JUDGMENT : S.N. PATHAK, J. 1. The issues involved in all these writ petitions are same, similar and identical and as such they have been tagged and heard together on various dates and are being disposed of by this common order. PRAYERS IN W.P. (S) No. 3332 of 2017, W.P. (S) No. 3498 of 2017, W.P. (S) No. 3499 of 2017, W.P. (S) No. 3509 of 2017 and W.P. (S) No. 7381 of 2017 2. The writ petitioners have approached this Court with a prayer for a direction upon the respondents to accept their Caste Certificates so submitted by them under BC-I category even though they had filled the form claiming to be belonging to BC-II category owing to the fact that ‘Teli’ and ‘Sundi’ Caste, which were earlier in BC-II category, have now been included into the BC-I category and as such the certificates which are now being issued are being issued for BC-I category and not for BC-II category. Petitioners have further prayed for quashing the final merit list published for appointment to the post of Constable issued by the respondent authorities whereby and whereunder they have not been declared as selected candidates though they have secured more marks than the last selected candidates of the said category and have also qualified the medical as well as physical tests. Petitioners have consequently prayed for a direction upon the respondents to appoint them to the post of Constable. PRAYER IN W.P. (S) No. 1780 of 2018 3. The writ petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for a direction upon the respondents to publish result as he has fully qualified in all the tests conducted by the Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission for the post of Forest Guard for Giridih District but because he had submitted his Caste Certificate for BC-I category in prescribed format, as during pendency of selection process his caste has been shifted from BC-II to BC-I category and as such, the authorities issued Caste Certificate of BC-I category, the respondents have rejected his candidature. Petitioner has further prayed for a direction upon the respondents to consider his candidature under the reserved category either under BC-II or BC-I category, since caste to which he belongs to has been included under BC-I category during pendency of selection process. Petitioner has further prayed for a direction upon the respondents to consider his candidature under the reserved category either under BC-II or BC-I category, since caste to which he belongs to has been included under BC-I category during pendency of selection process. FACTS OF THE CASE IN W.P. (S) No. 3332 of 2017, W.P. (S) No. 3498 of 2017, W.P. (S) No. 3499 of 2017, W.P. (S) No. 3509 of 2017 and W.P. (S) No. 7381 of 2017 4. According to petitioners, an advertisement no. 04/15 was issued by the Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission for appointment on several posts of Constables including JAP Constable wherein date for filling up online application forms was from 27.08.2015 to 30.09.2015. Petitioners being eligible, applied for their appointment under the said advertisement. At the time of filling up the Online Forms, petitioners were categorized under the BC-II category and as such they opted for the said category while filling up the application form. However, vide Memo No. 6548, Dated 23.07.2015, the Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha Department, Government of Jharkhand excluded ‘Teli’ Caste from BC-II category and included it under BC-I category. The said notification was also published in the Gazette on 06.08.2015. Similarly, ‘Sundi’ Caste was also shifted from BC-II to BC-I category vide Notification dated 18.12.2015 i.e. much after last date of filling up of application under the said advertisement. 5. It is further case of the petitioners that in light of the changes introduced by the State Government with regards to caste categorization, a Clarification dated 27.11.2015 was issued wherein it was directed that one chance is required to be given to such applicants who are applying for public employments under ‘Teli’ Caste, having last date of application after 23.07.2015 and whose categories were changed by State Government vide Memo No. 6548, dated 23.07.2015. Thereafter, due procedure for appointment under the aforesaid advertisement was carried out and all the petitioners in these cases successfully qualified the Preliminary, Mains and the Physical and Medical Test and as such, were called for document verification, which was scheduled from 28.12.2016 to 30.12.2016. Petitioners appeared and furnished documents including their Caste Certificate under BC-I category in due format as prescribed in light of the amendment introduced by the notifications dated 23.07.2015 (for ‘Teli’ caste) and 18.12.2015 (for ‘Sundi’ Caste) respectively, vide which caste of the petitioners were now included under the BC-I category. Petitioners appeared and furnished documents including their Caste Certificate under BC-I category in due format as prescribed in light of the amendment introduced by the notifications dated 23.07.2015 (for ‘Teli’ caste) and 18.12.2015 (for ‘Sundi’ Caste) respectively, vide which caste of the petitioners were now included under the BC-I category. Thereafter, final result was published by the respondents but name of the petitioners did not find place in the said list. After enquiry, it was informed to them that since they had mentioned their caste as BC-II under the Online Application Form but have furnished Caste Certificates of BC-I Category, they were treated under unreserved category owing to which their names did not find mentioned in the final selection list. FACTS OF THE CASE IN W.P. (S) No. 1780 of 2018 6. According to the petitioner, Online advertisement was published by the Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission, Ranchi being Advertisement No. 3/2014 for selection of Forest Guard in different districts of Jharkhand