JUDGMENT : Rajendra Chandra Singh Samant, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.04.2014, passed by the Learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Bastar at Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh in Sessions Trial No. 95 of 2010, whereby and whereunder the learned First Additional Sessions Judge has convicted the appellants under Sections 148, 307/149 (three times) & 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC') and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for 1 year and fine of Rs.100/-, imprisonment for 7 years and fine of Rs.200/- (in three times) and life imprisonment with fine of Rs.200/- to each of the appellants with default stipulations respectively. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is this that on the date of incident i.e. 31.5.2010, complainant – Sukhchand (PW-2), father of deceased - Harish Chand, brother Niluram (PW-7), mother Rajo (PW-10), Mandhar Kashyap (PW-3) and Mannu had been to the agricultural field at about 7:00 am for sowing the seeds. At about 8:00 am, the appellants came on the spot armed with bow and arrow, axe, battle axe and clubs, who argued with the complainant and others, used abusive words. Thereafter, all of them surrounded deceased – Harish Chand and assaulted him with axe, battle axe and clubs. Mandhar Kashyap (PW-3), Mannu and Niluram (PW-7) made an attempt to intervene and rescue the deceased, who were inflicted incised injuries by the appellants. Information was given to the police. The police arrived on the spot and Dehati Nalisi (Ex. P-4) was lodged on the information given by Sukhchand (PW-2). Morgue intimation (Ex.P-5) was also recorded at the same time. Inquest procedure was conducted, crime details form was prepared vide (Ex. P-6) and the inquest report was also prepared vide (Ex.P-17). The body of the deceased was subjected to autopsy. Dr. Virendra Kumar Jha (PW-1) has opined vide his report (Ex.P-1A) that the cause of death of the deceased was shock, which was caused due to hemorrhage resulting from the injuries found on the neck of the deceased and the death of deceased – Harish Chand was homicidal. The unnumbered morgue intimation vide (Ex.P-4) was recorded and on that basis numbered morgue intimation vide (Ex.P-25) was also recorded. Appellant No.1 – Mehtar was taken into custody and interrogated, who made a statement of discovery of an axe, battle axe, bow and arrow and club etc. The unnumbered morgue intimation vide (Ex.P-4) was recorded and on that basis numbered morgue intimation vide (Ex.P-25) was also recorded. Appellant No.1 – Mehtar was taken into custody and interrogated, who made a statement of discovery of an axe, battle axe, bow and arrow and club etc. At his instance vide memorandum (Ex.P-7) and on being presented by him, 2 bows, 1 battle axe, 2 axes and one club were seized vide (Ex. P-8). The injured witnesses, namely, Mandhar Kashyap (PW-3), Niluram (PW-7) and Mannu were medically examined and the MLC reports Ex.P-18, P-19 and P-33 were obtained. The blood-stained soil and the plain soil were seized from the spot of the incident vide Ex. P/28. The clothes of the deceased which were preserved by the doctor conducting postmortem were seized vide Ex. P-29. The seized articles were examined by the Medical Officer and thereafter, the same were sent for FSL examination as well. A spot map was also prepared by the Revenue Officer, Patwari. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. and on completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the concerned Court. 3. After completion of committal proceedings, learned Sessions Judge took cognizance in the case and framed charges under Sections 148, 307/149, 302/149 of the IPC against the appellants. The appellants pleaded innocence and denied the charges. The prosecution has examined as many as 13 witnesses. On completion of prosecution evidence, the appellants/accused persons were examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., in which the appellants denied all the incriminating evidence against them and again they made a statement of innocence and false implication. They also made a statement in defence that the disputed land was in possession of the appellants and they had title on the same, on which, the complainant party was forcibly taking possession on the date of incident, therefore, the appellants have reacted. Two witnesses were examined in the defence. After giving an opportunity of hearing to the prosecution and defence, the learned trial Court delivered the impugned judgment by convicting and sentencing the appellants in the manner mentioned herein-above. 4. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the conviction of the appellants is totally erroneous and unsustainable. The spot of the incident was land in dispute, on which, the appellants were in possession and they had sown the crops. 4. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the conviction of the appellants is totally erroneous and unsustainable. The spot of the incident was land in dispute, on which, the appellants were in possession and they had sown the crops. It was the complainant party, who came on the spot and acted to forcibly take the possession of the land, of which the appellants exercised their right to private defence to protect their property and the incident has occurred in the exercise of that right. 