JUDGMENT : A very peculiar, but a very interesting question, which has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant in the present second appeal would precisely be based upon the plaintiff’s own case, which was developed by him in Original Suit No.585 of 2017 Col. Anil Kumar Kak vs. Nagar Nigam Dehradun & Ors. Particularly the reference here would be required, would be as to what impact would the impleadment of defendant no.2, would have for the purposes of interpreting the implications of Section 571(1) Sub Section (b) of U.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1959 as now applicable in State of Uttarakhand, under the provisions of the Regularization Act. 2. The modulation of the relief, which is foundationed of the suit; is based on the pleadings raised in the plaint, admittedly and as per the pleadings raised by the plaintiff himself in para 8, the notice for taking an action was issued by him against defendant no.1 & 3 only on 03.05.2013, through his Advocate, in relation to the disputed property, which was lying in Khasra No.198/B (198/168), Rajpur Road, Block-1, Dehradun. In case if the said part of the pleading of the said para of plaint is taken into consideration, in fact, the notices of 03.05.2013, which has been reiterated in the pleadings in para 9, the cause of action is shown to have been issued to defendant nos.1 to 3, is contrary to the pleadings itself raised in para 8. In the suit in question, the plaintiff has formulated the relief in the following manner. In the suit in question, the plaintiff has formulated the relief in the following manner. The relief as sought for before the court below is extracted hereunder, including the description of property given at the foot of the plaint:- ;g fd oknh vius i{k esa rFkk izfroknhx.k la[;k 1 rk 3 ds fo:} fuEufyf[kr izfrdkjksa dh vkKfIr gsrq izkFkZuk djrk gS& d& izfroknhx.k la[;k 1 rk 3 dks vknsf’kr fd;k tkos fd dze'k% izfroknh la[;k 1 o 3 oknh ,oa vkSipkfjd izfroknh la[;k 4 ds LokfeRo dh lEifRr Hkkx ftldk iw.kZ fooj.k okn i= ds vUr esa fn;k x;k gS] ls fufeZr lMd dUdzhV] iRFkj] jksMh] lksfyax bR;kfn gVkdj mDr Hkw&Hkkx dk okLrfod fjDr dCtk oknh ,oa vkSipkfjd izfroknh la[;k 4 dks lkSai ns vkSj izfroknh la[;k 2 dks vknsf'kr fd;k tkos fd og voS/kkfud :i ls yxk;s x;s fctyh ds [kEcks dks oknh ,oa vkSipkfjd izfroknh la[;k 4 ds LokfeRo dh Hkwfe ls f'kV djsa] ,slk djus esa foQy jgus ij ekuuh; U;k;ky; }kjk voS/k :i ls fufeZr lMd dUdzhV] iRFkj] jksMh] lksfyax bR;kfn gVkdj ,oa fctyh ds [kEcs gVkdj lwph lEifRr esa of.kZr mDr Hkw&Hkkx dk okLrfod fjDr dCtk oknh ,oa vkSipkfjd izfroknh la[;k 4 dks fnyk;k tkosA [k& izfroknhx.k la[;k 1 rk 3 dks LFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk }kjk oknh ds LokfeRo dh lEifRr la[;k 198@ch ¼198@168½] jktiqj jksM CykWd&1 ¼mRrj½ nsgjknwu ds Hkkx tks fd 12 QhV pkSMs izkbZosV ,izksPk jksM ds :i esa fo|eku gS] ij Øe'k% fdlh Hkh izdkj dk iqu fuekZ.k djus] lMd fodflr djus ,oa fctyh ds [kEcs yxkus o fctyh ykbZu lwph lEifRr esa of.kZr Hkwfe ls gksdj vkxs ysdj tkus ls LFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk }kjk fuf"k) fd;k tkosA x& okn ds leLr O;; oknh ,oa vkSipkfjd izfroknh la[;k 4 dks izfroknh la[;k 1 rk 3 ls fnyk;k tkosA ?k& mijksDr izfrdkjksa ds vfrfjDr vFkok ,ot esa vU; dksbZ izfrdkj tks ekuuh; U;k;ky; okn dh ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa mfpr le>s oknh dks izfroknh la[;k 1 rk 3 ls fnyk;k tkosA Lkwph lEifRr Okknh ,oa vkSipkfjd izfroknh la[;k 4 ds LokfeRo dh lEifRr la[;k 198@ch ¼198@168½] jktiqj jksM CykWd&1 ¼mRrj½ nsgjknwu ds Hkkx tks fd 12 QhV pkSMs izkbZosV ,izksPk jksM ds :i esa fo|eku gS] ftls fd layXu ekufp= esa vaxzth v{kj A, B, C, D ls n'kkZ;k x;k gS] ftldh lhek,a fuEuor gSa& Ikwjc es & eq[; lMd] jktiqj jksMA Ikf'pe es& lEifRr vU; tks fjDr voLFkk es gSA mRrj es & 'ks"k lEifRr o fjgk;'kh Hkkx oknhA nf{k.k es & lEifRr vU;A^^ 3. The suit was instituted only on 27.11.2017, and for the aforesaid relief of granting a decree of mandatory injunction for the removal of the structure, as well as for possession. The suit was instituted on 27.11.2017. These two dates i.e. about issuance of notice on 03.05.2013 and the cause of action which was described by the plaintiff itself in para 13 of the plaint being 03.05.2013 and institution of suit itself on 27.11.2017, are not the facts which are required to be elaborated, because it is self explicit from the pleadings of the plaint itself. On the institution of the suit, the defendants had put in appearance and defendant no.1 at the first given opportunity had filed an application Paper No.22 Ga-2, by invoking the provisions contained under Order 7 Rule 11 of the C.P.C. in the light of the legal restrictions, which has been imposed by the provisions contained under the U.P. Nagar Nigam Act, 1959 as contained in its Section 570 to be read with Section 571(1) of the Act. For the purposes of convince Section 570 and 571(1) of U.P. Municipal Corporation Act 1959, is extracted hereunder:- “570. Indemnity for acts done in good faith. - No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie in respect of anything in good faith done or purported or intended to be done under this Act against the State Government, any Corporate, 25[* * *] Mayor or against the Municipal Commissioner, or any Corporation officer or servant or against person acting under and in accordance with the directions under this Act of the State Government, the Corporation, any Committee constituted under this Act, the Municipal Commissioner, any Corporation officer or servant or of a Magistrate. 