JUDGMENT : SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI, J. 1. Heard Mr. Navin Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Md. Asadul Haque, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 and Mr. Achinto Sen, learned counsel for the State. 2. This petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 25.05.2017 including the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Complaint Case No. 338/2011, pending in the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Pakur. 3. The complaint case No. 338/2011 has been instituted on the basis of the protest petition dated 20.10.2011 by opposite party no. 2 in Hiranpur P.S. Case No. 05/2011 dated 30.01.2011 after submission of final form by the Investigating Officer in which the petitioner has not been sent up for trial, alleging therein that the complainant/informant happens to be an elected member of Panchayat Samiti, Hathkathi, had gone to Block Office, Hiranpur for participating Panchayat Pramukh Election and she wants to cast her vote in favour of Basanthi Kisku, but the accused-petitioner cunningly by giving threat induce her to cast her vote in favour of Basanti Murmu and when immediately after foul play of the accused persons, she raised protest against it then all accused persons assaulted her and abusing her by filthy languages. When her husband and sister-in-law came to save her, accused persons also assaulted them which caused physical injury on their part, accused person also abusing them by calling chamar. 4. Mr. Navin Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on the date of occurrence the petitioner was posted as Block Development Officer. The petitioner had earlier filed a case against the husband of the complainant/informant and others being Hiranpur P.S. Case No. 04 of 2011 in which charge-sheet was submitted against them. He further submits that the informant/complainant, who happens to be elected member of Panchayat Samiti, has instituted FIR being Hiranpur P.S. Case No. 05 of 2011 against the petitioner and others making allegation that she was abused and assaulted at the behest of this petitioner. He also submits that in that said FIR, final form has been submitted whereby the petitioner has not been sent up for trial and on the protest petition, cognizance has been taken against the petitioner vide order dated 25.05.2017, which is impugned in the present petition. He also submits that in that said FIR, final form has been submitted whereby the petitioner has not been sent up for trial and on the protest petition, cognizance has been taken against the petitioner vide order dated 25.05.2017, which is impugned in the present petition. He further submits that this is a counter blast case, which has been filed maliciously against the petitioner, who is discharging his official duty. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Md. Asadul Haque, learned counsel appearing for opposite party no. 2 submits that the police has not investigated the case in right perspective and only to escape out the petitioner, final form has been submitted and that is why protest petition has been filed by the complainant/informant, wherein enquiry witnesses have supported the case of opposite party no. 2. He further submits that there is no illegality in the order taking cognizance. 6. Mr. Achinto Sen, learned counsel for the State submits that admittedly later on the FIR was lodged on 30.01.2011 by opposite party no. 2 against this petitioner, whereas, the petitioner has already filed the FIR on 29.01.2011. He further submits that in the second FIR, there was allegation of SC/ST Act also, in which, final form has been submitted. He further submits that on the protest petition of the complainant/informant, learned court has taken cognizance, however the learned court has not taken cognizance under the SC/ST Act. 7. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on the record and finds that the petitioner while discharging his official duty, has lodged the FIR on 29.01.2011 with regard to disturbance created by certain people in Panchayat election and after two days, FIR was lodged by opposite party no. 2, which was investigated by the police and final form has been submitted whereby the petitioner has not been sent up for trial. On the protest petition filed by opposite party no. 2, the learned court has taken cognizance. The learned court has not taken cognizance so far as SC/ST Act is concerned, whereas, in the complaint case there is allegation under SC/ST Act also and not taking cognizance under the SC/ST Act itself suggests that the learned court was not convinced to the protest petition and rightly not taken cognizance under the SC/ST Act. The learned court has not taken cognizance so far as SC/ST Act is concerned, whereas, in the complaint case there is allegation under SC/ST Act also and not taking cognizance under the SC/ST Act itself suggests that the learned court was not convinced to the protest petition and rightly not taken cognizance under the SC/ST Act. It appears that subsequent FIR was lodged by opposite party no. 2 maliciously against the petitioner, who has lodged the FIR for creating disturbance in the Panchayat election. It is a counter blast case. A reference may be made to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anjani Kumar vs. State of Bihar, (2008) 5 SCC 248 . Paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of the said judgment read as under: “12. As the factual scenario goes to show the complaint filed on 4-2-1993 appears to be a counterblast by Respondent 2 for the action taken by the appellant against him. 13. “7. The pivotal issue [i.e. applicability of Section 197 of the Code] needs careful consideration. In Bakhshish Singh Brar vs. Gurmej Kaur, (1987) 4 SCC 663 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 29 : AIR 1988 SC 257 this Court while emphasising on the balance between protection to the officers and the protection to the citizens observed as follows: “6........It is necessary to protect the public servants in the discharge of their duties.....In the facts and circumstances of each case protection of public officers and public servants functioning in discharge of official duties and protection of private citizens have to be balanced by finding out as to what extent and how far is a public servant working in discharge of his duties or purported discharge of his duties and whether the public servant has exceeded his limit. It is true that Section 196 states that no cognizance can be taken and even after cognizance having been taken if facts come to light that the acts complained of were done in the discharge of the official duties then the trial may have to be stayed unless sanction is obtained. But at the same time it has to be emphasised that criminal trials should not be stayed in all cases at the preliminary stage because that will cause great damage to the evidence.” 8. But at the same time it has to be emphasised that criminal trials should not be stayed in all cases at the preliminary stage because that will cause great damage to the evidence.” 8. The protection given under Section 197 is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as public servants. The policy of the legislature is to afford adequate protection to public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything done by them in the discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause, and if sanction is granted, to confer on the Government, if they choose to exercise it, complete control of the prosecution. This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the protection. The question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of this section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of this section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this regard would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant to commit the act complained of could have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty; if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, it may be said that such act was committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of his official duty and there was every connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant. This aspect makes it clear that the concept of Section 197 does not get immediately attracted on institution of the complaint case. 9. At this juncture, we may refer to P. Arulswami vs. State of Madras, AIR 1967 SC 776 wherein this Court held as under: “6......It is not therefore every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary. It is the quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties the protection contemplated by Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attracted. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. Where it is unconnected with the official duty there can be no protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable.” 10. Where it is unconnected with the official duty there can be no protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable.” 10. Prior to examining if the courts below committed any error of law in discharging the accused, it may not be out of place to examine the nature of power exercised by the court under Section 197 of the Code and the extent of protection it affords to public servants, who, apart from various hazards in discharge of their duties, in absence of a provision like the one may be exposed to vexatious prosecution. Sections 197(1) and (2) of the Code read as under: “197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants: (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction: (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government. (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government: *** *** *** (2) No court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government.” The section falls in the Chapter dealing with conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings. That is, if the conditions mentioned are not made out or are absent then no prosecution can be set in motion. That is, if the conditions mentioned are not made out or are absent then no prosecution can be set in motion. For instance, no prosecution can be initiated in a Court of Session under Section 193, as it cannot take cognizance as a court of original jurisdiction, of any offence, unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate or the Code expressly provides for it. And the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence is provided by Section 190 of the Code, either on receipt of a complaint, or upon a police report or upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his knowledge that such offence has been committed. So far as public servants are concerned, the cognizance of any offence, by any court, is barred by Section 197 of the Code unless sanction is obtained from the appropriate authority, if the offence, alleged to have been committed, was in discharge of the official duty. The section not only specifies the persons to whom the protection is afforded but it also specifies the conditions and circumstances in which it shall be available and the effect in law if the conditions are satisfied. The mandatory character of the protection afforded to a public servant is brought out by the expression, ‘no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction’. Use of the words ‘no’ and ‘shall’ makes it abundantly clear that the bar on the exercise of power of the court to take cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. The very cognizance is barred. That is, the complaint cannot be taken notice of. According to Black's Law Dictionary the word ‘cognizance’ means ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘the exercise of jurisdiction’ or ‘power to try and determine causes’. In common parlance, it means taking notice of. A court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining a complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed during discharge of his official duty. 11. Such being the nature of the provision, the question is how should the expression ‘any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty’, be understood? What does it mean? 11. Such being the nature of the provision, the question is how should the expression ‘any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty’, be understood? What does it mean? ‘Official’ according to the dictionary, means pertaining to an office, and official act or official duty means an act or duty done by an officer in his official capacity. In B. Saha vs. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 939, it was held: “17. The words “any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for “it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be”. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision.” (Emphasis in original) Use of the expression, ‘official duty’ implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in the course of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his duty. The section does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty. 12. It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office. 12. It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which, further, must have been official in nature. The section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its applicability to any act or omission in the course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in the course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far as its official nature is concerned. For instance, a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established that that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For instance, a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty [and without any justification therefor] then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official, was explained by this Court in Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. Bhari: “17......The offence alleged to have been committed [by the accused] must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty..... *** *** *** 19.......There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable [claim], but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.” 13. If, on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused was charged had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty then it must be held to be official to which applicability of Section 197 of the Code cannot be disputed. *** *** *** 19. We may mention that the Law Commission in its 41st Report in Para 15.123 while dealing with Section 197, as it then stood, observed: “It appears to us that protection under the section is needed as much after retirement of the public servant as before retirement. The protection afforded by the section would be rendered illusory if it were open to a private person harbouring a grievance to wait until the public servant ceased to hold his official position, and then to lodge a complaint. The ultimate justification for the protection conferred by Section 197 is the public interest in seeing that official acts do not lead to needless or vexatious prosecution. It should be left to the Government to determine from that point of view the question of the expediency of prosecuting any public servant.” It was in pursuance of this observation that the expression ‘was’ come to be employed after the expression ‘is’ to make the sanction applicable even in cases where a retired public servant is sought to be prosecuted.” 14. When the factual background as noted above is considered on the touchstone of legal principles set out above the inevitable conclusion is that certainly mala-fides were involved apart from the applicability of Section 197 of the Code. It is no doubt true that at the threshold interference by exercise of Section 482 of the Code has to be in rare cases. The present case appears to be of that nature and falls under Category (7) indicated in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426. The continuance of the proceedings by the prosecution would amount to abuse of the process of law. The present case appears to be of that nature and falls under Category (7) indicated in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426. The continuance of the proceedings by the prosecution would amount to abuse of the process of law. The criminal proceedings in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Begusarai in P.S. Case No. 63 of 1993 are quashed. The appeal is allowed.” 8. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis, the Court comes to the conclusion that maliciously, the case has been lodged against the petitioner by opposite party no. 2. Accordingly, the order dated 25.05.2017 including the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Complaint Case No. 338/2011, pending in the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Pakur is, hereby, quashed. 9. This petition is, accordingly, stands allowed and disposed of. 10. Interim order dated 15.12.2017 stands vacated.