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2022 DIGILAW 1283 (JHR)

Dilip Shit v. State of Jharkhand

2022-11-02

NAVNEET KUMAR

body2022
JUDGMENT : NAVNEET KUMAR, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction dated 03.12.2005 and order of sentence dated 05.12.2005 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. I, Ghatshila, East Singhbjhum in Sessions Trial No. 409 of 1999, in connection with Baharagora P.S. Case No. 65 of 1997, corresponding to G.R. Case No. 341 of 1997 at East Singhbhum, Jharkhand, whereby and where under all the appellants were convicted for the offence punishable under sections 323, 452, 324 and 307 r/w 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the IPC) and further all the appellants were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment (hereinafter referred to as R.I.) for 7 years for the offence punishable u/s 307 read with section 149 of IPC and further they were sentenced for two years R.I. for the offence punishable u/s 324 read with section 149 of IPC and both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. Further the learned trial court did not pass any order of sentence u/s 323 and 452 of IPC. 2. During the pendency of this appeal the appellant no. 1 Nilkantha Shit has died and the learned Addl. P.P. for the State has filed a counter affidavit on behalf of the State stating therein that the appellant no. 1 Nilkantha Shit has expired on 23.01.2019 and a death certificate issued by the competent authority to that effect has also been annexed along with the counter affidavit. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the appellant no. 1 has died and no close relative has come forward to continue with this appeal and it is submitted on behalf of the appellant that let this appeal be abated. Accordingly, this appeal gets abated with respect to the appellant no. 1 Nilkantha Shit and rest of the appellants are re-numbered and this appeal is heard with respect to the rest of the appellants and disposed of accordingly. 3. The prosecution case as disclosed in the fardbayan of the informant Pradip Kumar Shit (PW-2) recorded by P.S.I. Maheshwar Prasad Ranjan of Baharagora P.S. on 25.09.1997 at 1.00 P.M. in the night at Dr. 3. The prosecution case as disclosed in the fardbayan of the informant Pradip Kumar Shit (PW-2) recorded by P.S.I. Maheshwar Prasad Ranjan of Baharagora P.S. on 25.09.1997 at 1.00 P.M. in the night at Dr. Pratima Pani Clinic, Baharagora is that in the preceding night of 24.09.1997 on Wednesday at about 9.00 P.M. when the informant along with his family members was asleep at his house, then in the meantime, the villagers namely Nilkantha Shit, Dilip Shit, Antaryami Shit, (since deceased) Sudhangshu Shit, Satyaban Shit and Bimal Shit holding sword and lathi in their hands came there and attacked upon his father Ras Bihari Shit (PW-7) who was sleeping in the Veranda. On hearing the cries of his father, this informant and his younger brother Prahlad Shit (PW-1) came out of their rooms and saw that the accused persons namely Nilkantha Shit, Dilip Shit, Satyaban Shit and Bimal Shit were attacking with swords to his father (PW-7) and the rest accused persons namely Antaryami Shit and Sudhangshu Shit with Lathi. It is further stated that when this informant and his brother went to rescue, then both of them were also assaulted by the aforesaid accused persons. Out of fear, this informant entered into the room, then he was also assaulted with sword and Lathis. Thereafter, Rita Devi the wife of younger brother of informant reached there and she was also assaulted by the aforesaid persons with Danda, fists and slaps. It is also pointed out that thereafter all the injured were taken to the clinic of Dr. Pratima Pani for medical treatment. On the basis of aforesaid fardbeyan, a case was lodged with the Baharagora P.S. against the aforementioned six accused persons and accordingly the police investigated into the case and placed charge sheet against all of them under the same account. On receipt of the same cognizance was taken and the case was committed to the court of Sessions on 08.07.1999 for trial. On a transfer the record of this case has come to the file of Asst. Sessions Judge, Ghatshila where charges were framed against all the six accused persons on 12.6.2000 to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. It is pertinent to mention here that one of the accused namely Antrayami Shit has died during the course of evidence. Sessions Judge, Ghatshila where charges were framed against all the six accused persons on 12.6.2000 to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. It is pertinent to mention here that one of the accused namely Antrayami Shit has died during the course of evidence. Hence the proceeding against him has been dropped as is evident vide order sheet dated 05.02.2002 and after conclusion of evidence, on behalf of the prosecution the statement U/s 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded in which too the accused persons denied the allegation and claimed to be innocent. The defence of the accused persons is total denial of the prosecution story claiming that they are innocent and have been falsely implicated in this case on account of enmity arising out of the love affairs existing in between the daughter of informant on the one hand and the accused Dilip Shit on the other hand. 4. The learned trial court after conducting the full-fledged trial passed the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence which is under challenge in this appeal. 