JUDGMENT : This appeal is preferred against the order, dated 27.01.2021, passed in F.D.I.A.No.170 of 2017 in O.S.No.44 of 2006 on the file of the Court of I Additional District Judge, Rajamahendravaram. 2. Heard Sri Ghanta Sridhar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant No.2 and Sri Banka Nageswara Rao, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent/plaintiff. Respondents 2 & 3/defendants 1 & 3 died. Respondents/defendants 4 to 8 are shown to be not necessary parties to this appeal. Both parties filed written arguments. 3. The introductory facts, in brief, are as follows: (a) The 1st defendant-Ponnada Krishna Kumari, is the mother of 2nd the plaintiff-Rambha Swarajya Lakshmi and the defendant-Ponnada Venkata Hari Babu. Late Ponnada Venkateswara Rao is the father of the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant, and the elder brother of the 3rd defendant-Ponnada Anjaneya Swamy. Late Ponnada Bhaskaram, late Ponnada Gopala Swamy and late Venkatadri are brothers and they constituted a mitakshara Hindu Joint Family. Ponnada Gopala Swamy is the father of Ponnada Venkateswara Rao. Ponnada Gopala Swamy and brothers partitioned some of their joint family properties under the registered partition deed, dated 30.09.1962. As the division was not convenient, the brothers executed two registered exchange deeds, dated 16.09.1964. Since then they enjoyed properties separately. The father of the plaintiff predeceased his father. The 3rd defendant died during the pendency of the suit leaving his legal representatives who are the 5th to 8th defendants. (b) In the said backdrop, the plaintiff brought the suit, O.S.No.44 1st 2nd of 2006 for partition and for profits. and defendants contended that the joint family properties were partitioned between the 2nd defendant and the branch of the 3rd defendant in the year 1985 and a partition list was prepared on 25.01.1985 and the 1st and 2nd defendants have been enjoying their shares in items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule properties as their exclusive properties, but the prior partition was suppressed. The 3rd defendant also took the same defence. The 4th defendant claimed that he is a bona fide purchaser of plaint B schedule property. (c) The trial Court passed a preliminary decree on 25.01.2012. As no appeal was filed against it, plaintiff filed E.P.No.17 of 2012 in O.S.No.44 of 2006 for recovery of costs and the amount of profit decreed. The 3rd defendant also took the same defence. The 4th defendant claimed that he is a bona fide purchaser of plaint B schedule property. (c) The trial Court passed a preliminary decree on 25.01.2012. As no appeal was filed against it, plaintiff filed E.P.No.17 of 2012 in O.S.No.44 of 2006 for recovery of costs and the amount of profit decreed. The petition, viz., F.D.I.A.No.170 of 2017 was filed on 17.03.2012 for partition of the schedule properties as per the preliminary decree, dated 25.01.2012. In the meantime, the 2nd defendant preferred an appeal in A.S.No.371 of 2012 on the file of the High Court. The said appeal was disposed of in terms of the compromise entered into the parties, vide common judgment in A.S.M.P.No.1670 of 2015 in A.S.No.371 of 2012, dated 07.08.2015. As per the terms of the compromise decree, half of the property in item Nos.1 to 3 of plaint schedule properties situated on the Western side is allocated to the legal heirs of P.Venkateswara Rao, i.e., the plaintiff, respondents 1 & 2/defendants 1 & 2 and remaining half part of Eastern side shall be taken by the legal heirs of late P.Anjaneya Swamy, i.e., defendant Nos.5 to 8. Thus, the shares have been decided in terms of the compromise decree. Though final decree petition was filed with regard to plaint ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties, as the plaint ‘B’ schedule property was already decided by the High Court in a compromise decree, the trial Court focused its attention only on ‘A’ schedule property. An advocate commissioner was appointed to demarcate the shares with regard to item Nos.1 and 2 of plaint ‘A’ schedule property and the advocate commissioner filed his report appending a plan to it. As regards, item No.3, there was already partition of item No.3 of plaint ‘A’ schedule property, the trial Court opined that there is no necessity to further decide on item No.3 of the plaint schedule property in the final decree petition. (d) While the proceedings were going on, the 1st respondent in FDIA 170 of 2017, Ponnada Krishna Kumari, died on 09.07.2016. The 2nd respondent contended that he is the only legal representative of his mother, i.e., the 1st respondent in FDIA. He filed photostat copy of the Will, dated 08.09.2015, said to have been executed by the deceased 1st respondent in support of his claim in his mother’s share exclusively. 4. The 2nd respondent contended that he is the only legal representative of his mother, i.e., the 1st respondent in FDIA. He filed photostat copy of the Will, dated 08.09.2015, said to have been executed by the deceased 1st respondent in support of his claim in his mother’s share exclusively. 