JUDGMENT : NAVNEET KUMAR, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 14.03.2007 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C. Vth Dhanbad in Sessions Trial Case No. 432 of 2003 in connection with Putki P.S. Case No. 101/2001, G.R. No. 2351/2001 Dhanbad at Jharkhand whereby and where under the appellants have been convicted for the offence punishable u/s 324/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the IPC) and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment (hereinafter referred to as the R.I.) for 2 years. 2. It appears from the record that a report called for from the court concerned has been received by this Court with respect to the existence and whereabouts of the appellants which is available on record at Flag-X. From the perusal of the said report received from the court of District and Addl. Sessions Judge-IXth in Charge-A.D.J. FTC-VII, Dhanbad that one of the appellants namely Sitaram Ghatwar @ Sita Ram Shatwar has died on 23.06.2021, and the death certificate has been given by the Mukhiya, of Aralgadiya Panchayat namely Nitu Singh certifying that the appellant Sitaram Ghatwar @ Sita Ram Shatwar has died on 23.06.2021. 3. In this view of the matter, it is submitted by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that since no close relative has come forward to continue with this appeal on behalf of the deceased appellant Sita Ram Ghatwar @ Sita Ram Shatwar, let this appeal be abated with respect to the appellant no. 3 Sita Ram Ghatwar @ Sita Ram Shatwar. 4. Accordingly, this appeal gets abated with respect to the appellant no. 3 Sita Ram Ghatwar @ Sita Ram Shatwar. Let his name be deleted form the cause title of memo of appeal and this appeal shall be heard with respect to the two surviving appellants namely appellant no. 1-Ajay Sharma @ Ajay Kumar Sharma and appellant no. 2 Bijay sharma @ Bijay Kumar Sharma and disposed of accordingly. 5. The prosecution case arose out of the fardbeyan of the informant Nageshwar Paswan (PW-5) recorded by A.S.I. U.S. Tripathi of Putki P.S. Dhanbad at Central Hospital I.N.S. Male ward bed no. 10 at 12:30 p.m. on 27.08.2001. 1-Ajay Sharma @ Ajay Kumar Sharma and appellant no. 2 Bijay sharma @ Bijay Kumar Sharma and disposed of accordingly. 5. The prosecution case arose out of the fardbeyan of the informant Nageshwar Paswan (PW-5) recorded by A.S.I. U.S. Tripathi of Putki P.S. Dhanbad at Central Hospital I.N.S. Male ward bed no. 10 at 12:30 p.m. on 27.08.2001. The prosecution story is that the Nageswar Paswan on 26/27.8.2001 at about 22.30 went outside his house for attending natural call and all of a sudden accused Sita Ram Ghatwar, Ajay Kumar Sharma, Vijay Kumar Sharma and two other brothers of Vijay Kumar Sharma came with Lathi and iron rods and assaulted on head and caused injury on his head and after dragging him he was thrown into drainage. On Halla Barsati Paswan and Meghlal Kumhar came and tried to take informant to Putki P.S. However as he became senseless on way to Putki P.S. he was taken to hospital. 6. On 27.8.2001 Police recorded fardbeyan of informant Nageshwar Paswan at central hospital Saraidela and on the basis of fardbeyan of Nageshwar Paswan a formal F.I.R. has been lodged under sections 147, 148, 341, 323, 307/34 of IPC. After investigation charge sheet has been submitted against accused persons. After taking cognizance the case was committed to the court of sessions. A.D.J. VIIIth Dhanbad had framed charge on 03.08.2004 under section 341, 323, 307/34, 147, 148 of IPC. In this case prosecution has produced altogether six witnesses. However, in spite of sufficient opportunity I.O. has not been produced in this case and ultimately prosecution evidence has been closed, and statement of accused persons were recorded. Accused persons in their respective statements u/s 313 of Cr.P.C. stated that they were innocent and they have been falsely implicated in this case. 7. The learned trial court after conducting the full-fledged trial, passed the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, which is under challenge in this appeal. 8. Heard Mr. S.K. Laik, the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned counsel for the informant and Mr. Jitendra Pandey, the learned Addl. P.P. for the State. Arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants 9. 8. Heard Mr. S.K. Laik, the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned counsel for the informant and Mr. Jitendra Pandey, the learned Addl. P.P. for the State. Arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants 9. It has been jointly submitted by the learned counsels for the appellants as well as for the informant that a joint compromise petition has been filed vide I.A. No. 9586 of 2022 stating therein that both the parties have compromised their dispute which has been amicably resolved and now they are living peacefully in life and the informant has no grievance against the appellants and therefore, it is urged on behalf of both the parties that let this appeal be allowed as compounded. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant and the informant have relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court where the principle has been explained to allow the dispute to be resolved between the parties in a criminal cases of non-compoundable offences if the dispute is of personal nature and not affecting the society at large and the criminal case/appeal may be allowed to be compounded if the crime is not heinous. In the present case the dispute is of personal nature between the parties, which is evident from the FIR itself where the dispute had arisen between the neighbors. The learned counsel for both the parties have placed their reliance upon the rulings of Hon’ble the Apex Court where the circumstances have been set out to compound the offences which are non-compoundable in nature in a criminal case which are as under: 1. Narinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 2. Yogendra Yadav and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2014) 9 SCC 653 3. Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 4. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and Others, (2019) 5 SCC 688 5. Ramgopal vs. State of M.P. 2021 SCC Online SC 834 Arguments advanced on behalf of the State 11. On the other hand, the learned Addl. P.P. appearing for the State did not controvert the fact that the compromise has taken place between both the parties which has been filed by a joint compromise petition vide I.A. No. 9586 of 2022 which is duly sworn on affidavit by both the appellants namely appellant no. 1. On the other hand, the learned Addl. P.P. appearing for the State did not controvert the fact that the compromise has taken place between both the parties which has been filed by a joint compromise petition vide I.A. No. 9586 of 2022 which is duly sworn on affidavit by both the appellants namely appellant no. 1. Ajay Sharma @ Ajay Kumar Sharma and appellant no. 2 Bijay Sharma @ Bijay Kumar Sharma and the informant Nageshwar Paswan @ Nageshwar Dusadh PW-5 and therefore in this view of the matter an appropriate order may be passed. Appraisal and Findings 12. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the record of this case including the lower court records. 13. It is found that the appellants have been convicted for the offence punishable u/s 324/34 of IPC and it is submitted that the case of the prosecution is that both the parties are neighbours and the injury which is said to have been inflicted by the appellants are simple in nature as evident from the testimonies of the doctor who medically examined the injured vide Para-6 of PW-6 Dr. P.N. Rajak who has been examined on behalf of prosecution. Further it is found that during the pendency of this appeal both the parties have filed a joint compromise petition vide I.A. No. 9586 of 2022. 14. From the perusal of the said I.A., it appears that both the parties are seeking permission to compromise the instant appeal with a prayer to allow this appeal as compounded. It is found that both the parties have entered into a compromise by the intervention of common friends and well-wishers and the dispute has been resolved between both the parties as they are neighbours and it is a personal nature of dispute and therefore in the light of the rulings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court it is found that it is conducive to take into consideration the facts of the present case in the light of the rulings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which are as under: 1. Narinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 2. Yogendra Yadav and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2014) 9 SCC 653 3. Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 4. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and Others, (2019) 5 SCC 688 5. Narinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 2. Yogendra Yadav and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2014) 9 SCC 653 3. Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 4. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and Others, (2019) 5 SCC 688 5. Ramgopal vs. State of M.P. 2021 SCC Online SC 834 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 laid down following principles: “58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor......” 59. xxx xxx xxx 60. xxx xxx xxx 61.......the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc. cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above questions is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” These principles are subsequently reiterated in a number of cases. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and Others, (2019) 5 SCC 688 elaborating the principle the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in Para 15 as under: “15.1. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and Others, (2019) 5 SCC 688 elaborating the principle the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in Para 15 as under: “15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves. 15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. 15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 15.4. xxx xxx xxx 15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.” Further in the case of Yogendra Yadav and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2014) 9 SCC 653 recapitulating the Gian Singh's case Principle (Supra) it has been observed as under: “4..........Needless to say that offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed [Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 ]. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed [Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 ]. However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the offences are non-compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder, etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquility and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace. As a matter of fact from the aforesaid propositions of law as propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme court in Gian Singh's case (Supra), Laxmi Narayan's case (Supra) and Yogender Yadav's Case (Supra) it is now well settled that the offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by a criminal Court under the section 320 of the Cr.P.C. In spite of that there is a scope of compounding the offences by invoking inherent powers of the High Court vested under section 482 of Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of the process of any court and/or to secure the ends of justice by taking into consideration the circumstances surrounding the incident, the manner and mode under which the compromise has been arrived at between the parties, and further due consideration to the nature and seriousness of the offence, in addition to the conduct of the accused, before and after the incident. But, such power is to be exercised very carefully, diligently and cautiously as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 , as follows : “22. Thus, we find that in certain circumstances, this Court has approved the quashing of proceedings under Section 307 IPC whereas in some other cases, it is held that as the offence is of serious nature such proceedings cannot be quashed. Though in each of the aforesaid cases the view taken by this Court may be justified on its own facts, at the same time this Court owes an explanation as to why two different approaches are adopted in various cases. The law declared by this Court in the form of judgments becomes binding precedent for the High Courts and the subordinate courts, to follow under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Stare decisis is the fundamental principle of judicial decision-making which requires “certainty” too in law so that in a given set of facts the course of action which law shall take is discernible and predictable. Unless that is achieved, the very doctrine of stare decisis will lose its significance. The related objective of the doctrine of stare decisis is to put a curb on the personal preferences and priors of individual Judges. In a way, it achieves equality of treatment as well, inasmuch as two different persons faced with similar circumstances would be given identical treatment at the hands of law. It has, therefore, support from the human sense of justice as well. The force of precedent in the law is heightened, in the words of Karl Llewellyn, by “that curious, almost universal sense of justice which urges that all men are to be treated alike in like circumstances.” 