571. Protection of persons acting under this Act against suits. 571. Protection of persons acting under this Act against suits. - (1) No suit shall be instituted against the Corporation or against the Municipal Commissioner, or against any Corporation officer or servant, in respect of any act done or purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act- (a) until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been, in the case of the Corporation, left at the Corporation office and, in the case of the Municipal Commissioner or of a Corporation officer or servant delivered to him or left at his office, stating with reasonable particularity the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed, if any, and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and of his attorney, advocate, pleader or agent, if any, for the purpose of such suit, nor (b) unless it is commenced within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be construed to apply to a suit wherein the only relief claimed is an injunction of which the object would be defeated by the giving of the notice or the postponement of the commencement of the suit or proceeding.” 4. The argument of defendant no.1 was from the prospective, that if the cause of action as it has been pleaded in the suit itself if that is taken into consideration, according to the plaintiff himself, it had accrued in his favour on 03.05.2013 and admittedly the suit was instituted in 2017 that is almost after the lapse of four years i.e. beyond the prescribed period. What has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention is that if the relief which is extracted hereinabove is taken into consideration, where he has sought a decree for possession, it was a decree for possession sought qua defendant no.2 also and hence the implications of Section 571(1) of U.P. Nagar Nigam Act 1959, would not be applicable, when the relief has also been jointly sought, against the joinder of cause of action, against defendant nos.1 to 3. But the plaint itself is self contradictory too in its pleadings. But the plaint itself is self contradictory too in its pleadings. What he attempts to argue is that in fact in the plaint there was a joinder of cause of action, against co-defendant also and hence the bar of Section 571(1) would not be applicable. 5. In support of his contention, the counsel for the appellant had made reference to a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as reported in (2018) 11 Supreme Court Case 780 Sejal Glass Limited vs. Navilan Merchants Private Limited, wherein the implications of Order 7 Rule 11 of the C.P.C. was under consideration and particularly it was in the context of a cause of action, which was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court to have accrued in the light of the implications of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as against one defendant, which had led to the rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the C.P.C. 6. I am in respectful disagreement with the authority relied by the learned counsel for the appellant, because the factual backdrop in the said case was entirely distinct to the one involved in the present second appeal. It was a simplicitor civil case in which a prior notice under Section 80 of C.P.C. was a condition precedent which was to be adhere to and due to its non compliance the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of the C.P.C. was attracted. It was not from the prospective of the applicability of the provisions of the special statute and when a bar in institution of the proceedings itself is created by a special act which governs the management of a local body as constituted under it. Para 8 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder:- “8. We are afraid that this is a misreading of the Madras High Court judgment. It was only on the peculiar facts of that case that want of Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure against one Defendant led to the rejection of the plaint as a whole, as no cause of action would remain against the other Defendants. This cannot elevate itself into a Rule of law, that once a part of a plaint cannot proceed, the other part also cannot proceed, and the plaint as a whole must be rejected Under Order VII Rule 11. This cannot elevate itself into a Rule of law, that once a part of a plaint cannot proceed, the other part also cannot proceed, and the plaint as a whole must be rejected Under Order VII Rule 11. In all such cases, if the plaint survives against certain Defendants and/or properties, Order VII Rule 11 will have no application at all, and the suit as a whole must then proceed to trial.” 