JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Muk Pertin, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. Lissing Perme, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Also heard Mr. R. H. Nabam, learned Additional Advocate General, Arunachal Pradesh, appearing on behalf of the State Respondents. 2. The writ petition i.e. WP(c)478(AP)2019 has been filed by the writ petitioner, challenging the inquiry report, dated 14.09.2018, and the order, dated 12.08.2019, issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar, vide Memo. No. TAX(E)–48/2017 whereby the petitioner has been imposed a penalty of compulsory retirement in exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 15(4) readwith rule 11(vii) of the Central Civil Services(Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, pursuant to the inquiry report, dated 14.09.2018, submitted by Dr. Tapasya Raghav, IAS, in terms of the Order No. TAX(E)-48/2017/486, dated 22.08.2017, regarding conducting the inquiry under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, pursuant to the inquiry report, dated 14.09.2018, against the petitioner. 3. The subsequent petition i.e. WP(c)20(AP)2020 has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order, dated 13.12.2019, passed by the appellate authority, dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner under Rule 23 of the Central Civil Services(Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, against the inquiry report, dated 14.09.2018, as well as the disciplinary order, dated 12.08.2019, in addition to the challenge made in WP(c)478(AP)2019, namely, the inquiry report, dated 14.09.2018, and the disciplinary order, dated 12.08.2019. 4. Since what have been put to challenge in WP(c)478(AP)2019 have also been put to challenge in WP(c)20(AP)2020 in addition to the additional challenge made to the order, dated 13.12.2019, passed by the appellate authority, the facts pleaded in WP(c)20(AP)2020, shall be referred to, for adjudication of both these writ petitions, which, briefly, stated are as under: Consequent upon lodging of an First Information Report(FIR), dated 05.07.2017 against the petitioner before the Officer-in-Charge, Women Police Station, Itanagar, alleging sexual assault on a minor; registration of the Itanagar Women Police Station Case No. 57/2017 under sections 341/354 of the Indian Panel Code readwith section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and the arrest of the petitioner in connection therewith, the petitioner who was working as a Joint Commissioner, Tax & Excise, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, was put under suspension by the Chief Secretary, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar, vide order, dated 22.08.2017, issued under Memo. No. TAX-(E)/48/2017/486. No. TAX-(E)/48/2017/486. As the petitioner’s suspension order was not reviewed by the respondents within a period of 90 days, thereafter, on an intervention made by this Court in WP(c)777(AP)2019, filed by the petitioner; he was reinstated in service vide order, dated 21.11.2017, and pursuant thereto, the petitioner rejoined in service on 19.07.2018. In a disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner, which, however, continued; memorandum of charges, dated 20.10.2017, by the Commissioner, Tax & Excise, vide Memo. No. TAX(E)-48/2017/548 was served upon the petitioner along with 3(three) article of charges made against the petitioner, to which, the petitioner filed his reply on 23.10.2017. It is the case of the petitioner that during the course of the departmental proceeding, the Inquiry Officer had summoned the petitioner only once on 17.07.2018, on which date, the petitioner had appeared before the Inquiry Officer and gave his explanation. After conclusion of the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer submitted her report, on 14.09.2018. On furnishing of the inquiry report, dated 14.09.2018; the petitioner submitted his reply to the said inquiry report, on 06.12.2018, the disciplinary authority after consideration of the inquiry report as well as the reply submitted by the petitioner, had passed the impugned order, dated 12.08.2019, whereby the petitioner has been compulsorily retired from the service by the disciplinary authority in exercise of the power conferred under Rule 11(vii) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of penalty of compulsory retirement, dated 12.08.2019, as well as the inquiry report, dated 14.08.2019; the petitioner had preferred an appeal before the appellate authority under Rule 23 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, on 13.09.2019, which was dismissed by the appellate authority vide impugned order, dated 13.12.2019. 5. Assailing the legality of the impugned inquiry report, dated 14.09.2018; order dated 12.08.2019 imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement on the petitioner, and the order, dated 13.12.2019 passed by the appellate authority, dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioner, Mr. 5. Assailing the legality of the impugned inquiry report, dated 14.09.2018; order dated 12.08.2019 imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement on the petitioner, and the order, dated 13.12.2019 passed by the appellate authority, dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioner, Mr. Pertin, learned senior counsel, contends that the Inquiry Officer had conducted the enquiry in an ex-parte and hush-hush manner without affording the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, thereby denying him an opportunity to produce the defence witnesses apart from the Inquiry Officer not questioning the petitioner on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the petitioner to explain any circumstances that had appeared against him in the evidence. Mr. Pertin, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, thus, contends that the entire inquiry held, is vitiated for non-compliance of Rule 14(14), Rule 14(16), Rule 14(17) and 14(18) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, for which, the impugned inquiry report, dated 14.09.2018, is liable to be set aside and quashed and consequent upon quashing the impugned inquiry report, the impugned order, dated 12.08.2019, imposing the petitioner, the penalty of compulsory retirement and the order of the appellate authority, dated 13.12.2018, dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioner, are also liable to be set aside and quashed. 