23. As there is a close relation between equality and justice, it should be clearly discernible as to how the two prosecutions under Section 307 IPC are different in nature and therefore are given different treatment. With this ideal objective in mind, we are proceeding to discuss the subject at length. As there is a close relation between equality and justice, it should be clearly discernible as to how the two prosecutions under Section 307 IPC are different in nature and therefore are given different treatment. With this ideal objective in mind, we are proceeding to discuss the subject at length. It is for this reason we deem it appropriate to lay down some distinct, definite and clear guidelines which can be kept in mind by the High Courts to take a view as to under what circumstances it should accept the settlement between the parties and quash the proceedings and under what circumstances it should refrain from doing so. We make it clear that though there would be a general discussion in this behalf as well, the matter is examined in the context of the offences under Section 307 IPC.” 24. xxx xxx xxx 25. xxx xxx xxx 26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused persons attempted to take the life of another person/victim, at the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307 IPC as well. Therefore, only because FIR/charge-sheet incorporates the provision of Section 307 IPC would not, by itself, be a ground to reject the petition under Section 482 of the Code and refuse to accept the settlement between the parties. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while taking a call as to whether compromise in such cases should be effected or not, the High Court should go by the nature of injury sustained, the portion of the bodies where the injuries were inflicted (namely, whether injuries are caused at the vital/delicate parts of the body) and the nature of weapons used, etc. On that basis, if it is found that there is a strong possibility of proving the charge under Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that effect is led and injuries proved, the Court should not accept settlement between the parties. On that basis, if it is found that there is a strong possibility of proving the charge under Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that effect is led and injuries proved, the Court should not accept settlement between the parties. On the other hand, on the basis of prima facie assessment of the aforesaid circumstances, if the High Court forms an opinion that provisions of Section 307 IPC were unnecessarily included in the charge-sheet, the Court can accept the plea of compounding of the offence based on settlement between the parties. In the recent past the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramgopal vs. State of M.P. 2021 SCC Online SC 834 considering all the aforesaid cases laid down the following principles in Paras 11, 12, 13, 14, and 19: 11. True it is that offences which are ‘non-compoundable’ cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such attempt by the court would amount to alteration, addition and modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C. which is the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C. which may justify its wider interpretation and include such offences in the docket of ‘compoundable’ offences which have been consciously kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to compound an offence within the framework of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for justifiable reasons can press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. 12. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. even if the offences are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very object of the administration of criminal justice system. 13. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very object of the administration of criminal justice system. 13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or where the offences are pre-dominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck post-conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the extra-ordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast line constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice. A restrictive construction of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab and Laxmi Narayan (Supra). 14. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public policy, cannot be construed betwixt two individuals or groups only, for such offences have the potential to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a ‘settlement’ through duress, threats, social boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that “let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided.” 19. Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a ‘settlement’ through duress, threats, social boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that “let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided.” 19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences ‘compoundable’ within the statutory framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim and (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations. In view of the aforesaid propositions of law as propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme court in Gian Singh's case (supra), Laxmi Narayan's case (supra), Yogender Yadav's case (supra), Narinder Singh’s case (supra) and Ramgopal’s case (supra), it is found in the present case that both the parties including the appellants and informant are neighbours to each other and now they have resolved their dispute amicably by the intervention of the well-wishers and common friends and harmonious relationship has been established between both the parties and they are leading a peaceful life with each other and the informant has no grievance against the accused appellant. It appears that it was a personal nature of dispute and the society at large is not going to be affected emotionally, mentally and morally inasmuch it was a dispute between two neighbours. 15. The parties on their own volition, without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences and wish to accord a quietus to their disputes. 15. The parties on their own volition, without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences and wish to accord a quietus to their disputes. It is found from the evidence that the injury which is alleged to have been inflicted upon the injured PW-5 informant was simple in nature and the informant and the appellants have filed a joint compromise petition and the informant categorically stated that he has no objection if the present appeal is allowed to be compounded and, therefore, in the larger interest to maintain the peace and tranquility between the parties this Court finds that it is just and proper to allow this appeal to be compounded. 16. In the backdrop, this appeal is allowed as compounded. 17. Consequently impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 14.03.2007 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C. Vth Dhanbad in Sessions Trial Case No. 432 of 2003 in connection with Putki P.S. Case No. 101/2001, G.R. No. 2351/2001 Dhanbad at Jharkhand against the appellants are set aside. 18. The appellants are acquitted from the charges leveled against them. Since the appellants are on bail, they are discharged from the liabilities of the bail bonds. 19. I.A. No. 9586 of 2022 also gets disposed of accordingly. 20. Let the LCR be sent back to the concerned learned court below along with the copy of the judgment.