JUDGMENT : NELSON SAILO, J. 1. Heard Mr. M Batt, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. G Tarak, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4. Also heard Ms. P Sangeeta learned counsel for respondent No. 1. 2. By filing this writ Petition, the petitioner has challenged the Order dated 24.06.2015 (Annexure-8) issued by the Disciplinary Authority dismissing the petitioner from service with immediate effect and to pay fine of Rs. 80 lakhs along with interest @ 14% per annum w.e.f. 31.03.2009. The petitioner has also challenged the minutes of the Board of Directors’ Meeting held on 01.06.2016 (Annexure-11) by which, the appeal filed by the petitioner was rejected. 3. Brief facts of the essential for disposal of the writ petition is that the petitioner joined the Arunachal Pradesh Rural Bank as Junior Management Scale-1 in the year 1985 and he was subsequently promoted to the post of Manager and posted at Kimin Branch in the month of January 2006. While working as such, he was placed under suspension vide Order No. 37/3179 dated 17.02.2010 on the allegation of misconduct. An FIR was also lodged against him by one Pulakesh Paul on 08.03.2010 before the Officer-in-Charge of Kimin Police Station, alleging that the petitioner has committed serious irregularities during the period from July 2009 to December 2009. The FIR further indicated that the preliminary investigation report dated 05.02.2010 indicated that a sum of more than Rs. 80 lakhs had been misappropriated and that the petitioner had executed a lease deed with the landlord of the building occupied by the Kimin Branch of Arunachal Pradesh Rural Bank enhancing the rent without the prior approval and permission of the Head Office. On receipt on the FIR, Kimin P.S. Case No. 10/2010 under Section 408 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was registered and investigation initiated. 4. The matter was thereafter transferred to SIC (Vigilance) Police Station to the Chimpu at Itanagar on 22.11.2010 for further investigation on the ground that the offence alleged to have been committed appeared to be offences covered by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act). Upon completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed on 17.11.2011 under Section 409 IPC read with Section 13(1) (c)(d) and 13(2) of the P.C. Act in the Court of Special Judge, Western Zone, Yupia, Arunachal Pradesh. 5. Upon completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed on 17.11.2011 under Section 409 IPC read with Section 13(1) (c)(d) and 13(2) of the P.C. Act in the Court of Special Judge, Western Zone, Yupia, Arunachal Pradesh. 5. While the investigation was being conducted, a departmental Proceeding was also initiated by the respondent No. 3 against the petitioner and a Memorandum No. 37/1638 dated 15.12.2010 was issued against the petitioner containing as many as 7 (seven) charges. The petitioner was asked to submit his written statement against the charges within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the charge. The petitioner, accordingly on receipt of the Memorandum, submitted his written statement of defence on 30.12.2010 explaining the circumstances under which he had released the over-draft amount to the persons concerned. The Enquiry Officer, thereafter, submitted the Enquiry Report on 26.12.2014 (Annexure-4) by coming to the conclusion that the Charges No. 1 to 6 was proved and in respect of Charge No. 7, the same was partially proved. 6. In the meantime, the criminal trial against the petitioner i.e. P.C.A. No. 25 (YPA)/2013 was concluded by the Trial Court through its Judgment and Order dated 29.12.2014. According to the learned Trial Court, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused (petitioner) beyond the shadow of all reasonable doubt and therefore, acquitted him of the charge under Section 409 IPC read with Section 13(2) (1)(c)&(d) of the P.C Act. 7. Upon being acquitted as such, the petitioner submitted his Joining Report to the respondent No. 2 on 12.02.2015 but he was not allowed to join. Instead, he was given a Communication dated 16.05.2015 (Annexure-7) wherein, it was stated that a disciplinary proceeding conducted against him was concluded with findings against him and therefore, the Bank has decided to award him the punishment of dismissal from service. Therefore, he was asked to submit his response to the notice within 3 (three) days of the receipt of the said communication. Although the petitioner did not submit a written response but he appeared before the respondent No. 2. Thereafter, vide the impugned Order dated 24.06.2015, he was dismissed from service and imposed a fine in the manner as already stated in the preceding paragraphs. 8. Mr. Although the petitioner did not submit a written response but he appeared before the respondent No. 2. Thereafter, vide the impugned Order dated 24.06.2015, he was dismissed from service and imposed a fine in the manner as already stated in the preceding paragraphs. 8. Mr. M. Batt, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had been pressurized by the landlord of the building occupied by the Kimin Branch of the Arunachal Pradesh Rural Bank and at the same time he was also confident that loan will be given to the said person and therefore he disbursed the amount to him. He submits that the amount disbursed is not for the personal benefit of the petitioner. In fact, it was given in good faith on the belief that loan in favour of the landlord would sooner or later be approved by the competent authority. The learned counsel further submits that the criminal trial was initiated against the petitioner on the same set of facts and on similar charge and since the petitioner has been acquitted by the Trial Court vide its Judgment & Order dated 29.12.2014, the Disciplinary Authority could not have imposed the impugned penalty upon the petitioner. The learned counsel also submits that at any rate, the impugned penalty imposed upon the petitioner is too harsh and is not commensurate to the alleged misconduct said to have been committed by him and therefore, this Court being empowered to interfere in the imposition of such penalty, may suitably interfere with the impugned penalty. The learned counsel, in support of his submission, has relied upon the following authorities: (1) Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. (1999) 3 SCC 679 (2) G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (2006) 5 SCC 446 (3) Arju Rahman vs. State of Assam and Others, 2017 (3) GLT 149 9. Mr. G Tarak, learned counsel for the respondent Bank, on the other hand, submits that the petitioner himself