6. In support of the aforesaid contentions, Mr. Pertin, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, has relied on the following decisions of the Apex Court which are quoted hereunder, for ready reference: 1. (1986)3 SCC 229 [Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India & ors.] Paragraphs No. 13 &14 13. The appellant relied on Tirlok Nath v. Union of India in support of the proposition that if a public servant facing an inquiry is not supplied copies of documents, it would amount to denial of reasonable opportunity. It has been held in this case: Had he decided to do so, the documents would have been useful to the appellant for cross-examining the witnesses who deposed against them. Again had the copies of the documents been furnished to the appellant he might, after perusing them. Have exercised his right under the rule and asked for an oral inquiry to be held. Again had the copies of the documents been furnished to the appellant he might, after perusing them. Have exercised his right under the rule and asked for an oral inquiry to be held. Therefore, in our view the failure of the Inquiry Officer to furnish the appellant with copies of the documents such as the FIR and the statements recorded at Shidipura house and during the investigation must be held to have caused prejudice to the appellant in making his defence at the inquiry. Reliance has also been placed on State of Punjab v. Bhagat Ram and State of U.P. v. Mohd. Sharif in support of the proposition that copies of statements of witnesses must be supplied to the government servant facing a departmental inquiry. It has been emphatically stated in the State of Punjab V. Bhagat Ram by this Court as under: The state contended that the respondent was not entitled to get copies of statements. The reasoning of the State was that the respondent was given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and during the cross-examination the respondent would have the opportunity of confronting the witnesses with the statements. It is contended that the synopsis was adequate to acquaint the respondent with the gist of the evidence. The meaning of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken is that the government servant is afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges on which in inquiry is held. The government servant should be given an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence. He can do so when he is told what the charges against him are. He can do so by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him. The object of supplying statement is that the government servant will be able to refer to the previous statements of the witnesses proposed to be examined against the government servant. Unless the statements are given to the government servant he will not be able to have an effective and useful cross-examination. It is unjust and unfair to deny the government servant copies of statements of witnesses examined during investigation and of statements at the inquiry in support of the charges leveled against the government servant. A synopsis does not satisfy the requirements of giving the government servant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken. 14. It is unjust and unfair to deny the government servant copies of statements of witnesses examined during investigation and of statements at the inquiry in support of the charges leveled against the government servant. A synopsis does not satisfy the requirements of giving the government servant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken. 14. In view of the pronouncement of this Court it is impossible to take any other view. As discussed earlier the facts and circumstances of this case also impel us to the conclusion that the appellant has been denied reasonable opportunity to defend himself. In the result, we are of the opinion that the impugned order of dismissal rendered by the disciplinary authority is violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India in as much as the appellant has been denied reasonable opportunity of defending himself and is on that account null and void. We accordingly allow the appeal. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The impugned order of dismissal dated June 17, 1969 passed against the appellant is quashed and set aside. We further declare that the impugned order of dismissal is a nullity and non-existent in the eye of the law and the appellant must be treated as having continued in service till the date of his superannuation on January 31, 1983. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of this case and the time which has elapsed we are of the opinion that the State Government should not be permitted to hold a fresh inquiry against the appellant on the charges in question. We therefore direct the State Government not to do so.” 2. 1995 Supple.