, and (iii) that the medical evidence does not disclose any injury which could have been attributed to the beatings by sticks. 44. In our opinion, the first two reasons given by the High Court are legally tenable, however, the third reason i.e. the absence of injuries attributable to a stick, need not necessarily result in a conclusion that the accused were not present in the unlawful assembly. 44. In our opinion, the first two reasons given by the High Court are legally tenable, however, the third reason i.e. the absence of injuries attributable to a stick, need not necessarily result in a conclusion that the accused were not present in the unlawful assembly. But the absence of such injuries cannot be said to be an irrelevant consideration in arriving at a conclusion whether the four accused participated in the unlawful assembly in the background of the other two factors mentioned above. But a similar analysis with respect to the seven of the other accused who were given the benefit of doubt by the Sessions Court is lacking in the judgment of the High Court. 77. Mere absence of injuries would not lead to conclusion that the accused was not present, and the Court has to look into other surrounding circumstances also to find out as to whether the accused was the member of unlawful assembly or not and whether he was sharing common object or not? 78. In the present case, FIR, Ex. P.2 was lodged within 30 minutes of the incident. The names of the Appellants Devaram and Rampreet were also mentioned in the FIR as one of the assailants. 2 persons had died and one was seriously injured. Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) had no occasion to deliberate on this issue and to cook up a false story. 79. The Supreme Court in the case of Krishnan v. State, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 56 has held as under : 17. The fact that the first information report was given almost immediately, rules out any possibility of deliberation to falsely implicate any person. All the material particulars implicating the four Appellants were given 80. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Harban Sahai, reported in (1998) 6 SCC 50 has held as under : 13 In such a situation the prompt and early reporting of the occurrence by PW 1 to the police with all its vivid details gives us an assurance regarding truth of his version. 81. Thus, it is clear that Rampreet and Devaram were also present on the spot. Three persons were carrying mouser guns whereas one person was carrying Farsa. The accused persons came to the spot on the question of watering the fields. 81. Thus, it is clear that Rampreet and Devaram were also present on the spot. Three persons were carrying mouser guns whereas one person was carrying Farsa. The accused persons came to the spot on the question of watering the fields. The irrigation of the field of complainant party was already going on and the accused persons came to the spot to stop the complainant party from irrigating their land. Thus, it is clear that the Assembly of accused persons who were more than 5 in number, was Unlawful from the very inception and in furtherance of their Common Object, they assaulted Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and killed two persons namely Pahalwan and Darshan Singh by firing repeated gunshots. Further, gun shot was fired by Kedar at Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1). Thus, it is held that Devaram and Rampreet were also the members of Unlawful Assembly and were sharing Common Object. Whether Forensic Evidence supports prosecution case. 82. It is next contended by the Counsel for the Appellants that as per the FSL report,Ex. P.23, the marks of firing pin found on the fired cartridges were 'similar' to that of gun seized from the possession of Kedar. However, it is submitted that in absence of specific finding that the marks were 'identical', it cannot be said that the Forensic Evidence corroborates the prosecution case. To buttress his contentions, the Counsel for the Appellant Kedar relied upon the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Krishna Sewak Vs. State of M.P. reported in 1988 JLJ 321 . 83. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the Appellants. 84. As per F.S.L. report, Ex. P.23, the marks of firing pin were ',d leku', which necessarily means 'identical'. Thus, it cannot be said that the F.S.L. report, Ex. P.23 is of no help for the prosecution. Multiple fired cartridges were found on the spot, whereas only three gunshots were fired 85. It is submitted that Pahalwan Singh had sustained two gunshot injuries whereas Darshan Singh had sustained one gunshot injury, thus, it is clear that only three gunshots were fired, but 5 fired cartridges were found on the spot, therefore, it is clear that the prosecution has suppressed the very genesis of the incident. 86. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the Appellants. 87. 86. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the Appellants. 87. It is true that three gunshots injuries were found on the dead bodies of Pahalwan Singh and Darshan Singh, but it is also the case of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) that gunshots were also fired by Kedar at him, but he escaped unhurt. Therefore, multiple gunshots were fired by Kedar. Thus, the recovery of multiple fired cartridges from the spot is natural. Whether injuries caused to Ajab Singh (P.W.2), and miss fire on Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) would make out an offence under Section 307 of IPC or not? 88. It is submitted by the Counsel for the appellants, that since, the nature of injuries sustained by Ajab Singh (P.W.2) were simple and Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) did not sustain any injury at all, therefore, no offence under Section 307 of IPC would be made out. 89. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellants. 