5. It is submitted that Sukhchand (PW-2) has admitted in his cross-examination that the dispute is present regarding the disputed land and the same is presently continuing in the Revenue Courts and further, the revenue records also shows the name of appellant No.1 – Mehtar on the disputed property, therefore, the appellants have the right available to prevent the complainant party from taking possession of the land. Reliance has been placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Chinnathaman v. State represented by Inspector of Police, reported in (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 233, Bihari Rai v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand), reported in (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1209, Naveen Chandra v. State of Uttaranchal, reported in (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 321, Gurdial Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, reported in (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 890, Ramjit and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1386, Saroj alias Suraj Panchal and Another v. State of West Bengal, reported in (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 454, Rakesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 208, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sughar Singh and Ors, reported in (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1078, Ramkishan and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1998 Cri.L.J. 54 and the judgment of this High Court in the case of Peela Das @ Peela Sai and Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh in Cr.A. No. 628 of 2011 decided on 16.6.2011. 6. It is further submitted that the conviction of appellant No.2 – Mahadev and appellant No.4 – Mangadu is also erroneous. Mahadev and Mangadu had taken the ground of alibi, regarding which, the evidence was also led in the defence. Appellant No.2 – Mahadev was employed as Farrash in District Consumer Forum, Jagdalpur. 6. It is further submitted that the conviction of appellant No.2 – Mahadev and appellant No.4 – Mangadu is also erroneous. Mahadev and Mangadu had taken the ground of alibi, regarding which, the evidence was also led in the defence. Appellant No.2 – Mahadev was employed as Farrash in District Consumer Forum, Jagdalpur. Similarly, appellant No.4 – Mangadu was engaged as translator in the Court at Jagdalpur. Both of them were present on their duties at the time, when the incident occurred. This was proved by the defence witnesses Nalpat Bahgal (DW-1) and Bunaswar Singh (DW-2) and this evidence was not at all considered by the learned Sessions Judge. It is also submitted that appellant No.5 - Smt. Kamalvati has been baselessly prosecuted and convicted in this case. There is no evidence to show her active participation in the commission of offence of murder and attempt to murder and further, there is no evidence regarding any overt-act committed by her. Hence, on this basis, appellants No.2, 4 & 5 are entitled for acquittal. It is further submitted that appellants No.2, 4 & 5 be acquitted of all the charges against them and as regards, the other appellants, it is submitted that they have exercised the right of private defence of their property and the case is not clearly covered under Section 302 of the I.P.C., whereas, it is a case either under Section 304 part I of the IPC or under Section 304 part II of the IPC. Hence, the appeal be allowed and the reliefs be granted accordingly. 7. Learned State counsel opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants and submits, that it is clearly a case based on the eyewitness account. Sukhchand (PW-2), Mandhar Kashyap (P.W.-3), Kamal Sai (P.W.-4), Nilu (P.W.-7) & Rajo (P.W.-10) are the eyewitnesses of the incident. The evidence clearly shows that the appellants went to the spot of the incident armed with deadly weapons. None of the appellants themselves suffered any injuries or they were challenged by the complainant party as may be seen from the evidence in the case. Therefore, it was a premeditated act for assaulting and murdering the deceased and also for assaulting and attempting murder the other victims of the case, which is certainly not a case of private defence. Hence, the conviction against the appellants is sustainable, which needs no interference. 8. Therefore, it was a premeditated act for assaulting and murdering the deceased and also for assaulting and attempting murder the other victims of the case, which is certainly not a case of private defence. Hence, the conviction against the appellants is sustainable, which needs no interference. 8. We have heard the learned counsels for both the parties and perused the documents present on record. 9. Clearly, the cause of incident had been the land dispute present between the parties. Sukhchand (P.W.-2) has stated that he and the others including the deceased Harish Chand were present on the agricultural field for the purpose of sowing seeds on it, when the incident occurred. In cross-examination he has admitted about the dispute regarding the disputed land and the litigation being present in the Court. He has denied the suggestion that the disputed property was in possession of the appellants since 4-5 years. 10. Mandhar Kashyap (P.W.