ORDER : 1. The case is listed in the ‘orders’ category, however, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is heard and decided finally at this stage. 2. Briefly stated the facts arising in the present case are that a suit was filed by the respondent-plaintiff before the Additional Civil Judge (Jr.Division) & Judicial Magistrate I Class No.8, Jodhpur (hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”) against the petitioners-defendants for eviction from the suit property. The petitioner is a tenant of the respondent since 1966, who is sought to be evicted. During the pendency of the suit, on 15.05.2000, the rent of the suit premises was determined provisionally and the respondent-plaintiff was directed to supply details of the Bank Accounts so that the petitioners-defendants may deposit the rent in the said account. Since the particulars of the bank accounts were not supplied by the respondent-plaintiff, the petitioners defendants paid the rent due on each month to the counsel for the respondent-plaintiff till 30th April, 2007. In the month of May, 2007, the counsel for the respondent-plaintiff refused to accept the rent from the petitioners-defendants, therefore, the petitioners gave a notice dated 08.05.2007 to the respondent plaintiff for supplying the details of the bank account so that the rent due may be deposited. The said notice was not responded and replied to by the respondent-plaintiff. 3. Once again, on 05.06.2007, another notice was given by the petitioners-defendants with the same request i.e. to supply the account details for deposition of the rent due. The same was also not responded or replied to. The petitioners-defendants, thereafter, sent Money Order of Rs. 60/- of the rent due from 01.05.2007 to 31.04.2008 but the same too was refused and returned by the respondent-plaintiff. The petitioners-defendants again sent a Money Order for the period commencing from 01.05.2008 to 30.04.2009 but the same was also refused and returned by the respondent-plaintiff. In these circumstances, when the respondent-plaintiff did not accept the rent due, an application for deposition of rent was made before the trial court on 14.12.2007. 4. The respondent-plaintiff also preferred an application under Section 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). 5. In these circumstances, when the respondent-plaintiff did not accept the rent due, an application for deposition of rent was made before the trial court on 14.12.2007. 4. The respondent-plaintiff also preferred an application under Section 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). 5. The aforesaid applications were decided by the trial court vide order dated 01.02.2010, whereby, the application preferred by the respondent-plaintiff under Section 13(5) of the Act was allowed and the defence of the petitioners-defendants was ordered to be struck off. It was held by the learned trial court that since the defence of the petitioners-defendants was already struck off, no orders are required to be passed on the application preferred by the petitioners-defendants for depositing the rent due before the trial court. 6. The petitioners-defendants assailed the validity of this order by filing an appeal before the Additional District Judge No.3, Jodhpur Metropolitan, which was dismissed by the appellate court vide order dated 05.03.2011. 7. Aggrieved of the orders passed by the courts below dated 01.02.2010 and 05.03.2011, the present writ petition has been preferred. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned courts below committed grave error while allowing the application preferred by the respondent-plaintiff under Section 13(5) of the Act by resorting to the extreme steps striking out the defence, which virtually means that the suit of the plaintiff is decreed against the petitioners. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that pursuant to the order passed by the learned trial court on 05.05.2000 determining the provisional rent, the petitioner complied with the same for seven years as the rent due was deposited by him with the counsel for the respondent for each month, however, when the counsel for the respondent refused to accept the rent due, all possible efforts were made by the petitioner for depositing the rent. Since the particulars of the bank accounts were not provided by the respondent, notices were issued by the petitioner and when the notices were not responded or replied to, the Money Orders were sent and that too were refused, only then, an application was filed before the trial court for depositing the rent due. 10. Since the particulars of the bank accounts were not provided by the respondent, notices were issued by the petitioner and when the notices were not responded or replied to, the Money Orders were sent and that too were refused, only then, an application was filed before the trial court for depositing the rent due. 10. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner had made all bonafide possible efforts to deposit the rent due and therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner defaulted in depositing the rent due. In these circumstances, an order striking out the defence of the petitioner is not only harsh but virtually rendered the petitioner defenceless before the trial court by taking the extreme step of striking off the defence. To butress his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Miss. Santosh Mehta vs. Om Prakash reported in AIR 1980 SC 1664 . 