JUDGMENT : (J.J. Munir, J.) 1. This is a claimant’s appeal, arising out of the judgment and award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No.12, Allahabad, dated 31.10.2009 in Motor Accident Claims Petition No. 420 of 2008. The claimant, who is in appeal, seeks enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal lie in a narrow compass. Narrower still, would be the reference to facts of the case, and proceedings before the Tribunal, because the issue involved in this appeal is about adequacy of compensation alone. Smt. Ganpati Devi is the claimant, who is in appeal. She will hereinafter be referred to as “the claimant”. Her husband was the victim of a motor accident caused by the vehicle bearing Registration No. UP-70M/5044, said to be driven rashly and negligently. The claimant’s husband, in consequence of the accident, sustained injuries, to which he succumbed. The accident occurred on 23.04.2008 at the Imli Tiraha, Transport Nagar, P.S. Dhoomanganj, District Prayagraj. The deceased was aged 49 years at the time of the mishap. He was employed as a driver with the Jal Nigam and drew a monthly salary of Rs.8,933/-. 3. The claimant asserts that on account of her husband’s demise in the accident, she has sustained financial loss, besides suffering mental agony. She moved the Tribunal to recover from the owner of the vehicle as well as the insurer, a sum of Rs.14,73,000/- in compensation. The Tribunal, by the impugned judgment, has awarded a sum of Rs.1,61,232/- together with 6% simple interest from the date of institution of the claim petition until realization. 4. Aggrieved by the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the claimant has come up in appeal. 5. Ishtiak Ahmad is the owner of the offending vehicle, whereas the National Insurance Company, Civil Lines, Allahabad are its insurers. Ishtiak Ahmad shall hereinafter be referred to as “the owner”, whereas the National Insurance Company Limited, Civil Lines, Allahabad shall hereinafter be called “the insurers”. 6. The learned Counsel for parties have addressed this Court on the issue of quantum alone and not the other issues dealt with by the Tribunal, about which there is no cavil before this Court. 7. Heard Mr. Ram Singh, learned Counsel for the claimant and Mr. Anand Kumar Sinha, learned Counsel for the insurers. No one appeared on behalf of the owner. 7. Heard Mr. Ram Singh, learned Counsel for the claimant and Mr. Anand Kumar Sinha, learned Counsel for the insurers. No one appeared on behalf of the owner. I have perused the record. 8. The deceased, Banshilal Yadav was a driver in the employ of the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam, Allahabad and attached with the Executive Engineer, Construction Division of the said Nigam. He was drawing a salary of Rs.8,033/- per month. In order to prove the deceased’s income, the claimant has filed her husband’s salary certificate bearing Paper No. 19 x 1. The said certificate has been issued by the Executive Engineer, Construction Division, U.P. Jal Nigam, Allahabad. The Tribunal has recorded a finding that no evidence in rebuttal, or to contradict the said salary certificate, has been produced by the owner or the insurers. In the circumstances, the salary certificate has been accepted. The Tribunal has recorded that the basic salary of the deceased was Rs.4700/-, to which was added a sum of Rs.3478/- towards dearness allowance. In addition, the deceased was also in receipt of Rs.680/- per month towards house rent allowance, which was added to his salary. The deceased was, thus, found to be in receipt of a monthly salary of 8,858/-. 9. The Tribunal proceeded to determine the compensation payable on the basis of the aforesaid monthly income. The annual income was determined by the Tribunal at a figure of Rs.1,61,296/- by multiplying the monthly income with the figure of 12'. A one-third was deducted towards personal expenses of the deceased, which would be a sum of Rs.35,432/-. Thus, the annual dependency was determined at a sum of Rs.71,864/-. The Tribunal, however, did not take the sum last mentioned to be the annual dependency, on the basis of which, compensation would be calculated. The Tribunal took note of the evidence of the claimant, who testified as PW-1, to hold that it was acknowledged that the claimant was in receipt of a pension of Rs.5000/- per mensem. The Tribunal, accordingly, held that the claimant received a sum of Rs.60,000/- annually towards pension. The evidence of the witness was also considered to conclude that the deceased's son Pramod Kumar had been granted employment under The U.P. Recruitment of Dependants of Government Servants Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974, [for short ‘the Rules of 1974’]. The Tribunal, accordingly, held that the claimant received a sum of Rs.60,000/- annually towards pension. The evidence of the witness was also considered to conclude that the deceased's son Pramod Kumar had been granted employment under The U.P. Recruitment of Dependants of Government Servants Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974, [for short ‘the Rules of 1974’]. The Tribunal, therefore, concluded that the sum of money received by the claimant in pension had to be deducted from the annual dependency. Thus, out of the annual dependency of Rs.71,864/-, a sum of Rs.60,000/- was deducted to determine