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2022 DIGILAW 1257 (BOM)

Sachin @ Anna Daniel Gabrel v. State of Maharashtra

2022-04-29

AMIT B.BORKAR, V.M.DESHPANDE

body2022
JUDGMENT AMIT BORKAR, J. - Heard. 2. RULE. Rule made returnable forthwith. 3. By this Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner is challenging the order of cancellation of the emergency parole under Rule 19(1)(C) of the Maharashtra Prisons (Mumbai Furlough and Parole) Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Rules"). The Petitioner is a convict for the offences punishable under Ss. 302, 149, 148 and 143 of the Indian Penal Code and has been convicted to suffer imprisonment for life. The Petitioner is undergoing imprisonment at Nagpur Central Prison. 4. The Petitioner was initially released on emergency parole by the order dtd. 14/07/2021. However, during the subsistence of emergency parole, on 06/08/2021, an offence was registered against the Petitioner in Jaripatka Police Station bearing Crime No. 64/2021. Therefore Respondent No. 1 cancelled Petitioner's emergency parole leave. Therefore, the Petitioner is challenging the order of cancellation of the emergency parole by filing the present Writ Petition. 5. This Court, on 04/04/2022, issued notice to the Respondents, in pursuance of which Respondent No. 1 has filed an affidavit. In Paragraph 3 of the reply, the Respondent No. 1 has stated:- "3. I say and submit that the Government of Maharashtra substituted Rule 19 of the Maharashtra Prisons (Mumbai Furlough and Parole) Rules, 1959 vide by notification dtd. 10/02/2022, wherein the entire Rule 19 was substituted with amended provisions for Emergency Parole." 6. Ms Wankhede, Learned Advocate for the Petitioner, submitted that though during the pendency of present Writ Petition, Rule 19(1) of the said Rules as was in existence on the date of filing of the Application has been substituted by new rules, Petitioner would be governed by rights available on the date of filing of the Application. Therefore substitution of Rule 19(1)(C) by new rules would not affect the rights of the Petitioner. 7. Mr Pathan Learned APP for the Respondent/State submitted that prisoner could not claim to be released on parole as of right. He submitted that the introduction of Rule 19(1)(C) was in pursuance of the directions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition No. 01/2020. He invited our attention to the Notification dtd. 08/05/2021, which introduced Rule 19(1)(C). He submitted that Respondent No. 1, in its wisdom, has now substituted Rule 19 with a new Rule by Notification dtd. 10/02/2022. He invited our attention to the Notification dtd. 08/05/2021, which introduced Rule 19(1)(C). He submitted that Respondent No. 1, in its wisdom, has now substituted Rule 19 with a new Rule by Notification dtd. 10/02/2022. He submitted that the privilege conferred on the prisoners in the form of Rule 19(1)(C) is no longer available in view of the substitution of the new Rule, which does not provide any such privilege in favour of the Petitioner. He, therefore, submitted that no right vested with the Petitioner on the date of filing of the Application. In the absence of any vested right, the Petitioner is not entitled to contend that the Petitioner is entitled to be released on the basis of erstwhile Rule 19(1)(C). 8. We have carefully considered the submissions of the parties and also perused Rule 19(1)(C). However, before scrutinizing the effect of substitution of Rule 19(1)(C), it is necessary to consider the nature of the right of parole which is conferred on a prisoner. Sec. 59(5) of the Prisons Act, 1894 confers power on state to make rules for grant of release on parole of a prisoner. In exercise of such power said rules have been framed. Sec. 59(5) reads as follows:- "59. Power to make rules:- (5) for the award of marks, the suspension, or remission and consent shortening of sentences, and the grant of release on parole or furlough and determining the conditions on which and the authority by which the sentences may be suspended or remitted and the prisoners may be released on parole or furlough. Bombay Act 23 of 1959, S. 3 (w.e.f. 1- 6-1959)." 9. Bombay Act 23 of 1959, S. 3 (w.e.f. 1- 6-1959)." 9. The dictionary meaning of "parole" is: The Concise Oxford Dictionary- (New Edition) "The release of a prisoner temporarily for a special purpose or completely before the expiry of a sentence, on the promise of good behaviour; such a promise; a word of honour." Black's Law Dictionary- (6th Edition) "Release from jail, prison or other confinement after actually serving part of sentence; Conditional release from imprisonment which entitles parolee to serve remainder of his term outside confines of an institution, if he satisfactorily complies with all terms and conditions provided in parole order." According to The Law Lexicon [P. Ramanatha Aiyar's The Law Lexicon with Legal Maxims, Latin Terms and Words and Phrases], "parole" has been defined as: "A parole is a form of conditional pardon, by which the convict is released before the expiration of his term, to remain subject, during the remainder thereof, to supervision by the public authority and to return to imprisonment on violation of the condition of the parole." 