ORDER : (A.V. Sesha Sai, J.) 1. Heard Sri J.U.M.V. Prasad, learned counsel for the Central Government for the appellants and Sri V. Padmanabha Rao, learned counsel for the respondent, apart from perusing the material available on record. 2. Respondents in W.P.No.17574 of 2011 are the appellants in the present Writ Appeal, preferred under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 3. Challenge in the present Writ Appeal is to the order dated 19.07.2022 passed by the learned single Judge in the aforesaid Writ Petition. Respondent herein joined in the Central Industrial Security Force as a constable in the year 1998 and he was transferred to Visakhapatnam Steel Plant in the month of July, 2007. While the respondent herein was working in such a capacity, a charge memo dated 31.07.2009 came to be issued vide memorandum No.V-15014/VSP/Disc/Maj.08/IJ/2009 /3754 dated 31.07.2009, framing the following Article of Charge: - “An act of gross misconduct, dishonesty and unbecoming conduct of a member of an Armed Force on the part of No.884523127 Constable I.Jagannadhan of CISF Unit VSP, Visakhapatnam, in that while he was on ‘B’ shift duty on 18.07.09 and performing duty of vehicle material checking duty at B.C. Old out material vehicle gate from 1615 hrs on 18.07.09, collected money illegally and concealed a sum of Rs.232/- (Rupees two hundred thirty two only) beneath a concrete stone at B C Gate Old out material vehicle gate which was detected by Commandant at about 1645 hrs on 18.07.09 during surprise checking of Old out material vehicle gate at B C Gate. Further, on physical checking of Constable I.Jagannadhan by Ins/Exe M.R.Tiwari, a sum of Rs. 32/- (Rupees thirty two only) was also recovered from his Uniform shirt pocket, which was excess money than the declared pocket money of Rs. 10/- (Rupees ten only). The above act on the part of No. 884523127 Constable I.Jagannadhan attributes to his involvement, in collection of money, in an illegal manner, during his duty hours.” 4. After acknowledging the said Charge memo, the respondent-writ petitioner filed a written statement of defense on 08.08.2009 and thereafter a regular departmental enquiry was conducted by appointing an Enquiry Officer, who submitted a report on 04.11.2009, holding that the charge levelled against the writ petitioner stood proved. After acknowledging the said Charge memo, the respondent-writ petitioner filed a written statement of defense on 08.08.2009 and thereafter a regular departmental enquiry was conducted by appointing an Enquiry Officer, who submitted a report on 04.11.2009, holding that the charge levelled against the writ petitioner stood proved. Enclosing a copy of the said Enquiry Officer’s report, the disciplinary authority issued a show cause notice on 30.01.2010 and in response to the same, an explanation was submitted by the writ petitioner on 24.02.2010. 5. Thereafter, the Deputy Inspector General (CISF), South Zone, Chennai- appellant No.2 herein passed a final order dated 29.03.2010, inflicting on the Writ Petitioner herein punishment of compulsory retirement from service with full pension and gratuity with immediate effect in accordance with Rule 40 of the Central Civil Services Rules, 1972 (for short ‘The Rules’). After unsuccessfully availing the remedies of appeal and revision, eventually, the matter landed before this Court by way of W.P.No.17574 of 2011. The learned single Judge, by way of the order under challenge in the present Letters Patent Appeal, allowed the Writ Petition, setting aside the orders of disciplinary, appellate and revisional authorities and consequently directed the authorities to reinstate the writ petitioner into service with continuity of service and 50% of the back wages and with all other consequential benefits in accordance with law. Hence, the present Writ Appeal. 6. Sri J.M.U.V.Prasad, learned counsel for the Central Government strenuously contends that the order passed by the learned single Judge is highly erroneous and contrary to law. In elaboration, it is further submitted by the learned counsel that since the authorities conducted the disciplinary enquiry strictly, in accordance with the procedure contemplated under the Rules and also in accordance with the principles of natural justice, learned single Judge grossly erred in interfering with the orders of punishment by way of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is further contended that in the absence of any procedural infirmity, the learned single Judge ought not to have interfered with the orders of punishment. In support of his submissions and contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on the following judgments: 1. B.C. Chaturvedi vs Union of India and others, [ (1995) 6 SCC 749 ] 2. Director General, RPF and Others vs Ch.Sai Babu, [ (2003) 4 SCC 331 ]. 7. In support of his submissions and contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on the following judgments: 1. B.C. Chaturvedi vs Union of India and others, [ (1995) 6 SCC 749 ] 2. Director General, RPF and Others vs Ch.Sai Babu, [ (2003) 4 SCC 331 ]. 