the annual dependency for the claimant at a sum of Rs.11,864/-. To the aforesaid sum, a multiplier of 13' was applied in accordance with the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act. This was done as the deceased was aged 49 years. The dependency of Rs.11,864/-, upon application of the multiplier of 13', led the Tribunal to determine the substantive compensation payable at a figure of Rs.1,54,232/-. To this were added, under the conventional heads, a sum of Rs.5000/- towards compensation for loss of consortium and a sum of Rs.2000/- towards funeral expenses. Accordingly, the total compensation determined was a figure of Rs.1,62,232/-. The Tribunal directed that the compensation awarded would carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition until realization. There were certain directions regarding investment of Rs.25,000/- each in Fixed Deposits in the names of Km. Kiran and Punit Kumar, the daughter and the son of the deceased. There were some other ancillary directions regarding investment of the sum of money payable to the claimant. 10. It has been noticed that though the claim petition has been solely filed by the claimant, who is the deceased's widow, but she is not the only heir and dependent. The deceased in this case left behind six heirs, to wit, the claimant, a son Pramod Kumar Yadav aged about 29 years, a married man, Suman Devi aged about 24 years, a married daughter, Km. Kiran aged about 19 years, an unmarried daughter, Punit Kumar Yadav aged about 18 years, an unmarried son and Bachai Lal Yadav aged about 65 years, his father. 11. The Tribunal has remarked that since Pramod Kumar Yadav has been given compassionate appointment, he cannot be regarded a dependent of the deceased. Kiran aged about 19 years, an unmarried daughter, Punit Kumar Yadav aged about 18 years, an unmarried son and Bachai Lal Yadav aged about 65 years, his father. 11. The Tribunal has remarked that since Pramod Kumar Yadav has been given compassionate appointment, he cannot be regarded a dependent of the deceased. Likewise, the married daughter, Suman Devi is not a dependent of her father's. The widow, that is to say, the claimant besides Km. Kiran and Punit Kumar alone have been regarded as the deceased's dependents. There is absolutely no mention made of the deceased's father, a man of 65 years. 12. Mr. Ram Singh, learned Counsel for the claimant, has criticized the exclusion of the adult son, who has been granted compassionate appointment from amongst the deceased’s dependants for the purpose of determining the personal expenses. He has also assailed the exclusion of the deceased’s old father from amongst his dependants by the Tribunal. It is argued that the deceased’s son, prior to his compassionate appointment and post the deceased’s demise, was as much a dependant of his father’s as the other two unmarried siblings. It has been further argued that the deceased’s father was an old man of 65 years, and there is no evidence that he was financially independent at that age. He is a senior citizen, with no recorded income of his own. As such, according to the learned Counsel for the claimant, he has to be counted as one of the deceased’s dependants. Counting in the deceased’s son Pramod Kumar Yadav and his father, the deceased’s dependants would figure five souls in all – not three, entitling the claimant to a deduction of one-fourth towards personal expenses, rather than a one-third, as directed by the Tribunal. 13. On the other hand, Mr. Anand Kumar Sinha, learned Counsel for the insurers has supported the Tribunal's determination of the deduction to be directed on account of personal expenses of the deceased. He submits that the elder son, Pramod Kumar Yadav, has been granted compassionate appointment, which would not entitle him to qualify as a dependant of anyone. The father is a 65-year-old man and it has to be presumed that he would have an income of his own. He cannot also be regarded as a dependant. He submits that the elder son, Pramod Kumar Yadav, has been granted compassionate appointment, which would not entitle him to qualify as a dependant of anyone. The father is a 65-year-old man and it has to be presumed that he would have an income of his own. He cannot also be regarded as a dependant. Learned Counsel for the insurers, therefore, says that the Tribunal is right in deducting a one-third from the deceased's income towards personal expenses, inasmuch as the deceased had no more than three dependants, already indicated. 14. Upon a consideration of the matter, this Court finds that the deceased’s elder son, Pramod Kumar Yadav was, no doubt, a man of mature years, being aged 29 years, and a married man, at that. Still, in these days of scarcity of employment, no presumption of gainful occupation about a 29-year-old man, even married, who has a father to support, with a recorded source of income, can be drawn. 15. To the contrary, this Court is of opinion that the fact that Pramod Kumar Yadav has been granted compassionate appointment by his father's employers, who are a State employer under the Rules of 1974, treating him to be the deceased's dependant family member, is evidence enough to infer that Pramod Kumar Yadav was not gainfully employed at the time of his father's demise. He was a dependant of his father's. Likewise, regarding the deceased’s father aged about 65 years, there is not the slightest evidence to show that that he had a gainful employment at that age or an income of his own. 16. Amongst the dependents, the claimant has testified in her examination-in-chief that her father-in-law is alive. She has described the members of her family and gone on to say that all of them were dependant upon the deceased’s salary. In the cross-examination of P.W.