JUDGMENT : ALOK KUMAR VERMA, J. This is the Second Anticipatory Bail Application. The First Anticipatory Bail Application (No.04 of 2022) was rejected by this Court vide order dated 16.02.2022. 2. Facts, to the limited extent necessary, are that in the scholarship scam matter, vide letter dated 17.04.2018 of the Principal Secretary, Home of the Government of Uttarakhand a Special Investigation Team (SIT) was constituted. Sub-Inspector Lalita Chufal, the informant of this matter, was appointed as a member of the said Special Investigation Team. After enquiry, she lodged a First Information Report on 14.10.2019 against Manav Bharti Vishwa Vidyalaya, Solan, Himachal Pradesh. After completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against the present applicant. 3. During the investigation, evidence are found that the present applicant was the owner of N Power Academy. The said Academy was run and managed by the present applicant. The said Academy of the applicant was not recognized by Manav Bharti Vishwa Vidyalaya, Solan, Himachal Pradesh. The owner of the said Academy had forwarded the list of the concerned students to the Social Welfare Department to get scholarship of the said students and tuition fee. The Social Welfare Department had released the scholarship amount including the tuition fee to the said Academy and the said amount was deposited in the account of the present applicant, the owner of the said Academy. 4. Apprehending his arrest, the present applicant – accused had moved an application for anticipatory bail before the District and Sessions Judge, Haridwar in connection with the First Information Report No.357 of 2019, registered with Police Station SIDCUL, District Haridwar for the offence under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC. On 24.12.2021, the learned In-charge District and Sessions Judge, Haridwar had rejected the said application for anticipatory bail. 5. The First Anticipatory Bail Application (No.04 of 2022), under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was filed by the present applicant before this Court seeking anticipatory bail in the event of his arrest. After filing the charge-sheet, the said First Anticipatory Bail Application (No.04 of 2022) was filed by the present applicant. 6. Heard Mr. Bhupesh Kandpal, the learned counsel for the applicant and Mr. Pratiroop Pandey, the learned AGA for the State. 7. Mr. After filing the charge-sheet, the said First Anticipatory Bail Application (No.04 of 2022) was filed by the present applicant. 6. Heard Mr. Bhupesh Kandpal, the learned counsel for the applicant and Mr. Pratiroop Pandey, the learned AGA for the State. 7. Mr. Bhupesh Kandpal, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant, argued that the applicant was not named in the First Information Report, but, subsequently, he was named when the charge-sheet was filed. The charge-sheet was filed against the present applicant on the basis of the statement of a witness, namely, Anupama Thakur, the then Registrar of Manav Bharti Vishwa Vidyalaya, Solan, Himachal Pradesh, who is also an accused, but, the legal preposition of law was ignored and the charge-sheet was filed. The learned counsel for the applicant further submitted that N Power Academy was not fictitious Academy. The said Academy was running in the building of Ashok Kumar Gupta. After the rejection of the First Anticipatory Bail Application, the wife of the applicant found certain relevant records i.e. bank record/ statement, which shows that the scholarship amounts were paid to the students. The allegations against the applicant are highly improbable and further in order to show the bona fide, the applicant is continuously requesting that he is ready and willing to submit the bank guarantee before the authority. The learned counsel for the applicant further argued that the allegations against the applicant are not maintainable and are liable to be set aside. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Pratiroop Pandey, the learned AGA appearing for the State, has vehemently opposed the maintainability of this Second Anticipatory Bail Application and submitted that the present Second Anticipatory Bail Application is not maintainable. He further submitted that the applicant has not filed the said bank record. 9. At the time of hearing on the First Anticipatory Bail Application, Mr. Pratiroop Pandey, the learned AGA appearing for the State, has vehemently opposed the maintainability of this Second Anticipatory Bail Application and submitted that the present Second Anticipatory Bail Application is not maintainable. He further submitted that the applicant has not filed the said bank record. 9. At the time of hearing on the First Anticipatory Bail Application, Mr. Bhupesh Kandpal, the learned counsel for the applicant, had argued that the applicant has been implicated in this matter; Manav Bharti Vishwa Vidyalaya, Solan, was running by Manav Bharti Charitable Trust; the said University had sold twenty six thousand fake degrees across the seventeen States in over eleven years; total forty one thousand degrees were issued by the said University, but, only five thousand degrees were found to be genuine; the said University was declared fake University; however, at the relevant point of time, i.e., 2011-2012, the said University was genuine University; the scholarship and tuition fee, received from the Social Welfare Department, were transferred to the said University by the applicant; the applicant is ready to deposit a draft of Rs.50,00,000/- just to show his bona fide. 10. At the time of the hearing on the First Anticipatory Bail Application, Mr. T.C. Agarwal, the learned Deputy Advocate General for the State, had opposed the First Anticipatory Bail Application and had submitted that during the investigation, evidence are found against the applicant, who was the owner of N Power Academy; the said Academy was fictitious Academy; according to the statement of the Registrar of Manav Bharti University, recorded during the investigation, the said N Power Academy was not given recognition by the said University; an amount of Rs.02,59,20,300/- was released by the Social Welfare Department to the present applicant; the said amount was deposited in the bank account of the present applicant, and, the said amount was embezzled by the present applicant. 