(3) SCC 212 [S. C. Goitra v. United Commercial Bank(UCO Bank) & ors.], Paragraphs No. 3 & 5 “3. Admittedly, the disciplinary authority while making the order of dismissal stated as under: “The presenting officer has submitted to get exhibits, most of which are in the form of certificates of Shri Rajinder Paul and B.B. Bhatia, officer and the then Assistant Manager of the Branch, while one document (PEX-26) is in the form of inspection/investigation report of Shri V.P. Jindal and Shri J.R. Sharma. The certificates and inspection-cum-investigation report are most comprehensive documents. Inspection-cum-investigation report has been prepared by two senior officers of the then Division Office, Punjab Division, Chandigarh, after their painstaking efforts of about two months. The certificates and inspection-cum-investigation report are most comprehensive documents. Inspection-cum-investigation report has been prepared by two senior officers of the then Division Office, Punjab Division, Chandigarh, after their painstaking efforts of about two months. This has been substantiated by various certificates of the two officers of the Branch. All the four officers appeared before the Enquiry Officer and testified to their authorship of the documents. Their certificates/inspection-cum-Investigation report comprehensively cover all the allegations/charges made/levelled in the Charge-Sheet. They have also been supported by other documents.” From the above extract, it is clear that the report on which reliance was placed by the disciplinary authority was a comprehensive document in which conclusions were reached against the appellant on the basis of materials including the books and records of the bank as well as some certificates issued by officers of the bank which constituted evidence in support of the charges levelled against the appellant. It is also clear that no opportunity was given to the appellant to cross-examine either the makers of that report, Mr. V.P. Jindal and Mr. J. R. Sharma or the officers who had granted such certificates which formed evidence to proof the charges which laid to the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority, even though, those persons were examined for the purpose of proving the documents relating to them. In our opinion, the grievance made by the appellant that refusal of permission to cross-examine these witnesses was denial of reasonable opportunity of defence to the appellant, is justified. 5. In view of the infirmity in the inquiry indicated earlier, it is appropriate that the inquiry proceedings are set aside from the stage of the enquiry report and the respondent-Bank is directed to conduct the inquiry afresh from that stage giving the appellant due opportunity to defend himself. For this purpose, the appellant should be given the opportunity to crossexamine V.P. Jindal, J.R. Sharma, Rajinder Paul and B. B. Bhatia who were examined by the management in support of the charges. The Inquiry Officer must then conclude the inquiry and make the report on the entire materials before him. Further action must then be taken in accordance with law based on the finding given by the Enquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer must then conclude the inquiry and make the report on the entire materials before him. Further action must then be taken in accordance with law based on the finding given by the Enquiry Officer. In the circumstances of the case, we also direct that the appellant shall remain under suspension from today and he be dealt with according to the rules and regulations applicable to him in this behalf. The appellant, during the period of his suspension commencing from today shall be paid subsistence allowance at the current rates in accordance with the rules. The appellant shall report to the Zonal Manager, Chandigarh Zone of the respondent-Bank on 1.3.1994 for taking further directions in this behalf and he shall fully cooperate with the authorities to enable completion of the inquiry as early as possible and preferably by the end of May 1994.” 3. (2008) 8 SCC 236 [State of Uttaranchal & ors. v. Kharak Singh] Paragraphs No. 15, 18, 19 & 20 “15. From the above decisions, the following principles would emerge: i. The enquiries must be conducted bona fide and care must be taken to see that the enquiries do not become empty formalities. ii. If an officer is a witness to any of the incidents which is the subject-matter of the enquiry or if the enquiry was initiated on a report of an officer, then in all fairness he should not be the Inquiry Officer. If the said position becomes known after the appointment of the Inquiry Officer, during the enquiry, steps should be taken to see the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer. iii. In an enquiry, the employer/department should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman/delinquent charged and give an opportunity to him to crossexamine the witnesses of the employer. Only thereafter, the workman/delinquent be asked whether he wants to lead any evidence and asked to give any explanation about the evidence led against him. iv. On receipt of the inquiry report, proceeding further, it is incumbent on the part of the disciplinary/punishing authority to supply a copy of the inquiry report and all connected materials relied on by the Inquiry Officer to enable him to offer his views, if any 18. iv. On receipt of the inquiry report, proceeding further, it is incumbent on the part of the disciplinary/punishing authority to supply a copy of the inquiry report and all connected materials relied on by the Inquiry Officer to enable him to offer his views, if any 18. Another infirmity in the report of the Inquiry Officer is that he concluded the enquiry holding that all the charges have been proved and he recommended for dismissal of the delinquent from service. The last paragraph of his report 16-11-1985 reads as under: “During the course of above inquiry, such facts have come into light from which it is proved that the employee who has doubtful character and does not obey the order, does not have the right to continue in the government service and it is recommended to dismiss him from the service with immediate effect.” Though there is no specific bar in offering views by the Inquiry Officer, in the case on hand, the Inquiry Officer exceeded his limit by saying that the officer has no right to continue in the government service and he has to be dismissed from service with immediate effect. 