JUDGMENT : DINESH PATHAK, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the contesting respondent no. 6 and learned Standing Counsel representing respondent nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10. 2. Grievance of the petitioner is that the Settlement Officer of Consolidation has illegally allowed the substitution application on the same day of its filing, without giving opportunity of hearing to the present petitioner. 3. Record reveals that, during pendency of the appeal, a substitution application dated 17.02.2021 along with delay condonation application have been filed by the heirs and legal representatives of appellant Munir-ud-deen with an averment that he has died six months before, therefore, his name may be deleted and in his place names of his sons namely Mohd. Shafi, Mohd. Rahis, Mohd. Ishaq, Mohd. Rafiq, Khushi, Mohammad and Nafees Mohd. may be ordered to be substituted. Aforesaid substitution application along with delay condonation application was entertained on the same day by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, who has jotted in the margin of the application allowing the substitution application and issued notices to the parties fixing 03.03.2021. At subsequent stage, present petitioner has filed objection dated 17.03.2021. The objection field by the petitioner was rejected by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation vide order dated 22.12.2021. Having being aggrieved with the orders passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, present petitioner has preferred a revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation which was dismissed as well affirming the order passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation. Being aggrieved petitioner has filed instant writ petition assailing orders of Settlement Officer of Consolidation (respondent no. 2) and Deputy Director of Consolidation (respondent no. 1). 4. Counsel for the petitioner submits that substitution application has been allowed on the same day of filing of the application without giving opportunity of hearing. It is next submitted that delay in filing the substitution has not been condoned. Deputy Director of Consolidation has illegally dismissed the revision on the ground of maintainability being filed against the interlocutory order, therefore, orders passed by respondent No. 1 and 2 are illegal, unwarranted under the law and tained with irregularities which deserves to be quashed. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the contesting respondent has contended that substitution order dated 17.2.2021 was passed in presence of opposite party (in appeal) and he has not denied his presence at any stage. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the contesting respondent has contended that substitution order dated 17.2.2021 was passed in presence of opposite party (in appeal) and he has not denied his presence at any stage. In deciding the revision, respondent No. 1 has discussed the merits of the substitution as well. Petitioner (opposite party in appeal) only wants to linger the matter on the ground of technicalities which is not sustainable in the eye of law. It next contended that orders passed by respondents No. 1 and 2 are legal and suffers no infirmity, therefore, they are liable to be affirmed and instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. Having considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perusal of record, I am of the considered opinion that the purpose of substitution is only for the survival of the case. No right, title and interest confers upon the substituted person with respect to the property in question. If there is any dispute qua right, title and interest of the substituted person/ s, same would be adjudicated upon by the court competent in a befitting proceeding as advised. There is nothing on record to demonstrate that the persons, who are proposed to be substituted in place of deceased Munir-ud-deen, are not the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased. This aspect of the matter has properly been considered by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and has given specific finding that revisionist has not adduced any evidence to prove that there are other heirs and legal representatives of the deceased than the persons who have been substituted. Respondent no. 1 has also considered the death certificate and family membership certificate (succession) adduced by the sons of the deceased. Findings of fact given by respondent no. 1, in this respect as mentioned above, have not been contradicted by the petitioner in the instant writ petition. 7. Moreover, order dated 17.2.2021 evince presence of both the parties. For ready reference, order dated 17.2.2021 is quoted herein under: ^^mHk;i{kksa dks lquk x;k] U;k;fgr esa ÁfrLFkkiu ÁkFkZuk i= Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gSA i{kksa dks uksfVl tkjh gksdj i=koyh fnukad 03-03-2021 dks is'k gksA** 8. Finding returned by Settlement Officer of Consolidation, that substitution application was allowed in presence of both the parties, has not been challenged by the petitioner at any stage even before this Court. Finding returned by Settlement Officer of Consolidation, that substitution application was allowed in presence of both the parties, has not been challenged by the petitioner at any stage even before this Court. In objection dated 17.3.2021 (annexure No. 5) petitioner has raised objection qua sufficiency of grounds for delay condonation in filing substitution application. Apart form that paragraph 9 of memo of revision dated 11.1.2022 (annexure No. 7) it has been averred that court subordinate has passed order without giving opportunity of hearing and against the provisions of law. Plea of not affording opportunity of hearing has been taken as well in paragraph 17 of the writ petition, however, finding of fact returned by Settlement Officer of Consolidation qua “both parties heard” has not been challenged by the petitioner. 