11. At the time of hearing on the First Anticipatory Bail Application, it was found that the applicant had filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and in that matter, he had requested for ten days’ time to surrender before the concerned trial court. The said application, filed under Section 482 of the Code, was decided accordingly. The said application, filed under Section 482 of the Code, was decided accordingly. Even availing the sufficient opportunity and ten days’ time to surrender before the concerned trial court, the applicant had requested further ten days’ time to surrender, but, the applicant did not surrender before the concerned court. Therefore, nonbailable warrant, process under Section 82 and Section 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were issued against the applicant. 12. On 16.02.2022, this Court had made the following order:- “10. The scheme of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is introduced by the State of Uttarakhand vide Act No.22/2020. Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 reads as follows:- (1), Where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and that Court may, after taking into consideration, inter alia, the following factors, namely :- (i) the nature and gravity of the accusation ; (ii) the antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether he has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a Court in respect of any cognizable offence; (iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; and (iv) where the accusation has been made with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by having him so arrested, either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail: Provided that where the High Court or, as the case may be, the Court of Session, has not passed any interim order under this sub-section or has rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an officer in-charge of a police station to arrest, without warrant, the applicant on the basis of the accusation apprehended in such application. (2) Where the High Court or, as the case may be, the Court of Session, considers it expedient to issue an interim order to grant anticipatory bail under sub-section (1), the Court shall indicate therein the date, on which the application for grant of anticipatory bail shall be finally heard for passing an order thereon, as the Court may deem fit, and if the Court passes any order granting anticipatory bail, such order shall include inter alia the following conditions, namely:- (i) that the applicant shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required; (ii) that the applicant shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer; (iii) that the applicant shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court; and (iv) such other conditions as may be imposed under subsection (3) of section 437. as if the bail were granted under that section. Explanation: the final order made on an application for direction under sub- section (1); shall not be construed as an interlocutory order for the purpose of this Code. (3) Where the Court grants an interim order under subsection (1), it shall forthwith cause a notice being not less than seven days notice, together, with a copy of such order to be served on the Public Prosecutor and the Superintendent of Police, with a view to give the Public Prosecutor a reasonable opportunity of being heard when the application shall be finally heard by the Court. (4) On the date indicated in the interim order under subsection (2), the Court shall hear the Public Prosecutor and the applicant and after due consideration of their contentions, it may either confirm, modify or cancel the interim order. (4) On the date indicated in the interim order under subsection (2), the Court shall hear the Public Prosecutor and the applicant and after due consideration of their contentions, it may either confirm, modify or cancel the interim order. (5) The High Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, shall finally dispose of an application for grant of anticipatory bail under sub-section (l), within thirty days of the date of such application; (6) Provisions of this section shall not be applicable,- (a) to the offences arising out of, - (i) the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; (ii) the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; (iii) the Official Secrets Act, 1923; (iv) the Uttarakhand (Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986;) Adaptation and Modification Order, 2002 (v) sub-section(3) of Section 376 or Section 376AB or Section 376DA or Section 376DB of the Indian Penal Code; (vi) chapter 6 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, viz, offences against the state (except Section 129); (vii) The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012; (b) in the offences, in which death sentence may be awarded. (7) If an application under this section has been made by any person to the High Court, no application by the same person shall be entertained by the Court of Session. 11. The society has a vital interest in grant or refusal of bail because every criminal offence is the offence against the society. Therefore, the court must take into account the statutory scheme under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and, balance the concerns of the Investigating Agency, the society at large with the interest of the applicant. 