19. As pointed out above, awarding appropriate punishment is the exclusive jurisdiction of the punishing/disciplinary authority and it depends upon the nature and gravity of the proved charge/charges and other attended circumstances. It is clear from the materials, the officer, who inspected and noted the shortfall of trees, himself conducted the enquiry, arrived at a conclusion holding the charges proved and also strongly recommended severe punishment of dismissal from service. The entire action and the course adopted by the Inquiry Officer cannot be accepted and is contrary to the well-known principles enunciated by this Court. 20. A reading of the inquiry report also shows that the respondent herein was not furnished with the required documents. The Department’s witnesses were not examined in his presence. Though the respondent who was the writ petitioner specifically stated so in the affidavit before the High Court in the writ proceedings, those averments were specifically controverted in the reply-affidavit filed by the Department. Mere denial for the sake of denial is not an answer to the specific allegations made in the affidavit. Though the respondent who was the writ petitioner specifically stated so in the affidavit before the High Court in the writ proceedings, those averments were specifically controverted in the reply-affidavit filed by the Department. Mere denial for the sake of denial is not an answer to the specific allegations made in the affidavit. Likewise, there is no evidence to show that after submission of the report by the Inquiry Officer to the disciplinary authority, the respondent herein was furnished with the copy of the said report along with the relied upon documents. When all these infirmities were specifically pleaded a brought to the notice of the appellate authority (i.e. Forest Conservation), he rejected the same but has not pointed out the relevant materials from the records of the Inquiry Officer and disciplinary authority to support his decision. Hence, the appellate authority has also committed an error in dismissing the appeal of the respondent.” 7. The respondents have contested the case by filing a counter affidavit through Respondent No. 4. In the said counter affidavit, the respondents have denied the allegations made that the enquiry was conducted in an ex-parte and hush-hush manner. It has been contended that the petitioner was summoned during the inquiry and the inquiry was conducted in a fair manner as per the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, by providing a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself. It is further contended that the Inquiry Officer has never denied the petitioner an opportunity to produce the defence witness(es). It is the petitioner himself, who, did not produce the defence witness(es) on his own volition. The petitioner has also not sought for a defence assistant at any point of time. The cross-examination of the witnesses was also not sought for by the petitioner and thus, it is the petitioner himself, who, did not cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. Hence, it has been contended that the contentions made by the petitioner is incorrect and the inquiry was conducted strictly as per the procedures prescribed under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965. Hence, it has been contended that the contentions made by the petitioner is incorrect and the inquiry was conducted strictly as per the procedures prescribed under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965. The respondents also contends that since all the orders impugned in this writ petition have been passed by the appropriate authorities after taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case and after examining all the documents placed on record; as such, the orders impugned herein, does not suffer from any illegality. 8. In support of the contentions made by the respondents, Mr. Nabam, learned Addl. Advocate General, has relied on the following decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as by this Court which are quoted as under: 1. (2015)2 SCC 610 [Union of India & ors. v. P. Gunasekaran] Paragraphs No. 12 & 13 “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, appreciating even the evidence before the Inquiry Officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can also see whether: a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some consideration extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the findings; i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: i. reappreciate the evidence; ii. interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; iii. go into the adequacy of the evidence; iv. go into the reliability of the evidence; v. Interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. vi. correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; vii. go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 2. 