9. Prima-facie, in particular facts and circumstances of the instant case, it appears that, while allowing the substitution application, Settlement Officer of Consolidation was not oblivious of the delay caused in filing the substitution application, though specific order has not been passed for the condonation of delay. Substitution application was filed along with the delay condonation application and after considering both the application order dated 17.2.2021 has been passed. In paragraph 1 of the delay condonation application, sufficient reason has been assigned that expenses and instructions were provided to the previous counsel Shri R.L. Lal, Advocate, however, after engaging another counsel, this fact came to knowledge that steps were not taken to substitute the heirs of the deceased. Therefore, there is no deliberate delay in moving substitution application, which is liable to be condoned. Cause shown for the delay has neither been assailed in the objection dated 17.3.2021 nor in the memo of revision. For the first time, in paragraph 19 of the writ petition, it is averred that “there is no documentary evidence filed with the substitution application proving that Shri R.S. Lal, Advocate was appellant’s counsel.” In paragraph 19, petitioner has referred the name of counsel as “Shri R.S. Lal” whereas in delay condonation application name of counsel is shown as “Shri R.S. Lal.” Petitioner, in paragraph 3 of the memo of revision, has admitted that the counsel for Munir-ud-deen was through out pursing the appeal but heirs of Munir-ud-deen have not filed substitution application. 10. 10. In my opinion, contesting respondents have sufficiently explained the delay of six months (as averred in delay condonation application) in filing the substitution application owing to death of appellant namely Munir-ud-deen and, therefore, it will have an effect of obliterating the ramification of delay in filing the substitution application. 11. Even otherwise it would not be appropriate to shut the door of justice due to little delay caused in filing the substitution application. In catena of judgments Hon'ble Supreme Court has expressed the view that endeavour should be made for extending the substantial justice rather to shut the door of justice on technical ground. 12. It is settled law that all Courts of law are established for furtherance of interest of substantial justice and not to obstruct the same on technicalities. Reference: Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal vs. National Building Material Supply, AIR 1969 SC 1267 , wherein it has been held that the substantial justice and technicalities, if pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice should not be defeated on technicalities. No procedure in a Court of law should be allowed to defeat the cause of substantial justice on some technicalities. Reference: Ghanshyam Dass and Others vs. Dominion of India and Others, AIR 1984 (3) SC 46. 13. Apart from that in recent judgment of Bhivchandra Shankar More vs. Balu Gangaram More and Others, 2019 (6) SCC 387 (decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 07.05.2019) it is expounded that in condoning the delay “sufficient cause” should be given liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. The relevant paragraph nos. 15 and 16 of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted herein below: “15. It is a fairly well settled law that “sufficient cause” should be given liberal construction so as to advance sustainable justice when there is no inaction, no negligence nor want of bona-fide could be imputable to the appellant. After referring to various judgments, in B. Madhuri, this Court held as under: “6. The expression “sufficient cause” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. After referring to various judgments, in B. Madhuri, this Court held as under: “6. The expression “sufficient cause” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard-and-fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years courts have repeatedly observed that a liberal approach needs to be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated only on the ground of delay.” 16. Observing that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, in N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 , this Court held as under: “11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.” As pointed out earlier, an appeal under Section 96 CPC is a statutory right. Generally, delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned, in the interest of justice, where there is no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona-fide is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay.” 14. Generally, delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned, in the interest of justice, where there is no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona-fide is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay.” 14. Moreover, applicability of provisions as enunciated under Order 22 of Code of Civil Procedure (in brevity “Code”) would also be a paramount question to be considered by this Court in the instant matter. Order 22 of Code deals with the substitution of heirs and legal representatives of the deceased, who arrayed as a party in the cause title of suit/appeal being plaintiff/appellant or defendant/opposite party. U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (in brevity “U.P.C.H. Act”) is an special enactment and under the provisions as enunciated under Section 4 of Code the provisions of the Code shall not be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the provisions of U.P.C.H. Act. For the purposes of proceedings before the consolidation courts, procedure has been provided under Section 38 of U.P.C.H. Act read with Rule 26 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules (in brevity “Rules”). In additional to these provisions, Section 41 of U.P.C.H. Act enunciates that unless otherwise specially provided by or under U.P.C.H. Act, the provisions of Chapter IX and X of U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 shall apply to all proceedings including appeal