10. It is a well-settled principle of law that the grant of parole is not a matter of right. The parole can be granted only when there is a specific reason available to the prisoner, unlike furlough, where limited right accrues in favour of the Petitioner by the passage of his term of imprisonment. The privilege of parole is not available to the prisoner unless expressly conferred on it by the said Rules. Parole is a grant of partial liberty or lessening of restrictions to a convicted prisoner, but release on parole does not change the status of the prisoner. It is also settled that "parole" is a form of "temporary release" from custody, which does not suspend the sentence or the period of detention, but provides conditional release from custody and changes the mode of undergoing the sentence. 11. The Apex Court, in the context of maintainability of the writ of Habeas Corpus, for securing a release in terms of government rules providing for premature release of prisoners undergoing a sentence of imprisonment imposed by the court held in the case of State v. H. Nilofer Nisha [ (2020) 14 SCC 161 ] 26. We would also like to point out that the grant of remission or parole is not a right vested with the prisoner. We would also like to point out that the grant of remission or parole is not a right vested with the prisoner. It is a privilege available to the prisoner on fulfilling certain conditions. This is a discretionary power which has to be exercised by the authorities conferred with such powers under the relevant rules/regulations. The court cannot exercise these powers through once the powers are exercised, the Court may hold that the exercise of powers is not in accordance with rules. 12. It needs to be noted that in view of the emergency situation created by the Covid 19 pandemic by the intervention of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition No. 01/2020, the Respondent No. 1 introduced Rule 19(1)(C) as conditional legislation to reduce the overcrowding of the prisoners to avoid the spread of Covid 19 pandemic. Respondent No. 1, in its wisdom, has substituted a new rule in the form of Rule 19(1) by Notification dtd. 10/02/2022. Rule 19(1), as introduced by Notification dtd. 10/02/2022, reads as under:- "19. When a prisoner may be released on emergency parole- (1) Emergency Parole.- (A) All convicted prisoners, except foreigner and death-sentenced prisoners, may be eligible for emergency parole of seven days, including the traveling time, for participating in the rituals related to the death of parental grandfather or grandmother / father / mother / spouse / son / daughter / siblings. The emergency parole for such prisoners shall be granted by a written order passed by the Superintendent of Prison. (B) The initial period of seven days of emergency parole may be extended by a further additional period of maximum up to seven days, total not more than maximum fourteen days, by a written order containing just, sufficient, cogent and self - explanatory reasons, passed by the Superintendent of Prison, before expiry of initial period of seven days. No extension shall be granted to such emergency parole in any case and under any circumstances beyond the period of total fourteen days. (C) The Superintendent of Prison shall decide as to whether or not to grant such parole under police escort and the extent thereof, after taking into consideration all the relevant factors in that regard, including the nature of crime committed by such prisoner, his overall behavior and conduct etc. (C) The Superintendent of Prison shall decide as to whether or not to grant such parole under police escort and the extent thereof, after taking into consideration all the relevant factors in that regard, including the nature of crime committed by such prisoner, his overall behavior and conduct etc. (i) In case if the Superintendent of Prison decides not to grant such parole under police escort, he may decide other conditions subject to which such Emergency Parole may be granted, such as to report daily to the local police station, etc, depending upon the overall background of the prisoner, including but not limited to the nature of crime committed by such prisoner, his overall behavior and conduct etc. (ii) In case if the Superintendent of Prison decides to grant such parole under police escort, the expenses of police escort shall be borne by the prisoner himself or anybody duly authorized by him on his behalf. The estimate