7. On the contrary, Sri V.Padmanabha Rao, learned counsel for the writ petitioner-respondent herein, strongly supporting the order of the learned single Judge, contends that there is absolutely no error nor there exists any infirmity in the order passed by the learned single Judge and in the absence of the same, no interference of this Court is warranted under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It is the further contention of the learned counsel that the present case is a case of no evidence at all and without being supported by any evidence, the disciplinary authority imposed punishment of compulsory retirement from service. It is also the submission of the learned counsel that only on the basis of assumptions and presumptions, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion against the writ petitioner and though the writ petitioner brought to the notice of the disciplinary authority about the same, the disciplinary authority, without considering the same, passed the order of punishment. Learned counsel for the respondent also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi vs Union of India and others (first cited supra). 8. In the above background, now the issues which this Court is called upon to consider and adjudicate are: “1. Whether the order passed by the learned single Judge, which is impugned in the present Writ Petition, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, is sustainable and tenable and 2. Whether the order passed by the learned single Judge warrants any interference of this Court under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.” 9. The information available before this Court reveals, in clear and vivid terms, that during the course of departmental enquiry as many as 4 witnesses were examined on behalf of the department as PWs-1 to 4. Even according to the findings in the Enquiry Officer PWs-2, 3, 4 did not witness the collection of money by the charged official from anybody. PW-2 during the course of cross examination, in clear and vivid terms, deposed that he did not notice about the undisciplined activities of the charged officials. 10. Even according to the findings in the Enquiry Officer PWs-2, 3, 4 did not witness the collection of money by the charged official from anybody. PW-2 during the course of cross examination, in clear and vivid terms, deposed that he did not notice about the undisciplined activities of the charged officials. 10. According to the evidence of PW-3, no register was maintained to note down the particulars of the money in possession of the employees. According to the evidence of PW-1, he did not put his signature in the seizure list as witness, nor he was present at the time of preparation of seizure list. It is also required to be noted that PW-1 during the course of cross examination categorically deposed that he did not see the charged officer collecting money illegally at duty post. He also deposed that he did not receive any complaint about the collection of money. 11. A perusal of the order passed by the learned single Judge shows that all the aspects were thoroughly considered by the learned single Judge in the order under challenge. Coming to the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellants in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi vs Union of India and others (first cited supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said judgment at Para Nos. 12 and 17 held as follows: “Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. The next question is whether the Tribunal was justified in interfering with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Orissa Ors. v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra held that having regard to the gravity of the established misconduct, the punishing authority had the power and jurisdiction to impose punishment. The penalty was not open to review by the High Court under Article 226. If the High Court reached a finding that there was some evidence to reach the conclusion, it became unassessable. The order of the Governor who had jurisdiction and unrestricted power to determine the appropriate punishment was final. The High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty. It was further held that if the order was supported on any finding as to substantial misconduct for which punishment "can lawfully be imposed", it was not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The court had no jurisdiction, if the findings prima facie made out a case of misconduct, to direct the Governor to reconsider the order of penalty. This view was reiterated in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur. The court had no jurisdiction, if the findings prima facie made out a case of misconduct, to direct the Governor to reconsider the order of penalty. This view was reiterated in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur. It is true that in Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., a Bench of two Judges of this Court, while holding that the High Court did not function as a court of appeal, concluded that when the finding was utterly perverse, the High Court could always interfere with the same. In that case, the finding was that the appellant was to supervise felling of the trees which were not hammer marked. The Government had recovered from the contractor the loss caused to it by illicit felling of trees. Under those circumstances, this Court held that the finding of guilt was perverse and unsupported by evidence. The ratio, therefore, is not an authority to