has not denied the issuance of over-draft in favour of the landlord and the land lady of the building taken on rent by the Kimin Branch of Arunachal Pradesh Rural Bank. The petitioner being a Branch Manager of the Bank is expected to be fully aware of the fact that any amount to be given out as loan has to be done as per the relevant rules and procedures of the Bank. The petitioner being a Branch Manager of the Bank is expected to be fully aware of the fact that any amount to be given out as loan has to be done as per the relevant rules and procedures of the Bank. He submits that the petitioner had also executed a lease agreement with the landlord with the building for enhancing amount without obtaining prior permission and sanction of the Head Office. He submits that such action of the petitioner amounts to gross illegality misconduct and resulting in huge financial loss to the Bank. Therefore, the Disciplinary Authority upon appreciating the disciplinary proceedings and the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer decided to impose the impugned penalty upon the petitioner. He also submits that the petitioner has tried to rely upon the order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court in the criminal trial but the said acquittal is not an honourable acquittal and the same was mainly due to the failure on the part of the prosecution to prove the case against the petitioner on account of inefficient and callous investigation conducted by the investigating authorities. The learned Trial Court on this point had also made an observation in its judgment & order. At any rate, the learned counsel submits that the tests to determine the guilt of the accused person and that of a delinquent in departmental proceedings are different. Even in the present case, it is clearly distinguishable and therefore, no reliance can be placed upon the judgment & Order of the Trial Court to give any benefit to the petitioner in the departmental proceedings. The learned counsel submits that in services relating to Banks, the Bank Manager plays a very important role and they are required to have integrity, be vigilant and take due care, so that no loss is incurred by the Bank due to the callousness or otherwise or any of its employees. In the present case as well, the petitioner being the Branch Manager was a responsible officer of the Bank but he instead of ensuring that the Bank did not incur any pecuniary loss, indulged himself in the release of money in favour of persons who otherwise were not approved to be given such amount. In the present case as well, the petitioner being the Branch Manager was a responsible officer of the Bank but he instead of ensuring that the Bank did not incur any pecuniary loss, indulged himself in the release of money in favour of persons who otherwise were not approved to be given such amount. At any rate, the learned counsel submits that the petitioner had himself admitted to his guilt and therefore, the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and that of the Appellate Authority may not be interfered with and the writ petition should be dismissed. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has relied upon the following authorities: (1) Chairman and Managing Director vs. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu, (2008) 5 SCC 569 (2) State of Rajasthan and Others vs. Phool Singh, Civil Appeal No. 5930/2022, dated 02.09.2022 (3) Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Dilip Uttam Jayabhay, Civil Appeal No. 7403/2021, dated 03.01.2022 10. I have heard the submissions made by the learned counsels for the rival parties and I have perused the materials available on record. 11. The petitioner was issued the Memorandum of Charge on 15.12.2010 on the allegations made against him, after he was placed under suspension. The Memorandum contains 7 (seven) specific charges and the petitioner was asked to submit his written statement of defence within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the Memorandum. The petitioner, accordingly, submitted his written statement of defence on 30.12.2010 denying the charges. The Enquiry Officer, thereafter, submitted the Enquiry Report on 26.12.2014 by concluding that the charge Nos. 1 to 6 were proved against the petitioner and Charge No. 7 was partially proved. While the enquiry report was submitted in such a manner, the criminal trial initiated against the petitioner was also concluded by the Trial Court vide its Judgment and Order dated 29.12.2014 with a finding that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused (petitioner) beyond shadow of all reasonable doubt and therefore acquitted him from the charge. The case of the petitioner is that since he was therefore acquitted by the Trial Court in the criminal case, the disciplinary proceeding also having been initiated on the same set of facts, the respondents could not have dismissed him from service. It may be seen that in the criminal case, the petitioner was charged under Section 409 IPC. The case of the petitioner is that since he was therefore acquitted by the Trial Court in the criminal case, the disciplinary proceeding also having been initiated on the same set of facts, the respondents could not have dismissed him from service. It may be seen that in the criminal case, the petitioner was charged under Section 409 IPC. Section 409 IPC pertains to criminal breach of trust by public servant or by banker, merchant or agent. The punishment prescribed is imprisonment for life or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years with fine. Criminal breach of trust is define under Section 405 IPC and it provides that whoever being in any manner entrusted with property or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or willfully suffers any other person to do so, commits criminal breach of trust. The petitioner was further charged under Section 13(1)(c) and (d) and Section 13(2) of the P.C Act. The said provisions are more or less similar to Section 409 IPC. It is a well settled principle of law that the test and the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding and in a criminal proceeding are different. The recent Apex Court decision in State of Rajasthan and Others vs. Phool Singh (supra) and Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Dilip Uttam Jayabhay (supra) have dealt with this issue and they will be referred to in the later part of this judgment. 