against the vacancies notified by the State Government, last date for which was 20.12.2014. Petitioner having requisite qualification and otherwise eligible for being selected, submitted his application online for Giridih district. Petitioner belongs to ‘Sundi’ caste which fell under the BC-II category at the time of submission of form and as such he applied under the BC-II category. After facing different stages of selection process, petitioner was declared successful in the Main Examination and thereafter he also appeared in physical and medical tests and was called for verification of certificates. After his selection, petitioner applied for Caste Certificate and the same was issued on 15.02.2017 showing him under BC-I category in view of resolution as contained in Memo No. 10760, dated 18.12.2015 whereby ‘Sundi’ caste was shifted from BC-II to BC-I category. Petitioner submitted his documents including the caste certificate issued to him. Thereafter, a notice was issued by the Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission, Ranchi giving a list of candidates whose certificates were found to be defective and were asked to submit their show-cause on or before 15.03.2017. However, petitioner’s roll number was not mentioned in the said list and as such petitioner did not submit any show-cause or explanation as to why he had not submitted BC-II certificate issued by the competent authority, though in the changed circumstances he had submitted the BC-I certificate issued by the competent authority. However, petitioner’s roll number was not mentioned in the said list and as such petitioner did not submit any show-cause or explanation as to why he had not submitted BC-II certificate issued by the competent authority, though in the changed circumstances he had submitted the BC-I certificate issued by the competent authority. The final list of successful candidates with respect to Giridih district was published on 24.05.2017 but the petitioner’s name was not shown in the said list. Upon inquiry petitioner was informed that he had secured 58.91% marks whereas cut-off marks for BC-II category was 56.18%. Since petitioner could not submit the caste certificate as mentioned in the application form and as such he was treated under unreserved category where the cut off marks was 59.96% and as such he was not selected. Thereafter petitioner was served with letter no. 874, dated 01.06.2017, received on 05.06.2017, giving him an opportunity to submit Caste Certificate as mentioned in the original application with respect to claim for reservation in proper form by 05.06.2017 in the office of Commission. In view of said letter, petitioner submitted the Caste certificate issued to him showing him under BC-I category in view of Resolution as contained in memo no. 10760, dated 18.12.2015. Even after submission of certificates with respect to entitlement of the petitioner for reservation, no action has been taken on part of the respondents though the seats are lying vacant. 7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid, petitioners have knocked door of this Court for the relief as prayed for in the writ petitions. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS 8. Heard Mr. Indrajit Sinha assisted by Mr. Vipul Poddar, Mr. Shresth Gautam as also Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, learned counsels appearing on behalf of petitioners in respective writ petitions. 9. It has been strenuously urged by learned counsels that procedure was not mandatory and no terms and conditions have been violated. It has further been argued that the mistake, if any, occurred due to the changed circumstances after Resolution taken by the Government shifting the ‘Teli’ and ‘Sundi’ from BC-II category to BC-I category and the same is beyond the control of the petitioners. The decision of the respondents to deny benefits to the petitioners in either of the categories and putting them under General category is not proper rather discriminatory and in complete violation of the equitable principles. The decision of the respondents to deny benefits to the petitioners in either of the categories and putting them under General category is not proper rather discriminatory and in complete violation of the equitable principles. The letter dated 27.11.2015 supports case of the petitioners as it was issued prior to cut-off date. No Gazette Notification was ever issued, neither displayed in the Website showing changes in the category. The Gazette Notification was published on 06.08.2015 as per State then how the Certificates were issued in September, 2015 showing petitioners under BC II category which casts cloud. Learned counsels further argues that since petitioners have secured more marks than the cut-off marks in their respective category, they cannot be treated to be candidates under General category and looking into peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and also in view of the fact that vacancies still exists, their candidature ought to have been considered in the category of BC-I and appointment letters may be issued if they come within the zone of consideration taking into account that they do not belong to General category rather they may be treated in the category of BC-I. There is no dispute that at the time of filling up the forms, petitioners were possessing Caste Certificates issued by the competent authorities showing them under BC-II categories whereas at the time of final scrutiny of documents, the category was changed from BC-II to BC-I and as such, it was beyond control of the petitioners to submit the caste certificates as filled up in the application form. In the changed circumstances, the Commission could have declared petitioners successful in view of the fact that they are possessing BC-I certificates and are having more marks than the cut-off marks. 