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the provisions of Section 13(5) of the Act are directory in nature, however, the learned trial court treated the same to be of mandatory nature. Per contra, Mr. R.K. Thanvi, learned Sr. counsel for the respondent vehemently argued that as per Section 13 (5) of the Act of 1950, the petitioner was under an obligation to deposit the rent due to the respondent every month and for whatever reasons, if the rent was not deposited on the due date, the petitioner will be held as defaulter in light of the provisions of Section 13 (5) of the Act and the petitioner cannot take any excuse for not depositing the rent on the due date. He further submits that since the mandatory condition of the Section 13(5) of the Act was not complied with and the petitioner defaulted in paying the rent due before the trial court, the learned trial court rightly allowed the application preferred by the respondent plaintiff under Section 13(5) of the Act. He, therefore, submits that the order passed by the learned trial court on 01.02.2010 and affirmed by the appellate court on 05.03.2011 are perfectly just and proper and do not call for any interference by this court. 12. Learned Sr. counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Nasiruddin & Ors. Vs. Sitaram Aggrawal reported in 2003 DNJ (SC) 180. 13. 12. Learned Sr. counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Nasiruddin & Ors. Vs. Sitaram Aggrawal reported in 2003 DNJ (SC) 180. 13. Learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent submits that apparently there is a delay in deposition of the rent due as the petitioner is trying to buy time on the strength that the counsel for the respondent had refused to receive the rent due. He further submits that there is nothing on record to show such refusal. He further submits that the attempts made by the petitioner for payment of rent due by issuing the notices and sending the Money orders is nothing but a method to cover up the time for non-payment of the rent due on the stipulated date. He further submits that in view of the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin (supra), the petitioner had not deposited the rent due on the date fixed, the view taken by the learned trial court in allowing the application of the respondent –plaintiff under Section 13(5) of the Act is just, proper and correct. 14. Learned Sr. Counsel further submits that as per Section 19A of the Act, the petitioner should have immediately deposited the rent due before the trial court if the same was not accepted by the counsel for the respondents. Since the trial court had acted in conformity with the provisions of Section 19A of the Act, therefore, the view taken by the courts below does not call for any interference. Learned Senior counsel, therefore, prays that the writ petition may kindly be dismissed. 15. I have considered the submissions made at the Bar and perused the material available on record. 16. The undisputed facts in the present case are that after the determination of the provisional rent by the trial court vide order dated 15.05.2000, the petitioner deposited the rent due with the counsel for the respondent-plaintiff and the plaintiff accepted the rent from time to time till April, 2007. On refusal by the counsel for the respondent-plaintiff to receive the rent, the petitioner served notices upon the respondent on two occasions i.e. 08.05.2007 and 05.06.2007 for supplying the bank details for deposition of the rent. On refusal by the counsel for the respondent-plaintiff to receive the rent, the petitioner served notices upon the respondent on two occasions i.e. 08.05.2007 and 05.06.2007 for supplying the bank details for deposition of the rent. When the notices sent by the petitioner were not responded, the petitioner submitted the monthly rent of 12 months by way of Money Orders to the respondent but the same were not received by the respondent and the Money Orders were returned. In these circumstances, it can safely be presumed that the petitioner had made all bonafide efforts for payment of the rent to the respondent. When the respondent failed to accept the rent, the petitioner preferred an application for depositing the rent in the trial court on 13/14.12.2007. The fact that in pursuance of the order dated 15.05.2000 determining the provisional rent, the petitioner had paid the rent determined for 7 years and after the refusal by the counsel for the respondent to accept the rent, this Court feels that the petitioner had made all sincere efforts for payment of the rent due to the respondents. 17. The argument of the learned Sr. counsel for the respondent that the petitioner is only buying time to make up the lacunae, does not appear to be correct as for no fault of the petitioner, the rent could not be deposited with the respondents. The learned trial court has taken the extreme step of striking out the defence of the petitioners-defendants and this Court feels that this extreme step virtually demolishes the case of the petitioner before the trial court and there will be no defence to be pleaded before the trial court on behalf of the petitioner, which ultimately leads to decreeing the suit. The contention of the learned Sr. Counsel is that in view of the judgment of Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Nassiruddin (supra), the limitation/time period has been mentioned for paying the rent due, which is mandatory as per Section 13(5) of the Act, has not been complied with. This judgment is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case, as noticed in the preceding para that the petitioner had paid the rent due on regular basis for almost 7 years and thereafter had made all possible endeavours to pay the determined rent to the respondent. 