-1 Ganpat Devi, there is no question or suggestion put to her on behalf of the insurers that the deceased’s father was gainfully employed at the age of 65 years or that he had an income of his own from any source. In the circumstances, being a senior citizen of 65 years, this Court is of opinion that the deceased’s father must be regarded as one of his dependants. 17. There is one more issue which Mr. Sinha has raised, and that brings us back to Pramod Kumar’s entitlement as a dependant. In the circumstances, being a senior citizen of 65 years, this Court is of opinion that the deceased’s father must be regarded as one of his dependants. 17. There is one more issue which Mr. Sinha has raised, and that brings us back to Pramod Kumar’s entitlement as a dependant. This issue is that once appointed on compassionate grounds in the deceased’s stead, Pramod Kumar Yadav may not be regarded as a dependant at all. The Tribunal has accepted the said submission. In the opinion of this Court, the Tribunal has done so in manifest error. The mere fact that the elder son got an employment on compassionate basis in place of the deceased would not lead to the conclusion that he was not a dependant. 18. I had occasion to consider this question in United India Insurance Company v. Smt. Mamta Rani and others, [First Appeal From Order No. 1699 of 2013, decided on 19.07.2022]. Repelling an identical contention advanced there on behalf of the insurers, it was held in Smt. Mamta Rani (supra) : 31. The submission of learned Counsel for the insurers that the adult son of the deceased, who has been given compassionate appointment, must not be counted amongst his dependents, is not worthy of acceptance. This submission has been urged in the past to claim deduction from the dependency put forth by the claimants. This was the issue before the Supreme Court, put in a different manner on behalf of the insurers, in National Insurance Company Limited v. Rekhaben and others, [ (2017) 13 SCC 547 ]. There the issue was raised in terms that can best be understood by reference to the words of their Lordships in the report. These read : 11. The main contention of the appellant in these appeals is that the amount of salary received by the claimants being appointed by the employers of the deceased on compassionate grounds must be reduced from the award of compensation made in favour of the claimants. Thus, the only issue before us in these appeals is whether the income of the claimants from compassionate employment is liable to be deducted from the compensation amount awarded by the Tribunal under the statute. 32. The issue was differently posed in Rekhaben (supra), but ultimately at the bottom of it, it is identical to the contention that Mr. Sinha raises before this Court. 32. The issue was differently posed in Rekhaben (supra), but ultimately at the bottom of it, it is identical to the contention that Mr. Sinha raises before this Court. The contention, perhaps, has been differently put on behalf of the insurers in order to escape the principle that is laid down in Rekhaben and a number of other decisions of various High Courts that have not favoured any deductions from the compensation on account of compassionate appointment, granted to one of the dependents of the deceased. 33. Mr. Sinha has sought to argue that the deceased’s adult son was no longer a dependent of the deceased, being favoured with compassionate appointment in consequence of his demise. The issue, in substance, is answered against the insurers in Rekhaben by the Supreme Court, but, to dispose of a novel rendition of the same contention urged on behalf of the insurers by Mr. Sinha, it must be remarked that until time that the deceased passed away in consequence of the accident, the adult son was one of the deceased’s dependents. Right to compensation stood crystallized on the date of the victim's death. The day the deceased passed away, the claimants sustained the loss, which was the dependency. The deceased’s adult son was 24 years old. If the deceased had survived, the adult son might have improved his educational qualifications or looked for better prospects. There is no logic or principle by which on the grant of compassionate appointment, the adult son of the deceased is to be counted out of the dependents. 