10. Relying upon the decision passed by Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the matter pertaining to ‘Sundi’ caste in its decision dated 14.06.2022 in the case of Ranjeet Prabhakar vs. State of Jharkhand and Others in L.P.A. No. 675 of 2019, learned counsel submits that it has been held that direction of the State authorities to produce Caste Certificate of BC-II even when caste of the appellant was changed vide Notification dated 18.12.2015 was improper. To buttress their arguments, learned counsels places heavy reliance upon the decisions passed in the cases of Ram Kumar Gijroya vs. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board and Another, (2016) 4 SCC 754 , State of Rajasthan vs. Shamsher Singh, 1985 Supp. SCC 416. Learned counsels relying upon the decision passed in the case of Comptroller and Auditor General of India vs. K.S. Jagannathan and Another, (1985) 2 SCC 679 submitted that the Writ Courts in India are not only Court of Law but also Court of Equity. 11. Learned counsels argued that in the abovementioned facts and circumstances, since caste of the petitioners were later on shifted from BC-II to BC-I category, it was impossible for them to obtain certificates as mentioned in the application form and as such they duly submitted caste certificates showing them under BC-I category and as such treating them under General category is arbitrary, malicious and cannot be sustained and the writ petitions are fit to be allowed. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS-STATE 12. Per contra counter affidavits have been filed by the respondents. 13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State very fairly submitted that at the relevant time of verification of documents, petitioners did not produce the Caste Certificates as mentioned in the application form. Since petitioners failed to produce Caste Certificates as mentioned in the application form, the Commission had no power in view of Clause-9 of the Prospectus to make any correction or accept the same. Accordingly, candidature of the petitioners were treated to be under unreserved category. In case of some of the candidates it was found that they were overage in unreserved category and as such not declared successful for appointment, it has also been argued that petitioners were not declared successful as they had not obtained more marks than the last selected candidates in unreserved category. It was further brought to the knowledge of the Court that final results were published and recommendations have already been made to the State Government for appointment of the recommended candidates on 06.06.2017 itself. Since selection process has already been completed, case of the petitioners could not have been considered and as such rightly their candidature were rejected and they could not be appointed. Since selection process has already been completed, case of the petitioners could not have been considered and as such rightly their candidature were rejected and they could not be appointed. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel places heavy reliance in the case of Rohan Thakur vs. State of Jharkhand decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in S.L.P. (C) No. 18431 of 2019 whereby order of the Division Bench dismissing plea of the petitioners was affirmed. It was further argued that merely finding place in the merit list does not create any right in favour of the candidates. Reliance has been placed by the respondents in the case of Shankarsan Dash vs. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47 as also in the case of Bedanga Talukdar vs. Saifudaullah Khan and Others, (2011) 12 SCC 85 . ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS - Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission 14. Mr. Sanjay Piprawall, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission also adopted the same arguments as advanced on behalf of the State and further submitted that there is no merits in the instant writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. Petitioners cannot be allowed to change the criteria once preferred by them in the application form otherwise it would open the flood gate and the same would create lot of problems to the Commission in finalization of merit list and will lead to lots of litigations. Once a candidate has opted for belonging to a particular caste or category, he/she has to adhere with that. Learned counsel further submitted that reliance placed by the petitioners in the Judgment rendered in L.P.A. No. 675 of 2019, is not well founded as the same has been challenged before the Hon’ble Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 14377 of 2022. Learned counsel further submitted that Judgment passed in L.P.A. No. 675 of 2019 is per incuriam as relevant facts were not brought to the knowledge of the Court. Writ petitions are devoid of merits and the same are fit to be dismissed. FINDINGS OF THE COURT 15. The main issue involved in the instant writ petitions is with regards to the change of Caste category of the petitioners who at the time of filling up of Online applications were classified under BC-II category. Writ petitions are devoid of merits and the same are fit to be dismissed. FINDINGS OF THE COURT 15. The main issue involved in the instant writ petitions is with regards to the change of Caste category of the petitioners who at the time of filling up of Online applications were classified under BC-II category. However, during recruitment process, their category was changed from BC-II to BC-I category by the State Government. The amendments with regards to caste structurisation was introduced by the State during pendency of the recruitment process under the said advertisement. At the time of filling up of Online applications, petitioners belonged to BC-II category and as such, they mentioned their categories as BC-II in the Online application forms. However, before conclusion of recruitment process and publication of final results, their category was shifted by the State Government from BC-II to BC-I category. 16. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and from perusal of the documents brought on records, this Court is of the considered view that cases of the petitioners need consideration for the following facts and reasons: (i) Petitioners were not at fault in producing the Caste Certificate as per their application forms as the fault lies with the Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission and the State Government who did not issue any Corrigendum or Gazette Notification regarding change in category so far as ‘Teli’ and ‘Sundi’ Caste are concerned. Admittedly petitioners had submitted Caste Certificate either in BC-II or BC-I as issued by competent authority at relevant time. (ii) It was not open for the Commission to treat petitioners in unreserved category. They ought to have been treated either in BC-II or BC-I category. When the categories of the petitioners were changed to BC-I category and also Caste Certificate to that extent was submitted by them in light of Corrigendum, the respondents ought to have accepted fresh Caste Certificate, which was not done in the instant case and as such the benefits should go to the petitioners and not to the State. Admittedly Caste Certificate under BC-II category was accepted by the respondents themselves. However, in view of notification published in the Gazette on 06.08.2015 and 18.12.2015 respectively, their caste i.e. ‘Teli’ and ‘Sundi’ caste shifted from BC-II to BC-I category and as such their categories changed before publication of final results. Admittedly Caste Certificate under BC-II category was accepted by the respondents themselves. However, in view of notification published in the Gazette on 06.08.2015 and 18.12.2015 respectively, their caste i.e. ‘Teli’ and ‘Sundi’ caste shifted from BC-II to BC-I category and as such their categories changed before publication of final results. The respondents, therefore, could not deny to accept the changed category of the petitioners. They should not have insisted for production of BC-II category certificate as the category has been changed by the Government and not the petitioners. (iii) It was not case of the respondents that the petitioners though belonged to unreserved category, had produced the Caste Certificate of reserved category. The candidate of reserved category in no way be treated as unreserved category as the same amounts to complete violation of provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as well as the Presidential Proclamation under Articles 340 and 341 of the Constitution of India. (iv) The petitioners had obtained more marks than the cut-off marks which cannot be denied as per records of the case. The arguments of learned counsel for the respondents that petitioners had obtained lesser marks than the cut off marks under the unreserved category is totally misconceived and not well founded taking into consideration the fact that the petitioners belong to reserved category and not unreserved category. (v) In view of the fact that no mandatory terms and conditions were ever violated and also taking into consideration that the mistake was not so grave to deny opportunity and benefits of either BC-II or BC-I categories to the petitioners and putting them in general category. (vi) In the case of Presidential Poll, (1974) 2 SCC 33 , it has been held at paragraph-15 as under: “15. The impossibility of the completion of the election to fill the vacancy in the office of the President before the expiration of the term of office in the case of death of a candidate as may appear from Section 7 of the 1952 Act does not rob Article 62(1) of its mandatory character. The maxim of law impotentia excusat legam is intimately connected with another maxim of law lex non cogit ad impossibilia. Impotentia excusat legam is that when there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law that impotentia excuses. The maxim of law impotentia excusat legam is intimately connected with another maxim of law lex non cogit ad impossibilia. Impotentia excusat legam is that when there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law that impotentia excuses. The law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform. “Where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has no remedy over it, there the law will in general excuse him.” Therefore, when it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like the act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse. Where the act of God prevents the compliance of the words of a statute, the statutory provision is not denuded of its mandatory character because of supervening impossibility caused by the act of God. [See Broom's Legal Maxims 10th Edn. at pp. 162-163 and Craies on Statute Law 6th Edn. at p. 268].” (Emphasis supplied) Similar view was reiterated in the case of State of Rajasthan and Another vs. Shamsher Singh, 1985 (Supp.) SCC 416. Para-10 of the said Judgment reads as under: “10. Mr. Jethmalani placed before us a passage from Broom's Legal Maxims (p. 162), 10th Edn. where the doctrine of impossibility of performance (lex non cogit ad impossibilia) has been discussed. It has been indicated therein that however mandatory the provision may be, where it is impossible of compliance that would be a sufficient excuse for noncompliance, particularly when it is a question of the time factor. Keeping the attendant circumstances of this case in view, we find it difficult to hold that the time taken by the State Government can amount to withholding of the representation which resulted in non-compliance of Section 10 of the Act so as to vitiate the detention. It is useful to refer to a paragraph from a judgment of this Court in Frances Coralie Mullin vs. W.C. Khambra, (1980) 2 SCC 275 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 