18. The argument of the learned Sr. This judgment is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case, as noticed in the preceding para that the petitioner had paid the rent due on regular basis for almost 7 years and thereafter had made all possible endeavours to pay the determined rent to the respondent. 18. The argument of the learned Sr. Counsel that as far as the compliance of Section 19A of the Act is concerned, it is noted to be rejected as the petitioner had deposited the rent determined by the trial court for almost 7 years and thereafter made all endeavours to pay the same but the respondent had neither supplied the details of bank account nor accepted the Money Orders sent by the petitioner. Further, apart from that, the condition of Section 19A of the Act had not been complied with by the respondent and, therefore, the liability for compliance of the provisions of Section 19A of the Act cannot be fastened upon the petitioner-defendant. 19. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Miss Santosh Mehta (supra) in para 2 & 3 observed as under: “2.Rent Control laws are basically designed to protect tenants because scarcity of accommodation is a nightmare for those who own none and if evicted, will be helpless. Even so, the legislature has provided some grounds for eviction, and the Delhi law contains an extreme provision for striking out altogether the defence of the tenant which means that even if he has excellent pleas to negative the landlord's claim the court will not hear him. Obviously, this is a harsh extreme and having regard to the benign scheme of the legislation this drastic power is meant for use in grossly recalcitrant situations where a tenant is guilty of disregard in paying rent. That is why a discretion is vested, not a mandate imposed. Section 15(7) reads thus: "If a tenant fails to make payment or deposit as required by this section, the Controller may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the application." 3. We must adopt a socially informed perspective while construing the provisions and then it will be plain that the Controller is armed with a facilitative power. He may, or not strike out the tenant's defence. We must adopt a socially informed perspective while construing the provisions and then it will be plain that the Controller is armed with a facilitative power. He may, or not strike out the tenant's defence. A judicial discretion has built-in-self-restraint, has the scheme of the statute in mind, cannot ignore the conspectus of circumstances which are present in the case and has the brooding thought playing on the power that, in a court, striking out a party's defence is an exceptional step, not a routine visitation of a punitive esteem following upon a mere failure to pay rent. First of all, there must be a failure to pay rent which, in the context, indicates wilful failure, deliberate default or volitional non-performance. Secondly, the Section provides no automatic weapon but prescribes a wise discretion, inscribes no mechanical consequence but invests a power to overcome intransigence. Thus, if a tenant fails or refuses to pay or deposit rent and the court discerns a mood of defiance or gross neglect, the tenant may forfeit his right to be heard in defence. The last resort cannot be converted into the first resort; a punitive direction of court cannot be used as a booby trap to get the tenant out. Once this teleological interpretation dawns, the mist of misconception about matter of-course invocation of the power to strike out will vanish. Farewell to the realities of a given case is playing truant with the duty underlying the power.” 20. The observations of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Miss Santosh Mehta (supra) have been reiterated by the Apex Court recently in the judgment of Dina Nath (D) by LRs & anr. vs. Subhash Chand Saini & Ors. reported in (2019) 9 SCC 477 , wherein it was held that the power to strike out a party’s defence is an exceptional step and has only to be exercised where a “mood of defiance” and “gross negligence” on the part of the tenant is detected. 21. Thus, the extreme step of striking out the defence should not have been resorted to in the present case, more particularly, when the petitioner had made all efforts to deposit the amount of determined rent after paying the same for almost 7 years. 22. 21. Thus, the extreme step of striking out the defence should not have been resorted to in the present case, more particularly, when the petitioner had made all efforts to deposit the amount of determined rent after paying the same for almost 7 years. 22. In view of the discussions made above, the present writ petition is allowed and the order dated 01.02.2010 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Jr.Division) & Judicial Magistrate I Class No.8, Jodhpur and the order dated 05.03.2011 passed by the Additional District Judge No.3, Jodhpur are quashed and set aside. 23. The learned trial court is directed to decide the suit pending before it after giving all reasonable opportunities of defense to the petitioners. 24. Since, the application preferred by the petitioners defendants for depositing the rent due has been rejected, it is ordered that the petitioners-defendants shall deposit the entire determined due rent before the learned trial court in accordance with law and will continue to pay the same regularly.