19. In view of my holding in Smt. Mamta Rani and the guidance of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Limited v. Rekhaben and others, [ (2017) 13 SCC 547 ], there is absolutely no substance in the submission put forth on behalf of the insurers or the opinion of the Tribunal that upon compassionate appointment being granted to the deceased’s son, he is no longer to be counted as one of the dependants. The deceased’s elder son is, therefore, held to be one of the family members dependent upon him at the time of his demise. Likewise, the deceased’s father, who is a senior citizen with no evidence about gainful employment at that age, or income, has also to be regarded as one of the dependants. The deceased’s elder son is, therefore, held to be one of the family members dependent upon him at the time of his demise. Likewise, the deceased’s father, who is a senior citizen with no evidence about gainful employment at that age, or income, has also to be regarded as one of the dependants. In the circumstances, the deceased must be held to have left behind five dependants, counting out, of course, the married daughter Smt. Suman Devi. 20. In view of the principle about deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased laid down by the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, [ (2009) 6 SCC 121 ], the deduction of a one-fourth towards the deceased’s personal expenses would be the correct quantification on this count. In Sarla Verma (supra) it has been held : 30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra[ (1996) 4 SCC 362 ] , the general practice is to apply standardised deductions. Having considered several subsequent decisions of this Court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of dependent family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5th) where the number of dependent family members exceeds six. 21. The deceased having left behind five dependent family members, the case would fall in the bracket of 4-6, which would attract the deduction of a one-fourth from the deceased’s income towards personal expenses, as already remarked. The Tribunal was, therefore, not right in directing a deduction of a one-third towards personal expenses of the deceased while working out the dependency. 22. The other deduction, that the learned Counsel for the appellant has scathingly criticised, is on account of family pension that the claimant receives for her husband’s services rendered to his employers. The Tribunal has, in working out the dependency, deducted the entire sum of family pension, being a figure of Rs.60,000/-, from the annual dependency of Rs.71,864/-. 22. The other deduction, that the learned Counsel for the appellant has scathingly criticised, is on account of family pension that the claimant receives for her husband’s services rendered to his employers. The Tribunal has, in working out the dependency, deducted the entire sum of family pension, being a figure of Rs.60,000/-, from the annual dependency of Rs.71,864/-. It is on the annual dependency of Rs.11,864/- alone, that the Tribunal has applied the multiplier to work out the substantive dependency, that would serve as the basis for determining the compensation payable. The learned Counsel for the Insurance Company, Mr. Sinha has supported the said view and submits that the pension that the claimant receives from the employers would constitute ‘pecuniary advantage’ that is liable to be deducted from the dependency. This Court is afraid that Mr. Sinha is not right in the aforesaid submission of his. This question has engaged the attention of the Supreme Court more that once and has been squarely answered against the insurers in Vimal Kanwar and others v. Kishore Dan, [ (2013) 7 SCC 476 ], where it was held : 18. The first issue is “whether provident fund, pension and insurance receivable by the claimants come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as ‘pecuniary advantage’ liable for deduction”. 19. The aforesaid issue fell for consideration before this Court in Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC [ (1999) 1 SCC 90 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 197] . In the said case, this Court held that provident fund, pension, insurance and similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc. are all a “pecuniary advantage” receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. Such an amount will not come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as “pecuniary advantage” liable for deduction. The following was the observation and finding of this Court: (SCC pp. 111-12, para 35). “35. Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the provident fund which is a deferred payment out of the contribution made by an employee during the tenure of his service. Such employee or his heirs are entitled to receive this amount irrespective of the accidental death. 111-12, para 35). “35. Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the provident fund which is a deferred payment out of the contribution made by an employee during the tenure of his service. Such employee or his heirs are entitled to receive this amount irrespective of the accidental death. This amount is secured, is certain to be received, while the amount under the Motor Vehicles Act is uncertain and is receivable only on the happening of the event viz. accident, which may not take place at all. Similarly, family pension is also earned by an employee for the benefit of his family in the form of his contribution in the service in terms of the service conditions receivable by the heirs after his death. The heirs receive family pension even otherwise than the accidental death. No co-relation between the two. Similarly, life insurance policy is received either by the insured or the heirs of the insured on account of the contract with the insurer, for which the insured contributes in the form of premium. It is receivable even by the insured if he lives till maturity after paying all the premiums. In the case of death, the insurer indemnifies