-3) is also witness of the spot. He has stated that the incident had occurred, when he and others were working on the field. In cross-examination, he has denied knowledge that the disputed land is in possession of the appellant - Mehtar. Kamal Say (P.W.-4) has stated that he saw the deceased Harish Chandra present in his field and also saw that the deceased and others were sowing paddy in the field, when the appellants arrived armed with weapons and incident occurred. He is a neighbouring field owner. In cross-examination, he has denied about the knowledge of the dispute between the appellants party and the complainant party and also denied the presence of name of the appellant -Mehtar in the revenue records. Laxman (P.W.-6) has also stated that he saw the deceased Harish Chandra present and working on the field, when the appellants came armed with weapons and the incident occurred. In cross-examination, he has denied the adverse suggestions and also denied the suggestion that it was the deceased Harish Chandra and others, who were armed with weapons. 11. Nilu Ram (P.W.-7) is one of the injured witness, who has stated that he and the others were sowing seeds in the field, when the incident occurred. He has made this statement in his examination-in-chief that the place of incident was the same, regarding which, there is dispute present between him and the appellants. 11. Nilu Ram (P.W.-7) is one of the injured witness, who has stated that he and the others were sowing seeds in the field, when the incident occurred. He has made this statement in his examination-in-chief that the place of incident was the same, regarding which, there is dispute present between him and the appellants. In cross-examination, he has admitted about the litigation present in the Court and he has denied that the disputed property was in possession of the appellants prior to the date of incident. Rajo (P.W.-10) is also a witness of the spot, who saw the incident and she has stated that the appellants had been quarreling. She is ignorant about the litigation present in the Court. 12. Badal Kumar Sao (P.W.-12), Patwari has been examined, who has proved the spot map (Ex.P-36), prepared by him and also proved the revenue records, form B-1 (Ex.P-38) and Khasra Panchshala (Ex.P-39) showing entry on the land bearing Kh.No.654, measuring 1.66 acres jointly in the name of Mehtar, appellant No.1 and the deceased – Harishchandra. In cross-examination, he has admitted that the name of Harish Chandra was added on the basis of the order dated 04.08.2009, passed by the Commissioner, Jagdalpur in Revision Case No.15-A-23/2007-08 and therefore, the name of Harish Chandra was not present in the record prior to 14.08.2009. He has further stated that it was the appellant - Mehtar and Rainu, who were in possession of the disputed land bearing Kh.No. 654 on 31.05.2010. 13. The relevance of this statement of Patwari has to be understood. The date of incident is 31.05.2010, which is the time of sowing the fields for the Kharif crops and that the name of the Harish Chandra (deceased) was entered in the revenue records in the month of August, 2009 as a result of the order of revenue Court. The litigation has concluded or not is not clear, as there is no statement made by the complainant party or by the appellants. However, presence of dispute and litigation between the appellants and the complainant party is very much clear and if the, statement of Badal Kumar Sao (P.W.-12), Patwari in the cross-examination is to be believed, then it were the appellants, who were in possession of the disputed land prior to the date of incident. However, presence of dispute and litigation between the appellants and the complainant party is very much clear and if the, statement of Badal Kumar Sao (P.W.-12), Patwari in the cross-examination is to be believed, then it were the appellants, who were in possession of the disputed land prior to the date of incident. A revenue Court does not decide the title over any immovable property, regarding which, only the Civil Court have jurisdiction. Therefore, the claim of title over the disputed property from the appellants’ side appears to be alive and the same can be prosecuted by them if it is so desired. Hence, the reasons why the appellants attacked the complainant party and cause of death of the deceased is very clear and it is established in defence on the basis of the evidence of quality having preponderance of probability, therefore, it can be deemed that the appellants acted in good faith that they had the right to defend their property on the basis of the claim present on the same and also on the basis of their prior possession. 14. Section 97 of the Indian Penal Code provides for exceptions under which, right is available to defend the property against the various offences including the criminal trespass and Section 103 of the Code provides for as to when right of private defence of property extends to causing death. The relevant description mentioned in Section 103 of the I.P.C., is reproduced as follows:- “Fourthly. – Theft, mischief or house - tresspass, under such circumstances as may reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the consequence, if such right of private defence is not exercised.” 