4. Respondents 1 and 2 reported no counter. Respondent No.4 filed counter denying the contents of the petition. It is further contended that this respondent filed appeal on the file of the High Court and the same is pending and therefore, no appeal is filed against the preliminary decree is false. Plaint B schedule property is only an extent of Ac.1.14 cents and this respondent is a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration and is entitled to equities. Therefore, without prejudice to the rights of this respondent, whatever share in the B schedule property can as well be granted to her by granting equal value of share in plaint A schedule property. This respondent being in possession of plaint B schedule property and is not concerned with ‘A’ schedule property, the petitioner is not entitled to claim ascertainment of profits in respect of plaint A schedule properties so far as relief against her is concerned. The application is premature and the petition is liable to be dismissed. 5. The 5th respondent filed counter which was adopted by respondent No.6 & 8. The 5th respondent filed cross-objections in S.R.No.10579 of 2012 in A.S.No.371 of 2012 on the file of the High Court and the same are pending consideration. In view of the cross objections filed by this respondent and other respondents, appointment of advocate Commissioner is sought. Hence, appropriate orders be passed in this regard. 6. The plaintiff also filed counter objections. The primary contention of the 1st respondent/plaintiff is that the alleged Will, dated 08.09.2015, said to have been executed by the 2nd respondent/1st defendant herein in favour of the appellant/2nd defendant herein, is not genuine, true, valid and binding on her, as the same is shrouded by suspicion. The plaintiff contended that the 2nd defendant confined the mother without any liberty to her and brought into existence the Will, dated 08.09.2015 and it was fabricated and was not executed by the mother in a sound and disposing state of mind and had health problems due to old age. The plaintiff contended that the 2nd defendant confined the mother without any liberty to her and brought into existence the Will, dated 08.09.2015 and it was fabricated and was not executed by the mother in a sound and disposing state of mind and had health problems due to old age. She further contended that the mother was kept in an old-age home and neglected by the brother and that the photograph affixed to the Will is not a latest one as on the date of execution of the Will and the witnesses are the persons interested in the 2nd respondent. 7. PWs 1 & 2 were examined for the petitioner and RWs 1 to 3 were examined for the respondents. Exhibits A1 to A8 are marked on behalf of the petitioner and exhibits B1 to B4 and C1 to C9 were marked for the respondents. 8. The trial Court, on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, held that it did not believe the execution of the Will by the 1st respondent in a sound and disposing state of mind with her free will. Accordingly, the trial Court partly allowed the final decree petition, by order, dated 27.01.2021. The operative portion of the order, dated 27.01.2021, reads as follows: “In the result, final decree is allowed in part, consequently allocated the shares to the petitioner and Respondent No.2, i.e., No.1 is allocated to petitioner and No.II is allocated to respondent No.2 in item No.1 of ‘A’ schedule property as shown in the commissioner’s plan. Further share of deceased, i.e., Respondent No.1 is allocated to petitioner and respondent No.2 equally i.e., No.2(a) is allocated to petitioner and No.2(b) is allocated to the respondent No.2 in item No.1 of A schedule property as shown in the commissioner’s plan. (i) No.1 is allocated to petitioner and No.II is allocated to the Respondent No.2 in item No.2 of A schedule property as shown in the commissioner’s plan. Whereas the share of the deceased Respondent No.1 is allocated to petitioner and respondent No.2 equally, i.e., petitioner is allocated No.2(aa) and respondent No.2 is allocated No.2(ab) in item No.2 of A schedule property as shown in the commissioner’s plan. (ii) With regard to item No.3 of plaint schedule property partition is already made out vide partition deed dated 05.12.2015 and holds good. (ii) With regard to item No.3 of plaint schedule property partition is already made out vide partition deed dated 05.12.2015 and holds good. (iii) The share of deceased respondent No.1 in item No.3 of plaint ‘A’ schedule property which is devolved in partition deed dated 05.12.2015 for which the petitioner and second respondent are entitled equally half share each, i.e., the petitioner is entitled for the share on the Western side shown as ‘X’ and the second respondent is entitled on the Eastern side shown as ‘Y’ as per the plan annexed to Ex.B2 partition deed, dated 05.12.2015. (iv) The rest of the claim with regard to the plaint ‘B’ schedule property is not considered in view of the compromise decree passed before the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh.” 9. Aggrieved by the order of the trial Court, the appellant/2nd respondent in F.D.I.A.170 of 2017 preferred this appeal mainly contending that the Will was duly proved by him, but the trial Court erred in disbelieving it. Suffice it to say, the entire dispute revolves around the genuineness of the alleged Will, dated 08.09.2015. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant mainly contended that the trial Court erred being carried away by the perceived suspicious circumstances pointed out by it, such as active participation taken by the son, total exclusion of the daughter from getting any part of the property of the mother etc. He further contended that the number of suspicious circumstances against the son are far less than the circumstances existing against the 1st respondent/ plaintiff for not giving her any share and they rather justify execution of the Will in favour of the son. In this regard, it is pointed out that the plaintiff admitted in her cross-examination that she never visited her mother after the marriage of the plaintiff, that there are disputes between the plaintiff and her mother and moreover, she filed criminal cases against her mother and brother in Crime No.131 of 2015 on the file of Rajanagaram police station apart from filing a case in D.V.C.No.94 of 2010 on the file of the Court of IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. Thus, it was submitted that the plaintiff harassed the mother throughout her life. Thus, it was submitted that the plaintiff harassed the mother throughout her life. It is also contended that though the plaintiff pleaded that the mother was neglected by the son and the mother was kept in old-age home and to that effect she also has evidence, but she failed to lead even iota of evidence to substantiate her contention in that regard and if it is true, she could have summoned the person running the old-age home and the person who recorded the video-graphed statement of the mother when she was allegedly in the old-age home. 11. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff totally supported the observations of the trial Court and contended that the alleged Will cannot be believed since its execution is shrouded by suspicious circumstances. It is further contended that the son could not establish as to who gave the letter to the Sub-Registrar to attend at house for registration of the Will and other fact regarding attestors being the henchmen of the son of the deceased etc. 12. In reply, it is said that the attestor who is cousin is equally related to both parties and nothing was elicited from his cross-examination when he was examined as a witness as to why he should favour one cousin and speak about the other cousin who are equally related to him. It is further submitted that attestation by cousin equally related to both parties is a strong circumstance in favour of the legatee than the attestation being done by a stranger. 13. Before proceeding further, it is apropos to refer the legal position which is well settled: (i) In H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma, AIR 1959 SC 443 , it is laid down that the onus is on propounder of proof of essential facts, which are : (i) that the Will was signed by the testator in a sound and disposing state of mind duly understanding the nature and effect of disposition and put his signature on the document of his own free will, and (ii) when the evidence adduced in support of the Will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of testator's mind and his signature as required by law, Courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of propounder. It was also held that if a Will is challenged as surrounded by suspicious circumstances, all such legitimate doubts have to be removed by cogent, satisfactory and sufficient evidence to dispel suspicion. (ii) In Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529 , a Constitution Bench of Supreme Court approved the law in H.Venkatachala Iyengar's case (supra), and laid down as below: “The onus of proving the Will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where however there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the Court accepts the Will as genuine. Where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud and coercion, the onus is on him to prove the same. Even where there are no such pleas but the circumstances give rise to doubts, it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the Court. The suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator, the condition of the testator's mind, the dispositions made in the Will being unnatural improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances or there might be other indication in the Will to show that the testator's mind was not free. In such a case the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicion should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last Will of the testator. If the propounder himself takes part in the execution of the Will which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a circumstance to be taken into account, and the propounder is required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence.” (iii) In Indu Bala's case (supra), Madhukar D. Shende's case (supra), Rambai Padmakar Patil's case (supra) and Shashi Kumar's case (supra), also Supreme Court reiterated law in H. Venkatachala Iyengar's case (supra). (iv) An element of solemnity is attached to the Will because it is last testament of testator and speaks from death of testator. Therefore when suspicious circumstances are alleged every allegation cannot be treated as suspicious and if allegations are well founded, the Court has to subject the Will to a closer scrutiny. (iv) An element of solemnity is attached to the Will because it is last testament of testator and speaks from death of testator. Therefore when suspicious circumstances are alleged every allegation cannot be treated as suspicious and if allegations are well founded, the Court has to subject the Will to a closer scrutiny. In Jaswanth Kaur's case (supra), Supreme Court pointed out that when the Will is allegedly shrouded in suspicion, its proof ceased to be a simple lis between plaintiff and defendant. An adversary proceeding in such cases becomes a matter of Court's conscience and propounder of the Will has to remove all suspicious circumstances to satisfy Court's