2012(5) GLT 153 [Tirtha Nath Das v. State of Assam & ors.] Paragraphs No. 14 & 16 “14. Having heard the learned counsel for both the parties and perusing the materials on record, we find that the basic grievances, raised by the writ appellant/appellant, are that no Presenting Officer was appointed by the disciplinary authority to present the case of the disciplinary authority, that the appellant was not allowed to engage any defence assistant, that no specific charge was framed against the appellant, that additional witnesses were examined from outside the list, that the appellant/appellant was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses and also to adduce defence evidence. It is also the contention of the appellant that the witnesses were examined, keeping the appellant outside the office of the Enquiry Officer and, thereafter, his signature was taken, sometimes in original and sometimes in copy of the deposition. Those grounds were taken in the writ petition also, before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge, perusing the record, which was placed before the Court, more particularly, the order sheets, maintained by the Enquiry Officer, found that all the witnesses were examined in presence of the appellant and the appellant was afforded the opportunity to adduce the defence witnesses, which opportunity was not availed of. Therefore, the allegation regarding examination of the witnesses in the absence of the appellant, i.e. keeping him outside the office and subsequently taking his signature in the deposition, stood belied by the record. From the impugned judgment and order, it transpires that the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, after inspecting the record, contended, before the learned Single Judge, that some of the signatures of the appellant appeared in the original statement of the witnesses and some signatures appeared in carbon copy. From the impugned judgment and order, it transpires that the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, after inspecting the record, contended, before the learned Single Judge, that some of the signatures of the appellant appeared in the original statement of the witnesses and some signatures appeared in carbon copy. A clarification being sought by the Court, the respondent filed an affidavit indicating, therein, that several departmental proceedings were drawn up against other persons, involved in the said incident and as all the proceedings were simultaneously conducted by the same Enquiry Officer, the statements of the witnesses were recorded at one time with adequate copies of such statement and that the copies of such statements were kept in the record of the respective departmental proceedings, against each delinquent, after obtaining their signatures in such copies. The said explanation, put forward by the respondents, was found to be acceptable. From the record it was found that the witnesses were examined in presence of the delinquent employee and that he declined to cross-examine the witnesses. Therefore, there is no force in the contention of the appellant that the witnesses were examined keeping him outside the office, without affording him opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses. Regarding failure of the disciplinary authority to appoint a Presenting Officer and the Enquiry Officer, himself, performing the role of the Prosecutor, the learned Single Judge relied on the following observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala. "33. We may summaries the principles emerging from the above discussion.(These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee): (1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquiry whether – (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained herein-before and the theory of substantial compliance of the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. The Court or the Tribunal should enquiry whether – (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained herein-before and the theory of substantial compliance of the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (3) In case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under- "no notice", "no opportunity" and "no hearing" categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz. whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. It no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, in a case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. (4) (a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. (4) (a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (b) in the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the persons proceeded against or in public interest. If is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the appropriate adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar. The ultimate test is always the same, vize., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called. (5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action- the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no fair hearing". (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it 'void' or a nullity if one chooses to). In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no fair hearing". (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it 'void' or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the later cases, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. (It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.) (6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/tribunal/authority must always bear in the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them. (7) There may be situations where the interests of State or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision" As observed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant petitioner at no point of time requested the authority to appoint a Presenting Officer indicating that failure to appoint a Presenting Officer would cause prejudice to him. Admittedly, as observed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant did not plead prejudice either in the writ petition or at the departmental proceeding. Admittedly, as observed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant did not plead prejudice either in the writ petition or at the departmental proceeding. In view of the above, referring to said observation, made by the Supreme Court, in the case of State Bank of Patiala (supra), the learned Single Judge came to the findings that the appellant's plea, that failure to appoint a Presenting Officer vitiated the enquiry itself, cannot be accepted. There is nothing, on record, to show that failure to appoint a Presenting Officer caused any prejudice to the appellant. The record also does not support the contention that the appellant/writ appellant was denied the opportunity of engaging defence assistant. There is nothing to show that the appellant had asked for permission to engage a defence assistant and that such prayer was rejected. Further, as observed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant was given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, and he declined to do so. As the appellant declined to cross-examine the witnesses, it cannot be held that any prejudice was caused to him for not engaging a defence assistant and due to examination of additional witnesses, if any. Therefore, no prejudice being caused to the appellant, in the teeth of the said Principles, held by the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala(supra), the failure to engage Presenting Officer, defence assistant can't be held to be violation of any mandatory procedure, causing miscarriage of justice. Hence, there is no material to show there was violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the learned Single Judge committed no error by holding that failure to appoint a Presenting Officer as well as the alleged denial of the services of the Defence Assistant amounted to prejudice to the appellant. In view of the contention made in the charge memo, dated 3.10.1998 and the specific charges mentioned therein against the appellant, his plea that no specific charge was levelled against him cannot be accepted. It has also been contended, on behalf of the appellant, that SI Haresh Kumar Borgohain, a co-delinquent, who was also dismissed from service virtually on the same charges, had filed a writ petition, being WP(C) 2311/2000 and the same was allowed directing reinstatement of the said co-delinquent. It has also been contended, on behalf of the appellant, that SI Haresh Kumar Borgohain, a co-delinquent, who was also dismissed from service virtually on the same charges, had filed a writ petition, being WP(C) 2311/2000 and the same was allowed directing reinstatement of the said co-delinquent. The learned Single Judge, perusing the judgment passed in the said writ petition, found that the same was allowed on the ground that the record of the departmental proceeding was not placed before the Court at the time of hearing of that case and as such, in absence of the records, the Court had no option but to come to the conclusion that the stand of the appellant, that the enquiry was held without giving him any opportunity of cross-examination and of adducing evidence in defence, stood established so as to warrant interference with the dismissal and to further direct for holding a de-novo enquiry. But, as observed by the learned Single Judge, in the case at hand, the records of the enquiry was placed before the Court and the learned Single Judge, perusing the records came to the findings that the witnesses were examined in presence of the writ appellant and that he was granted opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, but the appellant declined to cross examine the witness, examined on behalf of the disciplinary authority. Hence the decision rendered in the said case does not help the appellant. 16. In view of the above discussion and in the light of the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the above referred cases, we do not find it to be a fit case requiring interference by a writ court. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the learned Single Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that no prejudice was caused to the appellant requiring interference with the impugned order of dismissal. Therefore, we find no merit in this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.” 9. Rival submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties have received due consideration of this Court and the materials placed on record have been perused. 10. Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, insofar it is relevant for the purpose of adjudication of this case, namely, Rule 14(14), Rule 14(16), Rule 14(17) and Rule 14(18), are quoted hereinbelow, for ready reference: “14. PROCEDURE FOR IMPOSING PENALTIES: “14. 10. Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, insofar it is relevant for the purpose of adjudication of this case, namely, Rule 14(14), Rule 14(16), Rule 14(17) and Rule 14(18), are quoted hereinbelow, for ready reference: “14. PROCEDURE FOR IMPOSING PENALTIES: “14. On the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority. The witnesses shall be examined by or on behalf of the Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the Government servant. The Presenting Officer shall be entitled to re-examine the witnesses on any points on which they have been cross-examined, but not on any new matter, without the leave of the Inquiring Authority. The Inquiring Authority may also put such questions to the witnesses as it thinks fit. 16. When the case for the Disciplinary Authority is closed, the Government Servant shall be required to state his defence, orally or in writing, as he may prefer. If the defence is made orally, it shall be recorded, and the Government servant shall be required to sign the record. In either case, a copy of the statement of defence shall be given to the Presenting Officer, if any, appointed. 