15. The evidence in this case has been scrutinized. There is nothing to suggest that the appellants had any apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the consequence, if the right of private defence is not exercised, therefore, it is a case in which the appellants have exceeded the exercise of right to provide defence of property. 16. In case of Navin Chandra v. State of Uttaranchal (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph -14, which is as under :- “14. (26)………………. The accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt. 16. In case of Navin Chandra v. State of Uttaranchal (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph -14, which is as under :- “14. (26)………………. The accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough for him to show as in a civil case that the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his plea. ……………………….. (30) As noted in Buta Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1991 SC 1316 ), a person who is apprehending death or bodily injury cannot weigh in golden scales in the spur of moment and in the heat of circumstances, the number of injuries required to disarm the assailants who were armed with weapons. In moments of excitement and disturbed mental equilibrium it is often difficult to expect the parties to preserve composure and use exactly only so much force in retaliation commensurate with the danger apprehended to them where assault is imminent by use of force, it would be lawful to repel the force in self-defence and the right of private-defence commences, as soon as the threat becomes so imminent. Such situations have to be pragmatically viewed and not with high-powered spectacles or microscopes to detect slight or even marginal overstepping. Due weightage has to be given to, and hyper technical approach has to be avoided in considering what happens on the spur of the moment on the spot and keeping in view normal human reaction and conduct, where self-preservation is the paramount consideration. But, if the fact situation shows that in the guise of self-preservation, what really has been done is to assault the original aggressor, even after the cause of reasonable apprehension has disappeared, the plea of right of private-defence can legitimately be negatived. The Court dealing with the plea has to weigh the material to conclude whether the plea is acceptable. It is essentially, as noted above, a finding of fact. 33. The right of private defence is essentially a defensive right circumscribed by the governing statute i.e. the IPC, available only when the circumstances clearly justify it. It should not be allowed to be pleaded or availed as a pretext for a vindictive, aggressive or retributive purpose of offence. It is a right of defence, not of retribution, expected to repel unlawful aggression and not as retaliatory measure. It should not be allowed to be pleaded or availed as a pretext for a vindictive, aggressive or retributive purpose of offence. It is a right of defence, not of retribution, expected to repel unlawful aggression and not as retaliatory measure. While providing for exercise of the right, care has been taken in IPC not to provide for and it has not devised a mechanism whereby an attack may be a pretence for killing. A right to defend does not include a right to launch an offensive, particularly when the need to defend no longer survived. (See: V. Subramani and Anr. v. The State of Tamil Nadu ( 2005 (10) SCC 358 ).” 17. The guidelines as laid down by the Supreme Court are followed. We are of the view that in this particular case, there is no evidence in this case that the complainant party was in prior possession of the disputed property. The proof present is suggestive that it was the appellants, who were in possession of the disputed property. Admittedly, it was the complainant party, who had been present on the disputed property for sowing paddy seeds. The deceased Harish Chandra and other members of the complainant party were attacked by the appellants to prevent them from performing the agricultural activities. Although, the right to private defence of the property was available to the appellants, but the same could have come to an end by driving and beating away the complainant party, but causing death of the deceased on the spot, is clearly in excess to the exercise of the right to private defence, which shall be considered further in this judgment. 18. Grounds has been raised regarding the alibi of the appellant No.2 and appellant No.4. The appellant No.2 Mahadev was employed as Farrash in District Consumer Forum in Jagdalpur and appellant No.4 was engaged as a translator in the District Court at Jagdalpur. It is the argument that these appellants were not present at the time of the incident and they had left to join their duties on the date of incident. The suggestions given to the prosecution witnesses regarding their absence has been denied. 19. Nalpat Bahgal (D.W.-1) was employed as Farrash in District Consumer Forum, Jagdalpur. It is the argument that these appellants were not present at the time of the incident and they had left to join their duties on the date of incident. The suggestions given to the prosecution witnesses regarding their absence has been denied. 19. Nalpat Bahgal (D.W.