90. Section 307 of IPC reads as under : 307. Attempt to murder.-Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is herein before mentioned. Attempts by life convicts.-When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death. 91. From the plain reading of Section 307 of IPC, it is clear that presence of injury is not sine qua non for making out an offence under Section 307 of IPC. If any act is done with an intention or knowledge that, if assailant by that act causes death, then the assailant would be guilty of murder, then such act would certainly be punishable under Section 307 of IPC. 92. Thus, the following two ingredients are necessary to make out an offence under Section 307 of IPC : (a) Knowledge or intention that by his act, if murder is caused, then he would be guilty of murder. (b) Does any act towards commission of that offence. 93. 92. Thus, the following two ingredients are necessary to make out an offence under Section 307 of IPC : (a) Knowledge or intention that by his act, if murder is caused, then he would be guilty of murder. (b) Does any act towards commission of that offence. 93. The first part of Section 307 of IPC deals with a situation, where no injury is caused and second part of Section 307 of IPC deals with a situation where hurt is caused. 'Hurt' is defined in Section 319 of IPC which reads as under : 319. Hurt.-Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt. 94. Thus, the nature of injuries is not a decisive factor to determine as to whether the act of the assailant would be an act punishable under Section 307 of IPC or not. In order to gather intention or knowledge, the weapon used, part of the body on which injury was caused as well as nature of injuries are some of the important aspects. 95. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Harjeet Singh reported in (2019) 20 SCC 524 has held as under : 5.6.1. If a person causes hurt with the intention or knowledge that he may cause death, it would attract Section 307. 5.6.2. This Court in R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka, held that: (SCC p. 30, paras 8-9) '8. ... The first blow was on a vital part, that is, on the temporal region. Even though other blows were on non-vital parts, that does not take away the rigour of Section 307 IPC. ... 9. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section.' (emphasis supplied) 5.6.3. If the assailant acts with the intention or knowledge that such action might cause death, and hurt is caused, then the provisions of Section 307 IPC would be applicable. There is no requirement for the injury to be on a 'vital part' of the body, merely causing 'hurt' is sufficient to attract Section 307 IPC. 5.6.4. This Court in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana held that: (SCC p. 370, para 12) '12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that the accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc.' (emphasis supplied) 5.6.5. This Court in the recent decision of State of M.P. v. Kanha held that: (SCC p. 609, para 13) '13. The above judgments of this Court lead us to the conclusion that proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.' 96. The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.' 96. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Kanha reported in (2019) 3 SCC 605 has held as under : 13. The above judgments of this Court lead us to the conclusion that proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent. 97. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Saleem reported in (2005) 5 SCC 554 has held as under : 12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. 13. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. 13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt. 14. This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil, Girija Shankar v. State of U.P. and R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka. 15. In Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar it was observed in para 6 that mere fact that the injury actually inflicted by the accused did not cut any vital organ of the victim, is not by itself sufficient to take the act out of the purview of Section 307. 16. Whether there was intention to kill or knowledge that death will be caused is a question of fact and would depend on the facts of a given case. The circumstances that the injury inflicted by the accused was simple or minor will not by itself rule out application of Section 307 IPC. The determinative question is the intention or knowledge, as the case may be, and not the nature of the injury. The basic difference between Sections 333 and 325 IPC is that Section 325 gets attracted where grievous hurt is caused whereas Section 333 gets attracted if such hurt is caused to a public servant. 98. According to Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) the injured Ajab Singh (P.W. 2) had suffered 4 incised wounds on his head and one incised wound over right ear. Thus, five incised wounds were on vital part of the body of Ajab Singh (P.W.2). The injuries were caused by Bharat by Farsa. 98. According to Dr. G.R. Shakya (P.W.10) the injured Ajab Singh (P.W. 2) had suffered 4 incised wounds on his head and one incised wound over right ear. Thus, five incised wounds were on vital part of the body of Ajab Singh (P.W.2). The injuries were caused by Bharat by Farsa. Causing incised wounds by a sharp edged weapon like farsa on the vital part of the body like head, would certainly involve intention or knowledge on the part of the assailant. Thus, it is incorrect to say that the injuries caused on the vital parts of the body of Ajab Singh (P.W.2) would not bring the act of the accused persons within the purview of Section 307 of IPC. 99. It is next contended by the Counsel for the appellants, that since, no injury was sustained by Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) therefore, it cannot be said that any attempt was made to kill Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1). 