and application under U.P.C.H. Act. No doubt that by virtue of Section 40 of U.P.C.H. Act proceedings before the consolidation authorities have been treated as a judicial proceeding but it does not mean that the provisions of Code are made applicable in the proceeding under the U.P.C.H. Act. 15. Considering the applicability of Code in proceedings under the U.P.C.H. Act, Full Bench of this Court in the case of Bijai Narain Singh and Others vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1970 All 241 (FB) has expounded that provisions of Code are not fully applicable in the proceeding under U.P.C.H. Act. Relevant paragraph no. 32 of the judgment is being quoted herein under: “32. It may now be seen as to whether the various authorities constituted under the Act are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of procedure. On an examination of the various provisions of the Act it would appear that all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been made applicable to the proceedings under the Act. On an examination of the various provisions of the Act it would appear that all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been made applicable to the proceedings under the Act. Some limited powers have been specifically given under Section 38 and enlarged by Rule 26, which have been again supplemented by S. 41, which says that the provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, shall apply to all proceedings under the Act. On a perusal of the provisions of Section 38 and Rule 26 it would appear that they make a mention of the application of only some provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the same way the provisions in Chapter IX and X of the Land Revenue Act show that all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been made applicable to the proceedings under that Act also. As such, it could not be held that all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have been made applicable to the proceedings under the Act. Had the intention of the legislature been to make all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the proceedings under the Act, it could have said so just in one sentence.” 16. In the matter of Anand Narayan vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur, 2013 (121) RD 45 , question relating to applicability of Order 22 of Code was considered and answered by the coordinate Bench of this Court that the provisions as enunciated under Order 22 of Code qua substitution of the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased on the record is not applicable in the cases/appeal/revision under the U.P.C.H. Act. Relevant paragraph no. 12 of the judgment in Anand Narayan (supra) is being quoted herein under: “12. In such circumstances, the provisions of Order 22 Rule 3(2) and Rule 4(3) CPC which provides for abatement of the suit and proceeding for not filing the substitution application within 90 days of the death of the parties will not automatically apply to the proceeding before the consolidation authorities and in view of Section 4 CPC, the special provisions regulating the proceedings before the consolidation authorities will have overriding effect and the provisions of CPC will not be imported to the proceeding in the consolidation. The case law relied by counsel for the respondents in the cases of Khedan vs. Vishwanath, 1989 RD 364, Dibhag Singh vs. DDC and Others, 1990 RD 151, Ishwari vs. DDC and Others, 1990 RD 175 and Ranvir Singh vs. JDC and Others, 2007 (102) RD 42 as well as the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Bijai Narain Singh and Others vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1970 All 241 (FB) squarely cover the controversy. In such circumstances, the argument of counsel for the petitioner is not liable to be accepted.” 17. In this view of the matter, even assuming that substitution application was filed at a belated stage, there will be no abatement in the matter inasmuch as provisions as enunciated under Order 22 of Code and the provisions as enunciated under Article 120 and 121 of the Limitation Act are not applicable in a proceeding under the U.P.C.H. Act, though provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has been made applicable, for the limited purposes in proceedings under U.P.C.H. Act by virtue of Section 53-B of the U.P.C.H. Act. Therefore, mere furnishing an information qua death of any party, along with the details of his heir and legal representatives, arrayed in the cause title of any proceeding under U.P.C.H. Act would be suffice for the purpose of survival of the cause of action involved in the matter. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to demonstrate as to how he is prejudiced due to the order passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation in allowing the substitution or there is any likelihood of causing miscarriage of justice to the present petitioner. I do not find any justifiable ground to interfere in the impugned orders passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 19. Accordingly, the present writ petition, being misconceived and devoid on merits, is dismissed with no order as to the costs. 20. However, before parting the matter, counsel for both the parties have requested for issuance of a direction for expeditious disposal of the appeal pending before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation. 21. Considering the old matter, the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, before whom the appeal is pending, is hereby directed to decide the appeal expeditiously, preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. 21. Considering the old matter, the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, before whom the appeal is pending, is hereby directed to decide the appeal expeditiously, preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. 22. It is expected that it should be decided by reasoned and speaking order, in accordance with law, after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned without granting unnecessary adjournments.