-1) was employed as Farrash in District Consumer Forum, Jagdalpur. He has stated that in the year 2010 he was employed as Peon in another Court and the appellant No.2 -Mahadev was employed as Peon in the Consumer Forum. He has also stated that the appellant No.4- Mangadu was engaged as translator in the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Jagdalpur. He stated that he himself, appellant No.2- Mahadev and appellant No.4 - Mangadu left the village to join their duties at about 8.00 AM in the morning on 30th of May, 2010. All of them arrived at Jagdalpur and went to join their duties. He has stated that at about 9.30 AM, the appellant No.2 Mahadev came and informed him that an incident has occurred in his village with his family members. He also stated that the appellant No.2- Mahadev also informed about the incident to appellant No.4 – Mangadu and that he was going to his village along with Mangadu-appellant No.4. In cross-examination by the prosecutor, he has remained firm that the narration given by him is regarding 30th May, 2010 and not regarding the date 31st May, 2010. 20. Buneswar Singh (D.W.-2) is employed as driver in the District Consumer Forum, Jagdalpur. He has stated that on 31.05.2010 appellant No.2 and 4 both had arrived and joined their duties at about 8.00 AM and then the appellant-Mehtar informed about the incident at about 9.30 AM. No question was put to this witness by the prosecutor in cross-examination. Therefore, the statement of Buneswar Singh (D.W.-2) regarding the presence of appellants No.2 and 4 on duty at about 8.00 AM in the morning in their respective places at Jagdalpur on 31.05.2010 is unrebutted and unchallenged statement. Although the statement of Nalpat Bahgal (D.W.-1) regarding the date on which he saw the appellant No.2 and 4 on duty is not correct, but in a way his statement supports the statement given by Buneswar Singh (D.W.-2). Although the statement of Nalpat Bahgal (D.W.-1) regarding the date on which he saw the appellant No.2 and 4 on duty is not correct, but in a way his statement supports the statement given by Buneswar Singh (D.W.-2). Nothing has been brought by the prosecution side by way of any statement of any witnesses or any other evidence either oral or documentary, on the basis of which, this Court should consider and disbelieve the statement of these witnesses. On the contrary, this evidence is unrebutted and unchallenged and therefore, reliable. The plea of alibi is established and thus this fact established creates a doubt on the statement of the prosecution witness, who have spoken about the presence of appellant No.2 and No.4 on the spot and incident. The other circumstances, which confirms the doubt is the presence of dispute regarding the land between the appellants and the complainant side and also that the appellant No.2 and 4 both are sons of appellant No.1. Hence, on these basis appellant No.2 and 4 are found to be entitled for benefit of doubt. 21. Another grounds raised in this appeal is this that the appellant No.5 -Smt. Kamalvati had not participated in the commission of offence, hence, the conviction against her is unsustainable. Sukhchand (P.W.-2) has made general statement that appellants came armed with various weapons, who assaulted and injured the deceased and other victims. No specific name has been taken as to which of the appellant was armed with which weapon and who assaulted him. Kamal Say (P.W.-4) has similarly made general statement not mentioning any specific details regarding the assault and their weapons. 22. Nilu Ram (P.W.-7) has given some details stating that appellant- Mehtar was armed with bow and arrow and Mangadu was armed with axe, appellant -Mahadev armed with bow and arrow, appellant- Ishwar armed with an axe, appellant - Sitaram was holding axe, Motiram was holding an axe and appellant - Kamalvati was holding a club, who arrived on the spot and committed the offence. 23. Rajo (P.W.-10) has also made general statement regarding the appellants/accused persons, coming armed with weapons and committing the offence. Thus there is only one statement of Niluram (P.W.-07) that the appellant - Kamalvati was armed with a club. 24. 23. Rajo (P.W.-10) has also made general statement regarding the appellants/accused persons, coming armed with weapons and committing the offence. Thus there is only one statement of Niluram (P.W.-07) that the appellant - Kamalvati was armed with a club. 24. Investigating Officer has made seizure of two sets of bow and arrow, three axes and one Bamboo club from the appellant No.1 Mehtar vide (Ex.P-8) on the basis of the memorandum statement given by him vide Ex.P-7. There is no separate seizure of club made from the appellant -Smt. Kamalvati. 25. According to the statement of Dr. Virendra Kumar Jha (P.W.-1), he examined the deceased – Harish Chandra. He has stated that on examining the body of the deceased he found 8 injuries on the body of the deceased out of which, 7 injuries were incised wounds, which was caused by some hard and sharp object and there is one abrasion on his chest vide his report (Ex.P-1). Dr. K.K. Singh (P.W.-9) examined the victim- Mandhar (P.W.-3), who had suffered one incised wound caused by sharp pointed object vide his report (Ex.P-18). Another victim – Mannu was also examined by him and one incised wound was found on his body caused by sharp object vide his report (Ex.P-19). 26. Injured victim Niluram (P.W.