100. As already pointed out, Section 307 of IPC is in two parts : a. When no injury is caused; b. When hurt is caused. 101. Presence of injury is not a sina qua non for bringing the act within the purview of Section 307 of IPC. Firing a gunshot at a person, would certainly involve intention or knowledge on the part of the assailant. Furthermore, multiple fired cartridges were recovered from the spot, which indicates, that the guns were reloaded. Thus, the prosecution has succeeded in establishing beyond reasonable doubt that an attempt was made to kill Bhanupratap Singh (P.W. 1) by firing at him. Names of assailants not mentioned in inquest report. 102. It is submitted by the Counsel for the appellants that while preparing Lash Panchnamas of dead bodies of Pahalwan Singh and Darshan Singh, Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) had not disclosed the names of assailants, therefore, it is clear that he is not a reliable witness. 103. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the appellants. 104. The purpose of inquest is to find out the cause of death and not to find out as to who caused death. Therefore, non-mentioning of names of assailants in the Lash Panchnamas Ex. P.4 and P.5 would not make the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) unreliable. The Supreme Court in the case of Guiram Mondal v. State of W.B., reported in (2013) 15 SCC 284 has held as under : 12. Therefore, non-mentioning of names of assailants in the Lash Panchnamas Ex. P.4 and P.5 would not make the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) unreliable. The Supreme Court in the case of Guiram Mondal v. State of W.B., reported in (2013) 15 SCC 284 has held as under : 12. The inquest report normally would not contain the manner in which the incident took place or the names of eyewitnesses as well as the names of accused persons. The basic purpose of holding an inquest is to report regarding the cause of death, namely, whether it is suicidal, homicidal, accidental, etc. Reference may be made to the judgments of this Court in Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P. and Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh. 13. In Radha Mohan Singh v. State of U.P. this Court held that the scope of inquest is limited and is confined to ascertainment of apparent cause of death. Inquest is concerned with discovering whether in a given case the death was accidental, suicidal or homicidal, and in what manner or by what weapon or instrument the injuries on the body appear to have been inflicted. The details of overt acts need not be recorded in the inquest report. The High Court has rightly held that the manner and approach of the trial court in disbelieving the prosecution story by placing reliance on the inquest report was erroneous and bad in law. 105. No other argument is advanced by the Counsel for the parties. 106. Thus, considering the evidence of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1), Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and Brijendra (P.W.4), coupled with the Medical Evidence and Forensic Evidence, this Court is of the considered opinion, that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that the appellants formed an Unlawful Assembly and in furtherance of Common Object, Pahalwan Singh and Darshan Singh were killed, as well as an attempt was made to kill Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1). 107. Although the Trial Court has convicted the Appellants for committing murder of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh as well as for making an attempt to Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and held them guilty for offence under Section 302/149 and 307/149 but did not mention that the conviction of the Appellants for offence under Section 302/149 and 307/149 of I.P.C is on two counts. Even in the charges which were framed by the Trial Court, it was mentioned that the Appellants had committed murder of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh as well as had attempted to commit murder of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2), but charges under Section 302/149 of IPC on two counts and 307/149 of IPC on two counts were not framed. Thus, it was clearly mentioned that the charges are that the Appellants have killed Pahalwan and Darshan Singh and therefore, their act is punishable under Section 302/149 of IPC and have made an attempt to kill Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2), therefore, their act is punishable under Section 307/149 of IPC. However, in the light of Section 219 of Cr.P.C., while framing charge, the Trial Court should have mentioned that the act of the Appellants is punishable for offence under Section 302/149 of IPC on two counts and similarly for offence under Section 307/149 of IPC, it should have been mentioned that their act is punishable on two counts. 108. Although Section 218 of Cr.P.C., provides that separate charge should be framed for distinct offence and Section 220 of Cr.P.C. provides that if, in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, more offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence, but at the same time, the Appellants cannot claim that the charges were vague thereby adversely effecting their valuable rights to contest the Trial or caused any prejudice. The Appellants were aware of the fact that they are being tried for murder of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh as well as for making an attempt on the lives of Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2). The Supreme Court in the case of State of W.B. v. Laisal Haque, reported in (1989) 3 SCC 166 has held as under : 1 The State Government of West Bengal and the complainant Mohd. The Supreme Court in the case of State of W.B. v. Laisal Haque, reported in (1989) 3 SCC 166 has held as under : 1 The State Government of