conclude that in every case the Court/Tribunal is empowered to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. In Rangaswami v. State of Tamil Nadu, a Bench of three Judges of this Court, while considering the power to interfere with the order of punishment, held that this Court. while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitutions, is empowered to alter or interfere with the penalty; and the Tribunal had no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. It would be seen that this Court did not appear to have intended to lay down that in no case, the High Court/Tribunal has the power to alter the penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the appellate authority. The controversy was again canvassed in State Bank of India’s case (supra), where the court elaborately reviewed the case law on the scope of judicial review and powers of the Tribunal in disciplinary matters and nature of punishment. On the facts in that case, since the appellate authority had not adverted to the relevant facts, it was remitted to the appellate authority to impose appropriate punishment.” 12. On the facts in that case, since the appellate authority had not adverted to the relevant facts, it was remitted to the appellate authority to impose appropriate punishment.” 12. In the case of Director General, RPF and Others vs Ch.Sai Babu, [ (2003) 4 SCC 331 ], the Hon’ble Apex Court at Para Nos.6 & 7 held as follows: “As is evident from the order of the learned Single Judge there has been no consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case including as to the nature of charged held proved against the respondent to say that penalty of removal from service imposed on the respondent was extreme. Merely because it was felt that the punishment imposed was extreme was not enough to disturb or modify the punishment imposed on a delinquent officer. The learned Single Judge has not recorded reasons to say as to how the punishment imposed on the respondent was shockingly or grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the charges held proved against the respondent. It is not that in every case of imposing a punishment of removal or dismissal from service a high court can modify such punishment merely saying that it is shockingly disproportionate. Normally, the punishment imposed by disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by high court or tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly of shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors including nature of charges proved against, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected of and discipline required to be maintained, and the department/establishment in which the concerned delinquent person works. In the present case we do not find that there has been a consideration of all the relevant facts and the learned Single Judge has not recorded reasons in order to modify the punishment imposed. The Division Bench of the High Court also did not examine the matter in proper perspective but simply concurred with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Normally in cases where it is found that the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, high courts or tribunals may remit the cases to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration on the quantum of punishment. Normally in cases where it is found that the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, high courts or tribunals may remit the cases to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration on the quantum of punishment. In this case the disciplinary proceedings were initiated in the year 1989 and to shorten the litigation we think it appropriate to set aside the impugned order and remit the writ appeal No. 952 of 1998 to the Division Bench of the High Court to reconsider the case only on the quantum of punishment imposed on the respondent having regard to all relevant factors including the facts that the respondent was a member of Railway Protection Force and in the light of the observations made above. Since the proceedings are pending for quite some time, we request the High Court to dispose of the writ appeal expeditiously. The impugned order is set aside and the appeal is ordered in the above terms. No costs.” 13. It is very much clear from a reading of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court that the Courts/Tribunals are empowered to interfere with the findings of the disciplinary authority in the event of the same being not supported by any evidence. In the instant case, obviously, no witness was examined on behalf of the department to prove the collection of money by the Writ Petitioner. At the cost of repetition, it is required to be noted that one of the witnesses examined on behalf of the petitioner, i.e., PW-2 categorically deposed that he did not notice about the undisciplined activities of the Charged Official. In the considered opinion of this Court, the learned single Judge arrived at the conclusions by assigning cogent and convincing reasons, as such, this Court is not inclined to meddle with the said well-articulated order passed by the learned single Judge. 14. In view of the above reasons, the Writ Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 15. As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.