12. In the departmental proceeding, 7 (seven) charges were drawn against the petitioner. In view of the allegations made in the charges, he was accused of having willfully caused serious loss of repetition of the Bank and his acts resulted in huge financial loss to the Bank. He was accused of acting in total disregard to the position of trust and responsibility to which the assignment of the Branch Manager posts entails. In view of the allegations made in the charges, he was accused of having willfully caused serious loss of repetition of the Bank and his acts resulted in huge financial loss to the Bank. He was accused of acting in total disregard to the position of trust and responsibility to which the assignment of the Branch Manager posts entails. On perusal of the written statement of defence made by the petitioner against the charges, it can be seen that the petitioner has not denied having allowed the landlord concerned to withdraw huge sums of cash from his already overdrawn savings bank account with the intention to adjust the same against a loan, which he expected to be sanctioned in favour of the landlord shortly. He contended that he was under the impression that the loan application of the landlord would be considered favourably and that there was no reason for rejecting his application since the project of the landlord to construct a mini market was viable one. Further, the Bank could have easily recovered the loan from the rentals earned from the mini market. It is a settled principle of law that the charges in a departmental proceeding can be proved or established by preponderance of probability whereas, in a criminal proceeding or trial, the charges have to be established with proof beyond reasonable doubt. The partial admission of the petitioner about having released the amount without due process clearly demonstrates despite being the Branch Manager of the Bank, he had ignored his responsibility to see that such huge amount of cash was not released without due process. Although, the petitioner has taken the stand in his writ petition that he was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the author of the exhibited documents during the departmental proceeding but in his appeal before the Board of Directors, such stand has not been taken. All that can be seen is that much reliance has been placed by the petitioner on his acquittal by the trial court in the criminal case. Therefore, it has to be inferred that the petitioner duly participated and was given reasonable opportunity during the departmental proceedings. 13. This Court in Arju Rahman (supra) in the given facts of that case held that the order of removal of the petitioner therein was not sustainable in view of the petitioner having been acquitted by the Trial Court. Therefore, it has to be inferred that the petitioner duly participated and was given reasonable opportunity during the departmental proceedings. 13. This Court in Arju Rahman (supra) in the given facts of that case held that the order of removal of the petitioner therein was not sustainable in view of the petitioner having been acquitted by the Trial Court. It may, however, be seen that the facts in that case was not similar to the facts in the present case. In that case, after the complainant had filed a petition for withdrawal of the case pursuant to an amicable settlement arrived at between the parties, the Trial Court had discharged the accused person from the charge. This Court had also placed reliance upon the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) and also the case of G.M. Tank (supra). It may however be seen that the Apex Court in the State of Rajasthan and Others (supra), had considered the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) along with other similar judgments on the subject and was of the view that acquittal by the criminal Court does not ipso facto entitle reinstatement of the accused person back into service. The reason being that disciplinary proceedings are governed by a different standard of proof, which are different from what is applied in a criminal proceeding. It is the disciplinary authority according to the Apex Court which is best equipped to reach a finding whether misconduct has been committed or not. The prime concern of a Judge should be whether such a finding has been arrived after following a fair procedure, following the principles of natural justice and fairness. On this point, the recent judgment of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Heem Singh, (2002) SCC Online SC 886 was also referred to and relied upon. It was also observed that the reason which weighed with the Court for reinstatement of the employee concerned is that the acquittal was honourable acquittal and not an acquittal on a technicality or on acquittal given because of benefit of doubt. 14. It was also observed that the reason which weighed with the Court for reinstatement of the employee concerned is that the acquittal was honourable acquittal and not an acquittal on a technicality or on acquittal given because of benefit of doubt. 14. In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Dilip Uttam Jayabhay (supra), the short question which fell for consideration by the Apex Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the punishment of dismissal could be said to be an unfair labour practice on the ground that the same was disproportionate to the misconduct proved. A criminal proceeding as well as a departmental proceeding was drawn against the employee concerned. The criminal court acquitted the employee/accused on account of the hostility of the witnesses, the evidence led by interested witnesses and lacuna in the examination of the Investigating Officer, etc. As such, the criminal Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the case against the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. After recording that there was difference in the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding and in a criminal proceeding, the Apex Court held that unless the penalty imposed in the disciplinary proceeding after proving the charge of misconduct is shockingly disproportionate, the penalty imposed should not be interfered with. Consequently, the penalty of dismissal from service imposed by the disciplinary authority upon the employee concerned was upheld. 15. Coming back to the present case, it may be seen that the petitioner being the Branch Manager of the Bank, his nature of work demanded vigilance with the inbuilt requirement to act carefully and not to act beyond his authority. The nature of the charge being grave and serious the penalty imposed, in my considered view, cannot be said to be excessive. Therefore, upon due consideration of the matter in its entirety, I do not find merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. No cost.