-7) was examined by Dr. Rajendra Kumar Singh according to his report (Ex.P-30A), the victim had three incised wound on his body caused by some sharp object. Therefore, the deceased and the victim all had suffered injuries by hard and sharp object. Except one injury found on the body of the deceased caused by hard and blunt object, but there is nothing suggestive that this injuries was caused by any club, as the injuries caused by bamboo club will certainly leave a mark of the club. Hence, the submissions on behalf of the appellant- Smt. Kamalvati has some force and is sufficient to create doubt regarding her participation in the commission of offence of causing death of the deceased and also causing injuries to the victims of the case. Hence, we are of the view that the appellant No. 5 – Smt. Kamalvati had also been entitled for benefit of doubt in this case. 27. Hence, we are of the view that the appellant No. 5 – Smt. Kamalvati had also been entitled for benefit of doubt in this case. 27. After these discussions, the case in hand would be that the prosecution has proved the presence and participation of appellant No.1 Mehtar, appellant No.3 – Ishwar, and appellant No.6 & 7 Motiram and Seetaram in the commission of the act against the complainant party. 28. This Court has found the appellant No.2, 4 and 5 to be entitled for benefit of doubt, therefore, their presence and participation is ruled out. Now the number of assailants is reduced to four, therefore, according to these numbers, the assembly of four will not fall under the definition of unlawful assembly as defined under Section 142 of the Indian Penal Code. Further it has already been held on the basis of which it can be said that the appellant No.1, 3, 6 and 7 acted in exercise of right to self defence of the private property, in which they have claimed that they have enjoyed possession, before the date of incident and it is also held that the appellants have exceeded the right to defend the private property and caused death of the deceased. The question is whether this act would be covered under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code or not? 29. On taking into consideration the circumstances, in which the incident occurred that the complainant deceased and others had been present on the disputed land because of which, the assailants were enraged and provocated, who came armed on the spot to repel the agricultural work, which was being performed by the deceased and the other members of the complainant party. 30. The original idea in such a case is to repel the act alone, it was in the heat of passion, the assailants continued to inflict injuries to the deceased because of which, he has died. It can not be said that the appellants had any pre-plan to cause death of the deceased. 30. The original idea in such a case is to repel the act alone, it was in the heat of passion, the assailants continued to inflict injuries to the deceased because of which, he has died. It can not be said that the appellants had any pre-plan to cause death of the deceased. The act of the complainant party was sufficient to deprive the power of self control of the assailants and it was the grave and sudden provocation, in which, the death of the deceased was caused by the appellants No.1, 3, 6 and 7, which is clearly a case under exception (1) of Section 300, hence, the act of the appellants No.1, 3, 6 & 7 causing death of the deceased Harish Chandra is an act punishable under Section 304-I of the I.P.C. 31. After over all consideration, we are of the view that this appeal is fit to be allowed in part. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The appellants No.2 Mahadev, appellant No.4 Mangadu and appellant No.5 – Smt. Kamalvati are given benefit of doubt and acquitted of all the charges against them. The conviction and sentence against the appellant No.1 – Mehtar, appellant No.3 – Ishwar, appellant No.6 – Motiram and appellant No.7 - Seetaram under Section 302 read with Section 149 of I.P.C. is set-aside and instead they are convicted for the offence under Section 304 Part-I of the I.P.C. read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction against these appellants No.1, 3, 6 & 7 under Section 307 (Three times), read with Section 149 of I.P.C. is also set-aside and instead they are convicted for the offence under Section 307 (Three times) read with Section 34 of I.P.C. 32. The appellants No.1, 3, 6 & 7 are in jail since they were arrested on 31.05.2010 and since then they are in jail, therefore, the period of detention already undergone by them in jail appears to be sufficient for the purpose of punishment under Section 304 Part-I and for the offence under Section 307/34 (three times) of I.P.C. of the Indian Penal Code. It is ordered that the appellants No.1, 3, 6 and 7 are sentenced for both the offences with the period of detention already undergone by them in jail. The appellants No.2 and 4 are also in jail. It is ordered that the appellants No.1, 3, 6 and 7 are sentenced for both the offences with the period of detention already undergone by them in jail. The appellants No.2 and 4 are also in jail. They shall be released immediately in case there is no other reason to keep them in detention. Appellant No.5 Smt. Kamalvati has been on bail during the pendency of this appeal, her bail bonds are discharged. 33. Accordingly the appeal is disposed off with the observations as aforesaid.