JUDGMENT Sudesh Bansal, J. - The appellant-defendant-tenant (hereafter 'the tenant') have preferred this second appeal assailing the judgment and decree dated 20-9-2007 passed by the Additional District Judge No. 2, Bharatpur in first appeal No. 62/1997 allowing appeal reversed the judgment dated 13-2-1997 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1, Bharatpur in civil suit No. 76/1991 and decreed the suit for eviction of tenant from shop in question and fixed the mesne profits Rs. 140/- per month. 2. Facts as culled out from the record are that respondent-plaintiff-landlord (hereafter 'the landlord') filed a suit on 31-5-1988 for eviction of tenant stating therein that shop in question was in tenancy of the tenant defendant No. 1 Brijendra Singh @ Bijjo from the time of erstwhile landlord Ganpat Singh on a rent of Rs. 140/- per month, which was purchased by landlord through registered sale deed dated 10-12-1986 of which information was given to tenant 24-1-1987. It was pleaded that the tenant did not pay rent from 1-12-1986 as such he committed default in payment of rent. It was pleaded that the shop in question was bonafidely needed for his son Laxmi Narayan for Kirana-shop as he was jobless. It was stated that notice dated 3-12-1987 was given to tenant mentioning therein the issue of default and bona fide need of shop for plaintiff's son. The notice was received by the tenant on 4-12-1987. It was further pleaded that after receipt of notice the defendant No. 1 sublet the shop to defendant No. 2 and deposited the rent in court under Section 19A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950. As the defendant No. 1 denied to admit the plaintiff as landlord therefore he is liable to be evicted from the shop. Rs. 2380/- for rent of 17 months was claimed to be recovered. 3. On service of notice, the defendant No. 1 filed written statement and denied the facts mentioned in plaint. It was stated that the property shown in the ownership of Vimla Devi, Sheela Devi and Vijay Singh, all properties belonged to plaintiff and these persons were family members of plaintiff and they are residing together. The shop in western side, house in northern side, three shops and hall on their roof were vacant and in possession of plaintiff. The hall was got vacated from Amarchand Jain after filing the suit. The shop in western side, house in northern side, three shops and hall on their roof were vacant and in possession of plaintiff. The hall was got vacated from Amarchand Jain after filing the suit. It was pleaded that alleged sale-deed was to be proved by plaintiff. Receipt of notice dated 24-1-1987 was denied. The allegation of default was denied and submitted that rent was sent to erstwhile landlord Ganpat Singh through Money Order, who did not receive the Money Order, but he did not tell about sell of shop in question. The plaintiff also did not raise demand for the rent after 24-1-1987. On receipt of notice dated 3-12-1987 the plaintiff sent the due rent through Money Order to plaintiff, but he refused therefore the defendant No. 1 deposit the rent in court under Section 19A of the Rent Act. The defendant No. 1 was always ready and willing to pay the rent but he did not receive malafidely just to prove the defendant No. 1 to be defaulter. It was pleaded that plaintiff's son Laxmi Narayan was not jobless, nor he was having any experience of kirana-shop. However, plaintiff has other vacant shop in his possession. After the notice dated 3-12-1987 the plaintiff demand to increase the rent as Rs. 300/-, to which the defendant No. 1 denied therefore the plaintiff has filed the suit alleging him to be defaulter. Alleged sub-tenant Bali Chand was servant of defendant No. 1 as the tenant was doing business in shop in question of tea-restaurant, ice and beetle sell for last fifteen years. 4. Defendant No. 2 filed separate written statement and denied the facts of plaint and stated that suit was wrongly filed just to harass defendants. As defendant No. 2 was wrongly impleaded in suit he claimed compensation of Rs. 1000/-. 5. On basis of pleadings of parties, eight issues were framed. Subsequently Issue No. 5 and 6 were not press by plaintiff's Advocate. Plaintiff examined himself as Pw.1 and three other witnesses and exhibited documents. Defendant No. 1 examined himself as Dw.1 and three other witnesses and exhibited documents. 6. The trial court considering evidence of both parties decided issues No. 1 to 4 against the plaintiff and the issue No. 7 in favour of defendants and awarded compensation of Rs. 500/- to both defendants vide judgment dated 13-2-1997. 7. Defendant No. 1 examined himself as Dw.1 and three other witnesses and exhibited documents. 6. The trial court considering evidence of both parties decided issues No. 1 to 4 against the plaintiff and the issue No. 7 in favour of defendants and awarded compensation of Rs. 500/- to both defendants vide judgment dated 13-2-1997. 7. On filing first appeal by the plaintiff, the appellate court considered the case. Issue No. 1 regarding default by defendant and No. 2 regarding rent due from 1-12-1986, were considered jointly and holding that the defendant after receipt notice did wait for 10-15 days and sent Money Order which was refused by plaintiff, but the defendant did not try to know the bank account of plaintiff and proceeded to deposit the rent in court under Section 19A of the Rent Act. Thus the defendant committed default in payment of rent for more than six months, however, benefit of first default has been extended in favour of tenant and decided both issues No. 1 & 2 in favour of plaintiff. Similarly, issue No. 3 regarding bona fide need of shop for plaintiff's son Laxmi Narayan and No. 4 the comparative hardship in case of not vacating shop to plaintiff or defendant were considered jointly and considering the fact of plaintiff's son being jobless decided both issues in favour of plaintiff. The issue No. 7 regarding compensation was decided in favour of plaintiff and against defendant. Issue No. 8 regarding default in payment of rent for more than six months, in view of decision of issues land 2 in favour of plaintiff decided against defendant, however, benefit of default under Section 13(6) of the Rent Act was extended. And in view of decision of issues No. 3 & 4 in favour of plaintiff passed the decree for eviction against the defendant. 8. Hence, this second appeal. 9. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused impugned judgments passed by courts below. 