12. Admittedly, the scholarship amount was released to N Power Academy and the said amount was deposited in the bank account of the present applicant. According to the learned counsel for the applicant, the said amount was transferred by the applicant to the University. However, no evidence has been filed before this court regarding this plea. This fact is also admitted between the parties that earlier, the applicant had filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the applicant requested ten days’ time to surrender before the concerned trial court. The said application was decided accordingly. However, no evidence has been filed before this court regarding this plea. This fact is also admitted between the parties that earlier, the applicant had filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the applicant requested ten days’ time to surrender before the concerned trial court. The said application was decided accordingly. After deciding the said application, the applicant again filed an application for further ten days’ time to surrender before the concerned Court. The time was granted. The applicant did not surrender before the concerned court. A non-bailable warrant and process under Section 82 and Section 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been issued by the concerned Court. 13. In “Prem Shankar Prasad vs. The State of Bihar and Another, L.L. 2021 SC 579”, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held on 21.10.2021, “It is clear from the above decision that if anyone is declared as an absconder/proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code, he is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail”. 14. In Directorate of Enforcement vs. Ashok Kumar Jain, (1998) 2 SCC 105 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, in economic offences, the accused is ordinarily not entitled to anticipatory bail. 15. In Niranjan Hem Chandra Sashittal Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013)4 SCC 642 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that corruption is not to be judged by degree, for corruption mothers disorder, destroys societal will to progress, accelerates undeserved ambitions, kills the conscience, jettisons the glory of the institutions, paralyses the economic health of a country, corrodes the sense of civility and mars the marrows of governance. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that immoral acquisition of wealth destroys the energy of the people believing in honesty, and history records with agony how they have suffered; and the only redeeming fact is that collective sensibility respects such suffering as it is in consonance with constitutional morality. The emphasis was on intolerance to any kind of corruption bereft of its degree. 16. In Subramanian Swamy Vs. C.B.I., (2014)8 SCC 682 , the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that corruption is an enemy of the nation and tracking down corrupt public servants and punishing such persons is a necessary mandate of the 1988 Act. 17. The emphasis was on intolerance to any kind of corruption bereft of its degree. 16. In Subramanian Swamy Vs. C.B.I., (2014)8 SCC 682 , the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that corruption is an enemy of the nation and tracking down corrupt public servants and punishing such persons is a necessary mandate of the 1988 Act. 17. The anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has falsely been enroped in the offence. Being an extraordinary remedy, it should be restored to only in a special case. 18. It would be inappropriate to discuss the evidence in depth at this stage because it is likely to influence the trial court. But, the evidence, collected during the investigation, prima facie indicate involvement of the applicant in the offence in question. No reason is found to falsely implicate the applicant. 19. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court does not find any exceptional ground to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to grant anticipatory bail. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the anticipatory bail application has no merit and is liable to be rejected. 20. The Anticipatory Bail Application No.4 of 2022 is hereby rejected. 21. It is clarified that the observations made regarding the anticipatory bail application are limited to the decision, in the light of the facts, provided by the parties at this stage, as to whether the anticipatory bail application should be allowed or not. The said observations shall not effect the trial of this case.” 13. In Ganesh Raj Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2005 ALL MR (Cri) Journal 200 (Rajasthan High Court) (Jaipur Bench) (Full Bench), the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court observed, “Having scanned the language of Sections 438 and 439 Cr.P.C. we find that there is no substantial difference between Sections 438 and 439, as regards the appreciation of the case as to whether or not a bail is to be granted. The only distinction is that in a cases under Section 438, the person who approaches the Court apprehends that he may be arrested without any basis whereas under Section 439, such person approaches the Court after his arrest”. 14. In State of Maharashtra Vs. The only distinction is that in a cases under Section 438, the person who approaches the Court apprehends that he may be arrested without any basis whereas under Section 439, such person approaches the Court after his arrest”. 14. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2292 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed, “…..Once that application was rejected there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact-situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes which are of little or no consequence. ……” 15. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Kajad, (2001)7 SCC 673 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is true that successive bail applications are permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances, the second bail application would be deemed to be seeking review of the earlier judgment which is not permissible under criminal law. 16. The applicant had opportunity to raise all his contentions on the previous occasion. It is not open to the applicant to make successive anticipatory bail application even on the grounds already rejected by this Court earlier. 17. On overall consideration of the application and also in the fact that any change in circumstances is not established, after rejection of the first anticipatory bail application on merit, I do not find any change in circumstances to entertain present second anticipatory bail application. The Second Anticipatory Bail Application does not deserve to be entertained. Consequently, the present Second Anticipatory Bail Application is rejected.