5. Heard Mr. Jitendra Nath Upadhyay, the learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Suraj Singh, learned counsel for the informant and Mr. Sanjay Kr. Shrivastav, learned Addl. P.P. for the State. Arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants 6. At the outset it is jointly submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and the informant that a joint compromise petition has been filed on behalf of the appellant no. 2 duly sworn on affidavit by the appellant no. 2 Dilip Kumar Shit (now appellant no. 1) and the informant PW-2 Pradip Kumar Shit. It has been stated in the joint compromise petition which is filed vide I.A. No. 5572 of 2022 that after the release of the appellants form the jail on 07.02.2006 the appellants and informant settled the dispute out of the court amicably by the intervention of the friends and well-wishers and the appellant No. 2 Dilip Kumar Shit (now the appellant no. 1) solemnized marriage with the daughter of the informant and from the said wedlock they have blessed with children and therefore it is jointly submitted that let this appeal be disposed on the basis of compromise and settlement arrived at between the parties and in the larger interest of peace and tranquility prevailing between the parties under the facts and circumstances of this case, despite the fact that the appellants were convicted in a non-compoundable offence u/s 307 along with section 323, 452, 324, r/w section 149 of IPC and they have placed their reliance upon the rulings of Hon’ble the Apex Court where the circumstances have been set out to compound the offences which are non-compoundable in nature which are as under: 1. Narinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 2. Yogendra Yadav and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2014) 9 SCC 653 3. Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 4. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and Others, (2019) 5 SCC 688 5. Ramgopal vs. State of M.P. 2021 SCC Online SC 834 Arguments advanced on behalf of the State 7. On the other hand, learned Addl. P.P. for the State did not controvert the fact that the appellant no. 2 Dilip Shit (now the appellant no. 1) solemnized the marriage with the daughter of the informant namely Dipa Rani Shit and after the marriage two children were born to them and now they are living happily in their matrimonial life and therefore in the interest of justice let this appeal be disposed of accordingly in the light of the rulings of Hon’ble Apex Court. Appraisal & Findings 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the record of this case including the lower court records and the compromise petition arrived at between both the parties filed on behalf of the appellant no. 2 Dilip Shit (now appellant no. 1) and the informant Pradip Kumar Shit vide I.A. No. 5572 of 2022. 9. From the perusal of the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants it is found that the appellant no. 2 Dilip Kumar Shit (now the appellant no. 2 Dilip Shit (now appellant no. 1) and the informant Pradip Kumar Shit vide I.A. No. 5572 of 2022. 9. From the perusal of the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants it is found that the appellant no. 2 Dilip Kumar Shit (now the appellant no. 1) has solemnized the marriage with the daughter of the informant and from their wedlock two children are born namely Dipesh Kumar Shit (son) and Dipun Shit is the daughter. And the informant has no grievance against the appellant and he does not want to proceed with this case further more. In view of the fact that the daughter of the informant has solemnized marriage with the appellant no. 2 Dilip Kumar Shit (now the appellant no. 1). 10. It appears from the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants that the date of birth of the daughter of the informant namely Dipa Rani Shit is 01.03.1983 and after solemnizing marriage with the appellant no. 2 Dilip Kumar Shit (now the appellant no. 1) she has been leading peaceful and happy married life along with her two children and a very cordial and harmonious relationship has been established between them appellant no. 2 Dilip Kumar Shit (now appellant no. 1) and the daughter of the informant namely Dipa Rani Shit and along with the supplementary affidavit a pan card and a birth certificate from the school and other related papers of their family including the appellant no. 2 Dilip Kumar Shit (now appellant no. 1), the daughter of the informant namely Dipa Rani Shit and the two children Dipesh Kumar Shit (son) and Dipun Shit (daughter) have been annexed with it and in this view of the matter both the parties have relied upon rulings of Hon’ble Supreme Court where under the facts and circumstances of the case if the dispute is of personal nature then even if the offences are non-compoundable in nature, the matter is allowed to be compounded. The authorities of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this regard which have been relied upon are as under: 1. Narinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 2. Yogendra Yadav and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2014) 9 SCC 653 3. Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 4. Narinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 2. Yogendra Yadav and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2014) 9 SCC 653 3. Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 4. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and Others, (2019) 5 SCC 688 5. Ramgopal vs. State of M.P. 2021 SCC Online SC 834 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 laid down following principles: “58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor...........” 59. xxx xxx xxx 60. xxx xxx xxx “61......the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above questions is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” These principles are subsequently reiterated in a number of cases. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and Others, (2019) 5 SCC 688 elaborating the principle the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in Para 15 as under: “15.1. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and Others, (2019) 5 SCC 688 elaborating the principle the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in Para 15 as under: “15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves. 15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. 15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 15.4. xxx xxx xxx 15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.” Further in the case of Yogendra Yadav and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2014) 9 SCC 653 recapitulating the Gian Singh's case Principle (Supra) it has been observed as under : “4.........Needless to say that offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed [Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 ]. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed [Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 ]. However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the offences are non-compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder, etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquility and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace. As a matter of fact from the aforesaid propositions of law as propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme court in Gian Singh's case (supra), Laxmi Narayan's case (supra) and Yogender Yadav's Case (supra) it is now well settled that the offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by a criminal Court under the section 320 of the Cr.P.C. In spite of that there is a scope of compounding the offences by invoking inherent powers of the High Court vested under section 482 of Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of the process of any court and/or to secure the ends of justice by taking into consideration the circumstances surrounding the incident, the manner and mode under which the compromise has been arrived at between the parties, and further due consideration to the nature and seriousness of the offence, in addition to the conduct of the accused, before and after the incident. But, such power is to be exercised very carefully, diligently and cautiously as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 , as follows : “22. Thus, we find that in certain circumstances, this Court has approved the quashing of proceedings under Section 307 IPC whereas in some other cases, it is held that as the offence is of serious nature such proceedings cannot be quashed. Though in each of the aforesaid cases the view taken by this Court may be justified on its own facts, at the same time this Court owes an explanation as to why two different approaches are adopted in various cases. The law declared by this Court in the form of judgments becomes binding precedent for the High Courts and the subordinate courts, to follow under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Stare decisis is the fundamental principle of judicial decision-making which requires “certainty” too in law so that in a given set of facts the course of action which law shall take is discernible and predictable. Unless that is achieved, the very doctrine of stare decisis will lose its significance. The related objective of the doctrine of stare decisis is to put a curb on the personal preferences and priors of individual Judges. In a way, it achieves equality of treatment as well, inasmuch as two different persons faced with similar circumstances would be given identical treatment at the hands of law. It has, therefore, support from the human sense of justice as well. The force of precedent in the law is heightened, in the words of Karl Llewellyn, by “that curious, almost universal sense of justice which urges that all men are to be treated alike in like circumstances”. 23. As there is a close relation between equality and justice, it should be clearly discernible as to how the two prosecutions under Section 307 IPC are different in nature and therefore are given different treatment. With this ideal objective in mind, we are proceeding to discuss the subject at length. 23. As there is a close relation between equality and justice, it should be clearly discernible as to how the two prosecutions under Section 307 IPC are different in nature and therefore are given different treatment. With this ideal objective in mind, we are proceeding to discuss the subject at length. It is for this reason we deem it appropriate to lay down some distinct, definite and clear guidelines which can be kept in mind by the High Courts to take a view as to under what circumstances it should accept the settlement between the parties and quash the proceedings and under what circumstances it should refrain from doing so. We make it clear that though there would be a general discussion in this behalf as well, the matter is examined in the context of the offences under Section 307 IPC.” 24. xxx xxx xxx 25. xxx xxx xxx 26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused persons attempted to take the life of another person/victim, at the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307 IPC as well. Therefore, only because FIR/charge-sheet incorporates the provision of Section 307 IPC would not, by itself, be a ground to reject the petition under Section 482 of the Code and refuse to accept the settlement between the parties. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while taking a call as to whether compromise in such cases should be effected or not, the High Court should go by the nature of injury sustained, the portion of the bodies where the injuries were inflicted (namely, whether injuries are caused at the vital/delicate parts of the body) and the nature of weapons used, etc. On that basis, if it is found that there is a strong possibility of proving the charge under Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that effect is led and injuries proved, the Court should not accept settlement between the parties. On that basis, if it is found that there is a strong possibility of proving the charge under Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that effect is led and injuries proved, the Court should not accept settlement between the parties. On the other hand, on the basis of prima facie assessment of the aforesaid circumstances, if the High Court forms an opinion that provisions of Section 307 IPC were unnecessarily included in the charge-sheet, the Court can accept the plea of compounding of the offence based on settlement between the parties. In the recent past the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramgopal vs. State of M.P. 2021 SCC Online SC 834 considering all the aforesaid cases laid down the following principles in Paras 11, 12, 13, 14 and 19: 11. True it is that offences which are ‘non-compoundable’ cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such attempt by the court would amount to alteration, addition and modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C. which is the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C. which may justify its wider interpretation and include such offences in the docket of ‘compoundable’ offences which have been consciously kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to compound an offence within the framework of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for justifiable reasons can press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. 12. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. even if the offences are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very object of the administration of criminal justice system. 13. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very object of the administration of criminal justice system. 13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or where the offences are pre-dominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck post-conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the extra-ordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast line constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice. A restrictive construction of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab and Laxmi Narayan (supra). 14. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public policy, cannot be construed betwixt two individuals or groups only, for such offences have the potential to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a ‘settlement’ through duress, threats, social boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that “let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided.” 19. Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a ‘settlement’ through duress, threats, social boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that “let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided.” 19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences ‘compoundable’ within the statutory framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim and (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations. 11. In view of the aforesaid propositions of law as propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme court in Gian Singh's case (supra), Laxmi Narayan's case (supra), Yogender Yadav's case (Supra), Narinder Singh’s case (supra) and Ramgopal’s case (Supra), it is found in the present case that the both the appellant No. 2 Dilip Shit (now appellant no. 1) and the daughter of the informant has solemnized the marriage with each other and out of the said marriage two children have been born and they are now living a very happy and peaceful life. In this case no such offence has been committed by which the society at large is going to be affected and although it is a case of u/s 307 of IPC but it is admitted during the course of the trial as evident from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses PW-1 (younger brother of informant PW-2) and the informant PW-2 that Dipa Rani Shit who is the daughter of the informant had been in love affair with appellant no. 2 Dilip Shit (now appellant no. 2 Dilip Shit (now appellant no. 1) and over a period of time during the pendency of this Criminal appeal they have solemnized the marriage and now they are leading a happy married life along with their two children as discussed in detail in the forgoing paragraphs. 12. Having taken into consideration the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this appeal is allowed to be compounded even if the offence under which the appellants are convicted are non-compoundable in nature. 13. In the result, the impugned judgment of conviction dated 03.12.2005 and order of sentence dated 05.12.2005 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. I, Ghatshila, East Singhbhum in Sessions Trial No. 409 of 1999, in connection with Baharagora P.S. Case No. 65 of 1997, corresponding to G.R. Case No. 341 of 1997 at East Singhbhum, Jharkhand, against all the appellants is set aside. 14. This appeal is allowed as compounded. 15. The appellants are acquitted from the charges leveled against them. Since the appellants are on bail, they are discharged from the liabilities of the bail bonds. 16. I.A. No. 5772 of 2022 also gets disposed of accordingly. 17. Let the LCR be sent back to the concerned learned court below along with the copy of the judgment.