conscience that Will was duly executed by testator. For doing so the propounder is bound to offer cogent and convincing explanation of suspicious circumstances shrouding the making of Will. (v) As held by Supreme Court in Indu Bala's case (supra), a circumstance would be "suspicious" when it is abnormal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person. In H. Venkatachala Iyengar's case (supra), Supreme Court inter alia pointed out that when the disposition in the Will appears to be unnatural, improbable or inferior in the light of relevant circumstances and when propounder took prominent role in execution of Will and received substantial benefit, that itself is treated as suspicious circumstance attending execution of Will. Here it may be mentioned that though in subsequent judgments, Supreme Court held that mere exclusion of a nearest relative from bequeath by itself does not render the Will suspicious, but in connection with attending circumstances, it would lead to suspicion. 14. Now, when the evidence lead by both parties is examined in the present case, in the light of the above said principles of law, it is evident that the son, by examining the attestor and scribe of the Will, discharged his initial burden of establishing the fact of execution of the Will by his mother being in sound and disposing state of mind. The plaintiff could not elicit in the cross-examination of RW2 as to why he should speak in favour of the 2nd defendant rather than the plaintiff. Thus, RW2 is a neutral witness and he clearly spoke in favour of the 2nd defendant about due execution of the Will. The fact that the deceased was ill is not in dispute. The plaintiff could not elicit in the cross-examination of RW2 as to why he should speak in favour of the 2nd defendant rather than the plaintiff. Thus, RW2 is a neutral witness and he clearly spoke in favour of the 2nd defendant about due execution of the Will. The fact that the deceased was ill is not in dispute. However, since the son pleaded that the mother had fracture of leg and could not attend before the Sub Registrar for registration, but did not prove it by placing medical evidence in that regard; the whole case cannot be disbelieved as contended by the plaintiff. 15. It is settled law that it is the duty of the Court to remove chaff from grains while appreciating evidence and the maxim ‘falsus in uno falsus in omnibus’ is not applicable to the Indian circumstances, and therefore, whatever is false, if can be separated from the other part of reliable evidence, the trust-worth part can be relied on. Thus, drawing inference from the lack of evidence of cause stated for calling the Sub-Registrar, the Will cannot be suspected in the light of other ample evidence on record. The fact that Sub Registrar has gone to the residence of the mother and registered the Will is duly established. Whatever the reason for not going to the office of the Sub-Registrar is not the criterion for disbelieving the execution of the documents and its registration. Therefore, on this ground, the execution of the Will need not be disbelieved and even cannot be considered as ‘suspicious circumstance’ therein enough to throw away the entire evidence of the 2nd defendant. 16. As rightly contended by the appellant, the circumstances working against the daughter are stronger for excluding her by the mother. In any case of execution of a Will, it may change the course of natural succession as per law, and therefore, exclusion of a heir who is likely to receive the property on natural succession, is not by itself a strong suspicious ground. But the same could be one circumstance while dealing with other suspicious circumstances. 17. As rightly contended, the plaintiff could not prove that the mother was left in the old-age home and no attempt was even made to get the evidence in that regard. Therefore, except an allegation, there is no iota of evidence. But the same could be one circumstance while dealing with other suspicious circumstances. 17. As rightly contended, the plaintiff could not prove that the mother was left in the old-age home and no attempt was even made to get the evidence in that regard. Therefore, except an allegation, there is no iota of evidence. On the other hand, there is clear admission by her in her cross-examination for not meeting her mother after the marriage for such a long period even when the mother was said to be not along with 2nd defendant, but in the old age home where the 2nd defendant may not have any control to prevent the plaintiff from meeting her mother. Further, the plaintiff admitted of filing of several cases not only against her brother but also her mother and dragging them to litigation. Moreover, the mother has always sailed with her son in defending the suit. Thus, there is nothing suspicious to disbelieve the Will, dated 08.09.2015, propounded by the 2nd defendant. But, the trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record in the light of the facts and circumstances brought in evidence and thus, the order impugned in the appeal is liable to be set aside. 18. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, setting aside the order, dated 27.01.2021, passed by I Additional District Judge, Rajamahendravaram, in F.D.I.A.No.170 of 2017 in O.S.No.44 of 2006. The final decree shall be drawn as per the preliminary decree passed in terms of the compromise and providing the share of property of the 1st defendant to be allotted to the 2nd defendant. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.