419 : (1980) 2 SCR 1095 while we are on this point. A Division Bench was dealing with a COFEPOSA detention. It is useful to refer to a paragraph from a judgment of this Court in Frances Coralie Mullin vs. W.C. Khambra, (1980) 2 SCC 275 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 419 : (1980) 2 SCR 1095 while we are on this point. A Division Bench was dealing with a COFEPOSA detention. Section 8 of the COFEPOSA requires the appropriate Government to make a reference to the Board within five weeks from the date of detention. While dealing with an argument referring to this aspect of the matter, the Court observed: (SCC p. 279, Para 5) “The four principles enunciated by the Court in Jayanarayan Sukul vs. State of West Bengal, (1970) 1 SCC 219 : AIR 1970 SC 67 : (1970) 3 SCR 225 as well as other principles enunciated in other cases, an analysis will show, are aimed at shielding personal freedom against indifference, insensibility, routine and red tape and thus to secure to the detenu the right to make an effective representation. We agree: (1) the detaining authority must provide the detenu a very early opportunity to make a representation, (2) the detaining authority must consider the representation as soon as possible, and this, preferably, must be before the representation is forwarded to the Advisory Board, (3) the representation must be forwarded to the Advisory Board before the Board makes its report and (4) the consideration by the detaining authority of the representation must be entirely independent of the hearing by the Board or its report, expedition being essential at every stage. We, however, hasten to add that the time-imperative can never be absolute or obsessive. The Court's observations are not to be so understood. There has to be lee-way, depending on the necessities (we refrain from using the word ‘circumstances’) of the case. One may well imagine a case where a detenu does not make a representation before the Board makes its report making it impossible for the detaining authority either to consider it or to forward it to the Board in time or a case where a detenu makes a representation to the detaining authority so shortly before the Advisory Board takes up the reference that the detaining authority cannot consider the representation before then but may merely forward it to the Board without himself considering it. Several such situations may arise compelling departure from the time-imperative. But no allowance can be made for lethargic indifference. Several such situations may arise compelling departure from the time-imperative. But no allowance can be made for lethargic indifference. No allowance can be made for needless procastination. But, allowance must surely be made for necessary consultation where legal intricacies and factual ramifications are involved.” (Emphasis supplied) (vii) Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Kumar Gijroya vs. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board, (2016) 4 SCC 754 has held in Para-14 and 18 as under: “14. The Division Bench of the High Court erred in not considering the decision rendered in Pushpa vs. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), 2009 SCC Online Del. 281. In that case, the learned Single Judge of the High Court had rightly held that the petitioners therein were entitled to submit the OBC certificate before the provisional selection list was published to claim the benefit of the reservation of OBC category. The learned Single Judge correctly examined the entire situation not in a pedantic manner but in the backdrop of the object of reservations made to the reserved categories, and keeping in view the law laid down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India, 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217 : 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1 : (1992) 22 ATC 385 as well as Valsamma Paul vs. Cochin University, (1996) 3 SCC 545 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 772 : (1996) 33 ATC 713 . The learned Single Judge in Pushpa vs. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), 2009 SCC Online Del. 281 also considered another judgment of the Delhi High Court, in Tej Pal Singh vs. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), 1999 SCC Online Del. 1092 : ILR (2000) 1 Del. 298, wherein the Delhi High Court had already taken the view that the candidature of those candidates who belonged to the SC and ST categories could not be rejected simply on account of the late submission of caste certificate. ................... 18. In our considered view, the decision rendered in Pushpa vs. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), 2009 SCC Online Del. 281 is in conformity with the position of law laid down by this Court, which have been referred to supra. ................... 18. In our considered view, the decision rendered in Pushpa vs. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), 2009 SCC Online Del. 281 is in conformity with the position of law laid down by this Court, which have been referred to supra. The Division Bench of the High Court erred in reversing the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, without noticing the binding precedent on the question laid down by the Constitution Benches of this Court in Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India, 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217 : 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1 : (1992) 22 ATC 385 and Valsamma Paul vs. Cochin University, (1996) 3 SCC 545 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 772 : (1996) 33 ATC 713 wherein this Court after interpretation of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 39-A of the directive principles of State policy held that the object of providing reservation to the SC/ST and educationally and socially backward classes of the society is to remove inequality in public