to pay the sum to the heirs, again in terms of the contract for the premium paid. Again, this amount is receivable by the claimant not on account of any accidental death but otherwise on the insured's death. Death is only a step or contingency in terms of the contract, to receive the amount. Similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc. though are all a pecuniary advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no corelation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. How could such an amount come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as ‘pecuniary advantage’ liable for deduction. When we seek the principle of loss and gain, it has to be on a similar and same plane having nexus, inter se, between them and not to which there is no semblance of any co-relation. The insured (the deceased) contributes his own money for which he receives the amount which has no co-relation to the compensation computed as against the tortfeasor for his negligence on account of the accident. The insured (the deceased) contributes his own money for which he receives the amount which has no co-relation to the compensation computed as against the tortfeasor for his negligence on account of the accident. As aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation under the Act is on account of the injury or death without making any contribution towards it, then how can the fruits of an amount received through contributions of the insured be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act. The amount under this Act he receives without any contribution. As we have said, the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory while the amount receivable under the life insurance policy is contractual.” (emphasis by Court) 23. In view of the aforesaid position of the law, it is held that the Tribunal was in error in directing from the annual dependency, deduction of the monthly pension received by the claimant. So far as the applicable multiplier is concerned, the same is governed by the Schedule set out in Paragraph No. 40 of the decision in Sarla Verma. The deceased has been unquestionably held to be aged 49 years and would, therefore, fall in the age bracket of 46-50 years stipulated in Sarla Verma. The applicable multiplier is ‘13’. The Tribunal has applied a multiplier of ‘13’ to the annual dependency to work out the total dependency. This Court is in agreement with the Tribunal about the applicable multiplier. Learned Counsel for parties also do not seriously dispute the aforesaid view of the Tribunal. 24. The next limb of the submission that has been advanced by learned Counsel for the claimant and which has been vociferously opposed by learned Counsel for the insurers is about the future prospects. Mr. Ram Singh, learned Counsel for the claimant argues that Rule 220-A(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998, [for short ‘the Rules of 1998’] would govern the award of future prospects in this case, because the deceased was a government servant, a salaried employee. Mr. Anand Kumar Sinha learned Counsel for the insurers, on the other hand, is equally emphatic in his submissions that Rules of 1998 would not apply. He submits that, at best, future prospects can be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi and others, [ (2017) 16 SCC 680 ]. Mr. Mr. Anand Kumar Sinha learned Counsel for the insurers, on the other hand, is equally emphatic in his submissions that Rules of 1998 would not apply. He submits that, at best, future prospects can be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi and others, [ (2017) 16 SCC 680 ]. Mr. Sinha submits that the Rules of 1998 would not be attracted to the present case, because the said rule was introduced by way of an amendment, which was enforced w.e.f 26.09.2011 governing the issue of future prospects, whereas the accident in this case occurred on 23.04.2008. He submits that amendment to Rule 220-A(3) being one that introduces a new right, is substantive law and would not operate retrospectively in the absence of an express provision in that behalf. 25. Elaborating his submissions, Mr. Sinha says that right to add future prospects to one's income was, for the first time, introduced by the decision of the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma, which was decided on 15.04.2009. The amendment in the Rules of 1998, inserting inter-alia Rule 220-A, of which sub-Rule (3) is a part, is inspired by the decision in Sarla Verma. Sarla Verma had, for the first time, granted future prospects to permanent employees in a government job, as the learned Counsel argues. The Rule grants it to government employees and the self-employed also. The Rule, therefore, brings in a new right and cannot be construed to retrospective in operation. 26. This Court is not in agreement with the aforesaid submission advanced on behalf of the learned Counsel for the insurers. The question is whether Rule 220-A(3) would apply to the present case because the accident happened on 23.04.2008, whereas Rule 220-A(3) was introduced vide Notification No. 777/XXX-4-2011-4(3)-2010 dated September 26, 2011 (Eleventh Amendment Rules, 2011). The said rules have been held by me to apply retrospectively in Smt. Shanti and others v. Anil Awasthi alias Anil Kumar Awasthi and another, [First Appeal From Order No. 866 of 2011 and connected appeals, decided on May 30, 2022], following the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sushil Kumar and others v. M/s. Sampark Lojastic Private Limited and others, [First Appeal From Order No. 2581 of 2011, decided on 26.04.2017]. There is, therefore, no doubt that Rule 220-A(3) of Rules of 1998 would govern future prospects payable to the claimant here. Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998 reads : 220-A. Determination of Compensation- (1) X X X (2) X X X (3) The future prospects of a deceased, shall be added in the actual salary or minimum wages of the deceased as under- (i) Below 40 years of age : 50% of the salary (ii) Between 40-50 years of age : 30% of the salary (iii) More than 50 years : 20% of the salary (iv) When wages no sufficiently proved : 50% towards inflation and price index 27. The issue whether future prospects would be governed by the decision of the Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi or Rule 220-A(3), since both govern the same right, was considered by the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Urmila Shukla, [2021 SCC OnLine SC 822]. Urmila Shukla (supra) was an appeal that arose out of a decision of this Court and is, therefore, applicable, without doubt, to the determination of future prospects in the State of Uttar Pradesh. In Urmila Shukla, the question that was considered by their Lordships reads : 4. The basic ground of challenge by the appellant is that sub-rule 3(iii) of Rule 220A is contrary to the conclusions arrived at by the Constitution Bench of this Court in National Insurance Company Ltd v. Pranay Sethi reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680 . 28. The issue was answered in Urmila Shukla thus : 9. It is to be noted that the validity of the Rules was not, in any way, questioned in the instant matter and thus the only question that we are called upon to consider is whether in its application, sub-Rule 3(iii) of Rule 220A of the Rules must be given restricted scope or it must be allowed to operate fully. 10. The discussion on the point in Pranay Sethiwas from the standpoint of arriving at "just compensation" in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 11. If an indicia is made available in the form of a statutory instrument which affords a favourable treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken to have limited the operation of such statutory provision specially when the validity of the Rules was not put under any challenge. 11. If an indicia is made available in the form of a statutory instrument which affords a favourable treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken to have limited the operation of such statutory provision specially when the validity of the Rules was not put under any challenge. The prescription of 15% in cases where the deceased was in the age bracket of 50-60 years as stated in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing principle available in the statutory regime, it was only in the form of an indication. If a statutory instrument has devised a formula which affords better or greater benefit, such statutory instrument must be allowed to operate unless the statutory instrument is otherwise found to be invalid. 12. We, therefore, reject the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant and affirm the view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court and dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs." 29. In the opinion of this Court, therefore, so long as Rule 220-A(3) is there on the statute book, future prospects have to be worked out according to the Rules of 1998, and not by the principles for determination thereof laid down in Pranay Sethi. Once it is held that future prospects are to be determined in accordance with Rule 220-A(3), there is little doubt that the deceased, under the said rule, is to be placed in the age bracket of 40-50 years, where, future prospects are to be added to the extent of 30% of the salary. The Tribunal has not awarded any future prospects in working out the dependency and calculating the compensation payable. 30. There is still one more issue which the learned Counsel for the claimant has much emphasized, and that is the award of the compensation under the conventional heads. There is little doubt that the Tribunal, in awarding compensation under the conventional heads, has manifestly erred in law, inasmuch as in Pranay Sethi, there are three distinct heads under which compensation has to be awarded, so far as the conventional heads go viz. Loss of Estate, Loss of Consortium and Funeral Expenses. I had occasion to consider the question of award of compensation under the conventional heads in Smt. Shanti (supra), where it was held : 28. Loss of Estate, Loss of Consortium and Funeral Expenses. I had occasion to consider the question of award of compensation under the conventional heads in Smt. Shanti (supra), where it was held : 28. Again, so far as the conventional heads are concerned, this Court is of opinion that far less than what is to be awarded for the loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses has been directed by the Tribunal. Moreover, loss of consortium is not confined to the widow alone, but the parents too are entitled to be compensated for the loss of filial consortium. The two minor children are entitled to compensation on account of loss of parental consortium. In this regard, the holding of the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi is again of much relevance, where it is observed: “48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. The said Schedule has been found to be defective as stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ] . Recently, in Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy [Puttamma v.K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574] it has been reiterated by stating : (SCC p. 80, para 54) “54. … we hold that the Second Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now become redundant, irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy.” 49. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also provides for general damages in case of death. It is as follows: “3. General damages (in case of death): The following general damages shall be payable in addition to compensation outlined above: (i) Funeral expenses Rs.2000 (ii) Loss of consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse Rs.5000 (iii) Loss of estate Rs.2500 (iv) Medical expenses – actual expenses incurred before death supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding. Rs.15,000 50. It is as follows: “3. General damages (in case of death): The following general damages shall be payable in addition to compensation outlined above: (i) Funeral expenses Rs.2000 (ii) Loss of consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse Rs.5000 (iii) Loss of estate Rs.2500 (iv) Medical expenses – actual expenses incurred before death supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding. Rs.15,000 50. On a perusal of various decisions of this Court, it is manifest that the Second Schedule has not been followed starting from the decision in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v.Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ] and there has been no amendment to the same. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs 1,00,000 was granted towards consortium in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] . The justification for grant of consortium, as we find fromRajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] , is founded on the observation as we have reproduced hereinbefore. 51. On the aforesaid basis, the Court has revisited the practice of awarding compensation under conventional heads. 52. As far as the conventional heads are concerned, we find it difficult to agree with the view expressed in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] . It has granted Rs 25,000 towards funeral expenses, Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167] , it does not seem to follow the same. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167] , it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads, needless to say, cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the tribunals and courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs 15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000 respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in respect of those heads.” 29. The principles governing award of compensation under conventional heads, particularly with regard to award for loss of consortium, have been laid down by the Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130 . In Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. (supra), it has been held: “21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses “spousal consortium”, “parental consortium”, and “filial consortium”. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse : [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] 21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of “company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation”. [Black's Law Dictionary(5th Edn., 1979).] 21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of “parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training”. 21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit. 22. Consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions world-over have recognised that the value of a child's consortium far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child. 23. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child. 23. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. In case where a parent has lost their minor child, or unmarried son or daughter, the parents are entitled to be awarded loss of consortium under the head of filial consortium. Parental consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Act. A few High Courts have awarded compensation on this count [Rajasthan High Court in Jagmala Ram v. Sohi Ram, 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 3848 : (2017) 4 RLW 3368; Uttarakhand High Court in Rita Rana v. Pradeep Kumar, 2013 SCC OnLine Utt 2435 : (2014) 3 UC 1687; Karnataka High Court in Lakshman v. Susheela Chand Choudhary, 1996 SCC OnLine Kar 74 : (1996) 3 Kant LJ 570] . However, there was no clarity with respect to the principles on which compensation could be awarded on loss of filial consortium. 24. The amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under “loss of consortium” as laid down in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205]. In the present case, we deem it appropriate to award the father and the sister of the deceased, an amount of Rs 40,000 each for loss of filial consortium.” 