17. The evidence on behalf of the Government servant shall then be produced. The Government servant may examine himself in his own behalf if he so prefers. The witnesses produced by the Government servant shall then be examined and shall be liable to crossexamination, re-examination and examination by the Inquiring Authority according to the provisions applicable to the witnesses for the Disciplinary Authority. 18. The Inquiring Authority may, after the Government servant closes his case, and shall, if the Government servant has not examined himself, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the Government servant to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.” 11. Rule 14(4) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965; provides that on the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charges are proposed to be proved, shall be produced by or on behalf of the disciplinary authority. Rule 14(4) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965; provides that on the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charges are proposed to be proved, shall be produced by or on behalf of the disciplinary authority. The witnesses shall be examined by or on behalf of the presenting officer and may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the government servant. The presenting officer shall be entitled to reexamine the witnesses on any points on which, they have been cross-examined. 12. Rule 14(16) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, provides that when the case for the disciplinary authority is closed; the government servant shall be required to state his defence orally or, in writing, as he may prefer. If the defence is made orally, it shall be recorded, and the government servant shall be required to sign the record. 13. Rule 14(17) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, provides that the evidence on behalf of the government servant shall then be produced. The government servant may examine himself in his own behalf if he so prefers. The witnesses produced by the government servant shall then be examined and shall be liable to cross-examination, re-examination and examination by the inquiring authority according to the provisions applicable to the witnesses for the disciplinary authority. 14. Rule 14(18) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, provides that the inquiring authority, may, after the government servant closes his case, and shall, if the government servant has not examined himself, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the government servant to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. 15. From the consolidated reading of Rule 14(14), Rule 14(16), Rule 14(17), Rule 14(18), of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, it appears that on the dates fixed for the inquiry, the evidence supporting the articles of charge is required to be produced by or on behalf of the disciplinary authority, the witnesses who shall be examined by or on behalf of the presenting officer may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the government servant. After the case of the disciplinary authority is closed, the government servant is required to state his defence, either, orally, or, in writing, as he may prefer and if the defence is made orally, it has to be recorded in writing and duly signed by the government servant. Thereafter, the evidence on behalf of the government servant is required to be produced for which the government servant may examine himself in his own behalf if he so prefers and the witnesses produced by the government servant, shall then be examined who shall be liable to be cross-examined, re-examined and may also be examined by the inquiry authority according to the provisions applicable for the witnesses to the disciplinary authority. After the closure of the case of the government servant, if the government servant has not examined himself, he is required to be examined by the inquiry authority generally questioning him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the government servant to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. 16. On perusal of the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court, as cited by the learned counsels for the parties; it is noticed that the High Court exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in a challenge made to the decision of the disciplinary authority imposing punishment upon the delinquent employee, is not supposed to act as a Court of Appeal. The jurisdiction of the High Court in exercising judicial review, however, extends to the cases where there has been a substantial non-compliance with the rules or the procedures or a gross violation of the rules of natural justice which has resulted in miscarriage of justice or that punishment is shockingly disproportionate. 17. The ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as by this Court in the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the parties, in short, is that in a challenge made to a decision rendered by the disciplinary authority, the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with such a decision made by the disciplinary authority is limited to the violation of the principles of the natural justice, which, in other words, is whether the delinquent employee or the government servant was afforded an adequate opportunity to defend himself as provided under the rules framed thereunder. 18. 18. In the light of the scope of judicial interference available to this Court in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India insofar as the decision taken by the disciplinary authority as set-out hereinabove; the inquiry conducted against the petitioner may now be examined. 