West Bengal and the complainant Mohd. Abu Bakkar Siddique Molla have come up in appeal by way of special leave, from the judgment and order of a Division Bench (Sukumar Chakravarty and Gobinda Chandra Chatterjee, JJ.) of the High Court of Calcutta dated 14-8-1986 setting aside the finding and sentences recorded by Shri S.K. Mitra, Additional Sessions Judge, 24 Paraganas, 14th Court, Alipore dated 4-4-1985 in Sessions Trial No. 3(8) of 1983 directing retrial of the respondents before us, 16 in number, on the ground of material defect in the framing of the charges which, according to the learned Judges, had occasioned in failure of justice. The High Court held that (1) it appears from the heads of the charges framed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the principal accused Laisal Haque was charged along with other accused persons under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860 alleging that in furtherance of the common object of killing the deceased Gulam Rabbani and injure others, all the rioters committed the murder of Gulam Rabbani. If such a charge was framed against all the accused persons including Laisal Haque, there was no warrant for framing a charge against the accused Laisal Haque under Section 302 simpliciter, 'without making that charge as an alternative charge'. (2) The charge framed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge as against the accused persons was materially defective inasmuch as it was a 'rolled up charge', the common object of the unlawful assembly being to murder Golam Rabbani and injure others. The use of the words 'injure others' without specifically mentioning the names of the persons who were injured made the charge vague and indefinite. Instead the learned Additional Sessions Judge ought to have framed separate and distinct charges for the assault and causing of grievous hurt in respect of each of the persons assaulted. (3) The judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge suffers from a serious infirmity in that he had in a slipshod manner not discussed at all the evidence separately under different heads of the charges framed against each of the accused persons. (3) The judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge suffers from a serious infirmity in that he had in a slipshod manner not discussed at all the evidence separately under different heads of the charges framed against each of the accused persons. While convicting the accused persons under Section 324 read with Section 149 he had not discussed which of the accused persons caused hurt to whom. * * * * 8. Next, Section 464 of the Code provides that no finding, sentence or order by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in the opinion of the court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure of justice has, in fact, been occasioned thereby. 9. In the celebrated case of Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the court after an elaborate discussion observed that in judging a question of prejudice, as of guilt, the courts must act with a broad vision and look to the substance and not to the technicalities, and their main concern should be to see whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him fairly and clearly, and whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself. That test is clearly fulfilled in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The principles laid down by that very eminent Judge in Slaney case1 have throughout been followed by this Court. See: K.C. Mathew v. State of Travancore-Cochin, Gurbachan Singh v. State of Punjab, Birichh Bhuian v. State of Bihar and State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak. 109. Since, the Appellants were aware of the fact that for which offence, they are being tried, therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that any prejudice was caused to them. Even otherwise, this ground was not raised and argued by the Counsel for the Appellants. 110. Accordingly, the Appellants are held guilty of committing murder of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh as well as for making an attempt to kill Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) in furtherance of Common Object. Even otherwise, this ground was not raised and argued by the Counsel for the Appellants. 110. Accordingly, the Appellants are held guilty of committing murder of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh as well as for making an attempt to kill Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) in furtherance of Common Object. Accordingly, their conviction for offence under Section 302/149 for causing murder of Pahalwan and Darshan Singh, 307/149 for making an attempt to kill Bhanupratap Singh (P.W.1) and Ajab Singh (P.W.2) and under Section 148 of IPC as held by the Trial Court is hereby upheld. 111. So far as the question of sentence is concerned, the minimum sentence for the offence of murder is Life Imprisonment. Therefore, no interference is called for. 112. Ex-consequenti, the judgment and sentence dated 28-7-2010 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Gohad, Distt. Bhind in S.T. No.118/2007 is hereby Affirmed. 113. The Appellant Kedar Singh in Cr.A. No.687 of 2010 is in jail. He shall undergo the remaining jail sentence. 114. In Cr.A. No.691 of 2010, the Appellant No.1 Bharat Singh was granted bail by order dated 25-8-2020, whereas the Appellants No. 2 and 3 namely Devaram and Rampreet were granted bail by order dated 16-11-2011. Their bail bonds are hereby cancelled. They shall immediately surrender before the Trial Court for undergoing the remaining jail sentence. 115. Let a copy of this judgment be provided to the Appellants immediately, free of cost. 116. The Registry is directed to immediately sent back the record to the Trial Court for necessary information and compliance. 117. The Criminal Appeals No.687/2010 and 691 of 2010 are hereby Dismissed.