30. It must be noted that under Rule 220-A(4) of the Rules of 1998, compensation or damages under the non pecuniary heads or the conventional heads have been stipulated. But, these are disadvantageous to the claimants and do not confer better or greater benefit upon them in comparison to liquidated figures laid down in Pranay Sethi. The figures under the conventional heads have been arrived at, bearing in mind the price index, falling bank interest, escalation of rates in different cases. There is a provision for 10% upward revision to be done in a span of three years. By contrast, the Rules of 1998, that have been amended to bring in Rule 220-A more than ten years ago, in the year 2011, cannot serve as a realistic index to award compensation under the conventional heads. There is a provision for 10% upward revision to be done in a span of three years. By contrast, the Rules of 1998, that have been amended to bring in Rule 220-A more than ten years ago, in the year 2011, cannot serve as a realistic index to award compensation under the conventional heads. The determination of compensation in Pranay Sethi would, therefore, be applicable. The revised and dynamic determination of compensation payable under the conventional heads stipulated in Pranay Sethi would prevail over that under the Rules of 1998. It is held, accordingly. (emphasis supplied) 31. So far as entitlement to compensation for the loss of parental consortium to the children of the deceased is concerned, there is a distinction to be made between children who are minors and those adults. I dealt with the question in Jiuti Devi and others v. Manoj Kumar and others, [2022 SCC OnLine All 46] and held : 39. Loss of consortium, that includes parental consortium, unlike dependency, is not some tangible economic loss. It is an emotional loss to the next of kin of the deceased-victim of a motor accident. In case of parental loss, it causes a particular deprivation to minors and young children, about whom it is said by the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur alias Satwinder Kaur, to borrow the words of their Lordships, “Parental Consortium is awarded to the children who lose the care and protection of their parents in motor vehicle accidents”. 40. To the understanding of this Court, the impact of loss of parental consortium upon the deceased's children, in the very nature of that loss, is dependent upon the children's age. The loss of parent is a disheartening and emotional event for the child at any age of his maturity, but by the nature of the principle governing award of compensation under the head of parental consortium, the deprivation, that is suffered by a child or a minor, appears to be the determinative and entitling fact. A child, who has advanced into matured adulthood, is married or otherwise in the mainstream of life, would not be entitled to compensation under that head. 32. In the present case, all children being adults, compensation for the loss of parental consortium would not be payable. A child, who has advanced into matured adulthood, is married or otherwise in the mainstream of life, would not be entitled to compensation under that head. 32. In the present case, all children being adults, compensation for the loss of parental consortium would not be payable. The claimant would be entitled to compensation for the loss of spousal consortium and the deceased’s father on account of loss of filial consortium. 33. However, so far as the loss of estate and financial expenses are concerned, that has to be awarded in one set, according to the rule in Pranay Sethi. Thus, the awarded compensation under the conventional heads, as determined by the Tribunal, is erroneous and the same too has to be modified. 34. In view of the principles applicable for the determination of compensation payable to the claimant and the other dependants, this Court proceeds to work out the same as follows : Sl. No. Particulars Amount (i) Monthly Income of the deceased = Rs.8,858/- (ii) Monthly Income + Future Prospects (monthly income x 30%) = Rs.8858 + Rs.2657 (rounded-off) = Rs.11,515/- (iii) Annual Income of the deceased = Rs.11515 x 12 = Rs.1,38,180/- (iv) Annual Dependency = Annual Income – one-fourth deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased (Rs.138180 – Rs.34545) = Rs.1,03,635/- (v) Total dependency = Annual Dependency x Applied Multiplier = Rs.103635 x 13 = Rs.13,47,255/- (vi) Claimant’s entitlement under the conventional heads = Loss of Estate + Funeral Expenses +Dependents’ consortium = Rs.15,000 + 15,000 + 40,000 x 2 = Rs.1,10,000/- (vii) Total Compensation = Total Dependency + Claimant’s entitlement under the conventional heads = Rs.14,57,255/- Total Compensation (in words) = Rupees Fourteen Lac, Fifty Seven Thousand, Two Hundred and Fifty Five only. 35. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The impugned award passed by the Tribunal is modified and the compensation awarded enhanced to a total sum of Rs.14,57,255/- (Rupees Fourteen Lac, Fifty Seven Thousand, Two Hundred and Fifty Five only). The compensation would carry Simple Interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realisation. However, the sum of money already deposited (paid or invested in terms of the impugned award or interim orders of this Court) shall be adjusted.