19. As against the contention of the writ petitioner that during the course of the inquiry, the petitioner was not summoned to participate in the inquiry, while the prosecution witnesses was produced by the disciplinary authority thereby denying him the adequate opportunity to defend himself under the rules; the respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition, though stated that the petitioner was duly summoned during the inquiry, by the inquiry authority, and more particularly, on 17.07.2018, on which date, the petitioner appeared and his statement was recorded, the proceeding of which has also been videographed, the respondents, however, does not dispute the correctness of the inquiry report submitted to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar, by the Inquiry Officer which has been annexed as Annexure-7 to the WP(c)20(AP)2020. Since the inquiry report, referred to above, has not been disputed by the respondent, in order to ascertain as to whether the petitioner was provided with an adequate opportunity to defend himself, the proceeding of the inquiry that has been recorded in the inquiry report, itself, may be examined. 20. From the inquiry report, it appears that on 12.12.2017, the mother of the victim, the complainant, was examined and her statement had been recorded. On 17.07.2018, the petitioner had appeared pursuant to a summon and on that date, the reply to each of the articles of charges framed against the petitioner, was recorded. On 18.07.2018, the statement of the victim was recorded. Alongwith the statement of the victim, it has been also indicated that the statements of 4 persons namely, Smti. Opak Komut, President, Angong Dune Society; Smti. Tutung Tasing, Secretary, Angong Dune Society; Smt. Menuk Patuk Apak, Vivek Vihar; and Smti. Lung Apang, W/o Nang Nangkar, Vivek Vihar, were also recorded. On the same date, the statements of Smt. Tutung Tasing, and Ms. Opak Komut, Secretary and President of Angong Dune Society, respectively, were recorded. On 30.07.2018, Shri Talom Dupak, Addl. Tutung Tasing, Secretary, Angong Dune Society; Smt. Menuk Patuk Apak, Vivek Vihar; and Smti. Lung Apang, W/o Nang Nangkar, Vivek Vihar, were also recorded. On the same date, the statements of Smt. Tutung Tasing, and Ms. Opak Komut, Secretary and President of Angong Dune Society, respectively, were recorded. On 30.07.2018, Shri Talom Dupak, Addl. Deputy Commissioner, Capital Complex, Itanagar; Shri Lelop Nobeng; and SI P. Mirip, I.O., Women Police Station, Itanagar, were indicated to have appeared before the Inquiry Officer and some statements made by them, which, however, has not been indicated to have been reduced in writing by the Inquiry Officer. 21. On the basis of the statements recorded of the above-named persons, the Inquiry Officer concluded that all the 3(three) charges framed against the petitioner, have been proved and recommended for imposition of penalties under the Rules. 22. Thus, though the inquiry report indicates to have examined as many as 11 persons including the petitioner, there is neither any indication in the inquiry report that the witnesses of the disciplinary authority was produced and examined in the presence of the petitioner, nor, there is any indication in the inquiry report that the petitioner was given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined by the disciplinary authority. That apart, the inquiry report also does not indicate that after the closure of the case of the disciplinary authority, the petitioner was given an opportunity to produce the defence witnesses, if any, which goes to establish that the inquiry was not conducted by the respondents in accordance with Rule 14(14), Rule 14(16), Rule 14(17) and Rule 14(18) of the Central Civil Services(Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, thereby denying the petitioner, an adequate opportunity to defend himself as provided under the Rules. 23. In view of the above, the inquiry report, in the instant case, is liable to be held to be vitiated for non-compliance of Rule 14(14), Rule 14(16), Rule 14(17), and Rule 14(18), of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, as well as in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in S.C. Giortra(supra) and State of Uttaranchal & ors. v. Kharak Singh(supra), wherein, it has been held that denial of opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the disciplinary authority by the delinquent government servant have been held to be a denial of reasonable opportunity of defence to the delinquent government servant. v. Kharak Singh(supra), wherein, it has been held that denial of opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the disciplinary authority by the delinquent government servant have been held to be a denial of reasonable opportunity of defence to the delinquent government servant. 24. Considering, however, the facts and circumstances of the case in its entirety, I am of the considered view that ends of justice would be met in the instant case, if the respondents, herein, are directed to conduct an inquiry against the petitioner, afresh, in accordance with Rule 14(14), 14(16), 14(17), and 14(18), of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, and conclude the same as expeditiously as possible, preferably, within a period of 6(six) months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. The impugned Inquiry Report, dated 14.09.2018; order, dated 12.08.2019, issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar, vide Memo. No. TAX(E)-48/2017, and the order, dated 13.12.2019, passed by the appellate authority under Rule 23 of the Central Civil Services(Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, shall be subject to the fresh order that may be passed by the inquiry authority as indicated above. 25. Both the writ petitions are disposed of in terms above. However, there shall be no order as to costs.