7. In order to answer the argument which has been extended by the learned counsel for the appellant, it would be relevant to precisely deal with, as to what was the legislative necessity to the formulate the U.P. Municipal Corporation Act of 1959 and if the SOR of the Act, is taken into consideration the Act of 1959, was made on the recommendation of the Government of India, by amending the U.P. Municipalities Act of 1916, in order to constitute a development fund of Municipal Council and a superior local body i.e. the Municipal Corporation, independent to one another and the status of the Nagar Nigam under the Act of 1959, it was as carved out from the principal provisions of U.P. Municipalities Act of 1916, has been given a status of being a distinct legal entity and a local body of larger urbanised area. 8. 8. The counsel for the appellant, when he referred to the relief clause qua the pleadings raised in the plaint, in order to oust himself from the applicability of the bar created by Section 571(1)(b) of the U.P. Nagar Nigam Act, it was attempted to be addressed by inter mixing the issue contending thereof that his relief and the cause of action was qua the defendant no.2 also, this aspect is not acceptable by this Court for the reason being that the first expression which had been given by the plaintiff in the suit while issuing notices on 03.05.2013, it was qua the action of defendant nos.1 & 3 only and that in itself, when it is a joinder of a cause of action against the co-defendants and if the suit has been jointly instituted for a joinder of cause of action against the codefendant, which has been attempted to argue that defendant no.2 would be ousted from the applicability of the embargo created by Section 571(1) of the Act, in fact, this strategical argument is not accepted by this Court, because it runs contrary to the appellant’s own case as agitated in the plaint where at the first opportunity available to the appellant the cause of action was pleaded to have accrued against defendant no.1 & 3 only as per plaint pleadings. 9. In that view of the matter, the decision taken by the learned trial court, while attracting the implications given and provided creating a bar to the proceedings, by Section 571 (1) Sub-Section (b) of the Act of 1959, which contemplates that there has had to be a mandatory six months notice after the accrual of cause of action and the institution of the suit within the time period prescribed therein. Since here the suit itself after the initial notice of 03.05.2013, was instituted in 2017, the same would not be tenable in view of the specific bar created by special legislation carved out by the amendment made by the Government of India vide its notification issued by the Act No.7 of 1959. Since here the suit itself after the initial notice of 03.05.2013, was instituted in 2017, the same would not be tenable in view of the specific bar created by special legislation carved out by the amendment made by the Government of India vide its notification issued by the Act No.7 of 1959. If the observations which has been made in the finding recorded while deciding Paper No.22 Ga, and the objection Paper No.40 Ga is taken into consideration, the learned trial court in its para 10 of the judgment had referred to the notices Paper No.12 Ga, the Receipt No.13 Ga which happens to be the notice dated 03.05.2013, which was sent by the plaintiff/appellant by registered post on 04.05.2013, and since the suit itself was for the purposes of possession in pursuance to the cause of action, which was said to have been accrued on 03.05.2013, the same would be barred by the provisions contained under Section 157(1) Gha. 10. In view of what has been observed above, this Court is of the view that in view of the provisions contained under Section 571(1) of the Act of 1959 which has been extracted above and according to the own case of the plaintiff as per the plaint averments made in para 8 and 13, the suit itself would not be tenable because the period of limitation prescribed for its institution under Section 571 (1) of the Act is not extendable. 11. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the second appeal. The second appeal is hereby dismissed and the substantial question of law as formulated by the plaintiff/appellant in the appeal with regards to the implications of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the C.P.C and with regards to the implications of Section 571(1)(b) of the U.P. U.P. Nagar Nigam Act of 1959 is answered against him.