employment, as candidates belonging to these categories are unable to compete with the candidates belonging to the general category as a result of facing centuries of oppression and deprivation of opportunity. The constitutional concept of reservation envisaged in the Preamble of the Constitution as well as Articles 14, 15, 16 and 39-A of the directive principles of State policy is to achieve the concept of giving equal opportunity to all sections of the society. The Division Bench, thus, erred in reversing the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge. Hence, the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 562 of 2011 is not only erroneous but also suffers from error in law as it has failed to follow the binding precedent of the judgments of this Court in Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India, 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217 : 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1 : (1992) 22 ATC 385 and Valsamma Paul vs. Cochin University, (1996) 3 SCC 545 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 772 : (1996) 33 ATC 713 . Therefore, the impugned judgment and order [Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board vs. Ram Kumar Gijroya, 2012 SCC Online Del. 472 : (2012) 128 DRJ 124 ] passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order [Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board vs. Ram Kumar Gijroya, 2012 SCC Online Del. 472 : (2012) 128 DRJ 124 ] passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside. The judgment and order dated 24-11-2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in Ram Kumar Gijroya vs. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) W.P. (C) No. 382 of 2009, order dated 24.11.2010 (Del) is hereby restored.” (viii) The issue fell for consideration before Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ranjeet Prabhakar vs. State of Jharkhand and Others in L.P.A. No. 675 of 2019 whereby the Hon’ble Court while setting aside the order dated 26.08.2019 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3480 of 2017 has observed as under: “13. In our opinion, the writ Court proceeded on a wrong premise and failed to appreciate that the case set up by the appellant was of wrong exclusion from selection. The grievance of the appellant is that it was on account of a mistake committed by the Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission that his candidature was considered under general category, though he belongs to BC-I category for which he had submitted valid caste certificate. Even otherwise, the writ Court should have exercised equitable jurisdiction to grant relief to the appellant that he deserved. 14. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the writ Court is guided by not only the statutory law but also by the principles of justice and good conscience. A writ Court is a Court of law as well as Court of equity, which developed as a body of rules to avoid hardships arising from strict compliance of the common law. in India, the equitable principles have been given due consideration by the Courts wherever the justice demanded provided there was no express bar in statutory law [Refer: Comptroller and Auditor General of India vs. K.S. Jagannathan and Another, (1985) 2 SCC 679]. 15. We gather from the proceedings in the present Letters Patent Appeal that the learned State counsel has produced a chart disclosing number of unfilled vacancies. It is stated that there are still 4 vacancies under BC-I category and 5 vacancies in BC-II category which have remained unfilled. 15. We gather from the proceedings in the present Letters Patent Appeal that the learned State counsel has produced a chart disclosing number of unfilled vacancies. It is stated that there are still 4 vacancies under BC-I category and 5 vacancies in BC-II category which have remained unfilled. The appellant who secured 10% more marks than the last selected candidate under BC-I category and would also qualify for selection under BC-II category could not have been deprived of selection on the post of Forest Guard. We are conscious that acting pursuant to the recommendations made by the Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission appointments have been made. But for the reason that the appellant’s exclusion from the merit list was illegal and the Judgments referred to by the writ Court in paragraph no. 13 are not applicable in the case, we hold that the appellant’s right to claim appointment on the post of Forest Guard would not extinguish by afflux of time because there was no laches or delay on his part in raising his claim.” It has come to the notice that during pendency of the instant writ petition, order of Hon’ble Division Bench in the case of Ranjeet Prabhakar vs. State of Jharkhand and Others in L.P.A. No. 675 of 2019 has been duly affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 10.10.2022 in Special leave to Appeal (C) No. 14377/2022. 17. As a sequitur of the aforesaid rules, guidelines and judicial pronouncements, this Court is of the considered view that case of the petitioners be reconsidered for their appointments taking into account that they have obtained more marks than the last selected candidates in the respective categories. As submitted by learned counsel for the parties that seats are still lying vacant, the respondents are directed to consider candidature of the petitioners under BC-I categories in view of Caste Certificates issued to them and if they have obtained more marks than the last selected candidates in the said category, then issue appointment letters to them within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order, subject to fulfillment of other eligibility criteria. 18. With the aforesaid observations and directions, these writ petitions stand allowed. 19. As a sequel thereof, all the Interlocutory Applications also stand disposed of.