Kamlesh Dubey S/o Shri Babu Lal Dubey v. State of Jharkhand
2022-11-03
ANANDA SEN
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : ANANDA SEN, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. Petitioner in W.P. (S) No. 329 of 2017 has challenged the order contained in Memo No. 1031/Go. dated 01.06.2016, whereby he has been dismissed from service after conclusion of a departmental enquiry. He has also challenged the order contained in Memo No. 1570/Go. dated 07.10.2016 passed by the Appellate Authority the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Paragana Range, Dumka, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed. Petitioner in W.P. (S) No. 330 of 2017 has challenged the order contained in Memo No. 1037/Go. dated 01.06.2016 by which he has been dismissed after conclusion of departmental enquiry. He has also challenged the order contained in Memo No. 1572/Go. dated 07.10.2016 passed by the Appellate Authority-Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Paragana Range, Dumka, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed. 3. Two departmental proceedings were initiated under two different memos against the petitioners for misconduct, committed jointly by them. Charge against both the petitioners are that on 28.11.2005, both the petitioners being police personnel, in an intoxicated state, were misbehaving and assaulting general public near Cinemal Hall at Maheshpur. Due to the acts of these petitioners, 50-60 persons assembled there and there was serious threat to law and order in the area. After receiving such information, higher police officers reached the place when petitioner Kamlesh Dubey [W.P. (S) No. 329 of 2017] fled from the place of occurrence, but petitioner Gunadhar Singh [W.P. (S) No. 330 of 2017] was escorted to the police station. Petitioner Kamlesh Dubey returned to the police station. They were sent to police barrack. Polo Ghosh and Lalu Yadav and other 50-60 persons arrived at the police station and they demanded to take action against these two petitioners. These two petitioners with arms came out and started misbehaving with the police personnel. They misbehaved with higher police officers and also fired, which added fuel to the fire. They entered into scuffle with other police officers. On the aforesaid allegations, which is a misconduct, both the petitioners were proceeded against in separate departmental proceedings. Chargesheets were submitted to which the petitioners replied. An enquiry officer took evidence of the witnesses and thereafter submitted enquiry report.
They entered into scuffle with other police officers. On the aforesaid allegations, which is a misconduct, both the petitioners were proceeded against in separate departmental proceedings. Chargesheets were submitted to which the petitioners replied. An enquiry officer took evidence of the witnesses and thereafter submitted enquiry report. It was the case of the petitioners that no opportunity was given to the petitioners to participate in the departmental proceeding. On the grievance raised by the petitioner, opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioners and witnesses were reexamined and the petitioners were given opportunity to cross examine the witnesses. Thereafter a fresh enquiry report was submitted by the enquiry officer to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority, thereafter, passed an order of punishment dismissing both the petitioners from service. Against the said order, appeals were also preferred by the petitioners, which were also dismissed. Challenging the aforesaid orders on the ground that no second show cause was served along with enquiry report, both the petitioners approached this Court by filing W.P. (S) No. 3515 of 2008 and W.P. (S) No. 3517 of 2008. Both these writ petitions were allowed and the matter was remitted to proceed afresh from the stage of supply of second show cause notice. Thereafter second show cause notice was served along with enquiry report. Petitioners, thereafter, were punished and they were dismissed from service on the proved charge. The order of dismissal, so far as petitioner Kamlesh Dubey in W.P. (S) No. 329 of 2017 is concerned, is dated 01.06.2016 as contained in Memo No. 1031/Go. and so far as petitioner Gunadhar Singh in W.P. (S) No. 330 of 2017 is concerned, punishment order is dated 01.06.2016 as contained in Memo No. 1037/Go. Both these petitioners approached the Appellate Authority by preferring appeals, which were dismissed by order dated 07.10.2016 as contained in Memo No. 1570/Go. and order dated 07.10.2016 as contained in Memo No. 1572/Go. respectively. 4. Counsel for the petitioners submit that the evidence which was led during the departmental proceeding was not considered properly by the Enquiry Officer. Detailed discussion has not been made in the enquiry report where the Enquiry Officer concluded that charges are proved. He submits that there is no medical evidence to suggest that the petitioners had consumed liquor and were under the influence of liquor.
Detailed discussion has not been made in the enquiry report where the Enquiry Officer concluded that charges are proved. He submits that there is no medical evidence to suggest that the petitioners had consumed liquor and were under the influence of liquor. In absence of medical report, the charge that the petitioners were under influence of liquor cannot be accepted, thus, the punishment is bad. 5. Counsel for the State-respondents submits that even if there is no medical report that the petitioners were in a drunken state, but the fact that the petitioners instigated the mob, misbehaved with general public and also misbehaved with higher officers and police personnel at Police Station has been proved. Since the misconduct has been proved, it is immaterial whether the petitioners were under the influence of liquor or not, thus, petitioners have been correctly punished. Enquiry report is elaborate and gives details of statements of witnesses. Opportunity of cross examination was given to the petitioners and it cannot be said that there is violation of principles of natural justice. 6. After hearing the parties, I have gone through the records. Allegations against the petitioners have been mentioned above. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India while considering a departmental proceeding is very limited. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Others vs. Rajendra Kumar Dubey, 2020 SCC Online SC 954 at paragraph 37 thereof has held that it is well settled that High Court cannot act as an Appellate Authority and re-appreciate the evidence, which was led before the enquiry officer. By referring to judgment in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. S. Sree Rama Rao, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is not the function of the High Court to review on the findings and arrive at a different finding. In a departmental proceeding, scope is very limited and it is well settled that the High Court can interfere where the departmental authority has acted against the principles of natural justice or where the findings are based on no evidence or in violation of the statutory rules provided. Further, if the punishment imposed is excessive, the Court can interfere.
In a departmental proceeding, scope is very limited and it is well settled that the High Court can interfere where the departmental authority has acted against the principles of natural justice or where the findings are based on no evidence or in violation of the statutory rules provided. Further, if the punishment imposed is excessive, the Court can interfere. It has also been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence. (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in the case the same has been conducted in accordance with law. (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence. (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence. (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be. (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 7. Further, in the case of Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Others vs. Ajay Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 24 thereof has held as under: 24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 8.
To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 8. In paragraph 25 of the aforesaid judgment (Ajay Kumar Srivastava) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has narrated the scope, which reads as follows: 25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public service, the court is to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority. (ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with. (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion. 9. In paragraph 28 of the aforesaid judgment (Ajay Kumar Srivastava) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 or 136 of the Constitution, the Court will not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceeding except in a case of mala-fides or perversity, i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. 10. Considering the aforesaid provisions of law, I find that the enquiry officer has submitted a detailed enquiry report. Evidence of the witnesses were dealt in detail by the enquiry officer in the enquiry report. Each and every statement has been referred to and the act which the petitioner has committed, i.e. the occurrence has been dealt with by the enquiry officer. Enquiry officer has held that the charge levelled against the petitioner has been proved. 11. Whether a particular person has been called as witness or not is immaterial in a departmental proceeding. Strict rule of evidence is not applicable in the departmental proceeding. There must be some material in evidence before the enquiry officer to come to a conclusion that the charges levelled against the delinquent stands proved. Principle here is based on preponderance of probability. In this case, from the enquiry report, it is clear that witnesses have categorically stated that the petitioners, had first in the market area near Cinema Hall were assaulting public and were behaving in a most improper manner.
Principle here is based on preponderance of probability. In this case, from the enquiry report, it is clear that witnesses have categorically stated that the petitioners, had first in the market area near Cinema Hall were assaulting public and were behaving in a most improper manner. Thereafter petitioners were sent to barrack. They opened the gate and came out with their fire arm and threatened the members of the public who arrived at Police Station praying to take action against these petitioners. Even the police officers were misbehaved. These misconducts has been proved in the departmental proceeding. This conduct is a misconduct and calls for punishment of highest level. 12. From the proceedings, I find that full opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioners. They were allowed to cross examine the witnesses and take their defence. Their defence was also considered. There are material to come to conclusion that the petitioners have committed misconduct. 13. So far as quantum of punishment is concerned, same cannot be said to be excessive in nature as the proved misconduct warrants highest degree of punishment, considering the fact that the petitioners are members of police force. Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority, considering all these aspects passed the impugned orders. No fault can be found in the departmental proceeding or the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority. Thus, there being no merit, these writ petitions are dismissed.