of such expenses shall be made known to the prisoner at the earliest by the authority approving such parole, whereupon, prior to the release of the prisoner on the Emergency Parole. The entire amount of such expenses shall be deposited by the prisoner with the prison authorities. The method and manner of calculating the expenses of the police escort shall be specified by the State Government from time to time. The entire amount of such expenses shall be deposited by the prisoner with the prison authorities. The method and manner of calculating the expenses of the police escort shall be specified by the State Government from time to time. Until and unless, the prisoner makes full payment of such expenses of police escort, if any, in terms of the order releasing the prisoner on such Emergency Parole, including all the following provisos, the prisoner shall not be entitled to any further release either on any type of parole or furlough: Provided that, in case if upon the reference made by the Superintendent of Prison, considering the overall financial background of the prisoner and his family, the Deputy Inspector General of Prisons, comes to the conclusion that it is practically not possible for such prisoner to deposit the appropriate charges of such police escort, prior to his release on the Emergency Parole, he may be a self - explanatory reasoned order passed within 48 hours of receiving such reference, permit the prisoner to deposit such charges of such police escort within such time as it may find appropriate, while passing such reasoned order: Provided further that, in case if upon a reference made by the Superintendent of Prison, considering the overall financial background of the prisoner and his family, the Deputy Inspector General of Prisons comes to the conclusion that, it is not possible for such prisoner to make payment of the appropriate charges of such police escort not only prior to his release on the Emergency Parole but also not to the full extent, he may be a self explanatory reasoned order passed within 48 hours of receiving such reference, permit the prisoner to deposit such percentage of the charges of such police escort, within such time, as he may find appropriate while passing such a self - explanatory reasoned order: Provided also that in a rare case and as and by way of exception to the requirement of deposit of such charges of such police escort, the Deputy Inspector General of Prisons may by a self - explanatory reasoned order passed within 24 hours of receiving such reference, considering the overall financial background of the prisoner and his family, completely waive the payment of such charges." 13. Reading of newly introduced Rule 19(1) by Notification dtd. Reading of newly introduced Rule 19(1) by Notification dtd. 10/02/2022 enables the Jail Authorities to release the prisoners on emergency parole only on the ground of death and marriage. It also provides for the release of the prisoners on regular parole on the ground of serious illness, delivery of wife and natural calamities. On perusal of newly substituted Rule 19(1) would show that the intention of the Respondent No. 1 is clear that the prisoner is not entitled to be released on emergency parole on the ground of the Covid 19 pandemic. 14. We have considered the submission made on behalf of the Petitioner that the rights of the Petitioner shall be governed by the law which is in existence on the date of filing of an Application. Though the contention raised appears to be sound at the first blush, on a little probe, we find Petitioner's contention meritless. The privilege of emergency parole on the ground of subsistence of Covid 19 pandemic will not be available to a prisoner as the very basis of conferring privilege on a Prisoner has been extinguished. The subordinate legislation which creates privilege in favour of the prisoner is based on the condition that there is a subsisting rule which confers power on the Prison Authorities to release a prisoner. Undisputedly, the privilege conferred by Notification dtd. 08/05/2020 is no longer in existence. As a result, the provision that confers privilege on a prisoner in the form of emergency parole has been extinguished. On careful reading of Rule 19(1)(C), which was in existence prior to its substitution, there was no right, much less a vested right. In the absence of such a right, the prisoner is not entitled to claim release on emergency parole after the Rule which created privilege in favour of the prisoner is no longer in existence. In the absence of conferment of any vested right, we are satisfied that the Petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of erstwhile Rule 19(1)(C). 15. There is no merit in the Writ Petition. The Petitioner is therefore dismissed. Rule discharged. Pending Application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.