JUDGMENT 1. This writ petition is directed against a notice dated 21.02.2022, issued under Section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1980 read with Rule 3 directing the petitioner to show cause as to why an order of eviction be not passed in respect of the premises occupied by the petitioner. 2. The main plank of the challenge is that the said impugned notice has been issued by the respondents, inspite of an assurance that no coercive action would be taken against the petitioner which had been made in the course of Civil Court proceedings namely T.S. No. 5(H) of 2020 and recorded in order dated 11.11.2020; and also order dated 22.12.2021, passed in Misc. Case No. 21(H) of 2021 in T.S. No. 20 of 2021, wherein status quo has been directed to be maintained. 3. On the part of the respondents, it is contended that, the writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226, as notwithstanding anything else, the Public Premises Act overrides the Rent Control Act, there is no dispute over the title and ownership of the respondent corporation over the premises and further, disputed facts have been brought into play by the petitioner. It has also been contended that pendency of Civil Court proceedings does not preclude the initiation of proceedings under the Public Premises Act. 4. Though, arguments and submissions have been advanced by the parties, as to the purport of the orders passed in the civil proceedings, as well as the conduct of the parties in the said suits, suffice it to say that, the said proceedings will have no bearing on the outcome of this writ petition before this Court, inasmuch as, the same is limited to a challenge to the impugned notice under the Public Premises Act, with the attendant facts thrown in by the petitioner to prop up her case. 5. Ms. A. Paul, learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms. R. Kharmawlong, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the show-cause issued under the Public Premises Act amounts to coercive action being taken against the petitioner and submits that the same is contrary to the undertaking that had been given in the Civil Court proceedings and as such, on this ground, the petitioner has been compelled to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. Mr. 6. Mr. S. Sen, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents MTC, while repelling the submissions of the petitioner has relied upon the following judgments: - i) Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2020) 2 SCC 659 . ii) Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Chembur Service Station reported in (2011) 3 SCC 710 . 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, as aforenoted, the issue necessarily revolves on the point, as to whether the instant writ petition is maintainable against a show-cause notice under the Public Premises Act. It is settled law that the pendency of civil proceedings will not preclude the initiation of proceedings under the Public Premises Act. In the judgment cited by the respondents i.e., Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. (supra), it has been held in Paras -85 and 86 as follows: '85. In the present case as stated above, the respondents are occupying the premises, may be as an agent of the appellant, right from 1-4-1972. According to the appellant the respondent have no authority to remain on the premises after the dealership agreement is terminated. As against that the respondent has contended that the respondent is a tenant and in any case a 'deemed tenant' of the premises. The respondent has moved the Court of Small Causes for the declaration and has obtained an order of status quo. That order presently survives and is not set aside though the learned Single Judge has observed in the impugned order that the order of status quo would operate only till the competent authority passes the order of eviction. The respondents have not challenged this order either by filing a special leave petition or by filing any cross-objections in the present appeal, and therefore it binds them. 86. In the circumstances of the present case, the learned Single Judge has permitted the appellant to proceed against the respondent under the Public Premises Act on the footing that after the termination of the dealership agreement the occupation would be unauthorised. He has rightly observed that the pendency of the proceeding in the civil court cannot preclude the appellant from taking recourse to recovery of the possession of the suit premises by following the due process of law including by resorting to action under the provisions of the Public Premises Act, if permissible. He has rightly observed that the pendency of the proceeding in the civil court cannot preclude the appellant from taking recourse to recovery of the possession of the suit premises by following the due process of law including by resorting to action under the provisions of the Public Premises Act, if permissible. He has, however, made it clear that in any case possession cannot be obtained by force. In our view, there is no reason for this Court to take any different view. The respondent has to be afforded an opportunity of being heard, may be in the forum of the appellant, and only after obtaining an order from the competent authority the respondent can be evicted.' Similarly, in the instant case therefore, though civil proceedings are pending, the initiation of proceedings under the Public Premises Act, cannot be said to be illegal or perverse. Further the Supreme Court in the judgment of Harbhajan Singh (supra) has held that the Public Premises Act, being a later enactment would prevail over the provisions of the Rent Control Act in respect of public premises. 8. In the face of the legal position and the circumstances surrounding this matter, no case has been made out to warrant exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and as such, the writ petition is held to be not maintainable. 9. However, before parting with the records, though the respondent is not precluded from resorting to the Public Premises Act for recovery of the possession of the suit premises, taking into account that civil proceedings are pending, wherein interim orders are operating, all further actions by the respondents are to be in accordance and with the due process of law. 10. Accordingly for the reasons aforementioned, the writ petition is dismissed. However, parties are left to bear their own costs.