10. Counsel for tenant filed written submissions and has vehemently argued and prayed for setting aside the judgment passed by appellate court. Reliance has been placed on Fakir Mohd. v. Sita Ram [ AIR 2002 SC 433 ] to contend that "depositing rent in court should be proceeded by tenant having adopted one of the two methods of payment i.e. either by remittance by postal money order or by depositing in bank account". Reliance has been placed on Fakir Mohd. v. Sita Ram [ AIR 2002 SC 433 ] to contend that "depositing rent in court should be proceeded by tenant having adopted one of the two methods of payment i.e. either by remittance by postal money order or by depositing in bank account". It has been submitted that when the tenant after sending money order on refusal deposited the same in court he cannot be treated in default and the issue in this regard, reversing the decision of trial court, has been wrongly decided by the first appellate court against the tenant. Reliance has also been placed on Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain [ AIR 1987 SC 741 ], S.J. Ebenezer v. Velayudhan [ AIR 1998 SC 746 ], Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [ AIR 2001 SC 2655 ] to contend that "need of landlord should be bona fide and reasonable one and not mere desire". Judgments in case of Raj Rani Sharma v. Sumer Segal [AIR Online 2018 Del. 3222], Smt. Annapurna Dei v. Akbar Patel [AIR 1974 Orissa 162] and The Dollar Company, Madras v. Collector of Madras [ AIR 1975 SC 1670 ] have been relied to contend that "if findings recorded by trial court is a possible view then first appellate court should not interfere with said findings". 11. Counsel for respondent landlord filed written submissions and supported the impugned judgment passed by the first appellate court and prayed for dismissal of appeal. He further submitted that tenant placed on record a document of purchase of another shop by landlord during pendency of suit, to which learned court has held that in the said shop tenancy was 50 years old therefore the landlord was in bona fide need of suit shop. Reliance has been placed on various judgments. 12. In case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [ (2001) 3 SCC 179 ] the Apex court held that "while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. An additional obligation has been cast on the first appellate court by the scheme of the present Section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. An additional obligation has been cast on the first appellate court by the scheme of the present Section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate court is also a final court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one." 13. In case of State Bank of India v. Emmsons International Limited [ (2011) 12 SCC 174 ] the Apex Court held that "first appellate court is required to consider all issues of fact and law before setting aside judgment of trial court. First appellate court is required to address itself to said issue which had bearing on final outcome of the case". 14. In case of Jagannath v. Arulappa [ (2005) 12 SCC 303 ] the Apex Court held that "court of first appeal can re-appreciate the entire evidence and come to a different conclusion from trial court". 15. In case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gurjar [ (1999) 3 SCC 722 ] the Apex Court held that "it is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at by the last Court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so". 16. 16. In case of Arumugham v. Sundarambal [JT 1994 (4) SC 464] the Apex Court has held that "the first appellate court is entitled to consider the evidence adduced by the parties and give its own reasons for accepting that of on one side or the other, and that it is not permissible for the second appellate court to interfere with such findings of facts by the first appellate court". 17. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the first appellate court shows that after due appreciation of evidence oral and documentary the first appellate court has given its own findings on each issues. The first appellate court considering evidence of parties has come to a just finding regarding bona fide and reasonable necessity of shop in question to appellant and has rightly reversed the said findings of trial court. The first appellate court after due appreciation of evidence oral and documentary has decided the issue of bona fide and reasonable necessity in favour of plaintiff landlord. The first appellate court, being final court of facts and law, has not committed any illegality in reversing the finding of the trial court. 18. In view of discussion of case law hereinabove, judgments relied upon by counsel for appellant tenant are of no help to him. 19. As far as findings of first appellate court on the issue of default in payment of rent by tenant is concerned, the first appellate court has granted benefit of first default under Section 13(6) of the Rent Act and has not passed any decree for eviction on the ground of default. Though, this court prima facie finds that findings of default passed by first appellate court are not sustainable in view of judgment of the Apex Court in case of Fakir Mohd. (supra) as the tenant had deposited the rent under Section 19A of the Rent Act after refusal money order by landlord. However, this court is not inclined to decide this issue afresh. Firstly, no decree for eviction has been passed on the ground of default, Secondly, the decree for eviction has been passed on ground of bona fide and personal necessity, which has been affirmed by this court. Hence, the issue relating to declaring the tenant as first defaulter remains of academic importance, and no fruitful purpose would be served, even if findings of first default are declared as incorrect. 20. Hence, the issue relating to declaring the tenant as first defaulter remains of academic importance, and no fruitful purpose would be served, even if findings of first default are declared as incorrect. 20. The scope of second appeal is confined to examine substantial question of law, which are sine qua non to exercise powers under Section 100 of CPC. In case of Umerkhan v. Bismillabi [ (2011) 9 SCC 684 ] Hon'ble Supreme Court has propounded that "if a second appeal is admitted on substantial question of law, while hearing second appeal finally, can re-frame substantial question of law or can frame substantial question of law afresh or even can hold that no substantial question of law involved, but the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction of Section 100 CPC without formulating substantial question of law". 21. It is a case where no substantial question of law involved as there is no perversity or material irregularity/infirmity in the judgment passed by the first appellate court. Accordingly, the second appeal is not liable to succeed. Consequently, the same is hereby dismissed. 22. Stay application and any other pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of. 23. Since the appellant is tenant in the shop in question since long, prior to 1986, three months time is granted to the appellant to vacate and hand over peaceful possession to the respondent landlord, subject to payment of due arrears of rent, as mesne profits, if any.